Mary (thought experiment)
Marys Zimmer is a philosophical thought experiment presented by Frank Cameron Jackson in 1982 in his article Epiphenomenal Qualia and expanded in 1986 in his treatise What Mary Didn't Know . The argument that is supposed to be underpinned by this thought experiment is often referred to as the knowledge argument against physicalism , i.e. against the view that everything that exists, even spiritual, is purely physical.
The thought experiment
The thought experiment was originally formulated by Frank Jackson as follows:
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In other words, imagine a scientist who knows everything there is to know in the science of color perception, but who has never experienced color . The interesting question Jackson poses is: does this scientist learn something new the first time she sees color outside of her black and white prison?
Inferences
Should Mary learn something new when she has her first color perception, this has two important consequences: the existence of phenomenal (spiritually experienced), qualitative properties, aspects or levels of consciousness that can only be experienced , so-called qualia . Since qualia are so closely related to spiritual experience and, according to Jackson, cannot be reduced to physical explanations (otherwise Mary's optical specialization would be sufficient to "really know" colors), this would also be an argument for the existence of the mental (more precisely for knowledge of mental facts ) and thus against physicalism (the sometimes so-called knowledge argument ).
Qualia
First, if Mary learns something new after a color experience, qualia (the subjective, qualitative properties of experiences) exist. If we hold the thought experiment valid, we believe that Mary is gaining something - that she is acquiring knowledge of a particular entity that she did not previously have. That knowledge, Jackson argues, is knowledge of the qualia of red vision. It should therefore be recognized that qualia are real qualities, as there is a difference between a person who has access to certain qualia and one who does not have that access.
The knowledge argument
Second, if Mary learns something new after experiencing color, the physicalism is wrong. In particular, the knowledge argument is an attack on the claim of the physicalists that a physical explanation of mental states is complete. Mary may know all about color perception that science can know about it, but does she know what it's like to see the color red when she has never seen that color? Jackson claims that she learns something new through experience, and thus that physicalism is wrong.
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It is important to note, however, that in Jackson's article, physicalism denotes the epistemological doctrine that all knowledge is knowledge of physical facts , rather than the metaphysical doctrine that all things are physical things.
Reactions
Frank Jackson
Frank Jackson himself initially supported the antiphysicalist implications of the thought experiment of Marys Zimmer. Jackson believed in the full explanatory power of physiology , that all of our behavior is caused by some physical force. The thought experiment, on the other hand, seems to show the existence of qualia, non-physical mental entities. So if, Jackson argued, both of these are true, then epiphenomenalism is true, that is, mental states are caused by physical states but, conversely, they have no causal influence on the physical world. ( Lit .: Jackson 1982 & 1986)
So when he designed the thought experiment, Jackson was an epiphenomenalist. He later rejected epiphenomenalism against it. ( Lit .: Jackson 2003) This is because, as he explains, Mary says "Wow" when she sees red for the first time, which is why it must be Mary's qualia that makes her say "Wow". This contradicts epiphenomenalism. Since the thought experiment of Mary's room provokes this contradiction, something must be wrong with him. This position is often referred to as "'there must be a reply' reply".
At the end of Mind and Illusion (2003) Jackson suggests that it is only under false assumptions about sensory perception that Mary acquires new knowledge. This does not follow with the correct theory, namely a representational one . In addition, only if representationalism is adopted can the most convincing response to the example be developed: the u. a. suggested by Nemirow and D. Lewis that Mary acquire a new ability. This allows physicalism to be maintained.
Daniel Dennett
The philosopher Daniel Dennett describes Mary's thought experiment as an “intuition pump”, a thought experiment that is easy to understand and intuitively accessible and that encourages us to misunderstand its assumptions all too easily and simply to fall into our intuition that the result of the thought experiment "Obviously" is that Mary will learn something new on her first color experiment. Dennett writes in his monograph "Consciousness explained":
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So, according to Dennett, we must not dismiss the knowledge of Mary based on our current knowledge and our need in closing the explanatory gap. At the moment we cannot imagine what such knowledge looks like, but if we really allow Mary to know everything that can be available in physical knowledge, we must not think of someone who has absolutely everything there is to be imagined as someone who is “just” damn rich. Dennett strongly opposes that it is "obvious" that Mary is learning something new the first time she sees color; this would be suggested to one by the way the thought experiment is usually presented. Instead, he suggests that the viewer imagine Mary being presented with a yellow and a blue banana to test after her release, and that she passes this test with flying colors. It is less important how it does this in detail, but rather that it does it. This alternative outcome of the experiment, Dennett said, would not prove that Mary was learning nothing new, but that the usually suggested outcome of the experiment would not necessarily show that she had to learn something new. For Dennett, therefore, Jackson's thought experiment is a
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This position was supported by Dennett in "What RoboMary Knows" ( Ref : presented Dennett 2003).
The debate sparked by this thought experiment was most recently the subject of a collection of essays - There's Something About Mary (2004) - with responses from leading philosophers such as Daniel Dennett , David Lewis , and Paul Churchland . The thought experiment can also be found in the film Ex Machina . Here Caleb introduces the thought experiment to the android Ava. It is indirectly related to artificial intelligence and adds a further component: Can machines ever experience colors if all the knowledge they have is only programmed into it? Will humans always be superior to AI if they are not?
See also
literature
- Daniel Dennett : Consciousness Explained , Little Brown and Co, Boston 1991, ISBN 0-316-18065-3 .
- Daniel Dennett: What RoboMary Knows . In: Torin Alter (Ed.) Knowledge Argument , 2003. Online version
- Frank Cameron Jackson : Epiphenomenal Qualia . In: Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1982, pp. 127-136. Online version ( Memento from December 31, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
- Frank Cameron Jackson: What Mary Didn't Know . In: Journal of Philosophy 83, 1986, pp. 291-295.
- Frank Cameron Jackson: Mind and Illusion , in Anthony O'Hear (Ed.): Minds and Persons , Cambridge University Press, pp. 251-271, 2003. Online version of David Chalmers' consc.net ( Memento April 5 2005 in the Internet Archive )
- Peter J. Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa and Daniel Stoljar (Eds.): There's something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument , MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 2004, ISBN 0-262-62189-4 (paperback) , ISBN 0-262-12272-3 (hardcover).
- Daniel Stoljar: Physicalism and the Necessary a Posteriori In: The Journal of Philosophy, Issue 1, Year 2000, pp. 33-54. doi: 10.2307 / 2678473
Web links
- Martine Nida-Rümelin : Qualia: The Knowledge Argument. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
- Torin Alter: The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. In: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
- David Chalmers : The Knowledge Argument , Bibliography, in: MindPapers