Antidote thesis

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The antidote thesis in economics says that imperfections in the market balance each other out. Figuratively speaking, there is to a certain extent an “antidote” for every “poison”.

As soon as one imperfection appears in the market , there is another imperfection that compensates for the previous one. Violations of the assumptions of the full competition model can thus be tolerated if further assumptions are violated at the same time. The result is a second-best, "sub-optimal" solution. The plump, " optimal " solution can not be achieved by individual imperfections are eliminated, but only if all at once eliminated.

Provided that the thesis is correct, state interventions in the market are ineffective or even harmful. Rather, imperfections in the market would have to be tolerated.

The thesis first appeared in 1939 with John Maurice Clark .