Association of United Merchants

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The Society of United Merchants (la Compagnie des Négociants réunis) was a consortium of French merchants whose activities in 1805 brought the French state to the brink of bankruptcy .

People involved

Members of the Society of United Merchants were:

At the time of Ouvrard's posting to Spain by Napoleon , he was represented as chairman of the society:

Purpose of the association

Since the payment obligations of the state exceeded government revenues, the French finance minister asked François Barbé-Marbois early 1804 at the merchant Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard by 50 million Swiss francs ( francs ) to. Ouvrard helped out immediately, but among the 50 million paid in there were also unsecured money orders over 20 million francs. The government owed him this for deliveries. The benefit to him was that it would later be easier to reclaim a loan than to collect delivery debts. As security, there were obligations from the general tax collector ( receveurs généraux ), which were as good as cash. There were special regulations for those bonds of the collectors on taxes and customs duties:

  • They could not be discounted .
  • Their sole purpose was to cover the ministerial instructions.
  • They should not be resold.

The action corresponded approximately to the well-known method of tax leasing .

In the middle of the year, the government was again in financial difficulties, again it received only 102 million in cash for bonds worth 150 million francs, the rest in unpaid instructions from the War Ministry from previous deliveries. This time Ouvrard had teamed up with professional colleagues to cope with the task. The Society of United Merchants was created . It attracted attention and a police report dated September 24, 1804 stated "that the new agency Vanlerberghe, Seguin and Shareholders released tax collector's obligations for the year XIV" (which began on September 23, 1805). The police's observation that "the gentlemen of the finance committee established by Ouvrard had long been in a close relationship and when the opportunity arose" was only partly true. Ouvrard actually met Seguin for the first time on a hunt a few days before they worked together.

First activities

In September 1804, Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard, made State Commissioner by Napoleon , set out for Spain to collect subsidies owed in the amount of 36 million francs. In order to make the country solvent at all, he founded the trading company François Ouvrard & Co. and a consolidation fund (Casa de Consolidación) with Charles IV . Their banker in Paris was Michel le jeune. With the help of the trading company, according to Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard's long-cherished plan, a sustainable financial situation for the two countries France and Spain was to be restored using South American state funds. But shortly after the contract was signed, England's declaration of war on Spain in December 1804 made the arrival of the piastres very random. It now seemed advisable to enlist the help of a trading house located in a neutral state; Hope & Co. in the Netherlands was chosen . This resulted in a situation in which Spain and the mirage of Mexican silver money became the linchpin and in which there was an increasing intermingling of state interests with speculative intentions and ambition on the part of Ouvrard.

Ouvrard made the first subsidy payment to France from his own pocket - Spain became its debtor - and provided the consolidation fund with valuable French bonds as start-up financing. In return, Spanish bonds were placed in the French treasury, nominally equivalent, but actually worthless for a short time. This was made possible by Médard Desprez's dual function as deputy chairman of the merchants and as a member of the board of directors of the Bank of France . Added to this was the good faith of Treasury Minister François Barbé-Marbois and the regent's distraction by events such as his coronation as Emperor of the French and preparations for war. Neither of them saw through that Ouvrard not only did not get any money from Spain to remedy the escalating predicament, but invested the reserves of the state treasury in Spain.

Scams and breakdown

Ouvrard's friends, equipped with the delivery monopoly for the army and navy, took advantage of the situation by delivering against advance payment. The clear breach of law occurred at the latest when Desprez handed the tax collectors receipts instead of the invalidated bonds and proceeded with the bonds as if cash receipts were still to be expected. Creation of counterfeit money, Napoleon later berated this practice.

Desprez's unrestrained granting of loans also ensured that the Bank of France soon had only 1.5 million in the coffers, along with 92 million claims. The scandalous business conduct became known and the police had to keep 2,000 angry people at bay in front of the bank. The insolvency also brought Ouvrard's Spanish Consolidation Fund to bankruptcy.

aftermath

On January 27, 1806, France's most powerful capital owners had to listen for nine hours to an angry lecture by Napoleon, whose threats ranged from imprisonment in the Tower of Vincennes to administration. Napoleon dismissed Treasury Minister Barbé-Marbois and put the total debts of the merchants at 87 million francs. A recalculation increased the amount by February 6 to 141 million. Vanlerberghe and Ouvrard managed to work the debt down to 85 million francs by the end of 1806. In March 1808 they owed the state only 13 million. Inevitably, however, on December 31, 1807, the members of the consortium went bankrupt.

Since Armand Seguin had brought his money into the business of the Society of United Merchants for a fixed commission - he was not allowed to fully benefit from the profits, but was protected against possible damage by Ouvrard and Vanlerberghe - he was able to assert claims against Ouvrard until 1829 assert and force them into custody from 1824 onwards. Barbé-Marbois received the post of President of the Court of Auditors two years after his dismissal, but was nevertheless one of the zealous operators of Napoleon's overthrow in 1814.

literature

  • Wilhelm Berdrow: Book of famous merchants. Men of energy and enterprise , 2nd edition. Otto Spamer, Leipzig 1909 (reprint Reprint-Verlag-Leipzig, ISBN 3-8262-0208-2 ), pp. 166-171.
  • Arthur-Lévy: Un grand profiteur de guerre sous la Révolution, l'Empire et la Restauration, G.-J. Ouvrard , Calmann-Lévy, Paris 1929, pp. 109-168.
  • Otto Wolff : The business of Mr. Ouvrard. From the life of a brilliant speculator , Rütten & Loenig, Frankfurt am Main 1932, pp. 100–148.
  • Marten Gerbertus Buist: At spes non fracta. Hope & Co. 1770-1815. Merchant Bankers and Diplomats at Work , Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1974, ISBN 90-247-1629-2 , pp. 284-380.
  • Louis Bergeron: Banquiers, négociants et manufacturiers parisiens du Directoire à l'Empire , Mouton Éditeur, Paris / La Haye / New York 1978, ISBN 2-7193-0458-1 , pp. 149–152.
  • Maurice Payard, Le financier G.-J. Ouvrard. 1770-1846 , Académie nationale de Reims, Reims 1958, pp. 99-162
  • Marcel Pollitzer: Le règne des financiers. Samuel Bernard, J. Law, G.-J. Ouvrard , Nouvelles Éditions Latines, Paris 1978, pp. 171-194.

Remarks

  1. Marten G. Buist: At Spes non fracta , The Hague 1974, p 285
  2. Michel jeune was already represented at the Twenty United Merchants ( les Vingt Négociants réunis ), a predecessor merger of the Society of United Merchants . Louis Bergeron: Banquiers, Negociants et Manufacturiers parisiens. Paris u. a. 1978, p. 148. And: "On July 1, 1810, Michel jeune owned undoubtedly the greatest fortune in Paris: more than 46 million assets, minus 17 million liabilities, ie almost 30 million net assets." Ibid., P. 308. Gabriele B. Clemens also commented on the Michel brothers and Napoleon's behavior towards army suppliers: real estate dealers and speculators. The socio-economic and historical significance of the large buyers at the national property auctions in the Rhenish departments (1803–1813) , Boppard am Rhein 1995, p. 188 u. 49
  3. Otto Wolff: The business of Mr. Ouvrard . Frankfurt a. M. 1932, p. 104
  4. Otto Wolff: The business of Mr. Ouvrard . Frankfurt a. M. 1932, p. 105
  5. William Berdrow: book of famous merchants . Leipzig 1909, p. 166
  6. quoted from Arthur-Lévy: Un grand profiteur de guerre , Paris 1929, p. 109
  7. quoted from Arthur-Lévy: Un grand profiteur de guerre , Paris 1929, p. 110
  8. Arthur-Lévy: Un grand profiteur de guerre , Paris 1929, p. 106
  9. Otto Wolff: The business of Mr. Ouvrard . Frankfurt a. M. 1932, p. 116
  10. ^ Georges Lefebvre: Napoleon . Stuttgart 2003, p. 205
  11. ^ Louis Bergeron: Banquiers, Negociants et Manufacturiers parisiens . Paris u. a. 1978, p. 50
  12. Arthur-Lévy: Un grand profiteur de guerre . Paris 1929, p. 111
  13. ^ Louis Bergeron: Banquiers, Negociants et Manufacturiers parisiens . Paris u. a. 1978, p. 151
  14. William Berdrow: book of famous merchants . Leipzig 1909, p. 167
  15. ^ Louis Bergeron: Banquiers, Negociants et Manufacturiers parisiens . Paris u. a. 1978, p. 150
  16. Otto Wolff: The business of Mr. Ouvrard . Frankfurt a. M. 1932, p. 127
  17. Otto Wolff: The business of Mr. Ouvrard . Frankfurt a. M. 1932, p. 125
  18. Otto Wolff: The business of Mr. Ouvrard . Frankfurt a. M. 1932, p. 128
  19. On August 24, 1805, Napoleon wrote to Barbé-Marbois: “Les billets de banque n'étant plus donnés à l'escompte contre un véritable crédit, se trouvent être des billets de circulation. En escomptant ainsi, je tranche le mot, la Banque fait de la fausse monnaie. ”Quoted from Arthur-Lévy: Un grand profiteur de guerre . Paris 1929, p. 141
  20. Otto Wolff: The business of Mr. Ouvrard . Frankfurt a. M. 1932, p. 133
  21. William Berdrow: book of famous merchants . Leipzig 1909, p. 171
  22. Otto Wolff: The business of Mr. Ouvrard . Frankfurt a. M. 1932, p. 243
  23. Arthur-Lévy: Un grand profituer de guerre . Paris 1929, p. 165