Transcendental methodology
The transcendental methodology is the second part of the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) by Immanuel Kant .
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Methodology in the overall context of the Critique of Pure Reason | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
To describe the task of the transcendental methodology, Kant used the metaphor of a building. In the transcendental elementary doctrine, the first part of the KrV, it was investigated what kind of building can be built with the existing "building tools" (human cognitive faculties). Because of the limits of reason, it is not enough for the dreamed tower up to the sky, but only for a house. In the methodology, the construction plan for this building should now be sketched. It contains the “determinations of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason” (B. 735 f.).
Discipline of Pure Reason
Discipline is designed to help avoid errors that arise from inadequate methods.
- “But where, as in pure reason, a whole system of deceptions and delusions is encountered, which are well connected with each other and united under common principles, then a completely separate and negative legislation seems to be necessary, which under the name of one Discipline from the nature of reason and the objects of its pure use establish, as it were, a system of caution and self-examination, before which there may be no false pretense of reasoning, but must immediately betray itself, regardless of all reasons for its glossing over. "(B 739)
- dogmatic use
Mathematics is a model in which knowledge advances "without the aid of experience". The reason is that in mathematics terms like that of a triangle are constructed intuitively. These constructions are based on definitions and axioms as well as demonstrations. On the other hand, philosophical knowledge is a discursive knowledge of reason made up of concepts (B 741), which it merely dissects, and of synthetic a priori sentences, as in the example of a cause, which as such cannot be empirically observed but represents a principle of synthesis (B 750 )
- “Everything that is there (a thing in space or time), to consider whether and how far it is a quantum or not, that an existence must be represented in the same or lack, how far this something (which fills space or time ) be a first substratum, or mere determination, have a relation of its existence to something other than cause or effect, and finally stand isolated or in mutual dependence with others with regard to existence, the possibility of this existence, reality and necessity, or to consider objects of the same: all of this belongs to the knowledge of reason from concepts, which is called philosophical. "(B 752)
Dogmas are doctrinal sayings that are based on judgments from concepts (B 764). Dogmas that remain unquestioned are the starting point for mistakes and delusions. The method of transcendental philosophy instead includes the "criticism of our financial circumstances" (B 766)
- polemical use
Kant expressed a certain understanding of polemics in the dispute against dogmatic errors. Dogmatists tend to cover up their arguments in order to be right. But in the end, polemics are not necessary, as the better reason will prevail in the long term.
- “So there is no real polemic in the field of pure reason. Both parts are air fencers who wrestle with their shadows, because they go beyond nature, where there is nothing for their dogmatic grasp that can be grasped or held. They have fought well, the shadows they cut grow together again in an instant , like the heroes in Valhalla , in order to be able to amuse themselves again in bloodless battles. "(B 784)
- skeptical use
The skepticism is unsatisfactory. Knowing about the limits of knowledge makes it possible to judge whether ignorance consists of the facts or the ability to cognize. It is not obtained from experience, but a priori. David Hume , "the most ingenious of the skeptics", has come to the conclusion that such a concept is based on habit by stating that causality cannot be grasped with experience. However, from Kant's point of view, this is a step too little. The fact that man possesses synthetic knowledge a priori is shown by the fact that he can anticipate the experience with principles of reason. The skeptic cannot explain how man can derive principles from the concepts and judgments of the understanding with which general scientific facts (Kant's example is the melting of wax in the sun) can be explained.
- hypothetical use
Concepts of reason remain mere ideas as long as they are not related to experience.
- “The order and expediency of nature must in turn be explained on the basis of natural reasons and according to natural laws, and here even the wildest hypotheses, if they are physical, are more tolerable than a hyperphysical one, that is, the appeal to a divine author who is assumed for this purpose. "(B 800-801)
A second requirement for scientific knowledge is that hypotheses must be justified. This also applies to auxiliary hypotheses that are consulted if an explanation is insufficient. Hypotheses in the realm of reason have no function; unless they are used (as in the case of the antinomies) to show that a contrary hypothesis can be justified in the same way.
- “For speculative reason in its transcendental use is dialectical in itself. The objections that are to be feared lie within ourselves. "(B 805)
- Use as evidence
A sensible use of reason is to check and show whether and how the terms used in transcendental and synthetic sentences have objective validity and a possibility of synthesis a priori is given. To this end, intuition serves as an indispensable guide in mathematics and experience in transcendental knowledge. Because sentences a priori only start from one concept, Kant said that there was only one correct way of proof in each case. Such proofs should also always be carried out directly (“ostensively”) and not indirectly (“apagogically”). The latter are only an "emergency aid" (B 818), as they are based on a negative.
Canon of Pure Reason
After the advice to maintain discipline in the use of reason in philosophy and the sciences and to observe the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, Kant set up a canon for principles of the correct use of the understanding in the second main part of the methodology. While the discipline is a negative doctrine, the canon now shows what is allowed. Since purely speculative reason cannot lead to meaningful results, this canon must refer to the practical use of pure reason. Specifically, for Kant this was the question of how the idea of an immortal soul and how a god as the highest ground can relate to practical life. He excluded free will (as an idea of the world) because he assumed that it can already be accepted empirically as proven.
- “Now one more attempt remains: namely, whether pure reason can also be found in practical use, whether in it it leads to ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason which we have just cited, and thus these from the point of view of theirs of practical interest cannot grant what it completely refuses to give us with regard to speculative.
- All the interests of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) are united in the following three questions:
- 1. What can I know?
- 2. What should I do?
- 3. What can I hope for? (B 832 - 833)
Kant saw the highest purpose of practical life in the happiness that is attained when the practical commandment of prudence is in harmony with the moral law that can be recognized by pure reason. This gives rise to the commandment to act according to the moral law: "Do that which makes you worthy to be happy." (B 836 - 837)
To strive for such an ideal, one must start from an ideal world. Such an ideal world is only possible if it has a highest ground, a creator. And such an ideal world can only be imagined as a future world, because the present world does not meet these requirements. Such an ideal and future world thus presupposes the existence of an immortal soul.
- “Morality in itself constitutes a system, but not bliss, unless it is duly duly allocated to morality. But this is only possible in an intelligible world under a wise author and ruler. Reason feels compelled to accept such a life, including life in such a world, which we must regard as a future world, or to regard moral laws as empty fantasies, because the necessary success of these, which the same reason connects with them, is without any presupposition should be omitted. "(B 839)
According to Leibniz, Kant called a future ideal world in which bliss reigns the “kingdom of grace” in contrast to the “kingdom of nature” (A 812). Anyone who behaves according to the moral law and the maxims derived from it (cf. GMS ) fulfills the conditions of happiness if he also bases his actions on a moral disposition. Under these conditions man can hope that God will grant him happiness. The practical science with which this insight can be gained is moral theology . With it, the belief in a first primal ground is demonstrated as a prerequisite for morality. Speculative reason can do this neither as a rational nor as a natural theology. Moral theology is based on theoretical considerations, but is directed towards practical action.
- "Moral theology is therefore only of immanent use, namely to fulfill our purpose here in the world by fitting into the system of all purposes, and not enthusiastically or even outrageously leaving the guideline of a morally legislative reason, [...] (B 847)
The content of the canon of pure reason are therefore the rational ideas of the soul, freedom and God, but only viewed as regulative ideas.
Architecture of Pure Reason
In architectonics, Kant wanted to show that philosophy has an internal system. It is "the science of the scientific in our knowledge" in general. The representation of the inner connection clarifies the scientific character of philosophy. This is therefore not a “ rhapsody ”, but “the unity of the manifold knowledge under one idea”. (B 860)
| Outline element | Counterpart | science |
|---|---|---|
| Understanding | ||
|
rational (ex principiis) |
empirical (ex datis; historical) |
empirical sciences including empirical psychology and anthropology |
|
subjective (rational in the sense of the word) |
objective (as mere ideas) |
|
|
according to the world concept (own reason = learning to philosophize) |
according to the school concept (foreign reason = conceptual teaching structure) |
History of philosophy system theory |
|
philosophical (solely from terms = general metaphysics) |
mathematical (from the construction of terms) |
mathematics |
|
System of pure reason (philosophy as science = metaphysics in the broad sense) |
Critique of Reason (propaedeutic about the faculty of knowledge) |
Philosophical critique of knowledge |
|
Metaphysics of nature (pure principles of reason consisting only of concepts = metaphysics in the sense of the word) |
Metaphysics of morals (principles of doing and letting go a priori = morality) |
ethics |
|
Physiology of Pure Reason (with given objects) |
Transcendental philosophy (without given objects = synthetic judgments a priori) |
ontology |
|
immanent (application from experience) |
transcendent (beyond experience) |
rational cosmology rational theology |
|
inner sense (thinking nature) |
external sense (physical nature) |
rational physics |
| I think | rational psychology |
Such an architectonics, as in the other sciences, follows a scheme that only results from reason when enough parts of science have been examined in order to find out their connection. Kant developed the scheme in the form of a dichotomous opposition, reminiscent of a Dihairesis of Plato. The starting point of the architecture of pure reason is the distinction between the two stems of knowledge, sensuality and understanding. Sensuality is empirical and relies on historical data. The rational, mind-based element of knowledge adds principles (categories and principles). Such knowledge is never merely objective. Then they were just ideas. Rather, it needs the knowing subject. Depending on the source of the knowledge of the principles, Kant differentiated knowledge according to the school concept and the world concept. According to the school term, one learns systems that were designed by an alien reason. One follows another's conceptual doctrinal structures. As an example of such a system, Kant named Christian Wolff's rational philosophy . According to Kant, however, philosophical knowledge only arises when one understands the principles from one's own reason.
- "So among all the sciences of reason (a priori) one can learn only mathematics, never philosophy (unless historically), but, as far as reason is concerned, at most learn to philosophize ." (B 865)
According to Kant, mathematics has a special role in knowledge from pure reason. This is based on definitions and axioms and is therefore a construction of terms. Philosophy, on the other hand, can rely solely on concepts and their immediate analysis. Such a delimited philosophy is called metaphysics, which includes both the critique of reason and the system of pure reason. Criticism has the task of a propaedeutic , in which the conditions of the possibility of knowledge are clarified. In the KrV, the philosophical critique of knowledge is dealt with primarily in the transcendental aesthetics and analytics (without the principles).
The actual metaphysics (in the broader sense) is philosophy when it examines the systematic connection of knowledge as a science. On the one hand there is the metaphysics of morals and on the other hand the metaphysics of nature. The basic principle of moral doctrine is morality, in which the principles of doing and not doing are determined a priori from pure reason. In contrast, the metaphysics of nature deals with pure principles of reason simply from concepts. This is metaphysics in the strict sense.
Kant divided metaphysics in the narrower sense into a structure that almost completely corresponds to traditional metaphysics as taught by Wolff. Their presentation largely corresponds to the content of the transcendental dialectic. The system that deals only with concepts and the principles determined by reason, i.e. without reference to given objects, is the transcendental philosophy. This is developed in the KrV with a focus on transcendental analytics. The ontology corresponds to it in traditional metaphysics. Insofar as philosophy deals with principles of reason (transcendental dialectic) that relate to given objects (not to their knowledge), it is the physiology of pure reason. When these objects are beyond experience, they are transcendent. It is a connection of the external with the knowing subject. This concerns rational cosmology (antinomies) and rational theology (ideal of pure reason).
If the connection relates to the interior of the subject, then the physiology is called immanent. Here the application of experience is taken into account. If the subject is directed to the external sense, reason in rational physics deals with physical nature. In relation to internal sense, the object is thinking nature, which is dealt with in rational psychology.
Kant was of the opinion that the system outlined in this way was completely structured in terms of form and necessary in terms of structure. To arrive at this system, one only needs the mere concept of matter (physical nature) and the concept of a thinking being (thinking nature) as the starting point for a priori knowledge. A significant part of the architecture has already been dealt with in the KrV. On the other hand, Kant saw a lot of open work to fill in the content of the system, some of which he carried out in his other works. When embedded in the architecture, there are immediate points of contact in the Critique of Judgment , Critique of Practical Reason, and in Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason . For the application of the system in the field of nature he wrote the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and in the field of morality the Metaphysics of Morals .
In summary, Kant noted at the end of Architectonics (B 878 - 879) that metaphysics
- is not the basis of religion, but makes it possible ("is its indispensable defense").
- is inescapably part of human nature.
- the purposes pursued by mankind also determined in mathematics and in the natural sciences.
- so that "the perfection of all culture of human reason" is.
- “The general order and harmony, yes the prosperity of the scientific common being” ensures.
- and finally promoted "general bliss".
History of Pure Reason
Kant only briefly dealt with this final point of the KrV. Its history of philosophy is itself philosophy. For it takes up the idea of purposefulness and purposefulness again, which he considers to be an essential element of theoretical reason and to which the conclusion in the composition of the work now belongs.
In the final paragraph of the KrV, Kant stated with satisfaction and self-assurance:
- “The only critical way is still open. If the reader has had the courtesy and patience to wander through this in my company, he may now judge whether not, if he chooses, to do his part to make this footpath into Heerstrasse, what many centuries could not achieve, may be achieved before the end of the present; namely to bring human reason to complete satisfaction in that which has occupied its curiosity at all times, but so far in vain. "(B 884)
Individual evidence
- ↑ see similar schemes in Hans Michael Baumgartner: Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", 134, or Otfried Höffe: Critique of Pure Reason, 306
literature
- Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
- Rudolf Eisler : Kant Lexicon. Reference work on all of Kant's writings, letters and handwritten legacy. 5. Reprint of the Berlin 1930 edition. Olms, Hildesheim 1989, ISBN 3-487-00744-4 .
- Walter Gölz: Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" in plain language. Text-related presentation of the train of thought with explanation and discussion. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006, ISBN 3-8252-2759-6 (UTB).
- Felix Grayeff : Interpretation and presentation of the theoretical philosophy of Kant. A commentary on the basic parts of the Critique of Pure Reason. With an index by Eberhard Heller. 1951. 2nd edition, Meiner, Hamburg 1977, ISBN 3-7873-0180-1 .
- Otfried Höffe : Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The foundation of modern philosophy. 2nd edition, CH Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-50919-3 .
- Georg Mohr , Markus Willaschek (ed.): Critique of pure reason ( classic interpretation ). Academy, Berlin 1998, ISBN 3-05-003277-4 .
- Heinrich Ratke: Systematic hand dictionary to Kant's critique of pure reason. Meiner, Hamburg 1991, ISBN 3-7873-1048-7 .
- Peter F. Strawson : The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966. (German: The Limits of Sense. A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Athenaeum, Frankfurt 1992, ISBN 3-445-07018-0 ).
- Holm Tetens : Kant's “Critique of Pure Reason”. A systematic commentary. Reclam, Stuttgart 2006, ISBN 978-3-15-018434-9 .