Van Gend & Loos decision
Starting with the decision in the Van Gend & Loos case against the Dutch tax authorities on February 5, 1963, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) developed its now almost undisputed case law of the independence and primacy of the law of the European Communities and thus justified the priority of application of the Union law .
Facts and subject of dispute
The Dutch transport company van Gend & Loos imported a certain basic chemical from Germany to the Netherlands in September 1960 . Due to a new regulation of the Dutch customs tariff of January 1st, 1960, the Dutch authorities levied a duty of 8% of the value of the goods. Previously, the corresponding tariff had been 3%. The Dutch administrative court, which was the last instance to deal with the lawsuit against this type of customs clearance , referred the European Court of Justice with the relevant European law issue that arose in this context.
The decision of the ECJ
The Tribunal states here:
“The European Economic Community represents a new legal order of international law, in favor of which the states have restricted their sovereignty rights, albeit to a limited extent; a legal system whose legal subjects are not only the Member States but also individuals. Community law, which is independent of the legislation of the member states, is therefore intended to give individuals rights just as it imposes obligations on them. "
Accordingly, Community law is an independent legal system that applies uniformly, directly and primarily in the member states, which even prevails over member state constitutional law (according to the ECJ later in the Kreil decision ). The ECJ confirmed this case law in several follow -up decisions , in particular in the Costa / ENEL decision and in International Trading Company .
Basis for the doctrine of the primacy of Community law was first, the independence of the European legal system recognize what the ECJ also did in "van Gend & Loos". The Court decided at this point that the community is a legal system of its own, which is neither international nor state in nature. Although it is undisputed that the founding treaties were originally international treaties, the separation of the Community legal order from this basis and its consequent independence was inferred from the need to create and maintain legal coherence within the community.
Based on this thesis, the problem of the hierarchy between European Community law and national law can be answered more easily. "Classical" international law can, depending on its type, take on different positions within a state. Within Germany, for example, it can be at the level of simple statutory law (Art. 59 GG ) or between statutory and constitutional law (Art. 25 GG).
Depending on its rank in the national legal system , it can claim priority or must give way to higher-ranking law. The principle of “lex posterior derogat legi priori”, according to which later law supersedes what was earlier in the event of equality, does not apply either. In the Federal Republic of Germany, however, it cannot take precedence over the Basic Law. Based on the point of view that Community law is not part of the national legal system, the conflict of laws rules do not apply to it, which the ECJ also postulated in its so-called Simmenthal II decision .
The autonomy of Community law does not result from the Treaties themselves, but was inferred by the Court of Justice from the requirement of uniform application of European law . The Federal Constitutional Court has expressly recognized the case law of the European Court of Justice with regard to the independence of the European legal system.
Although the independence of the European legal system does not say anything about its relationship to other legal systems, it serves as a starting point for the further arguments of the Court of Justice. This justifies the priority by stating that the member states have partially transferred their sovereign rights to the community, whereby the individual himself has become a legal subject with his own rights and obligations vis-à-vis the supranational institution (which may lead to direct applicability ). Furthermore, he concludes from the requirement of uniformity and functionality of the European legal system, according to which European law must apply uniformly throughout the legal area, so that no member state can decide itself on the applicability or inapplicability of Community law .
literature
- Case 26/62, "van Gend & Loos v. Dutch tax authorities", official collection of decisions of the ECJ 1963, page 1 ff. ( Decision on EUR-Lex )
Individual evidence
- ↑ Case 106/77, "Staatliche Finanzverwaltung gegen SpA Simmenthal", official collection of decisions of the ECJ 1978, page 629 ff.
- ↑ so in the decisions BVerfGE 22, 293 (296) ; BVerfGE 31, 145 (173) .
