Illusion of control

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The illusion of control (Engl. Illusion of control ) is to be believed, the human tendency to control to certain operations that can not be influenced proven.

Basics

The basic work on the illusion of control is Ellen Langer's study The illusion of control (1975). Langer showed that people often act as if by doing what they did they could control and change the outcome of random or coincidental events . For example, people rate their chances of winning the lottery higher if they picked the numbers themselves than if they were assigned them. She observed that her test subjects behaved more as if they were controlling the random event if the experimental setup contained so-called skill cues . According to Langer, skill cues are elements that are usually associated with certain skills: choosing, competing, becoming familiar with a process and making decisions.

A simple form of this mistake can be seen in the game of dice : players tend to throw harder for high numbers and softer for low numbers. In the experiment, test subjects were convinced that they could influence a completely random coin toss . Participants who successfully predicted a series of litters began to believe that they were indeed particularly good guessers and that their guessing successes would worsen if they were distracted.

Effects of the illusion of control

Positive effects

Taylor and Brown (1988) argue that positive illusions are useful in increasing motivation and perseverance . Albert Bandura supports this position with his view that "optimistic self-assessments that do not deviate inappropriately from what is possible can be beneficial, while truthful assessments can be self-limiting" (Bandura, 1989, p. 1177). His reasoning is fundamentally concerned with the benefits of optimistic assumptions about control and success in situations that can be controlled - not with imagined control in situations whose processes in reality do not depend on individual behavior. Bandura has also suggested that "in activities with tight tolerance for error, where missteps have costly or harmful consequences, the most careful assessment of potency is most beneficial to one's well-being" (1997, p. 71).

Taylor and Brown believe that positive illusions are adaptive because studies show that they are more common in normal, sane people than in depressed individuals. On the other hand, Pacini, Muir and Epstein (1998) believe that depressed people overcompensate for the tendency towards faulty intuitive thinking by overly rational monitoring of themselves even in trivial situations; and they find that the difference to the non-depressive disappears in momentous situations.

Negative effects

According to other empirical results, overconfidence can be a mismatch in some circumstances. In a scenario study with a deliberately unsuccessful course of action, Whyte et al. (1997) found that those participants who were suggested to have a high self-assessment increase their engagement significantly more often. Knee and Zuckerman (1998) criticize Taylor / Brown's definition of mental health, claiming that people without illusions are more likely to be non-defensive, adaptive, progressive personalities with little ego attachment to their outcomes. According to Knees and Zuckerman's work, self-confident individuals are less likely to succumb to these illusions.

Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2003), as well as Gollwitzer and Kinney (1989), argue that illusions of control may increase aspiration, but do not contribute to error-free decisions. The illusions can immunize against feedback, inhibit learning processes, and predispose to greater objective willingness to take risks (because the subjective risk assessment decreases). In a study among investment bankers, Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2003, 2004) that traders with a strong illusion of control performed significantly worse in analysis, risk management and profit contributions. They also earned significantly worse.

The so-called permanent illusion of control of "gamblers" can be one of the reasons why they are not able to stop playing, even in situations of persistent losses. If players believe that they have special skills, knowledge and other advantages in playing, they are able to convince themselves that this is a worthwhile strategy. In order for players to be able to maintain illusion control during a gambling session, selective perception of the illusion-aiding moments is required.

Explanatory approaches

An important explanation for the illusion of control could be self-regulation . People who pursue the self-imposed goal of controlling their environment will always try to regain control over chaos, uncertainty and stress. If they fail, they could withdraw to the defensive assumption of "control" in order to cope - with the result of an illusion of control (Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 2003).

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Ellen Langer (1975). The illusion of control . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 32, Iss. 2, pp. 311-328
  2. ↑ Elizabeth Cowley, Donnel A. Briley, Colin Farrell, How do gamblers maintain an illusion of control ?, Journal of Business 68, 2015 [1]

literature

  • Bandura, A. (1989). Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory. American Psychologist , 44 (9), 1175-1184.
  • Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: WH Freeman and Company.
  • Fenton-O'Creevy, M., Nicholson, N. and Soane, E., Willman, P. Traders - Risks, Decisions, and Management in Financial Markets ISBN 0-19-926948-3
  • Fenton-O'Creevy, M., Nicholson, N. and Soane, E., Willman, P. (2003) Trading on illusions: Unrealistic perceptions of control and trading performance. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 76, 53-68.
  • Gollwitzer, PM, & Kinney, RF (1989). Effects of Deliberative and Implemental Mind-Sets On Illusion of Control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56 (4), 531-542.
  • Henslin, JM (1967). Craps and magic. American Journal of Sociology 73 , 316-330.
  • Knee, CR, & Zuckerman, M. (1998). A nondefensive personality: Autonomy and control as moderators of defensive coping and self-handicapping. Journal of Research in Personality, 32 (2), 115-130.
  • Langer, EJ & Roth, J. (1975). Heads I win, tails it's chance: The illusion of control as a function of the sequence of outcomes in a purely chance task. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34 , 191-198
  • Langer, EJ (1982). The Illusion of Control. In Kahneman D., Paul Slovic , & Tversky, A. (Eds.). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases . New York: Cambridge University Press
  • Pacini, R., Muir, F., & Epstein, S. (1998). Depressive realism from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74 (4), 1056-1068.
  • Taylor, SE, & Brown, JD (1988). Illusion and Well-Being - a Social Psychological Perspective On Mental-Health. Psychological Bulletin, 103 (2), 193-210
  • Wegner, Daniel M. (2002). The illusion of conscious will . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  • Whyte, G., Saks, A. & Hook, S. (1997) When success breeds failure: The role of self-efficacy in escalating commitment to a losing course of action. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 18, 415-432.