international law


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The International Law ( loan translation to Latin ius gentium , law of nations' ) is a State, consisting of principles and rules legal system through which the relations between the subjects of international law (usually states ) are regulated on the basis of equality.

The term international public law has often been used synonymously since the 19th century , which is also due to the strong influence of the English term public international law .

The most important positive legal sources of international law are the Charter of the United Nations and the general prohibition of violence laid down in it , which as customary international law is binding beyond membership in the United Nations (UN) and prohibits any state from war of aggression .

The supranational legal is considered special feature of international law because it is also organized through the state; However, due to the transfer of sovereignty to intergovernmental institutions, it has some peculiarities that cannot be fully explained by international law.

General

The main difference between international law and domestic law is the lack of a compact code , a central legislative body , a comprehensive, hierarchically structured judiciary and executive power available at all times to uniformly enforce principles of international law. Classic international law is not imposed on the states, but represents a coordination system between them. Before it, only the "Christian", later the "civilized" - that is, the European states - were recognized as subjects of international law, which made colonialism appear legal. In today's international legal order, which is reflected in particular in the UN Charter , all states are, however, equal subjects. That is why the principle of "one state, one vote."

A distinction must be made between the law of peace and the law of war , whereby the law of peace also includes the norms that regulate the lawful use of military force ( ius ad bellum ), while the law of war is the law applicable in war ( ius in bello ). In principle, private international law is not part of international law . Rather, this term encompasses - regardless of an often international legal background - those state norms that determine the applicable law when a matter affects several state legal systems.

Depending on the number of contracting states, a distinction is made between “general”, “ common ” and “particular” international law.

Further development

In the last few decades there have been developments towards central legislation in international law. This tendency already existed before; it is being taken up by the United Nations Security Council , which, in particular after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 , switched to counter-terrorism obligations not yet accepted by all UN member states under generally applicable law with effect for and against to declare all member states and to approach the so-called mandatory law , the ius cogens (cf. Resolution 1373 and the Counter Terrorism Committee and Resolution 1540). This development is sometimes viewed critically, sometimes even skeptically, because it does not correspond to the conception of the Security Council as an executive body that deals with the solution of individual conflicts and is not supposed to act as a “world legislator”.

Subjects of international law

Subjects of international law are primarily states (according to Georg Jellinek's three-element theory, the three characteristics of state territory , state people and state authority are constitutive for a state ). However, today there are also other subjects of international law such as international organizations that can be founded by states or other international organizations. NGOs ( non-governmental organizations (NGOs), founded by private parties) generally do not have international legal personality. However, like multinational companies and individuals, they are increasingly being assigned certain rights and obligations under international law. For historical reasons, the International Committee of the Red Cross , the Holy See and the Sovereign Order of Malta are independent subjects of international law.

Sources of international law

Sources of international law are bilateral or multilateral international treaties , customary international law and general legal principles (cf. Art. 38 I lit. a, b, c ICJ statute of June 26, 1945):

  • International agreements of a general or special nature, ratified by the subjects of international law involved.
  • The customary international law is made up of the elements of the long-running exercise (possibly a number of years, in some rapidly changing areas of law less - consuetudo ) and the belief that this practice was lawful ( opinio juris ), together (international treaty law, despite its written form not take precedence over customary international law !). If a state wants to prevent its commitment to customary international law that is emerging, it must expressly and, as long as the other states adhere to their convictions, contradict it repeatedly ( persistent objector ).
  • The general legal principles recognized by the civilized peoples. These consist of principles common to all domestic legal systems, principles that are inherent in any legal system, for example pacta sunt servanda (contracts must be observed), lex specialis derogat legi generali (the more specific law takes precedence over the more general laws) or lex posterior derogat legi priori (a later law takes precedence over a previous one), venire contra factum proprium (violation of one's own previous behavior), principles based on the special character of international law, and principles of legal logic.

These sources do not claim to be complete. Rather, they represent a framework within which international law develops. In addition to these classic sources of international law, unilateral legal acts have also developed as sources of international law, even if they do not appear in the list of Art. 38 I ICJ Statute. Such unilateral legal acts can come from states as well as from international organizations. However, their legal liability is variable. The decisions of international organizations, such as the resolutions of the Security Council , are also seen as sources of law for international law.

Controversial is the legal nature of the so-called "soft law", the soft law , that be at least indirectly binding and can also become customary international law. In addition, if you follow the soft law, the presumption of legally compliant action applies.

Judicial decisions and the doctrine of renowned international lawyers can also serve as sources of law. According to Art. 38 I lit. According to the ICJ Statute, the International Court of Justice has to use the decisions of international courts and international law as aids for interpreting the above sources.

Relationship of international law to national law

International law provisions apply to all states, regardless of whether they have consented or not. The relationship between international law and national law can only be answered in conjunction with the respective state legal system . Monism (international law and national law form a uniform order) and dualism (international law and national law are completely separate legal orders) represent two theoretical extremes that are nowhere to be found in their pure form in practice. The diagram below gives an overview of the different approaches.

The question of whether an international law norm is to be observed by the domestic user of law is decided solely on the basis of whether the respective domestic law requires an act of implementation or not. In general, however, it can be said that the domestic application of international law in all legal systems actually presupposes a sufficiently specifically formulated norm that is not only addressed to states. Such norms are called self-executing (according to the correct view, however, this term is to be assigned to the respective national law, not to international law).

In Germany , according to Art. 25 S. 1 of the Basic Law, the general rules of international law are directly binding and take precedence over laws (→  international law clause ). Article 25 of the Basic Law makes no statement about the relationship between these general rules and the provisions of the Basic Law. Universal international law includes the generally applicable legal provisions, not just the legal principles. Implementation in national law is not required. General international law breaks all domestic law in the federal and state levels , but only takes a rank below (federal) constitutional law .

International treaty law requires transformation, which usually coincides with ratification by the legislative bodies (treaty law according to Article 59, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law), whereby it is implemented in domestic law. It then has the rank of federal law.

Theories on the relationship to national law, national enforcement, applicability and national rank
Relationship between international law and national law Domestic enforcement of international law Enforcement Domestic rank
  • specially defined by international treaty
  • not specifically set
  • monism
Unity of international law and national law
  • with primacy of IL
Primacy of international law
  • radical monism (strict monism)
every national sovereign act contrary to international law is null and void
  • tempered monism
every national sovereign act contrary to international law is initially valid, but must be rejected by judicial review
  • with primacy of national law
National law takes precedence
  • dualism
International law and national law are different legal systems
  • radical dualism (strict dualism)
no conflicts possible, as there are separate, possibly tangent circles
  • tempered dualism
partial overlaps and thus conflicts possible; in the area of ​​overlap: conflict of law rules, otherwise: domestic sovereign act still valid, but the state is liable to the outside world
Adoption theory (adaptation)

International law is applicable domestically without any further act

only self-executing norms are applicable, enforceable or transformable:
  • the norm must be sufficiently determined and
  • authorize or oblige the individual according to wording, purpose and content
Execution theory (execution)

Enforcement order establishes domestic applicability, but does not change the addressees or the legal nature (international law)

Transformation theory (transformation)
  • strict transformation theory
  • moderate transformation theory
Transformation only changes the target group; Entry into force etc. is therefore based on international law
  • general transformation
  • special transformation
Individual transformation, for example through the act of consent to international agreements = treaty laws
The rank of transformed law is directed
  • according to special regulations
  • otherwise according to the rank of the transformer

Relationship to international criminal law

The international criminal law is a branch of international law and regulates directly arising from international law and criminal responsibility of individuals for the most serious human rights violations. In the case of international law crimes ( genocide , crimes against humanity , war crimes and the crime of aggression ), the above remarks on subjects of international law and with regard to the relationship to national law do not apply or only apply to a very limited extent. On the one hand, individuals (and not states) can be held accountable under international criminal law. On the other hand, no transformation into national law is required. Even conflicting national law, e.g. B. Amnesty laws , does not in principle preclude criminal liability under international criminal law.

History of international law

Parliamentary negotiations were already common in ancient times in order to reduce the consequences of battle and war. The first "international law" agreement can be understood as the prohibition of war at the time of the Olympic Games , which were understood as a panhellenic competition. The friendship and trade agreement between the kings of Ebla and Assur , which was concluded in the middle of the third millennium BC, is the oldest “international law” treaty so far that has been handed down in full .

The conquests of Alexander the Great created a Hellenistic world that created Mediterranean legal bases through artful diplomacy, which were adapted and developed by the Roman Empire and culminated in the Codex Iustinianus .

The Jesuit Francisco Suárez can be seen as a co-founder of international law.

In 1625 Hugo Grotius summarized the rules developed up to then in his work De jure belli ac pacis (“On the law of war and peace”). They were further developed by Samuel von Pufendorf , Christian Wolff and others. Emer de Vattel summarized the status of international law towards the end of the 18th century .

In 1899 and 1907, the Hague Peace Conferences laid down international law and established the Hague Court of Arbitration. The Hague Land Warfare Code became the doctrine of international law for the two world wars of the 20th century.

One of the crucial aspects of modern international law, the prohibition of force, joined by the First World War for a long time back so that it only after the end of the war for the first time in the Kellogg-Briand Pact ( outlawing war ) was agreed between the States concerned. Previously, international war-related law was limited to trying to contain atrocities and protect civilians. With the League of Nations (founded in 1919) and its successor organization, the United Nations (since 1945), a common international level was created for the first time, which aims to secure a binding international law for all states.

Milestones of ( positive ) international law are:

This traditional periodization of international law has been increasingly in motion since the turn of the last millennium, with non-state actors gaining in importance and legal pluralistic tendencies intervening.

Theory of International Law

The theory of international law concerns, on the one hand, the question of the normativity of international law (i.e. the level of legal theory ) and, on the other hand, the question of an overall description of international law, which is on the one hand at the highest dogmatic level of abstraction (descriptive), and on the other hand at the level of legal philosophy (normative ) can be done.

Normativity of international law

The normativity of international law was derived from the doctrine of natural law from the divine will. They attribute voluntary theories to the will of the subjects of international law who have agreed to the respective legal norms . Partly it was based on the self-commitment of the states ( Hegel , Erich Kaufmann ), partly on the consensus among the states ( Triepel , right-wing positivism ). Hans Kelsen traced it back to a hypothetical so-called basic norm , which was criticized by other authors as pure fiction (Kelsen countered in his last publication: it is pure fiction, because the validity of any legal system is based on a practical fiction that is based on the will of the Participants depend, a self-justification is illogical). Sociological approaches focus on the social nature of man and natural solidarity among peoples ( Georges Scelle ).

The legal character of international law has been and is disputed by numerous authors. Kelsen, an avowed supporter of the idea of ​​international law, recognized the international law of the time, mainly because of the largely lacking enforcement mechanisms, only as a law that was emerging. HLA Hart did not deny the legal character of international law, but considered it to be only a collection of primary rules which, at least in its time, still lacked a generally accepted, secondary rule of recognition . Today, a few American authors in particular deny the normativity of international law and deny it the ability to influence the behavior of states. While the New Haven School still recognizes a limited normativity of international law, some advocates of an economic analysis of law such as Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner see it differently. According to them, international law is purely epiphenomenal : States are primarily interested in their security and increasing their power. Because of these interests, states behaved uniformly in certain situations. If this uniform state behavior is now given the predicate " customary law ", this still has no influence on the interests of the state. As soon as the circumstances change in such a way that a state can better satisfy its interests if it behaves differently, this state changes its behavior accordingly. The state wasted no thought on damaging its reputation. Other representatives of economic analysis (Joel Trachtman, Andrew Guzman) come to the conclusion with their models that international law can in certain situations have an influence on the behavior of states, since a potential lawbreaker includes loss of reputation in his calculation. According to them, international law has an - albeit limited - normativity. Parts of the Critical Legal Studies consider law to be an instrument for disguising hegemonic power politics and are therefore skeptical of its normativity.

In continental Europe , however, work is often carried out on the basis of legal positivism based on the consensus of states, without further problematizing the question of the normativity of international law.

Overall theoretical description of international law

The current discussion about a theoretical overall description of the international legal order is dominated by two terms in Europe, that of the international community (or community of nations ) and that of constitutionalization . The discussion takes place on different levels and concerns on the one hand descriptive (retrospective / dogmatic) and on the other hand normative (prospective / philosophical) statements about international law, which occasionally leads to misunderstandings.

  • The discussion about the “international community” gained topicality through the use of this term in the articles on state responsibility of the UN International Law Commission from 2001 (Art. 33 (1) and others). The existence of an “international community” is usually tied to certain community values ​​that can be derived from the legal system (human rights, environmental protection). Dogmatically, the existence of such community values ​​has consequences u. a. for the establishment of hierarchies of norms (e.g. ius cogens ) or for the creation of obligations for states against their will. This would be unthinkable under classic international law, which is geared towards intergovernmental coordination or cooperation.
  • At the same time, there is talk of a constitutionalization of international law. This discussion is based - despite all the differences in detail - on two observations: On the one hand, due to the steadily growing network of international legal relationships in which states are involved, state constitutional documents today only represent an incomplete legal basis for governing a state. The constitution of a state can therefore only be understood with the inclusion of the international legal order. On the other hand, various developments in international law made it possible to identify elements of a constitution there (e.g. hierarchy of norms, question of the constitutional character of the UN Charter). The constitutionalization debate has dogmatic effects, for example, on the question of the extent to which a state's domaine reservé extends or whether conflicting norms can be resolved according to valuation preferences . This shows a certain overlap in the discussions about “international community” and “constitutionalization”.

In addition to these two v. a. Discussions held in continental Europe must not ignore the widespread and massive skepticism among state representatives and international lawyers. Many of them still see the states as the central subjects of international law. They refer not only to the institutional weakness of the “international community”, but also to the risk of arbitrariness that the introduction of evaluative elements into international law harbors.

Another debate deals with the question of whether international law is not heading towards increasing fragmentation . This debate is based on two observations: Firstly, there are more and more normative conflicts between different international law regimes (e.g. between world trade law and international environmental law or between investment protection law and human rights ). Secondly, there is an overlap in jurisdiction between the increasing number of international courts of law and arbitration courts, which leads to conflicts of jurisdiction (e.g. between the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Justice in the MOX Plant Case ) or different decisions on the same issue (e.g. between the International Court of Justice and the Yugoslav Tribunal on the question of the attribution of the actions of non-state actors - Nicaragua case vs. Tadić decision). The fragmentation discussion can in a certain way be understood as a criticism of the thesis of the unity of the international legal order, which some authors advocate in the context of the constitutionalization debate. In 2006 the International Law Commission adopted a report on dealing with conflicting norms.

Current developments

Areas that are fiercely contested today and crucial for the future development of international law are: the ius cogens , humanitarian intervention as an exception to the prohibition of violence and (due to the current situation) preventive self-defense. Which norms belong to the ius cogens is controversial in detail, but in any case the core of the prohibition of violence and elementary human rights are an indispensable part of international law with absolute effect (effect erga omnes ). Further examples cited as conceivable by the International Law Commission (ILC) include acts such as slave trade, piracy and genocide, the violation of equality between states and the right of peoples to self-determination .

Humanitarian Interventions

When it comes to humanitarian intervention, not only are most of the statements tinged very politically, there is also a lot of confusion of terms. First of all, a distinction is made between interventions to rescue own nationals and those to rescue other people. The intervention to rescue own nationals in foreign territory is sometimes viewed as completely inadmissible and is justified by other authors with the violation of international law (protective obligations) of the state in which the foreigners are detained, or with the indication that the intervention does not target a foreign state power, but aimed at a criminal group. In the case of humanitarian interventions to rescue other people, a distinction must again be made between those authorized by the Security Council and those not authorized by it.

The UN Charter gives the Security Council the opportunity to ultimately impose military sanctions against behavior by a state that is qualified as a “threat to world peace”. Under customary law, this does not require troops directly subordinate to the Security Council; instead, states are empowered to use force. It is controversial at what point domestic processes endanger world peace, but the Security Council regularly sees this as threatened if genocide or so-called “ ethnic cleansing ” trigger refugee movements that spill over to neighboring countries. Even if the genocide carried out domestically does not affect neighboring countries (e.g. no flows of refugees), there may be a threat to world peace. According to the prevailing opinion, the prohibition of genocide works erga omnes , thus establishing an obligation towards all states of the international community. In addition, the prohibition of genocide is part of the ius cogens and is therefore a mandatory norm under international law. Genocide always affects the entire international community. The same applies to serious and systematic violations of elementary human rights.

However, the Security Council is often incapable of making decisions, in particular due to the veto right of the permanent members or politically precarious constellations. This is where the real question arises: if the Security Council is unable to act, may the states also use unilateral or multilateral force as a last resort ? One view categorically denies this with reference to the prohibition of violence and the risk of abuse. The contrary opinion also justifies humanitarian intervention by one or more states without the authorization of the Security Council in the event of a genocide currently taking place, on the one hand with the natural law justification that no legal system should condemn one to watch genocide; on the other hand with a teleological restriction of the UN Charter's prohibition of violence; or simply with new customary law overriding the Charter and the peoples' right to self-determination, which partially gives them the character of subjects of international law, with which they can ask others for help.

Preventive self-defense

While the UN Charter does not provide for a right to preventive self-defense, according to customary international law a preventive, more precisely: anticipatory or neutral: preventive self-defense in certain situations ( Caroline criteria ) is possible. However, the overwhelming opinion is that this is only the case if it can be shown that an attack is imminent and further waiting would undermine the effectiveness of the defense.

According to the prevailing opinion, there is currently no right to a presumed threat (by years) anticipatory defense, as assumed in the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 with reference to the concept of preemptive self-defense. In order for the normative force of the factual to assert itself in such a case, the rule that has been newly postulated in this way would have to be accepted by the predominant part of the international community through formal resolution or through long-term tacit consent (acquiescence) .

The right of self-defense in international law

It is sometimes argued in international law literature that individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter can only be directed against a state to which an act of aggression or an armed attack can be attributed. The attribution of acts of private legal subjects, to which terrorists belong according to the opinion represented here (if they are not regarded as independent subjects of international law), can only take place if the state in question sends these persons on its own initiative or actively supports them to such an extent ( e.g. through training, delivery of weapons) that one can speak of an effective control . Furthermore, “organizational links” between the state government and the terrorists operating from their area should also suffice if they had reached such a level that the latter would “de facto be regarded as part of the state structures”.

It is disputed whether the granting of so-called safe havens , i.e. the possibility of retreat for terrorists within a national territory, could be sufficient to apply the right of self-defense against the entire state concerned. However, the principle of proportionality must also be observed in the context of self-defense law, which must in particular take into account suitability, necessity and the prohibition of excess with regard to the use of military coercive measures.

Problem of the enforcement of international law

Since international law encompasses all intergovernmental agreements , today we often speak of mandatory international law, which makes basic human rights norms binding under international law. However, mandatory international law is not precisely defined. Mostly the ECHR directives, the UN covenants and similar treaties known as human rights are understood as mandatory international law.

Most of the members of the UN have signed such human rights conventions. The problem, however, is how to enforce international law. Implementation is hardly possible: As a historical example, Belgium was recognized and respected under international law as a neutral state during the Second World War , but this neutrality could not be guaranteed by anyone when it was violated by the German attack in May 1940. The torture in Guantánamo can also be viewed.

International legal norms can therefore only be enforced to a certain extent.

Problems of democratic legitimation in international law

International law is drawn up by delegations from a country in commissions and joint work. The delegations of the various states consist of the executive branch of a state, i.e. members of the government . They enact laws that they are supposed to enforce later. In democratic countries, however, the principle of separation of powers applies , with the executive, legislative and judicial branches being separated from one another. So the enactment of laws would actually be a matter for the legislature.

At the UN, all the governments of member states are involved in the consultation and drafting of international treaties, including all undemocratic elements of the international community. The provisions resulting from such contracts apply to everyone. Often this also happens without having been approved by a state people. This development only became problematic in the last few years when there was a radical change in understanding from international law to international law. The resulting laws intervene in the private life of the sovereign in general and of the individual citizen in particular, without the latter having given the legitimation to do so.

Humanity as a subject of international law

In principle, international law only establishes rights and obligations for subjects of international law; only in international humanitarian law (e.g. prohibition of discrimination, torture, etc.) is there a direct effect of international law rules in favor of organizations or private individuals. Subjects of international law are only states or international corporations created by states, e.g. B. the EU , WTO , etc. Humanity as such, that is, the totality of all people living on earth, has no subjectivity under international law and consequently neither rights nor obligations. The United Nations does exist, but in the legal sense it is only a union of states, not a representation of humanity as such. Humanity as such does not exist for international law. This leads to difficulties, for example in the area of ​​environmental law. Example: States that do not sign the climate convention do not act unlawfully if they emit gases that are harmful to the climate; States that do not sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea can dump their rubbish into international waters as they wish - because the climate and the high seas do not belong to anyone. Recently, however, Aden has taken the view that humanity is subject to international law, i.e. as such has rights and, if necessary, obligations under international law: the climate, the high seas etc. do not belong to anyone, but to humanity as such. According to this theory, it is illegal to damage common goods of humanity or to claim them exclusively for oneself, even without an express international agreement. These common goods of humanity also include supranational cultural goods such as the pyramids, claims to historical truth and information claims (for example, what do the files of State X say about a certain historical process, etc.).

From this follows, according to Aden: Mankind as such also has a claim against every state that it establishes its legal system in such a way that every single person, regardless of their origin, enjoys legal protection within the framework of certain inalienable minimum principles: impartial judges, granting of a legal hearing, Speed ​​of procedure etc. If a state cannot or does not want to guarantee the minimum rule of law stipulated by international law because of revolution, war or dictatorial government, another state may act in its place according to the principle of closest proximity (international emergency competence ; principle of proximity).

International institutions

See also

literature

German

French

  • Catherine Denis: Le pouvoir normatif du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies . Bruylant, Brussels [u. a.] 2004, ISBN 2-8027-1943-2 .
  • Robert Kolb: Les cours généraux de droit international public de l'Académie de La Haye . Bruylant, Brussels [u. a.] 2003, ISBN 2-8004-1327-1 .
  • Gérard Cohen Jonathan: Droit international, droits de l'homme et juridictions internationales . Nemesis, Brussels [u. a.] 2004, ISBN 2-8027-1900-9 .
  • Nguyen Quoc Dinh, P. Daillier, A. Pellet: Droit International Public . LGDJ, Cedin Paris X, 6th edition, Paris 1999.
  • Terry Olson, Paul Cassia: Le droit international, le droit européen, et la hiérarchie des normes . In: Droit et justice aux éditions , Presse universitaire française. ISBN 2-13-055494-6 .

English

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Matthias Herdegen: International Law . 15th edition. CH Beck, 2016.
  2. ^ Albert Bleckmann : General constitution and international law. From competence law to international cooperation law. Heymann, Cologne [a. a.] 1995, § 1 Rn. 9.
  3. Karin Oellers-Frahm: International jurisdiction - yesterday and today. From Settling Intergovernmental Disputes to Judging Individuals - Basics, Specifics, and Limits of International Jurisdiction. In: Constitution and Law in Übersee (VRÜ) 34 (2001), pp. 456–473.
  4. ^ Matthias Herdegen: International Law. 11th edition, CH Beck, Munich 2012, § 1 Rn. 15th
  5. ^ A b Hanspeter Neuhold, Waldemar Hummer, Christoph Schreuer: Austrian manual of international law . 4th edition, Vienna 2005, ISBN 3-214-14913-X .
  6. See Hans-Joachim Cremer : General rules of international law , in: Josef Isensee / Paul Kirchhof (ed.), Handbook of the State Law of the Federal Republic of Germany , Volume XI: Internationale Bezüge , 3rd edition, Heidelberg 2013, § 235 Rn. 27 ; Rudolf Weber-Fas: The constitutional state of the Basic Law. Origin - Principles - Shape , Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2002, p. 235 f.
  7. ^ Gerhard Werle: Principles of International Criminal Law , 2nd edition 2009, Rn. 3.
  8. ^ Gerhard Werle: Principles of International Criminal Law , 2nd edition 2009, Rn. 215; Special Court for Sierra Leone , Prosecutor v. Kallon and Kamara, SCSL (Appeals Chamber) , judgment of March 13, 2004.
  9. ^ Karl-Heinz Ziegler: History of International Law. A study book . CH Beck, Munich 1994, ISBN 978-3-406-38343-4 , p. 15 . Quoted from Christian Hillgruber: The contract as a legal source . In: Archive for Legal and Social Philosophy . tape 85 , no. 3 . Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1999, p. 348-361, 348 with fn. 2 , JSTOR : 23681351 .
  10. Kathpedia article on Francisco Suárez
  11. ^ Emer de Vattel : The Law of Nations - Applied to the Conduct of Nations and Sovereigns , Dublin 1792.
  12. ^ However, see Ferdinand Tönnies 1917: World War and Völkerrecht , TG 10, 2008, pp. 285–332.
  13. According to Memorandum A / CN.4 / 98 of February 21, 1956 (PDF; 2.0 MB) drawn up by the UN Secretariat .
  14. Michael Stolleis: Readjustment of the history of international law . In: Rechtsgeschichte Legal History - Journal of the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History . No. 26 , 2018, ISSN  2195-9617 , p. 375–377 , doi : 10.12946 / rg26 / 375-377 ( mpg.de [PDF; accessed December 17, 2018]).
  15. Hans Kelsen: General Theory of Norms , 1979, p. 206.
  16. Hans Kelsen: Peace through Law , 1944.
  17. Ulrich Vosgerau, in: Burkhard Schöbener (Ed.), Völkerrecht. Lexicon of central terms and topics , CF Müller, 2014, p. 400 ff.
  18. ^ Björn Schiffbauer: Preventive self-defense in international law. 1st edition, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2012, ISBN 978-3-428-13868-5 .
  19. Ulrich Fastenrath: A defensive war cannot be limited in advance. The constitution, international law and the deployment of the Bundeswehr in the fight against terrorism , in: FAZ , November 12, 2001, p. 8.
  20. Journal for Comparative Law 2006 , pp. 55 ff.
  21. See Journal for Comparative Law 07 , p. 490.
  22. ^ After Aden: Völkerrecht als Basis des Internationale Wirtschaftsrecht , 2006.