Postconventionalism

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The Postkonventionalismus is a moral theory that the moral Conventionalism breaks. Conventionalism is defined by its view that the basic moral principles are based on social conventions or social norms, at least not on the nature of things or transcendentally .

In contrast to conventionalism, which represents a form of deontological ethics , a postconventionalist is a teleological or consequentialist ethic. While conventional deontological ethics defines and evaluates the moral correctness of actions by the degree of their conformity with socially defined duty or acceptance values ​​(in the sense of Helmut Klages for example: discipline, fulfillment of duty, loyalty, subordination, diligence, self-control, punctuality or willingness to adapt) a postconventionalist (teleological) ethic the results or consequences of actions.

Basics of post-conventional morality

In contrast to conventionalist morality, postconventionalism questions the validity claims of moral conventions, especially in conflict situations. Postconventional moral evaluations of actions are not based on set rules and principles or norms shaped by tradition, but on the basis of the conditions that are likely to be brought about by them, as is also done in utilitarian ethics, which is the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" ( Jeremy Bentham ) aims. They are based on universalistic, reasonably justifiable principles.

At the center of post-conventional ethics is the problem of weighing the results or consequences of alternative actions, which plays a role in ethical dilemmas . After Ronald Dworkin a system based on a postkonventionalistischen ethics subject to legal ongoing interpretation processes. It is not based solely on positive law in the form of a fixed system of rules (the most prominent representative of which was his teacher HLA Hart ) nor on historical traditions, social conventions and habits, but implies the repeated application of rational-discursive procedures. Likewise, post-conventional morality is based on discursive processes, above all on the weighing of conflicting ideas of justice , the results of which can conflict with both positive law and social conventions. While Karl-Otto Apel strives for a solution to the problem by returning to the ethics of responsibility , Jürgen Habermas , who puts universal values ​​over local values, provides general rules of a rational discourse .

Dissemination of postconventionalist moral concepts in Europe

In Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral developmental stages , which is partly based on the three-stage developmental psychological model of Jean Piaget , the “moral point of view” represents the post-conventional and highest stage of individual moral development: At this stage, people orientate themselves towards universal ethical principles; they act neither purely egotistically nor only dutifully or in a group-related manner, but are able to think their way into other social roles when making moral judgments and to actively adopt their standpoints (“role taking”); thus they are capable of “reciprocity thinking”. This idea follows on from John Rawls , who postulates that people must find just and fair solutions to moral conflicts. In the tradition of rational philosophical moral theories of morality following Kant , such just solutions are based on an ideal exchange of roles.

According to Kohlberg, the majority of the people in western industrial society are still on the conventional level of social morality.

The universality of this development model is being questioned from various sides. Survey research states that, since the 1990s, the commitment to mandatory values ​​has lost importance, but performance-oriented self-realization and hedonistic-materialistic values ​​on the one hand, and values ​​aimed at idealistic self-development on the other hand, have become more important. Helmut Klages found that in 1997 conventionalists (with high mandatory and acceptance values ​​and low self-development values) only made up 18% and materialistically oriented hedonists made up 14% of the surveyed sample of the total population, non-conformist idealists as potential carriers of postconventionalist morality and supporters of universal values However, values ​​only 16%.

According to the business ethicists Peter Ulrich and Ulrich Thielemann, the fact that a transition to a post-conventional, rational morality has not yet been established in Europe is not due to the fact that traditional values ​​of conventional morality are adhered to, but is based on the fact that “the devaluation traditional, especially Christian-occidental values ​​did not take place as a critical further development, but for many people as a process of a general questioning of morality in general ”. The result of this intellectual-historical process is a general skepticism of ethics. The authors also do not trust the relatively high approval values ​​measured by executives for a reason-based ethics, since in case of doubt these executives would trust their individual conscience or the clever advice of other, i.e. local authorities, rather than a "general human reason" (one chosen by the authors , consciously following Kant's formulation).

Cross-cultural comparison

Guido Rappe examined different forms of ethics across cultures and negated the universality of postconventionalist ethics. The highest level of Confucian virtue ethics is characterized by the orientation towards exemplary, exemplary people, with the master-student dialogue playing an important role.

criticism

Can institutions function on the basis of post-conventionalist morality?

In addition to the problem of how to motivate the liberal-independent carriers of post-conventionalist morality without material incentives or sanctions in conflict-ridden decision-making situations to ethical behavior in everyday life, the political question arises as to how a society that consists predominantly of supporters of post-conventionalist discourse morality exists can without falling into permanent incapacity or even anarchy. This is where the criticism of conservative representatives of an institutional ethics, i.e. the ethics of supra-individual orders, comes in in the footsteps of Arnold Gehlen .

Are there any gender-specific morals?

The feminist psychologist and ethicist Carol Gilligan criticizes Kohlberg's claim that women are less likely to reach the highest levels of his model of moral development. On the basis of interviews (her method was often criticized), she argues that morality is gender-specific: male morality puts the problem of justice in the foreground, female morality rather the social (close) relationships and responsibilities (so-called ethics of care , welfare ethics ). Such morality cannot be post-conventionalist.

Marylin Friedman states that Gilligan does not justify the inequality in the treatment of closer and distant people and provides a legitimation: Intact social relationships are part of self-preservation. The self is social from the start. Therefore, promoting the benefit of the members of one's own group is not only understandable, but a downright moral imperative. Justice and welfare are complementary when one includes the right to well-being in the concept of justice. John Rawls , on the other hand, argues that such a consideration of individual personal needs would not be covered by the concept of justice. He makes an explicit distinction between public and private justice.

Is morality a social construction?

Gilligan's thesis is also criticized from a feminist point of view. The differences postulated by her are merely the result of social expectations regarding the ethical behavior of women and men; beyond that they would reproduce endlessly.

Individual evidence

  1. Ronald Dworkin: Law's Empire. Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass. 1986.
  2. Erik Stei: Justice and Political Universalism - John Rawls' Theory of Justice: A Critical Analysis of Justification. Tectum Verlag, 2007.
  3. Jürgen Habermas: Discourse Ethics - Notes on a Justification Program. In: Ders .: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp paperback, Frankfurt 1983.
  4. Jean Piaget: The moral judgment in the child. Zurich 1954.
  5. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse and responsibility. The problem of the transition to post-conventional morality. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1997, p. 317.
  6. ^ John Rawls: A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1971.
  7. Lawrence Kohlberg, Charles Levine, Alexandra Hewer: Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and a Response to Critics. Basel / New York 1983, pp. 48, 60.
  8. Helmut Klages: Do we need a return to traditional values? Federal Agency for Civic Education, 2001.
  9. ^ Peter Ulrich, Ulrich Thielemann: Ethics and Success. Business ethical thought patterns of managers - an empirical study. (= St. Gallen Contributions to Business Ethics. Volume 6.). Bern / Stuttgart 1992, p. 147.
  10. Peter Ulrich, Ulrich Thielemann 1992, p. 150.
  11. Guido Rappe: Intercultural Ethics. Volume I: Ethics and forms of rationality in a cultural comparison. A criticism of postconventionalism. Berlin u. a. 2003, ISBN 3-86515-002-0 .
  12. Walter Reese-Schäfer: Grenzgötter der Moral: The recent European-American discourse on political ethics. Frankfurt 1997, p. 134 ff.
  13. ^ Arnold Gehlen: Morality and Hypermoral. A pluralistic ethic. Frankfurt 1969, p. 107.
  14. Carol Gilligan: In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1982. (German edition: The other voice. Life conflicts and morals of women. Munich 1982)
  15. ^ Marylin Friedman: What are friends for? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory. Cornell University Press, Ithaka, New York 1993, pp. 68, 132.
  16. Susan Moller Okin: Justice, Gender and the Family. Basic Books, New York 1982.
  17. Will Kymlicka: Contemporary Political Philosophy. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press, New York 2002.