Peter K. Unger

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Peter K. Unger (* 1942 ) is an American philosopher and professor at New York University . His main research interests are metaphysics , epistemology , ethics and the philosophy of mind .

Education

Peter Unger studied with David Lewis at Swarthmore College , where he obtained a BA in philosophy in 1962. He then studied philosophy under AJ Ayer at Oxford University and received his doctorate in 1966.

Positions

In epistemology , Unger originally advocated an infallibilistic analysis of the attribution of knowledge. With various linguistic philosophical arguments he supported the thesis that such attributions of knowledge require certainty in order to be considered semantically true. He and others often attribute this position to skepticism , since there is usually no such certainty. In later works, however, he takes the view that several answers can be plausible to many philosophical questions. There is often no way to make a clear decision between these answers. For the knowledge analysis this means that the skeptical position outlined is one of several plausible positions.

In applied ethics, he caused a stir among professionals and the general public with the claim that anyone with a certain standard of living has a moral duty to make large donations to charities like Oxfam and UNICEF , even if one begs for loans must pick up or even steal. Furthermore, using the paradox of the heap , Unger has argued that it - like all other compound objects - does not exist.

Publications

Books

Essays

  • "On experience and the development of the understanding", American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 3 (1966), pp. 48-56.
  • "Experience and factual knowledge", Journal of Philosophy Vol. 64 (1967), pp. 152-173.
  • "An analysis of factual knowledge", Journal of Philosophy Vol. 65 (1968), pp. 157-170.
  • "Our knowledge of the material world", in Studies in the theory of knowledge , N. Rescher (Ed.), American philosophical quarterly / Monograph Series, 1970, pp. 40-61
  • "A defense of skepticism", Philosophical Review, Vol. 80 (1971), pp. 198-219.
  • "Propositional verbs and knowledge", Journal of Philosophy Vol. 69 (1972), pp. 301-312.
  • "The wages of skepticism", American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 10 (1973), pp. 177-187.
  • "An argument for skepticism", Philosophic Exchange: Annual Proceedings Vol. 1 (1974), pp. 131-155.
  • "Two types of skepticism", Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 25 (1974), pp. 77-95.
  • "Impotence and causal determinism", Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 31 (1977), pp. 289-305.
  • "The uniqueness in causation", American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 14 (1977), pp. 177-188.
  • "I do not Exist", in Perception and Identity , GF MacDonald (Ed.), London: Macmillan, 1979, pp. 235-251.
  • "There are no ordinary things", synthesis: An international Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science Vol. 41 (1979), pp. 117-154.
  • "Why there are no people", Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 4 (1979), pp. 177-222.
  • "The Problem of the Many", Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 5 (1980), pp. 411-467.
  • "Skepticism and Nihilism", Noûs Vol. 14 (1980), pp. 517-545.
  • "Toward a psychology of common sense", American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 19 (1982), pp. 117-130.
  • "The causal theory of reference", Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 43 (1983), pp. 1-45.
  • "Minimizing arbitrariness: Toward a metaphysics of infinitely many isolated concrete worlds", Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 9 (1984), pp. 29-52.
  • "The cone model of knowledge", Philosophical Topics Vol. 14, No. 1 (1986), pp. 125-178.
  • "Consciousness and self-identity", Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 10 (1986), pp. 63-100.
  • "Conscious being in a gradual world", Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 12 (1988), pp. 287-333.
  • "Causing and preventing serious harm," Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 65 (1992), pp. 227-255.
  • "Precis of identity, consciousness and value", Philosophical and Phenomenological Research Vol. 52 (1992), pp. 133-137.
  • "Reply to reviewers of identity, consciousness and value", Philosophical and Phenomenological Research Vol. 52 (1992), pp. 159-176.
  • "Contextual analysis in ethics", Philosophical and Phenomenological Research Vol. 55 (1995), pp. 1-26.
  • "The mystery of the physical and the matter of qualities: A paper for Professor Shaffer", Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 23 (1999), pp. 75-99.
  • "Precis of living high and letting die", Philosophical and Phenomenological Research Vol. 59 (1999), pp. 173-175.
  • "Replies", Philosophical and Phenomenological Research Vol. 59 (1999), pp. 203-216.
  • "The survival of the sentient (Volume 14: Action and Freedom)", Nous Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 14 (2000), pp. 325-348
  • "Science and the possibility of philosophy", Harvard Review of Philosophy Vol. 9 (2001), pp. 4-56.
  • "Free Will and Scientiphicalism", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 65 (2002), pp. 1-25
  • "The mental problems of the many", Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol. 1 (2004), pp. 195-222.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Peter Unger: Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism . Oxford University Press 1975.
  2. ↑ Peter Unger: Philosophical Relativity . Blackwell and Minnesota 1984.
  3. ↑ The Survival of the Sentient (PDF online; 82 kB) at nyu.edu, accessed January 31, 2009 (English)
  4. ↑ Free Will and Scientiphicalism (PDF online; 89 kB) at nyu.edu, accessed January 31, 2009 (English)
personal data
SURNAME Unger, Peter K.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION American philosopher and professor at New York University
DATE OF BIRTH 1942