Transcendental Analytics
The transcendental analytics is the first part of the theory presented under the term “ transcendental logic ” about the conditions of thinking in the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant . It is preceded by the transcendental aesthetic as the theory of the foundations of perception . Both together, thinking (understanding) and intuition (sensuality), form the common source of knowledge according to Kant .
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| The Transcendental Analytic in the Structure of the Critique of Pure Reason | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Subject of the transcendental analytics
- “This analytics is the dissection of our entire a priori knowledge into the elements of pure intellectual knowledge. It depends on the following pieces.
- That the concepts are pure and not empirical.
- That they do not belong to intuition and sensuality, but to thinking and understanding.
- That they are elementary concepts and that they are well distinguished from the derived or composed of them.
- That their table is complete and that they completely fill the whole field of the pure understanding. ”Immanuel Kant: AA III, 83 / B 89
The transcendental analytics is divided into three "books". The first, the analysis of concepts, has as its object the finding and the functioning of the pure concepts of the understanding. In the second book, The Analysis of Principles, Kant described how the categories found are applied (doctrine of schematism) and which principles can be recognized. Finally, in the third book, Kant used the terms phenomena and noumena to explain where he saw the limits of human cognition.
Analysis of terms
The aim of Kant was to find pure intellectual concepts that are not derived from perception and, as basic concepts, can no longer be traced back to other, superordinate concepts. In addition, he wanted to find all the terms that correspond to this claim and bring them into a systematic context.
Above all, in order to ensure the desired completeness, Kant did not see it as sensible to simply collect terms that correspond to the desired criteria. Such a collection would be a "rhapsody" with which one would have no guarantee for the completeness and thus for the correctness of the theory. According to Kant, Aristotle deserves great merit in having set up a table of categories at all. But he saw their deficiency precisely in the lack of a system.
Guide to the discovery of all pure concepts of the mind
The basic premise of Kant is:
"So the knowledge of everyone, at least of the human understanding, is knowledge through concepts, not intuitive, but discursive [conceptually]."
According to Kant, concepts are based on functions, that is, “to order different ideas under a common action.” The understanding has an active ability to form concepts.
“Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, like sensual perceptions on the receptivity of impressions. The mind cannot make use of these terms other than to judge. "
This was the decisive key for Kant. In judging, the understanding connects concepts to a higher concept. He creates unity between different ideas. When the mind is receptively given an idea as an intuition through sensuality, a spontaneous (active) process takes place in the mind in which the intuition is brought under a concept. The result of this process is a judgment. For Kant, a judgment was thus figuratively a mirror of an intuition, an idea of an idea (B 93). In this, the term is assigned as a predicate to a higher term. A judgment arises from the fact that an intuition is subsumed under a concept, whereby a multiplicity is brought into unity. A judgment is such an assignment, for example: "Every metal is a body".
"But we can trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding can at all be imagined as a faculty of judgment."
In order to find the pure concepts of the understanding, one must, according to Kant, examine the general types of judgment in order to determine which basic functions they express. He developed his theory of pure concepts in a total of four steps:
- Put up the judgment board
- Deriving the categories
- Elaboration of the scheme of linking categories and views
- Developing the principles of subject experience
Judgment board
Kant explained that he had derived the judgment table from traditional logic as the classical doctrine of judgment. According to Kant, this results in four titles with three moments each.
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| Fig. 2: Table of the “logical function of the understanding in judgments”, representation similar to Immanuel Kant: AA III, 87 |
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quantity
Judging the quantity is used to address the different number of subjects in a statement: all, some, one (for example: all S are P ). In contrast to classical logic, in which the individual as an expression of greatness is a case of “all”, Kant included the individual as a separate form of judgment in his table.
“So if I estimate an individual judgment (iudicium singulare) not only according to its inner validity, but also, as a knowledge in general, according to the size it has in comparison with other knowledge, it is of course based on generally valid judgments (iudicia communia ), and deserves a special place in a complete table of the moments of thought in general (although admittedly not in the logic that is merely restricted to the use of judgments among one another). ""
Kant therefore gave the singular terms a separate place in transcendental logic compared to general terms .
quality
Judgments of quality are based on the way an object is. If someone affirms something ( S is P ), then he also denies the opposite ( Not: S is not P ). In addition, something can also have a different quality ( S is not-P ), such as the tertium non datur is canceled in a multi-valued logic .
Relations
Relations describe statements between two or more statements.
"All relationships of thinking in judgments are the a) of the predicate to the subject, b) of the reason to the consequence, c) of the divided knowledge and the collective members of the division among one another."
Categorically means that the statement S is P is simply an assertion. A conditional is called hypothetical ( if S, then P ). The disjunction is the distinction between different cases ( S is either P or Q or R ).
modality
Modal judgments describe the reality content of a statement. They have a special character in that they say nothing about the content of a judgment. They determine "the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general." [Can, is or must]
“Problematic judgments are those in which the affirmation or denial is assumed to be merely possible (arbitrary); assertoric, as it is considered real (true); apodictic ones, in which one sees it as necessary. * (FN) * Same as if thinking were a function of the understanding in the first case, in the second case of judgment, in the third case of reason. A remark that awaits clarification later [note: in the book on the principles]. "
Category panel
To transition from the judgment table to the category table, the table of pure understanding concepts, Kant first explained the concept of synthesis (connection).
"But I understand synthesis in the most general sense as the action of adding different ideas to one another and understanding their diversity in one cognition."
Such a merging of diverse ideas is an element of transcendental logic, since it does not abstract from the contents of knowledge like general logic, but tries to explain how the contents come about. If this synthesis takes place without reference to empirical data, but only a priori in the pure mind, then it is a pure synthesis. If the ideas are not based on perception, then, according to Kant, they come from the imagination, a fundamental function of the understanding.
The judgment table is a system of testimony forms. The relationship of a judgment to a category, as the structuring basic concept of experience, consists in the fact that the category expresses the essential characteristic of the respective type of judgment.
“The same understanding, then, through the very same actions, through which it brought about the logical form of a judgment in terms, by means of the analytical unity, also, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in perception in general, brings a transcendental form into his representations Content, which is why they are called pure intellectual concepts that a priori refer to objects that general logic cannot achieve. "
Correspondingly, the table of judgments for Kant results in an analogous table of categories that is completely uniform in structure. Since he had designed it systematically, Kant also considered the table complete.
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| Fig. 3: “Table of categories.”, Representation similar to Immanuel Kant: AA III, 93 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
In the explanations of the table of categories attached in the second edition, Kant differentiated between two classes (quantity and quality) as mathematical classes and the other two classes (relation and modality) as dynamic classes. The first two classes relate directly to intuitions. The categories of dynamic classes, on the other hand, relate to the existence of objects in general. They are dynamic because they describe relationships and changes. Kant further pointed out that although the third category of each class “arises everywhere from the connection of the second with the first in its class” (B 111), the third category is not merely derived, but contains its own meaning. Thus the concept of number is connected with the category of allness, that of infinity with the category of unity. The category of community (interaction) expresses a different effect relationship than the category of causality (sequence and dependency).
The categories “the one, the true, the good”, which are significant in scholasticism, are traced back to the class of quantity. You can do this if you understand quantity not numerically but qualitatively. Unity is such a qualitative summary of the manifold, which then presents itself as one. The truth shows itself when it is valid for a variety of cases in objective reality. And the good is an expression of perfection, that is, a case of allness.
Transcendental deduction of the understanding concepts
Just as the function of the pure perceptions of space and time was derived in the two steps of a metaphysical and a transcendental deduction in transcendental aesthetics , so Kant also proceeded with the presentation of the function of the categories for knowledge. The setting up of the judgment table and the derivation of the categories from it is the metaphysical deduction of the categories.
The next step is now the transcendental (non-empirical) deduction, in which Kant wanted to show how the pure concepts of the understanding are the basis of the structures and knowledge of empirical reality that are only formed in the mind. It is “the explanation of the way in which terms can relate a priori to objects”. (B 117) Just as transcendental aesthetics provides a justification for the possibility of mathematics, so then results from transcendental analytics a justification for the possibility of natural sciences. Kant wanted to show that the categories are necessary conditions (conditions of possibility) of every experience and thus of natural science. Without the categories that exist a priori, man cannot think of objects at all. Every scientific statement is loaded with theory because of the thought patterns that are always present in the mind.
The objective of evidence (§§ 13-14)
From Kant's point of view, proving the necessity of space and time as a priori knowledge was relatively easy, because they relate to objects of empirical intuition. The problem with the categories of mind, on the other hand, is that they are subjective conditions of thought. There is no empirical measure of their objective validity. This can be seen in the example of causality, where one perceives two phenomena, but not the effect itself.
- “Appearances do provide cases from which a rule is possible, according to which something happens more usually, but never that success is necessary: hence the synthesis of cause and effect also attaches a dignity that is not empirical at all can express, namely that the effect does not just add to the cause, but is posited by it, and results from it. This strict generality of the rule is also not at all a property of empirical rules which, through induction, cannot acquire any generality other than comparative generality, i.e. widespread usefulness. "(B 124)
Precisely from the fact that a phenomenon such as causality cannot be observed, the question arose for Kant what role the understanding plays in the cognition, whether there are services of the understanding independent of experience.
- “Now the question arises whether concepts also precede a priori, as conditions under which something alone, if not looked at, is nevertheless thought of as an object in general, because then all empirical knowledge of objects is necessarily in accordance with such concepts because, without whose prerequisite, nothing is possible as an object of experience. "(B 126/127)
From Kant's point of view, Locke had tried to explain such phenomena empirically and dared to go beyond all limits of experience. Hume , on the other hand, recognized this limit, but explained the corresponding concepts not with the use of the understanding but with habit. Kant found both concepts unsatisfactory.
- "The empirical derivation, however, to which both fell for, cannot be combined with the reality of the a priori scientific knowledge that we have, namely pure mathematics and general natural science, and is thus refuted by the fact." (B127–128)
The consequence is either enthusiasm (Locke) or skepticism (Hume). That is exactly what Kant wanted to avoid.
- "We are now in the process of making an attempt to see whether human reason can not be successfully passed between these two cliffs, set certain limits, and still keep the whole field of its functional activity open." (B 128)
The task of transcendental deduction is to show that perceptual judgments are converted into empirical judgments with the help of the categories. Categories are constitutive for experience and form the yardstick for objective experience.
The unity of apperception (§§ 15-25)
By “ apperception ” (French: conception), Kant understood the ability of the mind to create clear ideas from sensory perceptions through synthesis. This faculty is the faculty of a subject. That is why Kant also defined apperception as self-confidence.
- "The consciousness of oneself (apperception) is the simple idea of the ego, and, if by this alone everything manifold in the subject were given automatically, the inner perception would be intellectual." (B 69)
Kant's starting point of the deduction was that a connection of the manifold grasped in the perception does not take place in the realm of the senses, because these are only passive (receptive), but through an active action (spontaneity) of the mind, which Kant called imagination.
- “But the connection (conjunctio), of a manifold in general, can never come into us through the senses, and therefore cannot be contained in the pure form of sensual perception at the same time; because it is an act of the spontaneity of the imagination. "(B 130)
In order for the process of linking receptively created intuition and spontaneous imagination to take place at all, an entity is required that is the origin of this process. Kant saw this authority in self-confidence.
- “That: I think I have to be able to accompany all of my ideas; for otherwise something would be imagined in me which could not be thought at all, which means as much as the imagination would either be impossible, or at least be nothing for me. "(B131-132)
- "The thought: these ideas given in perception belong to me as a whole, then means as much as I unite them in a self-consciousness, or at least can unite them in it." (B 134)
- "And so the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point at which one must attach all use of the mind, even the whole logic, and, according to it, the transcendental philosophy, yes, this faculty is the mind itself." (Note B 134 )
Kant distinguished two levels of self-confidence. For one thing, self-confidence is empirical. In addition to objects that are perceived by the external senses (by seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, smelling), there is also an inner sensory perception of physical states (pain, pleasure), to which the psychological states (joy, boredom) are to be counted. These ideas are based on views that are brought to unity as empirical phenomena in the mind.
In addition, however, there is also an ego-idea that is detached from all empirical, including bodily, views. This is the one “I think” in which every idea is thought of as its own idea. For Kant, man draws his identity from this pure imagination. Like the perceived nature, the human self is structured and brought to unity through thought processes. Only the idea of “I think” enables a unified awareness. This non-empirical “I think” is not always conscious, but you cannot have a conscious thought without always thinking “I think” in the background. It is certain to man. The content of thinking is grasped in the internal sense and is (subjective) appearance (B 139). Every thought is always my thought. The "I think" is just as much the pure idea of thinking as space and time are the pure intuition of perception. Kant called this type of self-awareness “transcendental apperception”.
- “The transcendental unity of apperception is that through which everything manifold given in a pure intuition is united in one concept of the object. It is therefore called objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of the inner sense, through which every manifold of perception is empirically given to such a connection. "(B 140)
Sensations are only subjective. When you lift a body, you have the feeling of a certain heaviness. Knowledge arises from the fact that one brings the sensation to a concept through a judgment. If you say: This body is heavy, then you have conceptualized an objective fact through this judgment. The statement leads to the objectivity of the term in that it is also comprehensible for another. The "I think" is not only valid for a certain subject, but is supra-individual. Since the categories, as pure concepts of the understanding, give the judgments their form, they are necessary prerequisites (condition of the possibility) of knowledge.
The unity of apperception (the “I think”), the categories as pure concepts of the understanding and space and time as pure perceptions are the foundations of human knowledge in Kant's concept. According to Kant, this can be ascertained analytically, but it cannot be explained why it is so.
- “But from the peculiarity of our understanding, to bring about the same unity of apperception a priori only by means of the categories and precisely through this type and number, no further reason can be given as why we allow this and no other function Have to judge, or why time and space are the only forms of our possible intuition. "(B 145)
Knowledge arises only through the application of the pure concepts of reason, even in mathematics, the principles of which are a priori (B 147). Mathematics in itself is a formal system. Whether it is applicable to questions of knowledge of nature can only be seen from perception. As soon as one presents an object, it must have properties that can also be grasped in sensual perception. There are no objects without sensual intuition.
- “This further expansion of the concepts beyond our sensual perception does not help us in anything. Because they are empty concepts of objects, from which, whether they are only possible once or not, we cannot judge through them, mere thought-forms without objective reality "(B 148)
Now man has imagination. This is "the ability to represent an object in perception even without the presence." (B 151) According to Kant, imagination differs from the purely intellectual synthesis by its relation to perceptions, so it is part of sensuality. To the extent that the imagination is not only reproductive but also spontaneous, Kant called it productive imagination. It affects the inner sense, analogous to the affection of the outer senses in the case of perception. According to Kant, one can also explain the process of self-reflection accordingly.
- “I, as an intelligence and thinking subject, recognize myself as a thought object, as far as I am still given in the intuition, just like other phenomena, not as I am in the understanding, but as I appear to myself, no longer has also no less difficulties with oneself than how I can be an object to myself at all, namely of inner intuition and inner perception. ”(B 155–156)
Man realizes that he is. He recognizes what he is like as an appearance. But he does not recognize what he is, as belonging to things in themselves.
The applicability of the categories (§§ 26-27)
After the origin of the categories was shown in the metaphysical deduction and their necessity for knowledge was established in the transcendental deduction, Kant wanted to show in a further step their applicability to nature.
- "Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori for appearances, and therefore nature, as the epitome of all appearances (natura materialiter spectata [the materially viewed nature])." (B 164)
Kant rhetorically described the statement that nature is based on understanding as strange. In his opinion, this is due to the principles that man thinks into nature.
- "Because laws exist just as little in the phenomena, but only relative to the subject, to whom the phenomena are inherent, as far as it has understanding, as phenomena do not exist in themselves, but only relative to the same being, as far as it has senses." (B 164)
Appearances are only ideas of things that cannot be known in themselves. They are also not linked to one another. The imaginary connections come from the human mind. However, humans are not free to think of any connections. It depends on experience. This includes the receptivity of the senses. So according to Kant there is definitely a world in itself. Only this cannot be grasped as it is for humans. Because man is at the same time limited by his cognitive faculties, which is limited by the forms of perception (space and time) and by the concepts of understanding (categories).
Analysis of the principles
The Analytic of Principles is the second part (book two) of the Transcendental Analytic. After deriving the categories from the table of judgments (the metaphysical deduction) and justifying the validity of the categories for all experience (the transcendental deduction), Kant now wanted to show how synthetic judgments a priori establish a connection between intuitions and pure intellectual concepts.
The analysis of the principles is thus a doctrine (doctrine) of understanding (concept), judgment (judgment) and reason (conclusions) and the interplay of these three faculties.
Schematism of the pure understanding concepts
Kant was of the opinion that there is a capacity in the mind to mediate between the categories and the concrete phenomena through a transcendental scheme. Such a schema is transcendental because it is not directly connected to a graphic representation. This is not how you can imagine an ideal triangle. Nevertheless, any triangles, whether acute or obtuse, equilateral or right-angled, can be subsumed under the term triangle. You don't learn that the four-legged creature there is a dog and not a cat through a definition, but you recognize it based on a scheme. Schemas are used to assign views to the correct terms. A schema does not contain anything empirically individual, but a structure. Transcendental are the schemes used to judge which category is applicable. The individual characteristics of a schema can be very different.
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| Fig. 4: Schemas of the pure understanding concepts according to Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 102 f. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Time series (counted time) |
Time content (perceived time) |
Time order (order in time) |
Epitome of time (how something is in time) |
|---|---|---|---|
| unrestricted | fulfilled time | Persistence of the real | Existence at any time |
| limited | empty time | Succession under one rule | Existence at a certain time |
| not restrictable | Transition from reality to negation | Simultaneousness of two substances | Existence at all times |
The link between categories and schemes is time. The timing associated with the categories are rules that apply a priori.
- "The schemes are therefore nothing but time determinations a priori according to rules, and these go according to the order of the categories on the time series, the time content, the time order, finally the time inclusive with regard to all possible objects." (B 184-185)
Schemas are the classification of the categories with regard to the temporal behavior of an intuition. The temporal is contained in every intuition. The quantity contains the number as a scheme. Counting corresponds to a time series. Time is unlimited, so that everything general can be represented in it. If one deals with a concrete multiplicity, the time concept is also limited. If, on the other hand, one regards time itself as allness, then its concept cannot be restricted. The quality as time content is the perceived time. If reality is affirmed, time is fulfilled, if it is negated, time is empty. The limitation is a transition from reality to negation. In relation to a rule, the objects are in a sequence in time. Substance stands for duration, causality for sequence of times and community for simultaneity. The modality is the epitome of time from which it follows how something is in time. If existence is at any time, it is possible; if it is at a particular time it is real; and if it is at all times, it is necessary.
Principles of pure mind
In the chapter on the principles of pure understanding, Kant names basic principles that apply as "pure" principles for every area of science. It is the application of the categories to nature by formulating generally valid propositions, synthetic a priori judgments, the validity of which is independent of the current empirical status of mathematical and scientific research. The principles form the basis of every single scientific research as a structural principle. They are general statements about the essence of nature.
It is easy to see that the examples used by Kant no longer correspond to the current state of research (non-Euclidean geometry, relativity theory). But it does not follow from this that the principles themselves lose their validity. They are independent of the respective historical state of science.
The ultimate principle of experience
The supreme principle for analytical judgments is the principle of contradiction . It can be used without restriction in logic to determine the truth of statements. For Kant, the principle of contradiction in empirical intuition only works for the negative determination of truth. An empirical statement that contradicts the principle of contradiction is wrong. But this is not sufficient to grasp the truth of synthetic judgments. Synthetic judgments have their origin in sensual perception. Kant said accordingly:
- "The supreme principle of all synthetic judgments is thus: every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of perception in a possible experience." (B 197)
The forms of perception given to man a priori (space and time) and concepts (categories) determine how an object appears to him, and thus also the object itself. Man constitutes objects based on the structure of his cognitive faculties. This leads to the famous Kantian theorem:
- "The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and therefore have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment." (B 197)
Synthetic judgments a priori
According to the classes of the categories, Kant distinguished four types of principles.
- Axioms of intuition
- "All views are extensive quantities" (B 202)
- In the first edition, Kant had formulated somewhat more extensively: “All appearances are, in their view, extensive quantities.” (A 162) Appearances cannot be understood otherwise than that they consist of something, that is, that they have a certain size. Without something having a size, it would not be countable and thus also not mathematically representable. The principle is therefore not only a prerequisite for mathematics, but also the first form principle of all quantifying sciences.
- Anticipations of perception
- "In all appearances, the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intense magnitude, ie a degree" (B 207)
- This proposition is also a prerequisite for the measuring sciences. Perception also contains sensations in addition to intuition. You cannot perceive anything without associating a certain intensity with the perception. Examples are temperature, brightness, hardness or weight. When something is real, it has a measurable property that can be represented on a scale from 0 (does not exist) to 1 (exists without restriction). In between are the empirical measured values (limitation). Every sensation, therefore every reality in the appearance, is continuous for Kant:
- “The property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the smallest possible (no part is simple), is called their continuity. Space and time are quanta continua, because no part of them can be given without including it between borders (points and moments), therefore only in such a way that this part itself is again a space or a time. "(B 211)
- Analogies of Experience
- "Experience is only possible through the idea of a necessary link between perceptions." (B 218)
- Here, too, the formulation of the first edition serves as a helpful explanation: "According to their existence, all appearances are a priori subject to rules determining their relationship to one another in time." (A 176). The basic principle of the analogies of experience is subject to the scheme of the order of time and is determined by the categories from the class of relations (substance, causal principle and community). Experience is made up of several perceptions that are ordered in the process of knowledge. Kant then divided the general principle into three separate analogies.
- 1. Analogy
- "With every change of phenomena, the substance persists, and the quantity thereof is neither increased nor decreased in nature." (B 224)
- Man perceives changes in time, while time as such is an unchanging, even imperceptible form. The following applies accordingly:
- "Change is a way of existing that takes place in a different way of existing of the same object." (B 230)
- So one cannot speak of change if there is not something, a substance that is the carrier of the changing properties. Change can only be experienced if there is something persistent as a starting point for change. What changes are the accidents, while the underlying substance remains persistent.
- 2. Analogy
- "All changes happen according to the law of the link between cause and effect." (B 232)
- The formulation of the first edition reads: "Everything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something, which it follows according to a rule." (A189) Man does not perceive causality sensually. The connection of perceptions is an achievement of the mind, which brings in the category of causality here. Humans perceive lightning and thunder as separate phenomena. The reason: It thunders because there was lightning, is formed according to a rule in the mind. Without the causal principle, humans would not be able to formulate natural laws, because the connection between the perceptions would then have to appear random. Without the causal principle there would be no objectivity.
- 3. Analogy
- "All substances, insofar as they can be perceived as simultaneously in the room, are in constant interaction." (B 256)
- Kant also understood interaction as indirect interaction (cf. B 259). There is a continuous connection between the perceived objects. Kant emphasized that his statement is only valid as far as experience goes.
- “I do not want to refute the empty space by doing this: because it may always be where perceptions do not reach at all, and therefore no empirical knowledge of simultaneity takes place; but then it is no object at all for our possible experience. "(B 261)
- Postulates of empirical thinking in general
- "1. Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (intuition and concepts) is possible.
2. What is connected with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is real.
3. Whose connection with the real is determined according to general conditions of experience, is (exists) necessary. ”(B 265–266) - Kant emphasized again that the categories of modality, in contrast to the three other classes, have no direct relation to the content of the objects under consideration. It is important to note that the postulates make it clear that the application of the categories only applies to the area of empirical knowledge. The pure concepts of reason are not suitable for contributing in terms of content to statements that go beyond what can be experienced.
- "Precisely for that sake, the principles of modality are nothing more than explanations of the concepts of possibility, reality and necessity in their empirical use, and thus at the same time restrictions of all categories to merely empirical use, without admitting and permitting the transcendental." B 267)
Excursus: refutation of idealism
After the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason appeared, Kant's new philosophy had been equated in part with Berkeley's position , a pure idealism . In order to distinguish himself from this assessment, Kant had inserted a separate section within the postulates in the second edition to refute idealism. In doing so, he expressly turned against Descartes , whose tracing of all thinking back to the “I” does not apply if one can show that empirical intuition is not only a possible, but a necessary precondition for knowledge. Kant's thesis reads:
- Theorem
- “The mere but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside of me.
- proof
- I am aware of my existence as determined in time. All timing presupposes something persistent in perception. But this perseverance cannot be something in me because my existence in time can first and foremost be determined by this perseverance. So the perception of this persistence is only possible through a thing outside of me and not through the mere imagination of a thing outside of me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is only possible through the existence of real things that I perceive outside of myself. Now the consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the possibility of this determination of time: thus it is also necessarily connected with the existence of things outside of me, as a condition of the determination of time; ie the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside of me. ”(B 275–276)
All human thinking is related to time. In doing so, he does not think of time, but of an object that changes over time. Because there is a relationship between thinking and something, that something cannot be thinking itself. From Kant's point of view, an object must exist outside of thinking. Even if Kant did not consider things in themselves to be immediately recognizable, their existence in themselves was essential to him. Against idealism, Kant advocated a realism , albeit a very weak one .
Phenomena and Noumena - things in themselves
With the specification of the principles, Kant had completed the actual presentation of his epistemology. He had shown that pure intuition and pure understanding concepts are constitutive for human knowledge. At the same time, these constitutive conditions of knowledge are also its limits. In the third section of the transcendental analytics, he was concerned with showing what these limits are - insofar as anything can be said about them at all.
Kant introduced this idea with a flowery picture. He compared the land of the mind to an island.
- “It is the land of truth (a lovely name), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the actual seat of the illusion, where many a fog bank and some soon-to-be-melted ice lie to new lands and by constantly emptying the seafarers swarming around on discoveries with it Hopes are deceptive, entangled him in adventures from which he can never give up and yet never bring them to an end. ”(B 294–295)
If one embarks on appropriate voyages of discovery, according to Kant, the rules of the use of the mind, including the principles, are the correct map. The understanding can only make empirical, but never transcendental use of all its principles a priori. Transcendental here means making statements about things in themselves, in contrast to the empirical phenomena on which all experience is based. Kant's discussion was about the relationship between phenomena and things in themselves. The world of perceptions (mundus sensibilis) is the realm of appearances, phenomena. Is there also an independent world of the mind (mundus intelligibilis) with pure thought things (noumena), which the mind can directly see? Kant strictly rejected this, citing the principles of transcendental aesthetics. The “thing in itself considered” is “just a borderline concept.” (B 131) This concept has only a methodological function and no metaphysical content.
Because man has the understanding, he is indeed able to imagine a pure world of thought. But he can't see anything from this. The concept of noumena is empty because it is not based on an intuition. The Noumena are a pure borderline concept that is "not contradicting", that is, contains logically thinkable things. But it is only valid negatively in that it protects the senses from false perceptions (cf. B 307). Kant also called the noumenon a problematic term. By this he meant that the noumenon is a possible concept, but due to a lack of experience it cannot lead to an idea.
- “In the end, however, the possibility of such a noumenorum cannot be seen at all, and the scope outside of the sphere of appearances is empty (for us), that is, we have an understanding that problematically extends further than that, but no perception, yes too not even the concept of a possible intuition, whereby objects outside the field of sensuality can be given to us, and the understanding can be used assertorically beyond them. The concept of a noumenon is therefore only a borderline concept in order to restrict the presumption of sensuality, and therefore only of negative use. "(B 310-311)
Kant thus decidedly rejected the existence of a world that is only produced intellectually, the existence of an intelligible world, and thus stood in opposition to the later systems of Fichte and Hegel .
- "So the question is: whether besides the empirical use of the understanding (even in the Newtonian conception of the structure of the world) a transcendental use is still possible, which goes to the noumenon as an object, which question we answered in the negative." (B 313)
Appendix: Amphibolia of reflection concepts
Just as the “refutation of idealism” was a clarification against Descartes and Berkeley, the section on the “amphibolism [ambiguity] of reflection concepts” served Kant to delimit his philosophy from Leibniz .
In a judgment, different ideas are differentiated on the basis of reflection terms. These are, according to the four category titles:
- Identity / diversity
- Attunement / conflict
- Inside / outside
- Matter / form
The task of “transcendental reflection” is to distinguish whether the application of these terms relates to sensuality or to pure understanding. (See B 319) Depending on the area of application, these terms take on different meanings.
Kant held against Leibniz that he had "intellectualized" the phenomena. (B 327) For Leibniz the sensually given percepts (perceptual contents) were initially only confused representations of objects and were only ordered into clear and distinct knowledge by the mind. According to Leibniz, the real world arises and thus only exists in the mind. All determinations of objects and their relationships would accordingly be of a purely conceptual nature. According to Kant, this produces a world that is only intelligible, which, since it contains no intuition, should be empty in itself, without any objects.
- According to Leibniz, the “ Principium identitatis indiscernibilium ” (principle of the identity of the indistinguishable) applies. According to this, two objects are identical if they do not differ in any of their properties. Since Leibniz also understood space and time as (not real) properties, there could not be two indistinguishable objects for him. Or: An object has the same properties only with itself. Kant, on the other hand, considered it possible that two objects have completely the same properties, but are located in two different space-time positions. As an example, he gave two drops of water, the non-identity of which can very well be grasped, although the mind cannot grasp different properties.
- Leibniz and, above all, his students advocated the principle that "realities (as mere affirmations) never logically conflict with one another". (B 328) Kant set against this the principle of "realpugnance" (the contradiction in the matter, not in the concept), according to which two physical or two psychic forces can cancel each other completely or partially.
- In Leibniz's doctrine of monads, according to which the world consists of simple and indivisible monads without interaction, Kant criticized the fact that there is nothing absolute, that is, “nothing absolutely, but nothing but comparative internal”. (B 333)
- Kant agreed with Leibniz (and against Newton's assumption of the reality of space) that space and time are neither substance nor property (accident). Leibniz considered space and time to be relations of external things and to be "phaenomena dei" (appearances of God). Kant, on the other hand, set his conception of space and time as pure forms of human perception that precede matter.
Kant's basic criticism of Leibniz consisted in all four points of the fact that an intelligible ideality follows from Leibniz's thinking, which necessitates complex speculative metaphysics ( pre-stabilized harmony ).
negation
At the end of the appendix, there is a brief consideration of the negation. Each of the four category titles has a specific form from which types of “ nothing ” arise - just as the categories different aspects of the determination of an object. This enables a distinction to be made between possible and impossible, but not real, objects.
- empty concept without object ( ens rationis - thought thing )
- empty object of a concept ( nihil privativum - nothing 'of something', "negation of perception")
- empty intuition without an object ( ens imaginarium - "mere form")
- empty object without concept ( nihil negativum - absurdity)
- “One sees that the thought thing (n. 1.) is distinguished from the absurd (n. 4.) by the fact that the thing may not be counted under the possibilities because it is mere fiction (although not contradicting), but this is the Opposite possibility, the term even cancels itself. But both are empty concepts. In contrast, the nihil privativum (n. 2.) and ens imaginarium (n. 3.) are empty data for concepts. ”Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 187
Overview of the Tables of the Transcendental Analytics
| Forms of judgment (B 95) | Categories (B 106) (term - condition) |
Schemes (B 181) (judgment - derivation) |
Principles (B 200) (conclusion - conditional) |
|---|---|---|---|
|
quantity |
Quantity (negation: empty concept without an object: ens rationis) |
Time series (counted time) time generated in the successive apprehension of an object MAN: Phoronomy = movement theory |
Axioms of perception (B 202) (According to their perception, all appearances are extensive quantities.) |
| General (universale: all S are P) apprehension of perception |
Unity (all people think) |
unrestricted | |
| Special (particular: some S are P) reproduction in the imagination |
Multiplicity (some people are philosophers) |
limited | |
| Single (singular: an S is a P) Rekognition in the process |
Allness (Kant was a philosopher) |
not restrictable | |
|
quality |
Quality (negation: empty object of a term: nihil privativum; ex: shadow, cold, darkness) |
Time content (perceived time) MAN: Dynamics |
Anticipation of perception (B 207) (In all appearances, the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intense size) |
| Affirmative (affirmative: S is P) |
Reality (this person is a philosopher) |
fulfilled time | |
| Negative (negative: S is not P) |
Negation (that person is not a philosopher) |
Empty time | |
| Infinite (infinite / limitative: S is not-P) |
Limitation (Philosophy requires a minimum of thinking) |
Transition from reality to negation | |
|
relation |
Relation (negation: empty notions without an object: ens imaginarium) |
Time order (order in time) MAN: Mechanics |
Analogy of experience (B 218) (experience is only possible through the idea of a necessary connection of perception) |
| Categorical (S is P) two concepts - major premise - idea of the soul |
Inherence and Subsistence (This person philosophizes) |
Persistence of the real in time | Principle of persistence of substance; the quantum remains the same (B 224) |
| Hypothetical (if S = P, then Q = R) two judgments - minor premise - idea of the world |
Causality and Dependency (If you deal with questions of knowledge, then you philosophize) |
Succession if it is subject to a rule | All changes take place according to the law of the link between cause and effect (B 232). |
| Disjunctive (S is either P, Q or R) multiple judgments - final clause - idea of God |
Community (either Leibniz or Hume or Kant have the better epistemology) |
Two substances being at the same time according to a rule | All substances, provided they are perceived in space at the same time, interact (B 256). |
|
modality |
Modality (negation: empty object without a term: nihil negativum) |
The epitome of time (How is something in time?) MAN: Phenomenology |
Postulates of empirical thinking in general (B 265) |
| Problematic (It is possible that SP is) Mind - Mine (Psychology) |
Possibility - impossibility (I can believe that there is a god) |
Existence at any time | Agreement with the formal conditions of experience means possibility |
| Assertoric (S is actually P) Judgment - Faith (Cosmology) |
Existence - non-existence (many have tried to prove the existence of God) |
Existence at a certain time | Connection with the material conditions of experiences (sensations) means reality. |
| Apodictic (S is necessary P) reason - knowledge (theology) |
Necessity - randomness (one cannot prove the existence of God) |
Existence at all times | Connection with the real, determined according to the general rules of experience, is (exists) necessary |
literature
- Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
- Rudolf Eisler : Kant Lexicon. Reference work on all of Kant's writings, letters and handwritten legacy , Olms, (5th reprint of the Berlin 1930 edition) 1989, ISBN 3-487-00744-4
- Walter Gölz: Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" in plain language. Text-related presentation of the train of thought with explanation and discussion , Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006, ISBN 3-8252-2759-6 (UTB)
- Felix Grayeff : Interpretation and presentation of the theoretical philosophy of Kant. A commentary on the basic parts of the Critique of Pure Reason. With an index by Eberhard Heller. 2nd edition, Meiner, Hamburg 1977 (original edition 1951), ISBN 3-7873-0180-1 .
- Otfried Höffe : Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The foundation of modern philosophy , Beck, 2nd edition Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-50919-3
- Georg Mohr , Marcus Willaschek (ed.): Critique of pure reason , classics interpreting. Akademie Verlag Berlin 1998. ISBN 3-05-003277-4
- Heinrich Ratke: Systematic hand dictionary to Kant's criticism of pure reason , Meiner, Hamburg 1991, ISBN 3-7873-1048-7
- Peter F. Strawson : The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason , London 1966 (German: Die Grenzen des Sinns. A commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason , Athenaeum, Frankfurt 1992, ISBN 3-445-07018-0 )
- Holm Tetens : Kant's “Critique of Pure Reason”: a systematic commentary , Reclam, Stuttgart 2006, ISBN 978-3-15-018434-9
Web links
- All works and letters in full text - University of Bonn
- Vorländer: history d. Philosophy. § 34. The transcendental analytics
- Wurzer: Literature review on the judgment table
- Entry in Rudolf Eisler's Kant Lexicon (1930)
Individual evidence
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 83 .
- ↑ B 89 stands for Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), page 89 according to the original page count of the second edition of 1787.
- ↑ With this criticism, however, Kant ignored the fact that Aristotle was pursuing a different question, namely the investigation of the structure of statements. Aristotle's categories are genres of statements that can no longer be traced back to one another.
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 85 / B 93.
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 85 / B 93.
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 86 / B 94.
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 87 .
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 87-88 / B 96-97.
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 88 / B 97.
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 89 .
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 91 .
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 92 .
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 93 .
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 102 .
- ↑ The origin of sensations remains unclear with Kant
- ↑ This section replaced a similar section contained in the 1st edition in the Transcendental Dialectic in the discussion of the 4th paralogism
- ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 187 / B 348.