Reich Office for Economic Demobilization

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The Reich Office for Economic Demobilization (DMA) was founded as the central body to deal with the economic problems of the German Reich immediately after the end of the First World War and was dissolved in May 1919.

Economic and social starting conditions

The DMA was founded under the impression of the lost war and the accompanying ceasefire conditions of Compiègne - confirmed in the Versailles Treaty , an economy almost entirely based on this war and the social instability resulting from the workers 'and sailors' uprisings. The Council of People's Representatives took over government on November 9, 1918 and initially pursued a policy of stabilization in an extremely difficult situation. The conditions of surrender stipulated that the army should withdraw behind the Rhine, reduce the army to 100,000 men, cease all further armaments, reparations and surrender territories that were important for the German economy. Millions of soldiers returned to their home communities without the local economy being able to secure a livelihood. The supply of the population with food was not guaranteed either. Friedrich Ebert described the situation in the following words:

"This is now the hour of the takeover of power, which so many once dreamed of as an hour of celebration and jubilation: The pressure of existence of 70 million mostly starving and desperate people is reduced to a few people."

Against the background of these conditions, the members of the Council of People's Representatives decided on a course on economic issues, which was oriented towards the most pressing problems.

history

The DMA was initiated on November 7, 1918 by a resolution of the Federal Council (on the basis of the War Ordinance on "Protecting the German Economy from Damage", "Enabling Act" Section 3 (1) of August 4, 1914). The establishment of the office was largely confirmed by the "Decree of the Council of People's Representatives on Economic Demobilization" of November 12, 1918. At the head of the new office was Joseph Koeth , a compromise candidate who was supported primarily by entrepreneurs and trade unions (ZAG). Koeth himself reformulated the mandate of the Council of People's Representatives to "bring the German economy to peace" as "maintain economic life during economic demobilization". In view of the tense economic and social situation, the DMA's measures were mainly aimed at short-term stabilization.

The DMA, which was upgraded to the Reich Ministry for Economic Demobilization on March 21, 1919 , was already dissolved on May 1, 1919 and the areas of responsibility were transferred to other ministries.

The archive material is available from the Federal Archives under R 3201 (partially digitized).

activities

On the basis of the War Ordinance to “protect the German economy from damage”, the DMA was endowed with extensive powers, which were also used in many ways. With the premise of relaxing the social situation, one of the main tasks was to integrate the many unemployed (ex-soldiers) into the economy. Among other things, companies were obliged to hire additional workers. The public sector launched an infrastructure program that created additional jobs. In addition, a social welfare system was set up to continue to take care of the unemployed. A system of “ proof of work ” from the time of the war was adopted, which contributed to the organization and control of this labor market policy.

In addition to the regulation of the labor market, the DMA campaigned for the slowest possible withdrawal of the forced economic measures of the war ordinances. There was fear that a hasty return to a free, international market would have deprived the German economy of the already low stocks of raw materials. This would have threatened the processing companies. The conversion of the production from war goods to peace goods was supported by government contracts and loans.

The End

Criticism of the DMA's policy arose soon after it was founded. Among other things, it was the loss of confidence in the Central Working Group (ZAG), the representation of trade unions and employers, that brought about the rapid end of the DMA. Criticism was primarily of the “compulsory economic measures”, the encroachments on labor law, which were soon voiced for rejection in the employers' camp, but also from the trade union side. On May 1, 1919, Koeth finally submitted a resignation, which was granted.

literature

  • Gerald D. Feldman: The demobilization and the social order of the interwar period in Europe . In: History and Society . tape 9 , no. 2 , 1983, p. 156-177 , JSTOR : 40185349 .
  • Gerald D. Feldman: The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924 . Oxford University Press, New York 1993, ISBN 0-19-503791-X .
  • Heike Knortz: Economic demobilization 1918/22. The example of the Rhine-Main area (=  studies on technology, economic and social history . Volume 4 ). Lang, Frankfurt am Main et al. 1992, ISBN 3-631-45467-8 .
  • Friedrich-Carl Wachs: The regulation work of the Reichsdemobilmachungsamt. Stabilizing factor at the beginning of the Weimar Republic (=  legal history series . Volume 85 ). P. Lang, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1990, ISBN 3-631-43532-0 .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Friedrich Ebert: Writings, records, speeches. With unpublished memories from the estate. (Ed. By Friedrich Ebert Jr.) Dresden, 1926, p. 115.