Liberal intergovernmentalism

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The Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) is a political science theory in the branch of international relations. Its subject is the explanation of integration processes, in particular the process of European integration . It goes back to the political scientist Andrew Moravcsik and his 1993 publication Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernementalist Approach . In the following years Moravcsik expanded his theory in further publications such as 1997 in Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. or 1998 in The Choice of Europe. Social Purpose & State power of Messina to Maastricht. Unlike the governance approach, which is about how the European Union is governed, Moravcsik is about the dynamics of European unification.

The LI developed from intergovernmentalism , which emerged from the confrontation with the neo-functionalist paradigm, which predicted a dynamic of integration in Europe that would inevitably lead to a supranational political community. Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, granted sovereign control over the progress of European integration to the European nation-states, which acted in accordance with interests. He thus shares his basic assumptions with neorealism and the realistically shaped intergovernmentalism of Stanley Hoffmann , which also assumes interest-driven nation-states as utility maximizers. Andrew Moravcsik added a liberal perspective to the assumptions. He identifies the following three core elements of "Liberal Intergovernmentalism":

  • the view of the state as a rational utility maximizer,
  • the liberal theory of preference formation in the nation state,
  • the intergovernmental analysis of the intergovernmental negotiations. (Moravcsik 1993: 480)

Moravcsik's central concept of the "two-level game" is based on these three elements. In the so-called "two-level game", one level forms the domestic level, on which national preferences develop through liberal-democratic decision-making processes. These preferences are primarily of an economic nature. Domestic social actors (parties, trade unions, lobbyists) compete for the political orientation of national positions. They compete against each other in pluralistic competition. The group with the best access to government prevails. Domestic, social preference becomes a state interest. In contrast to strategies and tactics, preferences are formed completely independently of the interests of other states or the international mix. The second level is the intergovernmental level where European member states meet with their individually developed interests. In order to be able to lead decision-making processes, the negotiating power of the individual nation state plays an important role at this second level , i.e. the weaker the pressure of the national social groups to force a certain result, the greater the state's scope for action.

The key players in "liberal intergovernmentalism" are thus the national social groups. National governments become gatekeepers. The two levels described form the platform for the rationally acting nation states to negotiate their interests. The formation of supranational institutions is therefore a rather pragmatic act. The institutions are not an end in themselves, but are only implemented by the national actors to reduce transaction costs and improve negotiating conditions.

The European integration stands or falls in the opinion of LI finally with the degree of the benefits offered by the nation states attribute the integration project.

In political science , the LI is seen as the theoretical counterpoint to the approach of neofunctionalism .

literature

  • Andrew Moravcsik: Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergouvernmentalist Approach. In: Journal of Common Market Studies. Volume 31, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 473-524.
  • Siegfried Schieder: New Liberalism. In: Siegfried Schieder, Manuela Spindler (Ed.): Theories of International Relations. 3rd, revised. and actual Edition. Opladen u. a. 2010, pp. 187-222.
  • Jochen Steinhilber: Liberal intergovernmentalism. In: Hans-Jürgen Bieling , Marika Lerch (Ed.): Theories of European Integration, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 169–196.
  • Werner Weidenfeld, Wolfgang Wessels: Europe from A – Z. 12th edition. 2011, p. 281.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Andrew Moravcsik: Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. In: International Organization. 51, 4, 1997, pp. 513-553.
  2. ^ Andrew Moravcsik: The Choice of Europe. Social Purpose & State power of Messina to Maastricht. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 1998.
  3. ↑ Jachtenfuchs, Kohler-Koch: European integration . Ed .: Jachtenfuchs, Kohler-Koch. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 1996, ISBN 978-3-663-10001-0 .
  4. ^ Kailitz, Steffen .: Key works in political science . Ed .: Kailitz, Steffen. 1st edition VS Verl. Für Sozialwiss, Wiesbaden 2007, ISBN 3-531-14005-1 .
  5. ^ Andrew Moravcsik: Preferences and Power in the European Community. A liberal intergovernmentalist approach. In: Journal of Common Market Studies. 31 (4), 1993, pp. 473-524.
  6. ↑ Moravcsik 1993, p. 481.
  7. ^ Andrew Moravcsik: Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach . In: JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies . tape 31 , no. 4 , December 1993, ISSN  0021-9886 , pp. 473-524 , doi : 10.1111 / j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x ( wiley.com [accessed August 27, 2019]).