Coup in Thailand 1947
On November 8, 1947, a coup took place in Thailand . The civilian government under Thawan Thamrongnawasawat (Thamrong) was overthrown bloodless by a union of several influential army officers. After a three-year constitutional-democratic phase, the country was unstable and in crisis against a background of corruption , economic uncertainty and the unexplained death of King Ananda Mahidol . Leading circles in the army used this to regain political power. After the coup , Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram became(Phibun) Prime Minister again and the military was again at the center of power. The role of parliament, the importance of the constitution and the development of party diversity were severely impaired for many years as a result of the coup.
situation
After the looming victory of the Allies in World War II , Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram and his military government were ousted from power in 1944 and a civilian government came into office in which Pridi Phanomyong played the most important role. Representatives of the Seri Thai movement now ruled in an alliance of progressive liberals with conservative royalists, which were united by a pro-Western stance during the Second World War and the rejection of Phibun and its military network. The field marshal was accused and sentenced as a war criminal according to his pro-Japan policy, but was released after five months in prison.
During this time there was party pluralism and a freely elected parliament, but also political instability and corruption. Pridi's liberals and the royalist-conservative camp soon fell apart and fell out. During this three-year phase of constitutional democracy, the hitherto dominant army was hardly involved in government. In 1946, the government passed a new constitution that was supposed to exclude state employees (including members of the armed forces) from political office. The military had to fear that they would finally be ousted by political power.
Before the coup, the country fell into a crisis. This resulted from a series of financial scandals, inflation, reports of widespread corruption, taking advantage and smuggling. In addition, there was the unexplained death of King Ananda Mahidol on June 9, 1946 and rumors that Pridi, who was considered anti-monarchist in the 1930s, was involved in them. As the Cold War began , the liberal "Elder Statesman", who supported anti-colonial liberation movements in neighboring Southeast Asian countries, was accused of abandoning the pro-Western course and even being close to communism. Pridi resigned in August 1946, handing over governance to Thamrong. The civil government was left without strong leadership. The military used this unstable situation to regain power.
Actor
The coup was carried out by the "coup group", which consisted largely of army officers. The naval leadership was predominantly close to the incumbent Prime Minister Thamrong or rejected Phibun. Phibun himself did not take part in the coup, but stood behind the idea and, as the country's highest-ranking military, was included in the coup for reasons of prestige. The actual leaders of the coup were Lieutenant General Phin Choonhavan , the commander of the important First Army Division with quarters in Bangkok, next to Colonels Kat Katsongkhram, Khun Jamnong Phumiwet and Nom Ketnut. Phin was a confidante of Phibun and the father-in-law of Colonel Phao Siyanon , who later became director general of the police, who also actively participated in the coup.
A group of officers at regimental and battalion commanders' level provided the necessary support for the troops. The most important of them were Colonel Sarit Thanarat and Lieutenant Colonels Thanom Kittikachorn , Praphas Charusathien and Praesert Ruchirawongs. These gained massive influence in the period after the coup and, after another coup in 1957, took power in the country they ruled until 1973. In addition, the commanders of the armored regiment, the anti-aircraft regiment and the first cavalry squadron took part. The participation of the commanders of the decisive units stationed in Bangkok ensured the success of the coup.
Khuang Aphaiwong , the leader of the royalist-conservative Democratic Party , who had been replaced as prime minister by Pridi Phanomyong in 1946, also approved the government's disempowerment. After the troops stormed the government building, Pridi fled abroad with the help of British and American naval attachés.
Prince Rangsit Prayurasakdi , who as regent represented King Bhumibol Adulyadej , who was still studying in Switzerland , accepted the result of the coup on his behalf within less than 24 hours. Bhumibol himself also expressly approved the coup. In a letter to the coup group on November 25, he wrote: “Those who carried out this operation do not covet power in their own interest, but merely intend to strengthen the new government that will prosper the nation and all The British ambassador to Thailand at the time, Sir Geoffrey Thompson , reported shortly after the coup that this was not so much a takeover of Phibun, but rather a " right-wing movement with the support of the royal family ”acted.
motivation
The armed forces acted out of a perceived humiliation that represented the abrupt demobilization by the civilian government after the end of the war and the attempted suppression of their political influence by the constitution of 1946. The American political scientist David Wilson explained the coup of 1947 with the desire of the military to restore “the honor of the army”, which in their perception had previously been “trampled”. The army's connection with the losing side in World War II was probably also humiliating, as Phibun had allied itself with the Japanese and was ousted for this reason. There was a widespread feeling in the military that the armed forces' patriotic contribution was not being properly appreciated. Since the army did not play a decisive role in Thai politics for the first time since 1933, the putschists saw the “integrity” of the armed forces in danger.
From the point of view of the putschists, however, their assumption of power was necessary in the national interest. They justified their intervention with an unprecedented emergency that seriously affected the economic basis and living conditions of the people. They claimed to have acted solely to avert the threat of a disaster in time. They also declared that they had taken power in order to do away with the "dishonesty and various evils" of those who had ruled until then. According to Field Marshal Phibun, “public opinion (...) wanted a change and since that could not be achieved by constitutional means and the former government had a majority in parliament, we decided to get rid of it.” In addition to the “national interest”, however also to see the individual interests of the putschists, who hoped to accelerate their careers by participating - and rightly so, as became apparent after the coup.
Result
After the coup, the conservative royalist Khuang Aphaiwong was reinstated as prime minister as a concession to Western countries. After his Democratic Party won the January 1948 elections while Field Marshal Phibun's party failed, the military dropped Khuang. Under threat of renewed violence, Phibun took over the office of prime minister again in April 1948. The army and police began to hunt down “leftists”, including supporters of Pridi. Phibun's government has now won the support of the United States. It stopped the Thai support for anti-colonial efforts in Indochina, which had begun under Pridi, and stood loyally and uncritically at Washington's side during the beginning of the Cold War.
The successful coup of 1947 marked a lasting loss of importance for the Thai parliament ( national assembly ) as a political decision-making body. The role of the constitution as the basis and framework for political action, which can only be changed through a special procedure, was permanently diminished by the putschists' repeal. Due to the disempowerment of the multi-party system, the development of parties was stifled in the long term. Since the decisive factor was obviously not the balance of power between the parties, but rather military power, the existing parties practically gave up trying to gain members. The fact that the change of government did not take place through parliamentary channels but through military power confirmed the concept anchored in Thai society that power legitimizes power, so whoever has power deserves it.
In addition, the coup also had personal consequences and those for the relationship between the various circles within the military. After the success of the coup led by army officers and the return of Phibun to the top of the government, mainly army officers were given influential posts in both military and political leadership. Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram came back to the center of political rule three years after his disempowerment. Pridi Phanomyong, however, was subsequently excluded from any influence. The younger officers involved in the coup - including Sarit, Thanom, and Praphas - were promoted significantly in their careers. Through him, they also gained significant economic influence.
See also
literature
- Volker Grabowsky : A Brief History of Thailand , CH Beck, Munich 2010
- Robert Patrick Kiener: The November 8, 1947 Coup d'etat , in “An analysis of the 1981 unsuccessful Thai coup”, University of Hong Kong, 1983, Master Thesis
- Martina Peitz: The Elephant's Leap: Rent-seeking, Nation Building and catch-up development in Thailand , LIT Verlag, Zurich 2008
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b Peitz, p. 198
- ↑ Kiener, p. 29f.
- ↑ a b Kiener, p. 30
- ↑ a b c d Peitz, p. 199
- ↑ Kiener, p. 31
- ↑ a b Peitz, p. 200
- ↑ Kiener, p. 31f.
- ↑ Quoted from Paul M. Handley: The King Never Smiles. A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej. Yale University Press, New Haven 2006, ISBN 0-300-10682-3 , p. 89.
- ↑ Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian: Thailand's durable Premier: Phibun through three Decades, 1932-1957. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, p. 23.
- ↑ Kiener, p. 32f.
- ↑ Kiener, p. 33
- ↑ Kiener, p. 33f.
- ↑ Kiener, p. 14
- ↑ Kiener, p. 34
- ↑ Grabowsky, pp. 168f.
- ↑ Kiener, 34 f.
- ↑ Kiener, 35f.