Battles of Latrun
As battles for Latrun is referred to several skirmishes between the Israeli forces and the Jordanian Arab Legion and Palestinian militias in Palestine war . The fighting continued with several interruptions from May 25 to July 18, 1948. The Israeli troops tried to take the strategically important position around Latrun , which controlled the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem . They failed because of the resistance of the Arab Legion.
prehistory
Since November 1947, according to the UN partition resolution 181, civil war raged in the Mandate Palestine between the Jewish community and Arab militias with the support of the Arab states. After the complete withdrawal of British troops in May 1948, several Arab states intervened with regular military units.
The Arab Legion took East Jerusalem together with the Jewish residential area there. Latrun was of strategic interest. The fortress-like police station at Latrun and the surrounding villages could be used to control the road from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem. Likewise the road from Ramallah to Majdal .
The commander in chief of the Legion Glubb Pasha feared reinforcement of the Israeli troops in West Jerusalem. As a result, he planned to block the road link. The fort at Latrun was evacuated by British troops in April 1948 and has since been occupied by Palestinian militias and small units of the Arab Liberation Army. On May 17th, the commander of the 4th regiment of the Habas al-Majali Legion decided with his troops to secure the positions at Latrun. The next day the regiment blocked the road to Jerusalem and thus cut off supplies to the Israeli-held West Jerusalem. On May 24th, Glubb reinforced the positions with the 2nd Legion Regiment under Major Geoffrey Lockett .
First Battle of Latrun
Operation Am Well
Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion feared the fall of West Jerusalem and the siege of the city that would weaken Israeli morale . As a result, he ordered the fastest possible occupation of the positions at Latrun and an advance against Jerusalem. The chief of operations of the Israeli general staff, Jigael Jadin, feared that sufficient forces would not be available and consequently demanded that the date of the attack be postponed. This was rejected by Ben Gurion.
On May 24, the Jordanian armed forces had around 2,300 regular soldiers from the Legion, around 800 Palestinian militiamen, 35 armored vehicles , 16 mortars and more than twenty artillery pieces of various caliber. The Israeli troops had recently been made up of immigrants, ammunition was scarce and some units were even missing canteens . The Israeli military intelligence service was not informed about the formation of the Legion troops and assumed that Latrun would only be held by militias.
As a result, the Israeli army deployed three battalions, one of which was in reserve and not yet fully deployed with 2 65mm guns and four David cam mortars for the attack. Battalion 32 should advance directly on Latrun while Battalion 72 should take the hills south of Latrun. A night attack was planned, but the troops started moving four to six hours too late. As a result, the attack took place in daylight and the troops were fully exposed to Jordanian artillery fire.
The attack failed with 72 dead, 120 wounded and 6 prisoners of war on the Israeli side.
Operation Am Now Bet
The food and water shortages in Jerusalem increased. The UN also discussed a four-week ceasefire. As a result, Ben Gurion feared that Jerusalem would be starved and ordered a second offensive. This time the Israelis again deployed three battalions, one of them in reserve, and carried out a night raid on May 30, 1948. The Israelis managed to break a breach in the outer wall of the fort with pioneer troops and to conquer the monastery near Latrun. But the Israelis could not take stable positions during the night. They withdrew due to fears of a Jordanian counterattack in daylight. This operation cost the Israeli forces 42 dead and around 80 wounded.
Operation Yoram
Ben Gurion ordered a second offensive to open the road. This time experienced troops from the Yiftah (3rd Battalion) and Harel Brigade (5th Battalion) were deployed. Another battalion was supposed to use mock attacks to divert attention from the intentions of the Israelis. Again there was a night attack, this time on 8/9. Planned June 1948. The 3rd and 5th Battalions were to occupy two hills south of Latrun. Both goals were missed. The 5th Battalion lost 16 men in the attack and 29 wounded. The 3rd Battalion lost visual and radio contact with the 5th Battalion and as a result did not intervene in the fighting. At 5:30 a.m. on June 9, the Israeli troops withdrew. The Legion had several dozen dead to mourn.
On June 11, a UN-enforced ceasefire ended the fighting until further notice. On May 28, Israeli patrols succeeded in scouting out an alternative route from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This was expanded by pioneers for civil traffic and water transport by pipeline and was ready for use on June 10, 1948. This so-called Burma Road ensured the supply of West Jerusalem for the rest of the war.
Second Battle of Latrun
After the end of the armistice, Israeli forces expelled the remaining Arab militias from the Lydda-Ramla area and were thus able to threaten the legion's positions at Latrun from both the north and the south. Glubb reinforced his troops at Latrun by a further battalion. This reinforcement also escaped the Israeli military intelligence. On the night of July 14-15, 1948, the Israeli army launched another attack on Latrun as part of Operation Dani. Troops of the Harel Brigade from the southeast and troops of the Yiftah Brigade from the northwest were supposed to encircle the positions. In difficult three days of fighting, the Israelis were able to close the ring to within three kilometers, but failed because of the Jordanian resistance. On July 18, a last tank attack with two Cromwell tanks failed due to Jordanian artillery and communication problems. On the same day, the second armistice came into effect, ending the fighting over Latrun.
consequences
The strategically important area around Latrun remained in Jordanian possession until the Six Day War and served to secure the Jordanian position on the West Bank , the occupation of which was the main war objective of the Jordanian government. Ben Gurion's orders came under strong criticism because the attacks through the Burma Road were pointless and had sacrificed poorly equipped and poorly trained troops.
literature
- Benny Morris: 1948 - A History of the First Arab-Israeli War . Yale University Press, New Haven 2008, ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9 .
Individual evidence
- ^ A b c d e f Benny Morris: 1948 - A History of the First Arab-Israeli War; New Haven 2008; Pp. 220-224
- ↑ Kenneth Pollack: Arabs at War, Lincoln, 2004; Pp. 276-278
- ^ Benny Morris: 1948 - A History of the First Arab-Israeli War; New Haven 2008; Pp. 224-229.
- ^ Benny Morris: 1948 - A History of the First Arab-Israeli War; New Haven 2008; Pp. 229-231.
- ↑ Kenneth Pollack: Arabs at War, Lincoln, 2004; Pp. 276-278.
- ^ Benny Morris: 1948 - A History of the First Arab-Israeli War; New Haven 2008; Pp. 229-231.
- ↑ Kenneth Pollack: Arabs at War, Lincoln, 2004; Pp. 276-278
- ^ Benny Morris: 1948 - A History of the First Arab-Israeli War; New Haven 2008; Pp. 293-295