Judgment heuristic

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A judgment heuristic is a heuristic (rough way of thinking) to quickly arrive at a decision.

In many situations it is not possible or extremely time-consuming to research all alternatives and then weigh them rationally . Instead, we often use a judgment heuristic, many of which have been scientifically investigated by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky . However, the formulation of these specific heuristics has also been sharply criticized as being vague. While these specific heuristics have greatly inspired research, they remain highly controversial.

Judgment heuristics are part of the automatic thought processes and therefore run unconsciously , unintentionally, involuntarily and effortlessly. This way of thinking is only interrupted and replaced by controlled thinking when the subject attracts strong supra-threshold attention. Controlled thinking is conscious, intentional, voluntary, laborious thinking. In addition, judgment heuristics are used when you want to think in a controlled manner but are unable to do so because of fatigue, disturbance, distraction and the like.

Examples

The classic judgment heuristics include the availability heuristic , the representativeness heuristic , the anchor heuristic and the recognition heuristic .

The attribution error and the illusory correlation are also results of judgment heuristics. Moods and feelings can also be used as judgment heuristics ( affect heuristics ).

literature

  • S. Chen, S. Chaiken: The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context. In: S. Chaiken, Y. Trope (Ed.): Dual-process theories in social psychology. Guilford Press, New York 1999, pp. 73-96.
  • S. Chaiken: Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 39, 1980, pp. 752-766.
  • Klaus Fiedler , Momme von Sydow: Heuristics and Biases: Beyond Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) Judgment under Uncertainty. In: MW Eysenck, D. Groome. (Ed.): Cognitive Psychology. Revisiting the Classical Studies: Sage, Los Angeles / London 2015, ISBN 978-1-4462-9447-5 .
  • Gerd Gigerenzer : Gut decisions: The intelligence of the unconscious and the power of intuition. C. Bertelsmann Verlag, New York 2008, ISBN 978-3-570-00937-6 .
  • Daniel Kahneman , Paul Slovic , A. Tversky (Eds.): Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases . Cambridge University Press, 1982.
  • Daniel Kahneman: Thinking fast, thinking slowly . Settlers, 2012, ISBN 978-3-88680-886-1 .
  • RE Nisbett, L. Ross: Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of human judgment . Prentice Hall, 1980.
  • Fritz Strack , Roland Deutsch: Judgment Heuristics. In: Dieter Frey , Martin Irle (Hrsg.): Theories of social psychology. Vol. III, Huber, Bern 2002, pp. 352-384.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b E. Aronson, TD Wilson, RM Akert: Social Psychology. 4th edition. Pearson Studies, 2004, ISBN 3-8273-7084-1 .
  2. ↑ Gerd Gigerenzer: On narrow norms and vague heuristics: a reply to Kahneman and Tversky . In: Psychological review . tape 103 , no. 3 , 1996, p. 592-596 .
  3. ^ K. Fiedler, M. von Sydow: Heuristics and Biases: Beyond Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) Judgment under Uncertainty . In: MW Eysenck, D. Groome (Ed.): Cognitive Psychology: Revisiting the Classical Studies . Sage, Los Angeles / London 2015, ISBN 978-1-4462-9446-8 , pp. 146-161 .