Philo of Megara

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Philo of Megara ( Greek Φίλων Phílōn , Latinized Philo ) was a Greek ancient philosopher . He probably lived in the 4th and 3rd centuries BC. BC, within the history of philosophy he is one of the megarics .

The writings of Philo are lost; only a few testimonies have survived (ancient accounts of life and teaching). The testimony that has been received mainly tells of Philon's views which fall into the realm of logic .

Lore

The most important sources on Philo are Diogenes Laertios , Clemens von Alexandria and Sextus Empiricus as well as various Aristotle commentators (e.g. Boethius and Alexander von Aphrodisias ).

Life

Almost nothing is known about Philon's life. All we know is that he and Zenon von Kition studied with Diodoros Kronos .

Teaching

Philon's writings are lost. It is known that he wrote a dialogue called Menexenos , in which his teacher Diodoros Kronos may appear as a dialogue figure. He can probably also be identified with Philo, whose writings On Signs ( Perì sēmasiṓn ) and On Forms of Closing ( Perì trópōn ) Diogenes Laertios mentions elsewhere.

A modern truth value table for conditional statement (or implication)
p q p → q
W. W. W.
W. F. F.
F. W. W.
F. F. W.
Definition of the true conditional statement

According to Cicero, Philo dealt with the question of when a conditional statement ( synēmménon ; an example not from Philo: “When it rains, the road is wet”) is true or false. Sextus Empiricus reports that his answer differed slightly from that of Diodoros Kronos (“A conditional statement [is] true when it was neither possible nor possible for it to begin with true and end with false.”): “The conditional statement [is] true if it does not begin with truth and end with falsehood. ”From the passage it cannot be deduced whether Philo's or Diodorus' answer is older.

In the modern truth value table provided for the conditional statement, one can read - what Diodorus and Philo already stated - that a conditional statement (in the table “p → q”, for example “If it rains, the street is wet”) is then wrong , if the antecedent ( ēgoúmenon , in table “p”, for example “It's raining.”) is true (in table “W”) and the suffix ( lḗgon , in table “q”, for example “The street is wet. ”) is incorrect (in table“ F ”).

Definitions of the modal terms

Boethius and Alexander von Aphrodisias report on Philon's definitions of the modal terms possibility, impossibility, necessity and non-necessity. As for possibility, Philo gives the example of a piece of wood that has the ability ( èpitēdeiótēs ) to go up in flames, even if it never will. In general terms, he asserted that what, due to its nature, is capable of being is possible, even if external circumstances prevent it from being realized. According to Boethius, after Philo it is impossible what is not fit to be; necessary what is and will be; not necessary that which is capable of not being.

reception

In 1935 Jan Łukasiewicz was the first to work out the independent character and value of Stoic logic, which, in contrast to the more influential Aristotelian logic, was not a conceptual logic , but a propositional logic . Łukasiewicz pointed out that Philon and Diodoros Kronos can be regarded as foremen of Stoic propositional logic, since their preoccupation with the truth of conditional statements falls into this very area.

Source collections

  • Klaus Döring : The mega-riders. Annotated Collection of Testimonies , Grüner, Amsterdam 1971, (Studies on Ancient Philosophy 2), ISBN 90-6032-003-4
  • Gabriele Giannantoni (Ed.): Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae , Volume 1, Bibliopolis, Naples 1990, Section II-G ( online )
  • Robert Muller: Les mégariques. Fragments et témoignages , Vrin, Paris 1985

literature

Overview representations

Investigations

  • Theodor Ebert: Dialecticians and early Stoics with Sextus Empiricus. Investigations into the emergence of propositional logic. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, ISBN 3-525-25194-7

Footnotes

  1. ^ Klaus Döring: Diodoros Kronos, Philon, Panthoides . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , Volume 2/1, Schwabe, Basel 1998, pp. 221–230, here: p. 221.
  2. ^ Klaus Döring: Diodoros Kronos, Philon, Panthoides . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , Volume 2/1, Schwabe, Basel 1998, pp. 221–230, here: p. 222.
  3. Diogenes Laertios, On the Lives and Teachings of Famous Philosophers 7:16.
  4. ^ Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis IV, 19,121,5.
  5. Diogenes Laertios, On the Lives and Teachings of Famous Philosophers 7,191.
  6. ^ Cicero, Lucullus sive Academicorum priorum liber 2 143.
  7. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoneiai hypotyposeis 2,110-2,112.
  8. ^ Harry A. Ide: Possibility and potentiality from Aristotle through the Stoics , Dissertation, Cornell University 1988, pp. 202-206.
  9. Boethius, De interpretatione II 234.10-234.15.
  10. Alexander von Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum I commentarium 184.6-184.10.
  11. Boethius, De interpretatione II 234.10-234.15.
  12. Jan Łukasiewicz: On the history of propositional logic . In: Knowledge. Number 5, 1935, pp. 111-131. Reprinted in: David Pearce, Jan Wolenski (Hrsg.): Logischer Rationalismus. Philosophical writings of the Lviv-Warsaw School. Athenaeum, Frankfurt / Main 1988, pp. 76-91.