Martine Nida-Rümelin

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Martine Nida-Rümelin (* 1957 in Munich ) is a philosopher and, since 1999, has been a professor at the University of Friborg in Switzerland . Her main areas of work are philosophy of mind , epistemology and philosophy of language . Most of her published work deals with the special status of conscious beings and aims to develop a non- materialistic view that avoids the weaknesses of traditional versions of dualism . Her research interests focus on phenomenal consciousness , the identity of beings capable of consciousness over time and across possible worlds, as well as activity in action. She is one of the philosophers of the analytic tradition who attach great importance to rational intuitions and phenomenological reflection.

Nida-Rümelin studied philosophy , psychology , mathematics and political science at the Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich . In 1994 she received the Wolfgang Stegmüller Prize of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy .

In her dissertation she dealt with the argument of incomplete knowledge put forward by the Australian philosopher Frank Cameron Jackson , which is directed against a materialistic conception of consciousness and is one of the most important qualia- based arguments. Nida-Rümelin's reformulation escapes problems where Jackson's argumentation threatens to fail. There is much discussion about her modified version of the Mary thought experiment, which through John Perry entered the debate as the “Nida-Rümelin room”.

In her habilitation, she developed a non- reductionist thesis regarding the identity of individuals capable of consciousness.

For 2019 she was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize .

Nida-Rümelin is the daughter of the artist Rolf Nida-Rümelin , the granddaughter of the sculptor Wilhelm Nida-Rümelin and the sister of the philosopher and politician Julian Nida-Rümelin .

Selected publications

  • Colors and phenomenal knowledge. A Critique of Materialistic Theories of Mind , Conceptus Sonderband, Academia, St. Augustin 1993.
  • The Special Status of Persons: An Anomaly for the Theory of Practical Rationality. In: Julian Nida-Rümelin and Ulrike Wessels (eds.): Practical Rationality , de Gruyter, Berlin, 1993, pp. 143–166.
  • What Mary couldn't know. Phenomenal states as objects of belief. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.): Consciousness, contributions from contemporary philosophy, Schöningh, Paderborn, 1995, pp. 259–282.
  • Pseudonormal Vision and Color Qualia. In Stuart Hameroff, Alfred Kaszniak and David Chalmers (eds.): Toward a Science of Consciousness III, The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates , MIT Press, 1999, pp. 75-84.
  • Grasping Phenomenal Properties. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (Eds.): Phenomenal Belief and Phenomenal Concepts , Oxford University Press, 2004.
  • The view from the inside. On the transtemporal identity of beings capable of consciousness. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main, 2006.
  • Dualist Emergentism , in Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind , Blackwell Publishing.
  • The person as the author of what they do. Comments on the interpretation of neurobiological data. In Adrian Holderegger u. a. (ed.), Brain Research and Human Image , Friborg Academic Press, 2008.
  • The conceptual origin of subject body dualism. In Annalisa Colliva (Ed.): Self and Self-Knowledge , Oxford University Press.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Directory of the award winners ( Memento of the original from June 9, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.gap-im-netz.de
  2. ^ John Perry: Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. Jean Nicod Lectures, Cambridge, Mass .: MIT, 2003.