Regime theory
The regime theory of Robert Keohane was in the late 1970s as a development of interdependence . Both are considered to be stages of development or components of neoliberal institutionalism , one of the most important theories of international relations .
Basics
International regimes are cooperative institutions that are characterized by informal and formal, legal and non-legal structures and that deal with conflicts between nation states. They are intended to reduce transaction costs and bring about a mutual give and take for everyone involved. The states still do not trust each other, but attempts are made to counteract this through controls within the regimes.
Stephen D. Krasner defines regimes as follows:
- implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.
So the four-part structure is:
- Principles (common assumptions),
- Norms (general behavioral standards),
- Rules (specific rules of conduct) and
- Procedure (concrete, mutually agreed procedures).
They are supposed to ensure the permanence of regimes. Nevertheless, of course, the benefits must be higher than the costs!
Examples
Examples of international regimes are:
- Exchange rate regime (such as the Bretton Woods II regime )
- World trade regime (GATT, from 1995: WTO as a central component)
- Environmental regime, e.g. B .:
- Seabed regime
- Regime to keep the Rhine clean
- Baltic Sea Regime
- Nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime
- Disarmament and arms control regimes (such as the Missile Technology Control Regime )
- UN human rights regime
- Border regime
logic
The regime theory ties in with the interdependence theory, and permanent cooperation is considered possible. States can solve problems in a coordinated manner through joint action without having to fear increased costs as a result. The time factor plays an important role here, as one can learn from mistakes and thus overcome the security dilemma . For Keohane, the establishment of regimes primarily makes sense because actors without the existence of a central authority can achieve worse outcomes than with the existence of one (see also the Coase theorem ).
Conditions for the emergence, structure and change of international regimes
Systemic explanations
International regimes arise as a result of a special power structure in the international system or in a problem area.
- Theory of Hegemonic Stability
Dominant actors form regimes. You regulate a policy area in your own interest and bear the majority of the costs, while everyone else benefits (non-excludability). If the respective hegemon loses power, the regime changes.
Objections: How can the existence of non- or post-hegemonic regimes be explained? Explanatory value for east-west relations (two hegemonic structured world systems)? Imprecise terminology (how do you find out how a hegemonic position changes?).
- Issue structure area approach
Game theory explanations
You are trying to map conflicts in international politics with the help of disbursement matrices. Assumptions about actor behavior are then formulated from these payout matrices. They differentiate between the “dilemma of common interests” and the “dilemma of common aversions”.
Unilateral behavior falls short. The affected states join forces to avoid suboptimal outcomes in the long term and to stabilize cooperative behavior ( collective action ).
Criticism: Problems with the clear determination of the order of preferences and the reduction of complexity . Regimes that were set up to deal with a “dilemma of common interests” differ from those that were set up to resolve a “dilemma of common aversions”. The first type requires cooperation, the second coordination.
Functional explanations
In functional explanatory approaches, conclusions are drawn from the expected consequences of a regime on the conditions of its formation.
The starting point is the theory of market failure. If, in certain situations, the results of the interactions guided by market mechanisms are suboptimal, regimes arise. This is because the subsequent problems of market failure can be overcome by creating regimes without establishing a central decision-making body (multilateral, so to speak, according to the principle of Coase's theorem ). However, three factors must then be given: legal certainty, communication between the actors, low transaction costs.
Under these conditions, regimes have three central functions: they establish behavioral expectations, produce information and reduce transaction costs.
Keohane believes that while it is difficult to establish an international regime, it is much easier to maintain it.
The functional regime theory can make general statements about the post-hegemonic continuity and the performance of existing regimes. However, it hardly explains how it came about, since conclusions are drawn from the result as to the conditions under which it came about and nothing is said about the likelihood of overcoming any obstacles to the formation of a regime.
Normative-institutional declarations
The normative-institutional approach assumes a direct or indirect influence of international institutions and organizations as well as of predominantly power-independent development of principles and norms in such institutions on the regime structure or formation.
Problem-structural explanations
Problem-structural explanations say something about the probability of the formation of international regimes. They attribute this probability to the nature of the conflict items to be dealt with.
Cognitive explanations
Cognitive explanatory approaches draw on the perceptions of political decision-makers to explain the emergence, structure and change of international regimes. A regime is only established if the decision-makers recognize the need to deal with conflicts.
Subsystemic explanations
Look for changes in the domestic politics of the countries concerned that would facilitate an agreement on a regime, e.g. change of government, reorientation of politics, etc.
Subsystemic explanations play only a minor role to this day. However, individual examples have shown that changes of government and the associated changes in foreign policy favor the emergence of international regimes.
Analysis of the effect of regimes
The empirical impact analysis is important. The majority of realists believe that cooperation can only be temporary, but that it cannot create norms and rules for a longer period of time. They reject the fact that regimes can outlast certain power and interest constellations. In contrast to this line of argument, the regime analysis has the duty to prove that the principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes embodied by international regimes produce behavior that is different from that which the power and interest structures would directly produce ( regimes do matter ).
General effects
The fact that regimes can outlast certain power and interest constellations can be directly demonstrated: regimes that existed before the East-West conflicts survived, while new regimes went under again.
Specific effects
- Peacekeeping
Internal international regimes: regulate the internal relations of regime members.
External international regimes: coordinate the behavior of regime members towards third countries .
Internal international regimes can have a peace-building effect by creating trust across problem areas and reducing the number of conflicts that can trigger a military conflict (especially when it comes to security regimes).
In contrast, external international regimes cannot be unreservedly assumed to have a peace-promoting effect.
- Socially and environmentally friendly services
It is important to distinguish between three types of international regimes and to examine their effects in the event of inequalities:
- Market-oriented international regimes serve to stabilize market processes. They tend towards polarizing distribution services.
- National-oriented international regimes assign regulatory and distribution powers in the problem area concerned to the nation states, but bind them to internationally agreed norms and rules. In terms of their effects, they lie in inequalities between market-oriented and internationally-oriented international regimes.
- Internationally-oriented international regimes transfer the regulatory and distribution powers to multilateral organizations or authorities. They have the most equitable effects in the event of inequalities, because they have a set of instruments with which compensatory redistributions can be undertaken.
Preliminary results of the regime analysis
The regime discussion has brought about essential innovations:
First of all, she brought an understanding of an indispensable new subject. The realistic paradigm was changed by the fact that the understanding of international politics was modified as an occurrence without norms and rules. In the form of neo-realism, attempts were even made to explain how these norms came about.
Finally, regimes have become an important area of application for game theory studies of the determinants of cooperation under the condition of anarchy.
In addition, the regime analysis suggests no longer assuming international politics as an anarchy of the world of states, but rather "regulated anarchy".
criticism
The regime theory is seen by some scientists more or less as a plagiarism and not so much as an original achievement. This accusation was made particularly decidedly by the American political scientist Philippe C. Schmitter . In 2002 he found some “novelties” of international relations - among them particularly prominent Keohane and Krasner's “International Regime Analysis” - that they represented adoptions from neo-functionalism : “And when there was some theoretical core it often sounded quite familiar to me. [...] neo-functionalist thinking turned out to be very much alive, even if it was usually being re-branded as a different animal. "
The regime theory is referred to as " fair weather theory ", so according to its critics it is far too idealistic. It is said that states can change internally and thus define new goals and break old rules.
An example: the Kyoto Protocol
- Principle: Climate change is caused by the greenhouse gas CO 2 ; this results in environmental disasters
- Standards: The emission of CO 2 is to be limited to the bare minimum; international cooperation on reducing CO 2 needs to be stepped up
- Rules: Formulated in the Kyoto Protocol
- Procedure: suction. flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol; Regular conferences
literature
- Robert O. Keohane: After Hegemony . Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984, reprinted 2005.
- Siegfried Schieder, Manuela Spindler: Theories of International Politics .
- A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, V. Rittberger: Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997.
- Robert O. Keohane : The Demand for International Regimes . In: International Organization , Vol. 36, 2, 1982, pp. 325-355.
- S. Haggard, BA Simmons: Theories of International Regimes . In: International Organization , Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987, pp. 491-517.
- Stephen D. Krasner : Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regime as Intervening Variables. In: International Organization , Vol. 36, 2, 1982, pp. 185-205.
- Michael Zürn : Just International Regime: Conditions and restrictions for the emergence of non-hegemonic international regimes, examined using the example of the world communication order. Frankfurt am Main 1987.
- Manfred Efinger, Volker Rittberger , Klaus Dieter Wolf , Michael Zürn: International Regime and International Politics .
- Harald Müller: The chance of cooperation. Regime in international relations . Darmstadt 1993.