Mission Radowitz

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As Mission Radowitz is called the deployment of German diplomat Joseph Maria von Radowitz to St. Petersburg early 1875 as Envoyé en mission extraordinaire.

occasion

The external reason for the mission was the illness of the German envoy in St. Petersburg, Prince Reuss , who was on a cure in Amsterdam for several months . Its representative was the charge d'affaires of Alvensleben , in the opinion of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was not up to the job. Alvensleben not only did not adequately represent the German position towards the Russian Chancellor, Prince Gorčakov ; he even allowed himself to be "misused" by Gorčakov to convey sharp criticism of Bismarck's policy to Berlin, although this would have been the task of the Russian ambassador in Berlin according to diplomatic practice. In a decree of January 25, 1875, Bismarck sarcastically rebuked Alvensleben as follows:

"The German embassy in Petersburg is mainly there to represent German wishes in Russia than Russian wishes in our country."

Political situation in early 1875

The German Reich had - unlike before, the German federal government - without complying with European Pentarchiemächten constituted . There was no guarantee from the major European powers for its existence, including the annexed Alsace-Lorraine . Germany feared demands for revenge from France. In this situation, Bismarck tried to keep the empire permanently in an alliance with Russia and Austria-Hungary. Any rapprochement between one of these allies and France was seen as a great danger ( coalitions nightmare or cauchemar des coalitions ). Therefore, Berlin viewed the Francophile policies of the Russian Chancellor Gorčakov critically.

In 1874/75, from a German perspective, there was a danger of encirclement on the horizon, on the one hand through rapprochement between Russia and France, and on the other hand through a possible merger of the Catholic powers Austria-Hungary, Italy and France with the Vatican . There were also anti-German protests and threats from the Catholic side in Belgium and Russian-occupied Poland , whereby the condemnation of the Kulturkampf was combined with other political demands (e.g. for the return of Alsace-Lorraine). It was also worrying that Russia, which had grown closer to the Vatican since 1871, condemned German policy against Catholicism.

Russia treated Germany - like Prussia before - as a junior partner. Bismarck sought equality with regard to the strengthened role of the united empire in relation to Russia. For German support of Russian interests he called for reciprocity.

Individual events at the beginning of 1875 show the tense situation:

02/03/1875 Sharp note from the German Reich to Belgium: call for measures against clerical aspirations
02/05/1875 Encyclical Quod numquam of Pope Pius IX. against the Kulturkampf
03/04/1875 After rumors that France wanted to buy horses in Germany on a large scale, German horse sales to France were banned
03/12/1875 French cadre law on army increase
04/08/1875 Article: "Is War In Sight?"

Justification of the mission

Between January 24 and 26, 1875, Bismarck made the decision to make the voice of Germany more heard in St. Petersburg by sending a diplomat. On March 3, Bismarck briefed Radowitz on his task. He should cultivate good relations with Russia and also develop a “'sincere understanding' '[...] with Gorčakov,' no matter how difficult it is for him. '" According to Radowitz's memoirs, Bismarck only gave general instructions without special political mandate ”.

The posting of Radowitz was accompanied by newspaper articles that can be described as semi-official. The mission was justified with the need not to jeopardize the recovery of Prince Reuss and, moreover, with Radowitz's familiarity with the conditions of the Orient.

Course of the mission

02/06/1875 Arrival in St. Petersburg
02/07/1875 Reception by Chancellor Gorčakov
02/08/1875 Inaugural audience with Tsar Alexander II.
02/14/1875 Circular from Russia to its diplomatic missions: Cooperation with representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary
03/11/1875 Return of the scheduled envoy Prince Reuss / handover of official business by Radowitz
03/14/1875 Audience of Prince Reuss with the Tsar
March 14 - March 18, 1875 Radowitz's stay in Moscow
03/18/1875 Radowitz's farewell audience with the Tsar
March 18 - March 20, 1875 The Tsar's hunting trip with Prince Reuss
03/21/1875 After Prince Reuss returned: Radowitz left for Berlin
03/23/1875 Arrival in Berlin - Reception at the Reich Chancellor and Kaiser Wilhelm I.

On the first day after his arrival, Radowitz held talks with Gorčakov and his department head for Asia Stremukov. In relation to the Russian Chancellor, Radowitz called for more respect for the nature of bilateral political relations and forbade himself to speak to Bismarck personally. During the audience with the Tsar, the envoy answered in the negative to the question of any special instructions and summarized the general wish of Kaiser Wilhelm for a close understanding between the two states on foreign policy. After a lengthy discussion on various foreign policy issues, both the Tsar and Radowitz later expressed their satisfaction with the conversation. In further talks, particularly with Stremukov, disagreements were discussed in which the diplomatic representatives of Berlin and St. Petersburg acted against each other on Balkan issues. Radowitz advocated that the mutual representatives should act in close agreement, especially in the Orient. He had so far as success when the Russian diplomatic missions abroad and consular missions in the East of Gorchakov a Circular ( Circular received) in which they have been referred to the good relations particularly with Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the event of any differences, the addressees were asked not to resolve them themselves, but to report them to their governments.

On February 17th, Alvensleben took a vacation of several weeks. Radowitz conducted normal diplomatic business during his stay. On March 11th, Prince Reuss returned to St. Petersburg and took over the management of the embassy again. That was the end of Radowitz's mission and he had to say goodbye to the Tsar. However, since he did not get a timely appointment at first, he accepted an invitation to Moscow. The farewell audience took place on March 18th. Even after that, however, he could not leave immediately, since he was supposed to take reports from Prince Reuss with him to Berlin. He accompanied the tsar on a hunting excursion, so that Radowitz could not leave St. Petersburg until March 21st. When he arrived in Berlin, he gave an oral report to Chancellor Bismarck and the Kaiser.

State of research

Already during the mission there were suspicions and rumors about its purpose. The German diplomatic files do not reveal any particular assignment. Nevertheless, several well-known historians conclude from evidence that there was a special secret commission. The content of this presumed order is formulated differently, usually with relativizing formulations and attributes. The representatives of the theory of a secret commission agree that Russia has rejected the German offer and that Bismarck's advance has failed.

According to Winckler, Radowitz's secret mission "seems" to have sounded out how Russia "intended to behave towards a division of the spheres of interests of southeast Europe and the Balkans at the expense of Austria-Hungary:" Leave the West to us, we leave the East to you, 'said Minister v. Radowitz [...] to have submitted [...]. "

Hillgruber sees the Radowitz mission as a “diplomatic-political main move” and speaks of the “probability that the Radowitz mission represented the most important part of Bismarck's political offensive […].” He admits: “To this day, one has special negotiation item in the context of the general objective in Radowitz's Petersburg talks can not gain clarity. ”However, he considers it likely that Radowitz“ [...] the idea of ​​a division of Southeast Europe across Austria-Hungary into a Russian and a German sphere as a goal of the policy of both powers in the long term […] ”.

According to Hildebrand , more recent research "seems likely [...]" that Radowitz should investigate whether Russia "[...] was willing to guarantee the existence of the empire, including the provinces wrested from the French, if it were to the detriment of the Danube monarchy in south-eastern Europe Compensations were offered. "

Lappenküper has researched the mission intensively in his extensive monograph and, following on from Hillgruber and Winckler, follows the theory of a secret mission. He sees it as “central task of Radowitz” to move the Russian government “with the promise of promoting Russian policy towards the Orient to benevolent neutrality in the event of a war against France.” Another task was the harmony between Russia and Austria -Bother Hungary. The author suspects that Radowitz made his offer in the last days of his stay, but no sources are available. He thinks it is possible that Bismarck had them destroyed.

Despite Lappenküper's investigation (completed in 1988), according to Rose, “[…] the final clarity about the meaning and content of the delicate mission is still missing in 2013.” He assumes a German offer of reciprocity in the Orient and in Western Europe, but this is not automatic included a demand for neutrality in a possible war against France.

According to Baumgart , neither the older research nor the investigation by Lappenküper has been able to "properly unveil the secret of the Radowitz mission [...]". He considers it a legend that Bismarck demanded a free hand from Russia in the West (towards France) and offered Russia a free hand in the Orient. He had by no means demanded a blank check from Russia for German policy against France or even for a preventive war. Rather, Bismarck behaved “defensively”. Baumgart placed Bismarck's policy in the first months of 1875 in the context of his overall foreign policy. He takes the view that Bismarck wanted to divert the four other great powers from the European center and to draw their attention to the Orient (where saturated Germany had no immediate interests). There - according to his plan - the other powers should be dependent on the support of Germany.

outlook

In his review of the monograph Lappenküpers, Baumgart pointed out that the author had not evaluated the Russian sources. Janorschke, who presented the most recent in-depth investigation into the Radowitz mission, has also dispensed with an independent investigation in Russian archives. The evaluation of these files should offer the last opportunity to answer any questions that have not yet been answered.

See also

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Envoy Extraordinary.
  2. ↑ Since October 1874. See Lappenküper, Mission, p. 313.
  3. ↑ Lappenküper, Mission, p. 9.
  4. ↑ Quoted from Lappenküper, Mission, p. 278.
  5. ↑ Baumgart, concert, p. 410.
  6. ↑ Janorschke, "Krieg-in-Sicht" -Krise, p. 80.
  7. ↑ Janorschke, "Krieg-in-Sicht" -Krise, p. 91 with additional references
  8. ↑ Lappenküper, Mission, p. 314.
  9. ↑ Quoted from Lappenküper, Mission, p. 314 m. Footnote 45.
  10. ^ Reports in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and the Kölnische Zeitung of February 5, 1875; Evidence from Lappenküper, Mission, pp. 315–317.
  11. ↑ Lappenküper, Mission, p. 413.
  12. ↑ Lappenküper, Mission, p. 418.
  13. ↑ Winckler, Alliance Policy, p. 15 f.
  14. ↑ Hillgruber, The "War in Sight" Crisis, p. 247.
  15. ↑ Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy, p. 6; Ders., The Past Kingdom, p. 30.
  16. ↑ Lappenküper, Mission, p. 26.
  17. ^ Lappenküper, Mission, p. 563.
  18. ↑ Lappenküper, Mission, p. 558.
  19. ^ Mission, p. 21 f .; on the other hand Janorschke, "Krieg-in-Sicht" -Krise, p. 104, fn. 301.
  20. ↑ Rose, German Foreign Policy, p. 61.
  21. ↑ Baumgart, concert, p. 411.
  22. ↑ Baumgart, review, p. 213.
  23. ↑ Janorschke, "Krieg-in-Sicht" -Krise, p. 32, fn. 59. Critical to this, Angelow, review, p. 2.
  24. ↑ So Baumgart, ibid.