The Will to Believe

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The Will to Believe is a religious-philosophical essay by William James , in which he tries to justify his belief in God through pragmatic arguments and in doing so takes a critical look at Pascal's bet . James gave this first as a lecture at Yale and at Brown University , then published it in the journal New World in 1896, and in 1898 in the anthology of his lectures The Will to Believe and other essays in popular philosophy .

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James begins by making a distinction between living and dead hypotheses. For a certain person only such hypotheses are alive that this person could actually seriously consider. Belief in the Mahdi (a kind of end-time savior in Islam) is a dead hypothesis for most Westerners . In the mind of an Arab, however, the Mahdi hypothesis could well find a place; for him the Mahdi hypothesis would be a living one , even if he were actually not a follower of the Mahdi belief.

The choice between two different hypotheses called James a choice (Engl. Option ). Options can be:

  1. alive or dead
  2. mandatory or avoidable
  3. meaningful or trivial .
  1. Living choices are choices between two living hypotheses , everything else is dead choices.
  2. Mandatory Elections ( forced options ) are those elections in which we can not remain undecided, all others are preventable elections.
  3. Significant elections ( momentous options ) are options that affect the taking or failure to take a one-time opportunity. A choice is not significant in this sense if it is not an irrevocable decision, if its consequences are moderate or minor, or if the choice can later be revoked if it turns out to be unwise. James counts most science choices to be of this trivial kind; a chemist could put a year of research into a certain hypothesis, he “believes” in it to the same extent, but if it is not confirmed, he can reject the thesis again.

James defined for its own purposes a real choice (Engl. Genuine option ) as one that both alive and compelling and important is.

James wants to show that the choice between theism and agnosticism (if it is alive at all for a particular person ) is a compelling and meaningful choice; he assumes that it is at least a living choice for most of his listeners ,

James first deals with Pascal's bet , according to which the decision of belief can be made like a bet in which belief in God offers the better prospects of winning. James doubts that a belief based on Pascal's argument is even seriously possible. It is true that any hypothesis can be asserted energetically, but it is absolutely impossible to actually believe it out of sheer willpower unless we have already had a certain inclination to seriously consider it beforehand.

For James it can be clearly felt that a belief that has been instilled in mathematical calculation misses the actual core of the reality of belief, and

“[…] Ourselves, if we were the deity, the 'believers' of this kind would probably with the greatest pleasure refuse the infinite reward. It is evident that, unless there has been a previous tendency to believe in Holy Masses and holy water, the choice that Pascal suggests to our will is not a living choice. There is no doubt that no Turk has ever seriously considered Holy Masses and holy water, and even for us Protestants these possibilities of salvation seem so absurd from the start that Pascal's logic, taken by itself, leaves us untouched. "

We could just as well be offered to believe in the Mahdi in order to gain infinite happiness, but to lose it if we do not believe in him. The logic would be the same as with Pascal, and yet the thought of the Mahdi would be so foreign to us that the Mahdi hypothesis would be a completely dead hypothesis for us.

Since the idea of ​​such a mechanically rewarding God seems nonsensical, Pascal's bet is already a dead hypothesis. Since this line of argument also endangers scientific thinking, it is not only stupid but also repulsive. Pascal's argument is powerless, but it still shows that the choice between belief and agnosticism is compelling and significant, because it influences our emotions and our actions in a morally relevant way, and the decision to act morally right is always necessary immediately.

All real (i.e. living, compelling and significant) choices that cannot be made on the basis of intellectual considerations may and must, according to James , be decided on the instinct (through the passional nature ). In these elections it is already a gut decision not to decide anything and to leave the question open. In such an epistemic situation, two maxims are relevant: We are epistemically obliged to learn as much as possible, i.e. to know the truth, and to avoid mistakes as much as possible, i.e. not to believe any untruths. These two laws are materially different, and our choice of preference for one of the two could steer our whole intellectual life in different directions.

In many areas it makes sense to give priority to avoiding errors: in science, but also e.g. B. in court hearings. However, scientific decisions are usually not mandatory or meaningful: they are initially of no relevance to our practical life; people are in a neutral, judgmental position here. Moral decisions, on the other hand, are often significant and have to be made without rational proof of correctness. In the social area, too, we often make gut decisions without much thought. This is important because when we consider whether someone likes us, the assumption that this is the case will often lead to the fact that this person actually likes us in the end. Thus, only through belief in a proposition does this proposition become true in the first place.

James admits that freedom to believe extends only to living hypotheses, which an individual's intellect cannot decide on its own; a “dead” hypothesis cannot be revived by willpower.

The “religious hypothesis” now consists in the fact that, firstly, perfection is something eternal and, secondly, that we are better served if we believe in the first part. It is believed that we gain a certain important good by believing and lose by disbelief, provided that belief is right. James notes that the choice between accepting and not accepting the hypothesis is imperative and significant here, since if the hypothesis is true, we will benefit immediately and permanently from our belief. However, we lose the said good, whether we now expressly choose not to believe or whether we remain undecided. In religious questions, skepticism now gives absolute priority to avoiding errors over knowledge of the truth and rejects religion for lack of sufficient evidence. James simply rejects this view, as he has no evidence why it is better to fall into a trap out of fear (of believing something wrong) than out of hope (that it may be true). A rule that prevents a whole class of truths from being found is irrational; but this is the case if the maxims of science are extended to religious convictions. So, as long as we have a real choice in matters of faith, it is acceptable and right to choose faith.

The essay ends with a quote from Fitz James Stephen:

“We are standing on a mountain pass in the middle of swirls of snow and thick fog, through which we now and then catch a glimpse of paths that may be deceptive. If we stop, we freeze to death; if we take the wrong path, we will be crushed. We don't even know for sure if there is any right way to go. What should we do? Be strong and of good cheer. Do the best, hope the best and take it as it comes. If death ends everything, we cannot face death any better. "

literature

Text output

  • William James: The Will to Believe and other essays in the popular philosophy , Dover, New York 1956, pp. 1–31.
  • William James: The will to believe. in: Philosophy of Pragmatism: Selected Texts , edited and introduced by Ekkehard Martens, Reclam, Stuttgart 2002.

Secondary literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See The Will to Believe, p. 1.
  2. ↑ The Will to Believe , pp. 2 f.
  3. ↑ The Will to Believe , p. 3 f.
  4. ^ The Will to Believe , p. 6.
  5. ↑ The Will to Believe , p. 6 f. In the original "silly" and "vile".
  6. ↑ a b The Will to Believe , p. 11.
  7. ^ The Will to Believe , p. 17.
  8. ^ The Will to Believe , p. 18.
  9. ↑ The Will to Believe , pp. 20 f.
  10. ↑ The Will to Believe , p. 22 f.
  11. ^ The Will to Believe , pp. 23-25.
  12. ↑ The Will to Believe , p. 26 f.
  13. ↑ a b The Will to Believe , p. 26.
  14. ↑ The Will to Believe , p. 28.
  15. ^ The Will to Believe , p. 29.