Mistakes in German criminal law

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The concept of error referred to in German criminal ignorance or misconception of the offender with respect to a legally relevant fact. These include, on the one hand, the circumstances of the offense and , on the other hand, the legal consequences associated with an offense . Such an error can have an impact on the criminal liability of the offender, as the level of knowledge of the offender at the level of intent , illegality and guilt is important. Errors can work both in favor of and against the perpetrator.

The Criminal Code (StGB) only regulates errors selectively as factual errors ( § 16 StGB), prohibition errors ( § 17 StGB) and as errors about the existence of an excusatory emergency ( § 35 paragraph 2 StGB). On this legal basis, jurisprudence developed complex dogmatics that systematized different forms of error and assigned appropriate legal consequences. While some mistakes relieve the perpetrator, others can incriminate the perpetrator. Furthermore, there are forms of error that are legally irrelevant and do not affect the criminal liability of the perpetrator, but at most the sentencing .

Factual error, § 16 StGB

(1) Anyone who does not know a circumstance that is part of the statutory offense when committing the act is not acting deliberately. The criminal liability for negligent inspection remains unaffected.

(2) Anyone who, when committing the act, mistakenly assumes circumstances which would constitute the offense of a milder law, can only be punished for deliberate commission under the milder law.

A factual error (also known as a factual error) occurs when the offender fails to recognize that he is realizing a characteristic of a criminal offense due to an incorrect assessment of the facts. According to Section 16 (1) sentence 1 of the Criminal Code, such a misconception leads to the perpetrator acting without intent with regard to the element of the offense affected by the error. As a result, he can not be punished for an intentional offense in accordance with Section 15 of the Criminal Code.

For example, the perpetrator is subject to a factual error if he shoots a person with the assumption that it is a scarecrow . Since the perpetrator does not realize that he is killing a person, he lacks the intention to kill a person. That is why he does not make himself a criminal offense for manslaughter ( § 212 StGB) or murder ( § 211 StGB). According to Section 16 (1) sentence 2 of the Criminal Code, however, a factual error does not affect the criminal liability for negligent offense. Therefore, in the example case, criminal liability for negligent homicide ( Section 222 StGB) comes into consideration.

In the above example, the perpetrator's error relates to a descriptive element of the offense: the presence of a person. The perpetrator acts willfully with regard to such a feature if he correctly records its actual presence. If, on the other hand, the error relates to a normative element of the offense , it is sufficient for the assumption of intent if the perpetrator correctly makes a parallel assessment in the lay sphere . To do this, he must capture the meaning and purpose of the element of the offense. Legal science describes elements of a factual nature as normative, the content of which results from a legal assessment. This applies, for example, to the characteristic that the object of the crime is foreign, which is particularly relevant in the case of property crimes . Whether something is foreign is judged on the basis of the legal ownership assignment . The perpetrator adequately understands the significance of the constituent element of foreignness, provided that he realizes that he is not allowed to determine the matter alone.

Section 16 (2) of the Criminal Code covers the case that the perpetrator imagines circumstances that justify criminal liability under a milder law. Such an error can occur, for example, in the context of homicides: If someone kills another person, for example, under the mistaken assumption that this person has asked for this, he is realizing the objective fact of manslaughter. If the erroneous assumption were correct, however, the perpetrator would have committed himself to be punished for killing on demand ( Section 216 StGB), which has a lower minimum penalty than manslaughter. Pursuant to Section 16 (2) of the Criminal Code, if such an error exists, punishment can only be based on the milder law, in the example from Section 216 of the Criminal Code.

Error in persona vel in obiecto

With the error in persona vel in obiecto, the perpetrator is subject to an error about the identity of the object of the crime. This happens, for example, when the perpetrator who has decided to kill a certain person, when committing the crime, considers a third party to be his planned victim and kills him. Such a mistake of identity is not subject to Section 16 of the Criminal Code, since the perpetrator intentionally, illegally and culpably realizes the legal offense, in the example a homicide, by killing the person he wanted to kill at the moment of the act. The identity of the victim is irrelevant for the actual offense, as the victim only describes the victim according to certain generic characteristics. A criminal liability for manslaughter presupposes that the perpetrator kills another. If the perpetrator is mistaken about the identity of the victim, this is merely a mistake of motive which is of no criminal significance.

What is controversial in jurisprudence is the criminal-law classification of a mistake for the victim if the perpetrator only individualizes it indirectly. This happens, for example, when the perpetrator attaches a bomb to his victim's vehicle in order to kill it. If the bomb kills someone other than the one the perpetrator wanted to kill, the prevailing opinion is that there is an error in persona.

Error about the causal process

There is an error about the course of causation if the act occurs in a different way than the perpetrator planned. This is the case, for example, when the perpetrator wants to kill another by beating him to death, but the victim evades the attack and thus dies. The causal process is a feature of the objective fact, which is why the perpetrator must have included this in his intent. However, the perpetrator cannot foresee all the details of a causal process, which is why it is sufficient for the assumption of his intention if the perpetrator imagines the essential processes. If the actual causal course therefore deviates from the planned one in one essential point, there is a factual error, so that the perpetrator acts without intent in accordance with Section 16 (1) StGB. In contrast, deviations that are within what is foreseeable according to general life expectancy are irrelevant for the intentional act.

An insignificant error about the causal process is present, for example, if the perpetrator strangles the victim with intent to kill, but the victim dies not as a result of this, but only through a later removal of the alleged corpse. When the jurisprudence decided on such a fact, it also did not attach any legal relevance to the error, but did not justify this with the negligence of the deviation of the actual from the expected causal course, but with the existence of a general intent on the part of the perpetrator. According to this, the killing intent that the perpetrator had when choking continued with the removal of the corpse. The figure of the general intent is no longer represented in jurisprudence, as it violates the principle of simultaneity ( § 8 StGB). According to this, all elements of the offense must be available when the offense was committed. At the time of the throw, however, the perpetrator considers the victim to be dead, which is why he cannot act with intent to kill.

Aberratio ictus

An aberratio ictus is present if the perpetrator starts attacking his victim, but this attack fails and hits a third party. This is the case, for example, when the perpetrator shoots his victim with a weapon, but tears the weapon away and as a result hits a third party. Such a course of events leads, like a mistake about the causal course according to § 16 paragraph 1 sentence 1 StGB, to the exclusion of intent if the victim actually injured and the victim selected by the perpetrator belong to different categories. For example, if the perpetrator aims at a bird scarer and hits a person with his missed shot, he lacks intent with regard to the killing, so that he is only punishable for negligent homicide. With regard to damage to the bird scarer, it is punishable for attempted damage to property ( Section 303 of the Criminal Code).

In jurisprudence, the classification of the aberratio ictus is controversial in the event that the injured and the planned crime victim actually belong to the same genre. This applies, for example, when the perpetrator shoots a certain person and hits another: Some legal scholars consider this error to be negligible if the actual course of events differs from the intended only in insignificant points. Such an error is comparable to an error in persona, since the perpetrator here also brings about success on an object of the same type of crime. The prevailing opposing view classifies the aberratio ictus as a considerable error, which makes the premeditation unnecessary. Because the intent of the perpetrator is concretized on a specific victim, in whom the factual success does not occur.

The intent remains unaffected, however, if the perpetrator approves of missing the victim and hitting a third party when committing the offense: In this case, the perpetrator acts with intent to kill both with regard to the intended victim and the third party. Such a will is referred to in law as an alternative intent.

Subsumption error

A subsumption error is present if the perpetrator misinterprets the content of a constituent element and as a result incorrectly assumes that he is allowed to act. The perpetrator acts in ignorance of the legal factuality of the act with knowledge of the facts and the social significance. This applies, for example, if he encourages another criminal to make up his mind and assumes that merely physical support is punishable aiding and abetting ( Section 27 StGB). This error is irrelevant at the factual level.

Conversely, if the perpetrator erroneously assumes that there is an offense, he is subject to an unpunished crime . In this context one speaks of the "reverse subsumption error".

Error about illegality

Prohibition error, § 17 StGB

If the perpetrator does not have the insight to do wrong when committing the act, he acts without guilt if he could not avoid this error. If the perpetrator was able to avoid the mistake, the sentence can be reduced according to Section 49 (1).

In the case of a mistake in the prohibition, the perpetrator fails to recognize that he has committed injustice through his act. In contrast to a factual error, he is not mistaken about a fact, but about its legal assessment. According to § 17 StGB, such an error can lead to the perpetrator not acting at fault, which excludes criminal liability. The provision of § 17 StGB has been included in the StGB since January 1, 1975. With this norm, the legislature regulated the question, which was previously controversial in jurisprudence, of the legal consequences of a lack of awareness of wrongdoing by locating it as a guilty characteristic.

A mistake in the prohibition is conceivable in several constellations:

On the one hand, the perpetrator can consider prohibited behavior to be permitted. In jurisprudence this is referred to as a direct error of prohibition. Such is the case, for example, if someone uses a third-party vehicle because he incorrectly assumes that mere presumption of use of a vehicle ( Section 248b StGB) is unpunished.

On the other hand, the perpetrator may be aware of the legal disapproval of his actions, but may exceptionally consider this behavior to be permitted, for example because he accepts a non-existent justification or exceeds the limits of an existing justification due to an error. Such a case is referred to in jurisprudence as a permission error or an indirect prohibition error.

Furthermore, the perpetrator can fail to recognize that an act is legally required. Such a misconduct is of particular practical importance in connection with offenses by omission , such as failure to report planned criminal offenses ( Section 138 of the Criminal Code).

A mistake in prohibition leads to the exclusion of guilt according to § 17 sentence 2 StGB if the mistake is unavoidable for the perpetrator. This is the case when the perpetrator, even with the necessary tension in his conscience, cannot recognize that he is doing wrong. This is judged on the basis of his individual abilities. If the error is avoidable, it is irrelevant, so that the perpetrator acts culpably and can thus be punished for the offense accused of him. The court can, however, mitigate the sentence in accordance with Section 49 (1) StGB.

An error about the prerequisites for a justification is conceivable in several constellations, most of which are not explicitly regulated by law. Hence, their treatment in jurisprudence is controversial.

Accepting prohibited behavior

For one thing, the perpetrator may mistakenly consider lawful conduct, such as adultery , to be prohibited. Such a misconception is a delusion offense is, the lack of Verübens criminally relevant injustice has no criminality result. An election offense is also present if the perpetrator wrongly considers the boundaries of a justification reason to be too narrow, for example by assuming that the justification of a killing is generally excluded.

Failure to recognize a justification situation

If the perpetrator fails to recognize that his action is objectively justified, the prevailing view in jurisprudence is an unsuitable attempt . Such an error occurs, for example, if the perpetrator injures his victim without noticing that the victim was about to attack a third party. The perpetrator could therefore have lawfully injured his victim based on the law of emergency aid ( Section 32 StGB). According to the prevailing view, a justification can only be considered if the perpetrator is aware of the justifying circumstances. Therefore, the perpetrator does not act justified who does not know the justifying facts. However, he only committed a limited injustice because he should have been allowed to exercise emergency rights. This corresponds to the structure of an attempt, which is why the perpetrator who fails to recognize a justification is punished within the scope of the attempt.

Adopt a justification situation

In the case of a legal error, the situation is the opposite of the misunderstanding of a justification situation: In this case, the perpetrator falsely imagines a situation that would justify him if he actually existed. This is the case, for example, if someone incorrectly assumes that he is being attacked by someone else, which is why he exercises self-defense rights ( Section 32 StGB) against this person . The law does not expressly regulate the erroneous status, which is why its legal treatment in jurisprudence is controversial.

Essentially, there are two opposing approaches, one of which treats the error as a factual error according to § 16 StGB, the other as a prohibition error according to § 17 StGB. The first view is called the constrained guilt theory. She argues that the perpetrator is primarily mistaken about facts on the basis of which he draws a wrong legal conclusion. Therefore, the error should be treated like a factual error, so that it always leads to the exclusion of criminal liability for willful action. Within the restricted theory of guilt, there are different currents that argue about whether Section 16 of the Criminal Code can be applied directly or by analogy in the event of an error in the legal status . This disagreement is based on the fact that the wording of Section 16 of the Criminal Code does not match this error insofar as it presupposes an error about a constituent element. However, the victim is not subject to such. The doctrine of the negative constituent elements, based on a two-stage crime structure, sees the first stage as a conglomerate of constituent elements and illegality. therefore, in the case of an error in the legal basis, it omits the intent with regard to the absence of grounds for justification in the subjective offense. This leads to the direct application of Section 16 of the Criminal Code and the treatment of the error of the legal status as a full legal error. The unjustly negating restricted guilt theory also negates the wrongful intent on the level of the subjective offense in the event of an error in the permissions and applies § 16 StGB is also applied directly. The restricted guilt theory, which corresponds to the prevailing opinion, does not deny the wrongful intent, but only the deliberate guilt. Nevertheless, although this would be an intentional and unlawful act, it applies § 16 StGB analogously. This is permissible as it only relieves the offender. This makes it possible to punish participants who are not mistaken.

The opposite view, which is referred to as the strict theory of guilt, applies, on the other hand, Section 17 of the Criminal Code to the erroneous status of the law, since the perpetrator lacks intent, but merely an awareness of wrongdoing, which is an element of guilt. She argues that Section 17 of the Criminal Code does not make any requirements for the lack of insight into injustice, so that the error of permissions can also be subsumed under this standard. According to this view, the error only leads to an exclusion of criminal liability if the perpetrator cannot avoid the error.

Error about elements of guilt

(2) If, when committing the act, the offender mistakenly assumes circumstances which would excuse him according to paragraph 1, he will only be punished if he was able to avoid the error. The penalty is to be mitigated according to Section 49 (1).

An error according to Section 35 (2) of the Criminal Code exists if the perpetrator mistakenly accepts the preconditions for an apologetic emergency under Section 35 (1) of the Criminal Code. This applies, for example, if the perpetrator incorrectly assumes that there is a current threat to life, limb or freedom of the perpetrator or a person close to him. Also under § 35 , paragraph 2 SCC the erroneous assumption falls of the perpetrator that a threat to one of § 35 detected StGB of legal protection is to tolerate.

An error according to Section 35 (2) StGB leads to the exclusion of guilt if it is unavoidable for the perpetrator. The standard of inevitability corresponds to that of § 17 StGB. This error is therefore also irrelevant for the criminal liability of the offender if he can avoid it. In this case, however, his sentence will be mitigated in accordance with Section 49 (1) StGB.

Error about reason for suspension or exclusion

The prevailing opinion in jurisprudence considers an error about personal grounds for suspension or exclusion to be insignificant. Another view, however, wants to differentiate according to the meaning and purpose of the grounds for exclusion (cancellation) and only consider the error to be insignificant if the exclusion is for criminal policy reasons. In the case of an “emergency-like situation” (read: especially in Section 258 V, VI StGB), however, the mistake about the family status required there should lead to the exclusion of guilt.

literature

  • Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015, ISBN 978-3-8487-0605-1 .
  • Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 .
  • Reinhard Maurach, Heinz Zipf, Karl Heinz Gössel: Criminal Law General Part Volume 2: Forms of the crime and legal consequences of the act . 8th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2014, ISBN 978-3-8114-5032-5 .
  • Ingeborguppe, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen: §§ 16, 17, 35 . In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 4th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2013, ISBN 978-3-8329-6661-4 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Detlev Sternberg-Lieben, Irene Sternberg-Lieben: The factual error (§ 16 paragraph 1 StGB) . In: Legal Training , 2012, p. 289.
  2. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 , § 13, Rn. 2.
  3. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 , § 5, Rn. 93.
  4. ↑ Helmut Satzger: The resolution - a closer look . In: Jura , 2008, p. 112 (114).
  5. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 , § 13, Rn. 16.
  6. ↑ Kristian Kühl: § 16 , Rn. 6. In: Kristian Kühl, Martin Heger: Criminal Code: Comment . 29th, revised edition. CH Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-70029-3 .
  7. ↑ BGHSt 11, 268 (270).
  8. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 , § 13, Rn. 20-26.
  9. ↑ Federal Court of Justice: 1 StR 635/96 . In: New Journal for Criminal Law , 1998, p. 294.
  10. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 , § 13, Rn. 27.
  11. ↑ BGHSt 1, 278 (279).
  12. ↑ BGHSt 48, 34 (37).
  13. ↑ BGHSt 7, 325 (329).
  14. ↑ Brian Valerius: Error about the causal course in multi-act events . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter , 2006, p. 261 (265).
  15. ↑ Mustafa Temmuz Oğlakcıoğlu: 50 Years of the Cesspit Fall - Old Wine in Older Bottles? In: Juristische Rundschau , 2011, p. 103.
  16. ↑ BGHSt 14, 193 .
  17. ↑ Brian Valerius: Error about the causal course in multi-act events . In: Legal worksheets , 2006, p. 261.
  18. ↑ Detlev Sternberg-Lieben, Frank Schuster: § 15 , Rn. 58. In: Adolf Schönke, Horst Schröder, Albin Eser (ed.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 29th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-65226-4 .
  19. ^ Friedrich Toepel: Aspects of the "Rose-Rosahl" problem - preliminary considerations, significance of the aberratio ictus in the individual perpetrator . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter , 1996, p. 886.
  20. ↑ BGHSt 37, 214 (219).
  21. ↑ Hans Kudlich: § 16 , Rn. 8-8.1. In: Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg (Hrsg.): Beckscher Online Comment StGB , 30th Edition 2016.
  22. ↑ Michael Hettinger: The evaluation of the "aberratio ictus" in single perpetrators . In: Goltdammer's Archive for Criminal Law , 1990, p. 531 (542).
  23. ^ Ingeborguppe: On the revision of the doctrine of "concrete" intent and the importance of the aberratio ictus . In: Goldtdammer's Archive for Criminal Law 1981, p. 1.
  24. ↑ Ingeborguppe: The criminal responsibility for errors in the exercise of self-defense and for their consequences - at the same time discussion of the judgment of the LG Munich v. 11/10/1987 - Ks 121 Js 4866/86 . In: Juristenteitung , 1989, p. 728.
  25. ↑ Michael Heuchemer: On the functional revision of the doctrine of concrete intent: Methodical and dogmatic considerations on aberratio ictus . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter , 2005, p. 275 (277–280).
  26. ↑ BGHSt 34, 53 .
  27. ↑ Mohamad El-Ghazi: The distinction between error in persona (vel obiecto) and aberratio ictus . In: Legal Training , 2016, p. 303.
  28. ↑ Federal Court of Justice: 4 StR 369/08 . In: New Journal for Criminal Law , 2009, p. 210.
  29. ↑ Carsten Momsen: § 17 , Rn. 39. In: Helmut Satzger, Wilhelm Schluckebier, Gunter Widmaier (eds.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 3. Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28685-7 .
  30. ^ Ingeborguppe: Criminal law general part in the mirror of the jurisprudence . 3. Edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-2746-9 , § 20, marginal no. 10.
  31. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 , § 13, Rn. 3.
  32. ↑ Michael Heuchemer: § 17 , Rn. 1. In: Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg (Hrsg.): Beckscher Online Commentary StGB , 30th Edition 2016.
  33. ↑ BGHSt 15, 377 .
  34. ↑ Wolfgang Joecks: § 17 , Rn. 1. In: Franz Säcker (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Civil Code . 7th edition. tape 1 : §§ 1–240, ProstG, AGG. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-66540-0 .
  35. ↑ Carsten Momsen: § 17 , Rn. 32-33. In: Helmut Satzger, Wilhelm Schluckebier, Gunter Widmaier (Ed.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 3. Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28685-7 .
  36. ↑ BGHSt 22, 223 .
  37. ↑ BGHSt 35, 347 .
  38. ↑ Wolfgang Joecks: § 17 , Rn. 30-31. In: Franz Säcker (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Civil Code . 7th edition. tape 1 : §§ 1–240, ProstG, AGG. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-66540-0 .
  39. ↑ Ulfrid Neumann: § 17 , Rn. 61a. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (eds.): Criminal Code . 4th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2013, ISBN 978-3-8329-6661-4 .
  40. ↑ Wolfgang Joecks: § 17 , Rn. 83. In: Franz Säcker (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Civil Code . 7th edition. tape 1 : §§ 1–240, ProstG, AGG. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-66540-0 .
  41. ↑ BGHSt 3, 357 .
  42. ↑ Thomas Fischer : Penal Code with ancillary laws . 67th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2020, ISBN 978-3-406-73879-1 , § 17 Rn. 7-8b.
  43. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015, ISBN 978-3-8487-0605-1 , § 28, marginal no. 15th
  44. ↑ Wolfgang Joecks: § 17 , Rn. 36. In: Franz Säcker (Ed.): Munich Commentary on the Civil Code . 7th edition. tape 1 : §§ 1–240, ProstG, AGG. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-66540-0 .
  45. ↑ Thomas Fischer : Penal Code with ancillary laws . 67th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2020, ISBN 978-3-406-73879-1 , § 17 Rn. 10.
  46. ↑ Theodor Lenckner, Detlev Sternberg-Lieben: Before § 32ff , Rn. 15. In: Adolf Schönke, Horst Schröder, Albin Eser (eds.): Criminal Code: Commentary . 29th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-65226-4 .
  47. ↑ Urs Kindhäuser: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015, ISBN 978-3-8487-0605-1 , § 29, marginal no. 9.
  48. ↑ Reinhard Maurach, Heinz Zipf, Karl Heinz Gössel: Criminal Law General Part Volume 2: Forms of the crime and legal consequences of the act . 8th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2014, ISBN 978-3-8114-5032-5 , § 25, Rn. 34.
  49. ↑ Kristian Kühl: Criminal Law General Part . 7th edition. Vahlen, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-8006-4494-0 , § 13, Rn. 67-73.
  50. ↑ Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen: Before § 32ff , Rn. 103. In: Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann, Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen (Ed.): Criminal Code . 4th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2013, ISBN 978-3-8329-6661-4 .
  51. ↑ BGHSt 11, 111 (114).
  52. ↑ BGHSt 35, 246 (250).
  53. ↑ Reinhard Maurach, Heinz Zipf, Karl Heinz Gössel: Criminal Law General Part Volume 2: Forms of the crime and legal consequences of the act . 8th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2014, ISBN 978-3-8114-5032-5 , § 44, Rn. 61.
  54. ↑ Armin Kaufmann: Limitation of the facts and justification . In: Juristenteitung , 1955, p. 37.
  55. ↑ Thomas Fischer : Penal Code with ancillary laws . 67th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2020, ISBN 978-3-406-73879-1 , § 35 Rn. 16-18.