Two-plus-four contract

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Signatures of the Four Powers

The two-plus-four treaty (full official title: treaty on the final regulation with regard to Germany ; therefore also referred to as the regulatory treaty for short ) is a state treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the one hand and France , the Soviet Union , and Great Britain and the United States of America on the other hand. It paved the way for the reunification of Germany , was signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990 , and came into effect with an official ceremony on March 15, 1991, the date on which the last instrument of ratification was deposited.

As the politically required and legally necessary peace settlement with Germany after the Second World War , the Two-Plus-Four Treaty marks the end of the post-war period - as a result , Germany, including Berlin, is finally exempt from occupation restrictions - and is considered to be a significant diplomatic contribution to the peace order in Europe . The contract is viewed as a so-called status contract , the legal effects of which also extend to third countries .


At the start of the two-plus-four talks between the foreign ministers, the guard building at the “ Checkpoint Charlie ” border crossing in Berlin was dismantled on June 22, 1990. It is now in the Allied Museum .
Meeting of the first round of talks according to the formula "2 + 4" agreed in Ottawa at civil servant level in the Foreign Office on March 14, 1990
(right: Dr. Dieter Kastrup , Ministerial Director and Head of Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany; 4th from left: Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher )

The initialling of the agreement for a "final settlement" (in English settlement final ) the hitherto partly unresolved German question who went two-plus-four talks ahead of where the external conditions for the unification of the two German states such as border issues, Alliance membership and troop strength were discussed. After an agreement on such talks had been reached on the fringes of the “ Open Skies ” conference of the CSCE in Ottawa on February 13, 1990, and the so-called “two plus four formula” was passed, these took place in four rounds on May 5 in Bonn , June 22 in East Berlin , July 17 in Paris (with the participation of the Republic of Poland ) and September 12 in Moscow. The venue was the Oktyabrskaya Hotel ("October"), the previous venue for the Warsaw Treaty .

The "two plus four" negotiations are judged to be a masterpiece of international diplomacy . Problems that had shaped and shaped an entire era were solved within a very short time.

Until recently, the outcome of the negotiations in Moscow had been questionable. After the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chancellor Helmut Kohl had telephoned the particularly controversial withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Federal territory until the end of 1994 on September 10, the concerns on the French and British sides in particular grew. The governments of both countries had previously assumed that reunification would only come about in the distant future because of Soviet concerns. Ultimately, the Soviet Union recognized that it “could expect greater economic aid from a saturated Germany as well as one firmly integrated into the Western communities.” It was assumed that the “reduced influence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe [...] would be politically compensated by the envisaged new forms of cooperation with the united Germany ”, such as the“ new quality ”given to the German-Soviet relationship.

The British government under Margaret Thatcher made one last attempt to delay the agreement by demanding that, after reunification, military maneuvers also be held in the territory of the former GDR. As expected by the British, this was resolutely rejected by the Soviets. In a nocturnal round of negotiations from September 11th to 12th, the US Secretary of State James Baker, at the instigation of his German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher, pushed the British through to the extent that far-reaching NATO maneuvers were not carried out in eastern Germany by standing up an additional protocol note agreed that these should only be held taking into account the security interests of the Soviet Union. Thus Thatcher's attempt was thwarted.

“The French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America hereby end their rights and responsibilities with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. As a result, the related quadrilateral agreements, resolutions and practices will be terminated and all related Four Power institutions will be dissolved. "

- Article 7 (1) of the Treaty on the final regulation with regard to Germany

Under the title “Treaty on the Final Settlement with regard to Germany”, the four powers , the main allies in World War II , waived their right of reservation with regard to Germany. The two-plus-four treaty was not ratified by all contracting states until 1991 - most recently on March 4, 1991 by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - whereby the acceptance of the treaty was highly controversial until the end and was by no means certain. Due to this, the representatives of France, the USSR, Britain and the United States announced on 1 October 1990 ( BGBl. II, pp 1331 et seq.) In New York issued a statement after their "rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole with effect from the time of the unification of Germany until the entry into force of the treaty on the final regulation with regard to Germany ” .

On March 13, 1991, the Soviet military flew the former head of state of the GDR, Erich Honecker , together with his wife Margot from the Beelitz-Heilstätten military hospital near Potsdam to Moscow, despite the German arrest warrant of November 30, 1990, and thus temporarily withdrew Honecker from a trial in Germany. This actually meant a violation of German sovereignty : the Soviet military authorities thereby de facto violated the treaty of October 12, 1990 on the conditions of temporary residence and the modalities of the scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and against international law. The USSR justified the action as “humanitarian aid” for Honecker, who saw himself as a “political refugee”, although the process “should not be politically loaded”, so the Soviet envoy in Berlin, Igor Maximytschew . The German federal government did not prevent Honecker's transfer to Moscow and only responded 30 hours later by summoning the Soviet ambassador to the Chancellery . The ratification document was only handed over by Ambassador Wladislaw Terechow to Federal Foreign Minister Genscher on March 15, 1991, after Honecker's flight, and the approved "2 + 4" treaty only came into force after this, albeit with the suspension declaration of the Foreign ministers of the four great powers officially "the activities of all relevant institutions [...] from the time of the unification of Germany were also suspended".

Provisions of the contract

The international law enshrined Oder-Neisse line since 1990: Even if it in the eastern territories no German after 1945 judicial power was more, they were not been released from the jurisdiction area of Germany. Only with the two plus four treaty did Germany lose territorial sovereignty over the areas east of the Oder and Neisse rivers.

The contract - it is also called sovereignty treaty called - regulates ten articles mutual agreement the foreign policy aspects as well as security conditions of German unification and its effect on as a peace treaty between Germany and the victors treated and Poland, although - because "virtually irrelevant "- he" expressly did not receive this designation "( see below ) and even in the Potsdam Agreement a" peace treaty regulation "was provided instead. The two-plus-four treaty thus forms “practically the basic foreign policy law of the united Germany”. With the termination of allied sovereignty that still existed , the Potsdam resolutions that had been valid up to that point were replaced. The result was the restoration of German unity, and after completion of the rights and responsibilities - remainders of from the Berlin Declaration of 1945 stemming "Supreme Authority" (supreme governance ) - The governments of the French Republic , the Soviet Union , the United Kingdom and the United States the regaining of “accordingly full sovereignty [of Germany] over its internal and external affairs”.

"[...] in the knowledge that their people live since 1945 in peace, [...]
bearing in mind the principles signed in Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ,
in recognition that these principles firm foundations for building a have created a just and lasting peace order in Europe, [...]
in recognition of the fact that as a result and with the unification of Germany as a democratic and peaceful state, the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole lose their significance [... ] "

- Preamble to the treaty on the final regulation with regard to Germany

An additional note on the German side wrote the land reform in the GDR for all time.

The signatories were Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher for the Federal Republic, Lothar de Maizière for the GDR (after Markus Meckel left the de Maizière government ), Roland Dumas for France, Eduard Shevardnadze for the USSR, Douglas Hurd for Great Britain and James Baker for the USA. Since the People's Chamber , the state symbol of the GDR with Hammer, circles and ears wreath had already abolished the East German delegation held with no official stamp. Without the seal, the Soviet Union would not have recognized the signature for the GDR and thus the authenticity of the document, which is why a special envoy from the nearby embassy had to bring in a disused stamp with the emblem.

“The two German states only acted in their own name and not as representatives of Germany [...]. According to Art. 8 I 2 of the treaty, however, the ratification must then take place “on the German side by unified Germany”; the treaty is to come into force “for the united Germany” (Art. 9 sentence 1) and “therefore also apply to the united Germany” (Art. 8 I 2). [...]
Politically, the chosen procedure is intended to ensure that breaks and distortions in interstate relations, such as can occur in cases of state succession, are avoided. Although it is unusual for a legal entity as a 'negotiating state' to draft and accept the text of the treaty, another legal entity expresses its consent to be bound by the text of the treaty; however, it is fundamentally possible for a state to agree to a contractual arrangement and be legally bound, even though it was not a “negotiating state”. [See. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969]. "

- Dieter Blumenwitz : Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1990, p. 3041

The Soviet memorials and cemeteries such as in Berlin in Treptower Park or Tiergarten as Soviet war cemeteries were an important negotiating point of the Soviet side on German reunification within the framework of the treaty . The Federal Republic therefore undertook in 1992 in the Agreement of December 16, 1992 between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Russian Federation on War Graves Care to guarantee their continued existence, to maintain them and to repair them. Any changes to the monuments therefore require the approval of Russia.

Instead of a peace treaty

The acceptance of the two-plus-four treaty was a prerequisite for the four powers to agree to complete German sovereignty, since a separate peace treaty was not concluded after the Second World War: “An additional peace treaty is therefore neither planned nor did it make sense. Everything that a peace treaty should contain is therefore regulated. The two-plus-four treaty replaces any peace treaty with the war opponents by virtue of its more than peace-oriented content ”.

Under international law, a peace treaty is not the only way to end the war: this can also be done through unilateral declarations, graduated partial regulations or simply through the factual resumption of peaceful relations. The existing agreement is found in the figurative sense in the language regulation instead of a peace treaty ; this was also taken to “u. a. not having to comply with any reparation claims of individual third countries that have not yet been settled . This related in particular to Greece , whose demands have been rejected in the past with reference to a future peace treaty. On a "peace treaty" could be "financial considerations have no interest," said the State Secretary Friedrich Voss . It "would inevitably have called all former war opponents of the German Reich onto the scene as potential contractual partners [...]", but "[neither the Four Powers nor the two German states [...] could [have] an interest in this." Above all, the argument prevailed that the four powers USA, France, Great Britain and USSR had exclusive competence over Germany as a whole. In this respect, West German diplomacy was able to prevent the direct participation of other states in the contractual “final settlement with regard to Germany”. All contracting parties involved agreed on this. Because “the participation of the European neighbors, all 35 CSCE states or even the 65 opponents of the Second World War would not only have prolonged the proceedings in an unfavorable manner; other participants would probably have liked to have their consent linked to the fulfillment of old and new reparation claims. "

This question "can be considered materially settled after Poland and the Soviet Union had already declared their waiver in 1953." At the London Debt Conference it was decided that all reparation claims would be negotiated according to a peace treaty. In addition, especially for the Federal Republic of Germany, the concept of the peace treaty had had a negative connotation since the Versailles Treaty and, not least in view of the time that had passed since the end of the Second World War - it was “often perceived as 'anachronistic'” - and changed political reality not appropriate.

“After the Second World War - at least for the Federal Republic of Germany - there were no reparation regulations comparable to the Versailles Treaty and therefore no comprehensible long-term reparation payments. Rather, the victorious powers unilaterally withdrew reparations which, seen as a whole, amount to a multiple of the total amount originally envisaged by the Potsdam Conference .
As part of the German unification , the contract on the final regulation with regard to Germany - the so-called two-plus-four contract - was concluded. The federal government concluded this treaty with the understanding that the reparations issue is finally settled. The two-plus-four contract does not provide for any further reparations. "

On March 15, 1991, the post-war regulations were eliminated with final effect. “For the '2 + 4' process [could] only be considered the reunification model of the partial order theory, based on the legal equality of the Federal Republic and GDR [...]. This does not exclude the legal identity of the united Germany with the (old) Federal Republic of Germany and with the German Reich […]. ”The demand for a peace treaty is therefore“ historically outdated ”in the best sense of the word; The large number of considerably stronger international treaties ensures that the member states are at peace with one another. B. within NATO or in the EU . "In addition, both the official title of the treaty and paragraph 12 of the preamble emphasize the 'final' character of the treaty with regard to Germany."

"I used the debate, which was not unwelcome to me, to make the tacit agreement of the four that there would be no more peace treaty and no more peace treaty-like settlement open:" The Federal Government joins the declaration of the four powers and states that the in The events and circumstances mentioned in the declaration of the four powers will not occur, namely that a peace treaty or a peace treaty-like settlement is not intended. "
For the minutes, the French foreign minister, who presided over it, declared:" I have established a consensus. "This was amicably laid down that neither the Potsdam Agreement nor the Paris Treaties of the old Federal Republic with the three Western powers could serve as a basis for the demand for a peace treaty in the future. The demand for a peace treaty could definitely no longer be raised - this also relieved us of concern about obvious reparation claims. It was sealed what Dieter Kastrup had already achieved at the official level. "

- Hans-Dietrich Genscher, retired Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs : Memories . Siedler, Berlin 1995, p. 846

The two-plus-four treaty is today recognized as a “masterpiece of diplomacy” and in 2011 it was included in the “Memory of the World” program by UNESCO . He is thus part of the world document heritage . The entire agreement original is in the Foreign Office Political Archives custody ; a facsimile is in the Genscher-Haus in Halle (Saale) .

See also


  • Foreign Office, Public Relations Department (Ed.): "2 + 4". The negotiations on the external aspects of the establishment of German unity. A documentation. Bonn 1993 ( online ).
  • Rafael Biermann : Between the Kremlin and the Chancellery: How Moscow struggled with German unity (=  Studies on Politics ; Vol. 30). Schöningh, Paderborn [a. a.] 1997, ISBN 3-506-79350-0 (also short version of: Bonn, Univ., Diss., 1995).
  • Dieter Blumenwitz: The contract of September 12, 1990 on the final regulation with regard to Germany . In: NJW 1990, issue 48, p. 3041 ff. ( Facsimile p. 3047 ).
  • Christoph-Matthias Brand: Sovereignty for Germany: Basics, history and importance of the two-plus-four contract of September 12, 1990 . Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne 1993, ISBN 3-8046-8796-2 (zugl .: Göttingen, Univ., Diss., 1992).
  • Ulrich Albrecht : The liquidation of the GDR: the "2 + 4 negotiations"; an inside report , Westdt. Verl., Opladen 1993, ISBN 3-531-12322-X .
  • Frank Elbe : The solution to the external aspects of German unification: the 2 - + - 4 process; Lecture given at the Walther-Schücking-Kolleg, Institute for International Law at the University of Kiel, December 11, 1992 . In: Walther-Schücking-Kolleg (Hrsg.): Series of publications by Walter-Schücking-Kolleg 14 , Europa-Union-Verlag, Bonn 1993, ISBN 3-7713-0443-1 .
  • Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung / Landesbüro Brandenburg (ed.), Gabriele Schnell (edit.): The Potsdam Agreement and the Two-Plus-Four Treaty: The Bracket of German Post-War History; Contributions to the event organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Brandenburg State Office, on October 13, 1995 in Potsdam. Potsdam 1997, ISBN 3-86077-465-4 .
  • Aleksandr Galkin, Anatolij Tschernjajew (ed.): Michail Gorbatschow and the German question. Soviet Documents 1986–1991 (Sources and Representations on Contemporary History, Volume 83). Oldenbourg, Munich 2011, ISBN 3-486-58654-8 .
  • Lutz-Philipp Harbaum: Paris dilemmas in the process of German reunification (=  Young Political Science Forum ; Vol. 15). Bouvier, Bonn 2008, ISBN 978-3-416-03238-4 .
  • Markus Meckel : To change the times. Memories. Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, Leipzig 2020, ISBN 978-3-374-06355-0 .
  • Reinhard Müller: The “2 + 4” contract and the right of peoples to self-determination (=  writings on constitutional and international law ; vol. 73). Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1997, ISBN 3-631-31284-9 (also: TU Dresden, Diss., 1996).
  • Barbara Munske: The two plus four negotiations from a German perspective: an analysis of perception (=  Studies on Peace Research ; Vol. 9). Westview Press Inc., Boulder (USA) 1994, ISBN 3-8258-2071-8 (Zugl .: FU Berlin, Diss., 1993).
  • Klaus Stern (ed.): Two-plus-four contract, partnership agreements, EC package of measures: with reasons and materials , with an introduction by Klaus Stern and Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu. Beck, Munich 1991, ISBN 3-406-35368-1 .
  • Tanja Wagensohn: The Soviet position in the two-plus-four process . In: Eastern Europe Inst. Munich (ed.): Mitteilungen / Osteuropa-Institut Munich No. 18 , Munich 1996.

Web links

Commons : Two-Plus-Four Contract  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files


  1. See Art. 2, Federal Law Gazette 1990 II p. 1317 and Federal Law Gazette 1991 II p. 587 : “The ratification documents were deposited by the united Germany on October 13, 1990, by the United States on October 25, 1990, by the United States Kingdom on November 16, 1990, of France on February 4, 1991, and of the Soviet Union on March 15, 1991. ”
    The associated final termination of the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers and their respective agreements and resolutions communicated by the Governments of the Four Powers corresponding verbal notes dated April 5, 1991 to the Secretary General of the United Nations in a notice to all states; see. UN Doc. S / 22449.
  2. See Bernhard Kempen , The German-Polish Border after the Peace Regulations of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty , 1997, pp. 208 ff .; on the reservation of “the final peace settlement” cf. Official Gazette of the Control Council in Germany , supplement sheet No. 1 p. 17 f. ( BVerfGE 40, 141 (157); BVerfGE 40, 141 (158)) or the "peace treaty regulation" see Art. 2 Clause 1, Art. 7 Para. 1 and 2 Clause 1 of the General Agreement (cf. also files on foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1971. January 1 to April 30, 1971 (AAPD 1971, I), published on behalf of the Foreign Office by the Institute for Contemporary History , Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2002, p. 719 ). The Soviet-Polish treaty of August 16, 1945, which describes the course of the Soviet-Polish border line in East Prussia , expressly repeats the reservation of the peace treaty with reference to the Potsdam Conference ( United Nations Treaty Series 10 II No. 61 p. 196).
  3. Dieter Wilke, The development of the constitution in Berlin: From the end of division to ascent to the federal capital , in: JöR, NF Vol. 51 (2003), pp. 193–250, here p. 213 .
  4. Cf. Ute Mager , Staatsrecht I: German State Organization Law taking into account the references to European law (= study series Law; Vol. 1), 7th, completely revised edition, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart 2009, chap. 4.3.3, marginal no. 53.
  5. The concept of state contract, see the habilitation of Eckart Klein , state contracts in international law. Legal issues of territorial special regimes (=  contributions to foreign public law and international law; vol. 76), Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg / New York 1980, ISBN 3-540-10141-1 , p. 21 ff., Here p. 23.
  6. See for example JA Frowein , Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public International Law , in: Académie de Droit International de la Haye (ed.), Recueil des Cours 248 (1994-IV), pp. 345-438, here p. 362.
  7. Bernhard Kempen, The Distomo case: Greek reparations claims against the Federal Republic of Germany , in: Hans-Joachim Cremer, Thomas Giegerich, Dagmar Richter, Andreas Zimmermann (ed.): Tradition and cosmopolitanism of law. Festschrift for Helmut Steinberger (=  contributions to foreign public law and international law; vol. 152), Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg / New York 2002, p. 179 ff., Here p. 194 .
  8. Kay Hailbronner , in: Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (Ed.): Völkerrecht , 4th ed. 2007, Rn. 206 .
  9. Gert-Joachim Glaeßner , Politik in Deutschland , 2nd, updated edition, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2006, ISBN 978-3-531-15213-4 , pp. 71-74 .
  10. ^ Andreas Wirsching , Horst Möller , Ilse Dorothee Pautsch, Gregor Schöllgen , Hermann Wentker : The unit. The Foreign Office, the GDR Foreign Ministry and the two-plus-four process . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2015, ISBN 978-3-647-30076-4 , p. 47.
  11. In follow-up negotiations, the date was brought forward to August 31, 1994.
  12. ^ Wichard Woyke (Ed.), Handwörterbuch Internationale Politik , 11th edition, Verlag Barbara Budrich (UTB), Opladen / Farmington Hills 2008, ISBN 3-8252-0702-1 , p. 68 .
  13. a b cf. Dieter Blumenwitz , NJW 1990, p. 3041 ff.
  14. See, in addition to other bilateral agreements , the Treaty on Good Neighborhood, Partnership and Cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , signed in Bonn on November 9, 1990 by Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev ( PDF ; BGBl. 1991 II P. 702 ff.). The treaty was initialed on September 13, 1990 in Moscow by the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic, Genscher, and the USSR, Shevardnadze . See in detail Klaus Stern , The State Law of the Federal Republic of Germany , Volume V, The historical foundations of German State Law. Munich 2000, pp. 2045 ff .; Mikhail Gorbachev , How It Was. German reunification. Berlin 1999.
  15. Alexander von Plato, The Unification of Germany - A World Political Power Game: Bush, Kohl, Gorbatschow and the Internal Conversation Protocols , 3rd edition, Ch. Links, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-86153-585-0 , p. 446 .
  16. Klaus-Rainer Jackisch: At a round table with sharp corners. Deutschlandfunk , October 3, 2005, accessed on September 12, 2017 .
  17. When the contract was concluded , this term covered “ 'Germany as a whole' within the limits of December 31, 1937 and not just the new, narrower term 'united Germany' from Art. 1”, cited above. according to Georg Ress , The final regulation with regard to Germany: Guarantee function of the four powers? ( Pp. 825-850 ), chap. 6: "Guarantee position of the four powers regarding the borders of Germany?", In: Ulrich Beyerlin u. a. (Ed.), Law between upheaval and preservation. Festschrift for Rudolf Bernhardt (=  contributions to foreign public law and international law; vol. 120), Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg / New York 1995, p. 838 ff. ( 839 fn 57 ).
  18. Announcement of the Allies' "declaration of suspension" of October 1, 1990 on their rights of reservation (October 2, 1990)
  19. Cf. Andreas Malycha, Peter Jochen Winters, Die SED: Geschichte einer deutschen Party , CH Beck, Munich 2009, p. 394 .
  20. a b Cf. also Joachim Nawrocki: The Beelitz Coup: Last Service for the Comrade - Erich Honecker's Flight from the Republic and the Consequences , in: Die Zeit , No. 13 of March 22, 1991.
  21. Heiko Wingenfeld, The Public Debate on the Criminal Proceedings Due to GDR Injustice: Dealing with the Past in the West German Public in the 1990s , Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin 2006, ISBN 3-8305-1196-5 , pp. 62 f.
  22. This Thomas Kunze , head of state aD: The last years of Erich Honecker , Ch links, Berlin 2001. ISBN 3-86153-247-6 , pp 128-129 .
  23. Helmut Quaritsch , The Self-Determination Right of the People as the Basis of German Unity , in: Josef Isensee / Paul Kirchhof (ed.), Handbook of the State Law of the Federal Republic of Germany , Volume XI: Internationale Bezüge , 3rd edition, Heidelberg 2013, § 229 (p 111-192) marginal no. 108 f.
  24. Gilbert Gornig , Burkhard Schöbener , Winfried Bausback , Tobias Irmscher, In Memoriam Dieter Blumenwitz , in: dies. (Ed.), Iustitia et Pax. Gedächtnisschrift for Dieter Blumenwitz (= writings on international law; vol. 176), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-428-12745-0 , pp. 7-16 (12 f.).
  25. See Joachim Bentzien, The international legal barriers of national sovereignty in the 21st century , Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 35, note 34 , 68–71.
  26. See Daniel-Erasmus Khan , Die deutscher Staatsgrenzen. Legal historical foundations and open legal questions , Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2004, p. 305 fn 158 .
  27. According to an assessment by Wilhelm Grewes in a supplement to the FAZ of May 22, 1982, after one "increasingly clear [...] on the part of the four main victorious powers and on the German side - for different reasons - the result [came] that he [one Peace treaty] by other instruments under international law, which concerned the central political concerns about Germany's status in Europe ”(quoted from Klaus Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesoline Republik Deutschland , Volume V, § 135, Munich 2000, p. 2070).
  28. ^ Karl Doehring , Völkerrecht , 2nd, revised edition, CF Müller, Heidelberg 2004, Rn. 651 .
  29. See in particular Georg Ress , ibid., Chap. 3: “The two plus four treaty of September 12, 1990 as a peace treaty equivalent?”, In: Ulrich Beyerlin u. a. (Ed.), Law between upheaval and preservation. Festschrift for Rudolf Bernhardt (=  contributions to foreign public law and international law; vol. 120), Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg / New York 1995, pp. 829–832 mwN , on p. 829 and In 843 , Ress called the two-plus-four treaty a "substitute for peace treaty".
  30. Wichard Woyke , German-French relations since reunification: The tandem sums up again Tritt , 2nd edition, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 3-8100-4174-2 , p. 31 f.
  31. Michael Stolleis , History of Public Law in Germany , Vol. IV, CH Beck, Munich 2012, p. 33 ; Stephan G. Bierling , The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Norms, Actors, Decisions , 2nd edition, Oldenbourg, Munich / Vienna 2005, pp. 69 , 253 ff .; Quaritsch, in: Isensee / Kirchhof, HStR XI, § 229 Rn. 107 .
  32. BGBl. II 1990, pp. 1318, 1320, 1324.
  33. ^ Wording of the Görlitz Treaty of July 6, 1950. See the text of the contract on the website of the German-Polish Society Federal Association ( Memento from March 1, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), accessed on October 11, 2016.
  34. Lothar de Maizière in an interview with Spiegel , in: Spiegel TV documentary "The End of the GDR - from the fall of the Wall to reunification", 250 min., Germany 2009.
  35. Art. 7 para. 2 of the two-plus-four contract
  36. a b c So Klaus Stern, The State Law of the Federal Republic of Germany , Volume V, § 135, p. 2071.
  37. So did the former war opponents of Germany, whereby - in addition to the formal end of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic and the GDR - "the international law of peace with the prohibition of violence and intervention has come into full force", cited above. according to a note by the ministerial director Truckenbrodt of July 10, 1969, in: AAPD 1969, II, Doc. 231, pp. 808-813 ( 809 f. ): The United Kingdom (the states of the British Commonwealth joined them) and France (Decret No. 51-883, in force on July 13, 1951) announced on July 9, 1951 the end of the state of war with Germany. The United States followed suit in a joint resolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives on October 19, 1951; US President Truman confirmed this on October 24, 1951 when he declared the war with Germany over. At this point in time, a total of 46 states had lifted the state of war ( Gregor Schöllgen , The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. From the Beginning to the Present , 3rd edition, CH Beck, Munich 2004, p. 31 ). The Soviet Union ended the state of war with Germany by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of January 25, 1955. Cf. on all this, Documents of the Divided Germany , Vol. 1, pp. 57-62; see. also AAPD 1951, Doc. 16 and Doc. 118.
  38. Cf. Clemens v. Goetze, NJW 1990, issue 35, pp. 2161, 2167 f.
  39. ^ So Georg Ress, in: Beyerlin u. a. (Ed.), Law between upheaval and preservation. Festschrift for Rudolf Bernhardt , Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg / New York 1995, p. 832 .
  40. Helmut Quaritsch, The Self-Determination Right of the People as the Basis of German Unity , in: Josef Isensee / Paul Kirchhof (ed.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts , Vol. XI, 3rd edition, Heidelberg 2013, § 229 Rn. 97 . In summary: "In this respect, the two-plus-four treaty was a peace treaty, even if the open labeling was avoided in order to justify the reduction of the contracting parties to the four powers." He goes on: "The German approval of the regulations 'of the two-plus-four contract was the prerequisite for the abolition of the four-power competences . "
  41. Klaus Stern, The State Law of the Federal Republic of Germany , Volume V, § 135, p. 2070.
  42. German Bundestag - 15th electoral term: Answer of the Federal Government to a question in the Bundestag (No. 22), BT-Drs. 15/414, p. 16 ( PDF ); see. but the decision of the BGH of June 26, 2003, Az .: III ZR 245/98, "Distomo", printed in: NJW 2003, p. 3488 ff.
  43. Quoted from Dieter Blumenwitz, The contract of September 12, 1990 on the final regulation with regard to Germany , in: NJW 1990, p. 3042.
  44. ^ Berlin - Two-plus-four conference of political directors (round of officials) , Zelikow 486–489 , September 4, 1990.
  45. Quoting from: Der Standard , "Masterpiece of Diplomacy" as World Heritage , , May 25, 2011.
  46. ^ German UNESCO Commission (DUK): Two-Plus-Four Treaty is UNESCO document heritage , press release from May 25, 2011 ; Two-plus-four treaty is UNESCO document heritage - Ceremony for 20 years of “Memory of the World” , October 2012 .
  47. Foreign Office - Political Archive: The two-plus-four contract in Unesco's “Memory of the World” register. Retrieved January 11, 2019 .