Propair flight 420

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Icon tools.svg This article was due to substance or form defects on the quality assurance side of the portal Aviation entered. This is done in order to bring the quality of the articles from the topic of aviation to an acceptable level. Articles that cannot be significantly improved are deleted. Please help to resolve the shortcomings in this article and please participate in the discussion .

Enter article


Propair flight 420
Metro 23 Rex Airline.jpg

A Fairchild Swearingen Metro operated by the Australian airline Regional Express

Accident summary
Accident type Structural failure after fire
place Montreal-Mirabel Airport , Canada
date June 18, 1998
Fatalities 11
Survivors 0
Aircraft
Aircraft type Fairchild Swearingen SA226-TC Metro II
operator Propair
Mark C-GQAL
Departure airport Montreal-Trudeau Airport
Destination airport Peterborough Airport
Passengers 9
crew 2
Lists of aviation accidents

On June 18, 1998, a Fairchild Swearingen Metro crashed on Propair Flight 420 from Montreal to Peterborough , killing all 11 occupants.

plane

The plane was a 21-year-old Fairchild Swearingen SA226-TC Metro II with the aircraft characteristics , the two C-GQAL turboprop engines of the type Garrett TPE331-3UW equipped. The takeoff mass and center of gravity were within the permitted range.

crew

The crew consisted of the 35-year-old captain and the 35-year-old first officer . Both pilots were adequately rested before the flight.

course

At 7:01 am, the plane took off from Montreal-Trudeau Airport , lurching to the left and requiring the pilots to step on the rudder to maintain the take-off direction and take a longer take-off distance. Two minutes later, clearance to climb to 16,000 ft (4,880 m ) was given. At 7:13 a.m., the pilots reported the loss of hydraulic pressure to the air traffic controller during the climb at an altitude of 12,500 feet (3810 m) and requested to return to the departure airport. Immediately afterwards, the air traffic controller gave clearance for a 180 ° turn and a descent to 8,000 ft (2,440 m). Shortly afterwards, the first signs of an engine malfunction came and the warning signal for the overheating of the left wing lit up 40 seconds later, which went out another 30 seconds later. At 7:18:12 a.m. the left engine appeared to be burning, which is why it was switched off. Less than a minute later, the captain took control because abnormal pressure on the right aileron was needed to keep the aircraft on course. At 7:19 am, air traffic control suggested the pilots fly to Montreal-Mirabel Airport instead of Montreal-Trudeau Airport, which the pilots accepted. Less than 1½ minutes later, the air traffic control pilots reported that flames were blazing from the engine outlet. At 723:10 hrs the pilots reported that the engine was no longer burning, but 3½ minutes later the pilots reported that the engine was again burning. Meanwhile, the plane became more and more difficult to control. At 7:27 a.m., during the approach to runway 24, the landing gear was extended, but only two of the landing gear control lamps came on. Near the runway threshold, the left wing collapsed upward and the aircraft rolled uncontrollably more than 90 degrees to the left, hit the runway upside down, caught fire, skidded 2,500 ft (760 m) and finally came to rest on the left edge of the runway .

Determination of causes

Determination of causes of death

During the autopsy of the inmates, the following could be determined:

  • Both pilots and most of the passengers suffered fatal injuries from the impact.
  • Two passengers initially survived the impact, but then died of burns.
  • One passenger died of hydrogen cyanide poisoning caused by the fire

Examination result

Overheating of the left landing gear brake was found to be the cause of the fire. The drift from the centerline to the left was caused by the landing gear brakes on the left landing leg, which damaged a piston seal that was used to contain the hydraulic fluid. This caused hydraulic fluid to hit the hot brake components, caught fire in the left landing gear nacelle, and caused the main hydraulics to fail. The pilots hadn't noticed the fire. In addition, neither the flight manual nor the emergency checklist mentioned the possibility of overheated landing gear brakes. The pilots did not extend the landing gear. Although this would be a measure on the emergency checklist for overheated wings, it was not done because the associated warning light went out before the pilots could work through the emergency checklist. It was later discovered that the hydraulics in the aircraft involved in the accident were filled with a mixture of two types of hydraulic fluids, which resulted in lower flashpoint and fire resistance. The master cylinders did not have the same part number, which resulted in complicated connections and adjustments to the master cylinders, which generally complicated operation and made troubleshooting difficult in the braking system. However, there was no evidence of residual braking force caused by it. The last recommended master cylinders could only be used with special brake system part numbers in order to facilitate adjustment, function and troubleshooting.

Security Recommendations

A safety recommendation was made in the report:

Similar cases

swell

Coordinates: 45 ° 40 ′ 55 ″  N , 74 ° 0 ′ 19 ″  W.