Governance ethics

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The governance ethics developed by Josef Wieland is a concept of business ethics that ties in with the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann and the approach of the new institutional economics with regard to transaction costs .

Globalization as a framework

Wieland notes a decreasing orientation towards traditional values ​​and sees the increasing globalization as a major influence , which is not only taking place in the goods markets, but above all in the financial system and in communication. Globalization demands legitimation across national borders. This applies, for example, to questions of environmental protection, human rights and the fight against poverty. However, there is no international regulatory framework for globally operating companies that exert a significant influence on social life through major investments, international procurement, setting social standards or relocating. The legal framework remains nationally determined. When nation states compete as business locations, there is even a risk that established standards in labor or environmental law will be lost again. However, globalization also leads to an expansion of civil society across national borders. A clear sign is the increase in internationally active non-governmental organizations that assign companies social responsibility for their actions and demand legitimation for this action. Companies react to such demands with concepts such as corporate social responsibility , corporate citizenship or the Global Compact and other codes of conduct. Wieland sees in this development "a shift in the control tectonics of modern societies" and advocates the thesis "that modern societies are organizational societies in terms of control technology and that corporate organizations in times of globalization, i.e. for the foreseeable future, have an essential social control task."

With this thesis, Wieland justifies that his considerations on business ethics focus on business ethics. "Of course, state rules and regulations are also governance structures, but for reasons of concentration and simplification of the analysis, they should not be systematically taken into account here."

Conceptual basics

Governance describes the management structure of an institution . Institutions relevant to business ethics can be organizational units such as the state, associations and companies, but also functional systems such as the market, a legal system or, in general, the regulatory framework. Steering, d. H. Steering and control means the definition of an ought. For Wieland, governance is therefore “normatively charged” from the start.

For Wieland, politics and law, economy and morals are independent functional systems with their own decision-making logics and language games that cannot be reduced to one another. Each of the functional systems has its own code of communication, so the economy the code of money (numbers / non-numbers), politics power, lawful, a company effort and income and the morality, which at Wieland in contrast to Luhmann an independent system forms the code of good and bad or of recognition (self-recognition and recognition by others). For this reason, Wieland does not consider a “primacy of ethics”, like the primacy of a functional system, to be possible. Rather, the functional systems come into effect simultaneously in individual transactions and cooperation acts as independent dimensions and are structurally linked. Wieland speaks of "polylingual" organizational systems. For example, language games from the areas of economics, technology, law, culture and morals take place in a company. The importance of the individual dimensions depends on the respective decision-making situation.

"The unity and integration of modern society, their common meaning, does not lie in a totality spanning systems, but in the perpetual appearance and disappearance of successful simultaneity of systemic and therefore different decision logics in the governance of the transactions of a society."

The formal concept of governance ethics

Economic actions are transactions that are always associated with transaction costs. The aim of doing business is to reduce transaction costs through cooperation. Thus, for the coordination and cooperation of organizations, a cooperation rent and not profit as the target of action is in the foreground. Since the system of morality is always coupled with the system of economics, morality always has an effect on the transaction costs of economic activities and thus on the cooperation rent through its influence on decisions.

Wieland names the factors influencing morality on economic actions formalistically in the form of a function:

Tm i = f (aIS i , bFI ij , cIF ij , dOKK i )
(a ... d = -1, 0, 1; i = specific transaction; j = specific location)

The core message of the ethics of governance, as it is recorded in this formal notation, is:

The moral dimension of a given and distinct economic transaction (Tm) is a function of individual self-commitment strategies (IS), the formal (FI) and informal (IF) institutions involved and the relevant coordination and cooperation mechanisms of an organization (OKK). Each argument of this function is considered in terms of its influence on a distinct transaction (i) in a given local or global context (j). Furthermore, every argument of this function, i.e. the individual regimes of self-governance, the formal and informal institutions and the organizational structures involved, the moral dimension of a transaction is either positive (a - d = 1) or negative (a - d = -1) can affect. On the other hand, if a - d assume the value 0, this means that an influence can be neglected.

It is essential that, in this formal view, Wieland regards individual moral concepts (IS) as (functionally) linked to institutional values. Institutions like companies have their own moral position that goes beyond the individual moral concepts of the individual actors. Individual moral concepts can be based on virtues, rational considerations (e.g. utility) or other mechanisms (e.g. religion). An example of formal institutions (FI) is law. And informal institutions (IF) are culturally anchored norms, as they are expressed, for example, in the image of the honorable businessman, but also the discourses of philosophical ethics. In this area, intercultural differences and their perception also play an essential role. With the coordination and cooperation mechanisms, Wieland addresses the way in which the processes are designed in which economic transactions are carried out. This includes trust-building behavior such as punctual delivery or payment or the requirement of suppliers to refrain from child labor. "Cooperation is a fundamental and universalistic phenomenon of human existence, which is suitable for moral as well as economic, political or legal reflections on the constitution and integration of a society."

By concentrating on the specific existing moral determinants of economic transactions, Wieland dispenses with a justification external to the economy, such as that given in utilitarianism or in a deontological ethics of practice. The governance ethics instead enables a strict application reference. "The systematic reference point of governance ethics is not the justification of moral action, but the exploration and design of the individual, organizational and institutional conditions for the successful realization of the moral dimension of a transaction (Tm)."

Companies are organizational structures that are based on contracts (articles of association, sales contracts, employment contracts, etc.) Contracts can never be complete, as future events can never be fully anticipated. Likewise, the future decisions of other actors cannot be foreseen. Correspondingly, a company acts under uncertainty. The incompleteness of the information and the contingency are the facts that make morality necessary. “The New Organization Economics translates the Platonic insight into the error susceptibility of humans as personal, situational and informational uncertainty and as limited rationality of economic actors.” Morality serves on the one hand to limit economic action. On the other hand, morality also enables cooperation in the first place, since compliance with moral rules can reduce uncertainty and build trust.

Governance ethics as virtue ethics

Wieland translates the formal concept of governance ethics into virtue ethics . He “defines ethical virtues as the willingness and ability of individual and collective actors to excellently realize the morally coded values ​​of a given society, its institutions and organizations through appropriate actions and governance processes.” “It is about showing that the connection between moral attitude with the development of the ability of individual and collective actors to realize this attitude through action, constitutes the core of the virtue-ethical quality of governance. ”He sees his formula as covered by the thinking of the ancient Greek philosophers:

“For both Plato and Aristotle it is a matter of course that the individual virtues (IS) are derived from the laws (FI) and the traditional customs of the polis (IF) and can be based on them. Without FI = 1 and IF = 1, there can be no IS = 1 either. Morals would deteriorate, the state and action would be corrupted. Furthermore, the requirements of virtues must be reflected in the constitution, the rules and procedures of the organizations (OKK) of the polis and the oikonomia, because without proper order in this regard, the virtue based on knowledge and education will have no chance to shape reality. “Virtues are not limited to the motivational readiness to act virtuously, but also include the training of the skills to do so. Even the virtues that were originally only linked to the individual require an institutional framework in order to develop. Organizations like corporations, however, are not inherently moral. “A collective actor is never constituted for its own sake, but for the sake of the interests connected with it.” Correspondingly, a moral stance arises in a company or other organization through the shaping of the actors and their moral attitudes. Wieland describes this as a two-stage (recursive) process: "The morally sensitive design of governance effectively presupposes moral preferences of actors, while morally sensitive governance itself is the systematic prerequisite for the effectiveness of moral preferences."

"The enabling and restricting function of morality is closely linked to the honesty and accuracy in the implementation of moral claims." Without lived moral and economic values, organizations lose reputation and credibility. Both are necessary to ensure a long-term existence.

Moral Incentives

Wieland does not only consider incentives to be effective in the functional system of the economy, but also sees incentives in the autonomous system of morality as driving factors for action. The same applies to the areas of psychology or law. Wieland emphasizes the distinction between motivation as an action-theoretical added value and incentive as a system-theoretical category. Moral incentives are reactions of the environment to the actions of economic actors, which are expressed in recognition or non-recognition. They are morally coded appreciations. The yardstick for recognition is compliance with rules and role expectations. Recognition can also take place intrinsically (self-referential) by adhering to self-set values. “Moral incentives are values ​​such as respect, recognition, preference for rule compliance, obedience, loyalty, appreciation, gratitude, fulfillment of duty, consistency of principles - which are assigned either in social exchange to one actor by another actor for conforming behavior or through self-observation by the latter himself. "

"Moral incentives therefore have the function of ensuring rule-compliant behavior by promoting the renunciation of non-rule-compliant behavior and the initiation of rule conformity."

The question of the effectiveness of moral incentives has to be answered depending on the implementation in a governance system. "The determination of the analytical unit of reference in governance ethics to the moral dimension of a transaction makes it possible to relate moral incentives to it in such a way that they are recognizable as a genuine component of economic transactions."

Wieland sees the transition from the justification discourse to the application discourse in comprehensive incentive management. “With regard to the justification of values, ethics as a reflection science is autonomous, with regard to their application it is not. Here it is tied to the judgment of the other knowledge systems such as economics, technology, law or politics. ”The communication of incentives creates identity for individual actors as well as for collective actors. In the case of individuals, this takes place through socialization , in the case of collective actors through systematic value management.

Value management

The practical application of the governance ethics in an organization takes place through the implementation of a value management system. As Scientific Director of the Konstanz Institute for Value Management and Director of the Center for Business Ethics GmbH (ZfW), Wieland had developed a specific system for this purpose and tested it in practice through cooperation with companies in the Bavarian construction industry and other industrial cooperation partners ( BASF , Otto Group ). Value management systems convey identity through self-description and self-commitment and also guarantee security of expectations with regard to cooperation partners. The values ​​are usually recorded in catalogs of basic values ​​or corporate guidelines (“Code of Ethics”, “Code of Conduct”). Wieland emphasizes that from a system-theoretical point of view it is important that such catalogs cover not only the ethical, but all values ​​of a company, since otherwise no uniform management organization can be enforced. Wieland names four key value groups:

  • Performance values ​​(benefit, competence, willingness to perform, flexibility, creativity, innovation orientation, quality)
  • Communication values ​​(respect, belonging, openness, transparency, understanding, willingness to take risks)
  • Cooperation values ​​(loyalty, team spirit, ability to deal with conflict, openness, communication orientation)
  • Moral values ​​(integrity, fairness, honesty, contractual loyalty, responsibility)

The description of values ​​is initially only a declarative codification. In order to be effective, they must find their way into the organization of a company and be communicated (employment contracts, work instructions, supplier agreements, etc.). Implementation requires implementation projects and the assignment of personal responsibilities as well as regular status reviews through internal or external audits. It is essential for the implementation that the top management identify with the programs and declare them to be a top priority. Possible measures are the establishment of an ombudsman for moral problems, an ethics hotline, the written setting of social standards or a “gift policy” to combat corruption, institutionalized stakeholder dialogues or sustainability reports.

Critique of Governance Ethics

The introduction of formal value management systems creates the risk of disproportionate bureaucratisation. Wieland's model is incomplete in that it lacks the dimension of the contractual partner's moral attitude. In addition, the formulaic representation of governance ethics suggests that something can be calculated mathematically using a formula, which is not possible due to the complexity of systems theory alone. At Wieland, the justification of a moral system and the evaluation in comparison to alternative moral systems remains open. There is no bridge between what is and what should be, because at Wieland the source of values ​​comes from local conditions. Due to the lack of ethical reflection, one could speak of a governance morality rather than a governance ethics. Another point of criticism is that the transaction cost approach and the rule-based incentive systems resulting from it are based on the principle of compliance and thus do not sufficiently take into account the question of innovation in companies.

literature

  • Josef Wieland, Michael Fürst: Value Management Systems in Practice. Experiences and prospects. (=  Working Paper . No. 4 ). University of Applied Sciences Konstanz, Konstanz 2003 ( Online [PDF; 410 kB ; accessed on April 24, 2018]).
  • Josef Wieland: governance ethics and moral incentives (=  Working Paper . No. 7 ). Konstanz University of Applied Sciences, Konstanz 2007 ( Online [PDF; 369 kB ; accessed on April 24, 2018]).
  • Josef Wieland: The ethics of governance (=  studies on governance ethics . Volume 1 ). Metropolis, Marburg 2005, ISBN 978-3-89518-606-6 .
  • Josef Wieland: Governance ethics and moral incentives . In: Th. Beschorner, M. König, OJ Schumann et al. (Hrsg.): Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik . Hampp, Munich 2005, p. 261-280 .
  • Josef Wieland: Normativity and Governance . Social theoretical and philosophical reflections on governance ethics (=  studies on governance ethics . Volume 3 ). Metropolis, Marburg September 2005.
  • Josef Wieland (ed.): The virtue of governance (=  studies on governance ethics . Volume 4 ). Metropolis, Marburg 2006, ISBN 3-89518-546-9 .
  • Thomas Beschorner: Governance Ethics . In: Michael Aßländer (Ed.): Handbuch Wirtschaftsethik . Metzler, Münster 2011, ISBN 3-89518-535-3 , p. 124-131 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 15 .
  2. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 16 .
  3. ↑ Wieland: The ethics of governance . 2005, p. 45 .
  4. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 10 .
  5. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 17 .
  6. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 24 .
  7. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 29 .
  8. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 31 .
  9. ↑ Josef Wieland (ed.): The virtue of governance . 2006, p. 11 .
  10. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 32 .
  11. ↑ Josef Wieland (ed.): The virtue of governance . 2006, p. 9 .
  12. ↑ Wieland: The ethics of governance . 2005, p. 85 .
  13. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 35 .
  14. ↑ Josef Wieland (ed.): The virtue of governance . 2006, p. 7 .
  15. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 83 .
  16. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 63 .
  17. ↑ a b Wieland: The ethics of governance . 2005, p. 78 .
  18. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 103 .
  19. ↑ Wieland: Governance ethics and moral incentives . In: Business and Business Ethics . 2005, p. 252 .
  20. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 129 .
  21. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 116 .
  22. ↑ Wieland: Normativity and Governance . 2005, p. 137 .
  23. ↑ Wieland: Governance ethics and moral incentives . In: Business and Business Ethics . 2005, p. 254 .
  24. ↑ Prof. Dr. habil Josef Wieland . Konstanz University of Technology, Business and Design , accessed on April 24, 2018 (English).
  25. ↑ Josef Wieland (Ed.): Handbook value management . Murmann, Hamburg 2004, ISBN 3-938017-06-6 .
  26. ↑ Wieland, Fürst: Values ​​Management Systems in Practice . 2003.
  27. ^ Oswald Neuberger: Micropolitics and Morality in Organizations . 2nd Edition. Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2006, p. 394 .
  28. ^ Regina Schwegler: Moral behavior of companies . Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8349-8122-6 , p. 237 f .
  29. ↑ Kim Oliver Tokarski: Ethics and Entrepreneurship . Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8349-9932-0 , p. 227 .
  30. ^ Andreas Georg Scherer: Multinational company and globalization . Physica Verlag, Heidelberg 2003, ISBN 978-3-7908-0046-3 , p. 451 .
  31. ^ Thomas Beschorner: Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship . Perspectives for an active role for companies. In: Holger Backhaus-Maul, Christiane Biedermann, Stefan Nahrlich, Judith Polerauer (eds.): Corporate Citizenship in Germany . 2008, p. 75 .
  32. ^ Thomas Beschorner: Business Ethics . Theoretical perspectives for a proactive role of companies . In: Andreas Georg Scherer, Moritz Patzer (ed.): Business administration and business ethics . Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden 2008, p. 92 .
  33. ↑ The articles marked as “Working Paper 2004” are in the anthology: Josef Wieland (Ed.) Governanceethik im Diskurs, Metropolis, Marburg 2nd edition 2005