Panair do Brasil Flight 026
| Panair do Brasil Flight 026 | |
|---|---|
 A Douglas DC-8-33 in Pan-Am version, similar to the unlucky machine |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Agreement from the runway after aborted take-off |
| place |
Guanabara Bay , Rio de Janeiro , Brazil.svg){kind=small}
|
| date | 20th August 1962 |
| Fatalities | 15th |
| Survivors | 90 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type |
 Douglas DC-8-33
|
| operator |
Panair do Brasil
|
| Mark |
PP-PDT
|
| Surname | Bandeirante Brás Cubas |
| Departure airport |
Buenos Aires Airport , Argentina
|
| 1. Stopover |
Rio de Janeiro-Galeão Airport , Brazil
|
| 2. Stopover |
Lisbon Airport , Portugal
|
| 3. Stopover |
Paris-Orly Airport , France
|
| Destination airport |
London Heathrow Airport , UK
|
| Passengers | 94 |
| crew | 11 |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
On August 20, 1962, on the Panair-do-Brasil flight 026 (flight number: PB026 ), a Douglas DC-8-33 of the Brazilian airline Panair do Brasil had an accident . The plane with which a flight from Buenos Aires to London was to be carried out had an accident after an aborted take-off at Rio de Janeiro-Galeão airport . 14 people were killed in the accident.
plane
The aircraft involved in the accident was a one and a half year old Douglas DC-8-33, which was ordered by Pan American World Airways and approved with the aircraft registration N820PA and named Clipper Morning Star . The machine was finally delivered to the Pan-Am subsidiary Panair do Brasil in March 1961 before it went into operation . The machine had the factory number 45273, it was the 121st Douglas DC-8 from ongoing production. The DC-8 was equipped with four Pratt & Whitney JT4A engines. It was certified with the aircraft registration PP-PDT and was given the name Bandeirante Brás Cubas . The Douglas DC-8s were used by Panair do Brasil on transatlantic flights to Europe and replaced the Douglas DC-7 in this role .
crew
There was a crew of 11 on board, consisting of a master, first officer, flight engineer and 8 flight attendants.
the accident
The flight was to lead from Buenos Aires via Rio de Janeiro to London , another stopover in Lisbon was planned. The first leg of the flight from Buenos Aires to Rio de Janeiro went without a hitch. A new cockpit crew got on before the onward flight.
The take-off run began at 11:03 p.m. local time after the machine had received clearance from runway 14 to take off. The plane accelerated normally, there were no abnormalities. The master later stated that while he was accelerating at a speed of 100 to 135 knots (approx. 185–250 km / h), i.e. the decision-making speed , he found that the steering column was too far back and pushed it forward. At this point, the first officer let go of the steering column, which was the usual procedure when reaching decision speed. When the aircraft reached a speed of 148 knots (approx. 274 km / h), i.e. the take-off speed, the captain pulled the control column towards him to take off, but the aircraft did not react, whereupon he pushed it forward again. The flight data recorder did not record these maneuvers; instead it is assumed that the crew attempted to take off prematurely at 132 knots (approx. 244 km / h). Finally, 14 seconds after reaching decision speed, both pilots pulled their control columns backwards. Since the captain had already reduced the thrust at this point, the aircraft nose did not rise. According to the flight data recorder, the brakes were also applied five seconds before the thrust was reduced. The first signs of braking could be seen 2300 meters from the runway threshold.
When the captain realized that he could no longer bring the machine to a stop on the remaining part of the runway, he steered the DC-8 to the right and took the thrust back completely. Clear, continuous skid marks were visible from a distance of 2600 meters from the runway threshold. The brakes were applied, but not the reverse thrust. The first officer gave full thrust to further slow down the machine with the thrust reverser and tried to activate the spoilers, which he did not succeed because he could no longer reach the button due to the strong jarring after overshooting the runway. The right wing leaned, the engines dragging the ground. The left-hand landing gear wheels got caught in the sand behind the runway, with the engines on the left also touching the ground. When it came into contact with the ground, the jet compressor and reversing blades of the engines tore off, whereupon the engine was accelerated again by the thrust. The machine broke through the airport fence at high speed and overshot the expressway behind it, with the two engines and gear wheels breaking off on the left. The machine finally crashed 50 meters from the shore into the sea.
Rescue operation
After the impact, the machine drifted 100 more meters from the shore and finally sank to a depth of 8 meters in Guanabara Bay . Since the automatic emergency lighting failed, the drifting wreck was unlit. A flight attendant used a flashlight to light the way to the emergency exit. The people on board were disoriented and panicked in the dark. The passengers could not leave the machine through the main door because it would have opened to the sea.
The exits were opened and most of the passengers left the machine on the starboard side. The fact that the exits were in the middle of the machine impaired the evacuation, especially since there were a considerable number of passengers on board the machine. The cockpit crew exited the machine through the cockpit window.
The evacuation was generally chaotic. Since no instructions were given to the passengers during the evacuation, most of them left the aircraft without wearing life jackets. Although the machine was equipped with six lifeboats, none of them were used. After the machine had drifted 100 meters within 25 minutes, it finally sank in Guanabara Bay. Of the 105 occupants of the machine, 14 passengers and one flight attendant died.
Cause of accident
When investigating the accident, the investigators found that the take-off was aborted at a speed of 175 knots (approx. 324 km / h) after the machine did not rotate . The fact that the nose of the aircraft remained on the ground was due to an incorrect horizontal stabilizer setting, which was adjusted to −1.75 degrees from an angle of + 3 degrees and thus an aircraft nose pointing upwards. The investigators noted that in addition to the high taxiing speed, the delayed initiation of the aborted take-off by the master and the failure to follow the standard procedures for such situations contributed to the accident.
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d e f g h Accident report PP-PDT Aviation Safety Network , (English), accessed on March 28, 2019.
- ^ Operating history of PP-PDT Planespotters, accessed on March 28, 2019.
- ↑ Panair Aviação Comercial.net aircraft fleet (Portuguese), accessed on March 28, 2019.
Coordinates: 22 ° 49 ′ 55.4 " S , 43 ° 14 ′ 4" W.