Germany Treaty

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The Germany Treaty ( Treaty on Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers , General Treaty , also known as the Bonn Treaty or Bonn Convention ) is a treaty under international law that was signed on May 26, 1952 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Western occupying powers France , Great Britain and USA was closed. The object of the Germany Treaty was the restoration of German sovereignty and the normalization of Germany's status under international law . It replaced the 1949 Occupation Statute.

Against the background of the Korean War and the growing tensions between East and West , the US endeavored to get a German contribution to the defense of the West within the European Defense Community (EDC). This was the reason for the end of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic and the granting of the rights of a sovereign state . In the GDR, the Germany Treaty was referred to as the “General War Treaty” in accordance with the SED language .

Although the treaty was ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and the USA , it did not come into force because of the junction with the EDC contract, because the French National Assembly on August 30, 1954 refused to ratify the EDC contract. As a result, parts of the Germany Treaty were renegotiated. It finally came into effect in a modified version in accordance with the protocol of October 23, 1954 to the Paris Treaties , in which the Western European Union (WEU) was established. The revision was advantageous for the Federal Republic. The revised version granted the Federal Republic of Germany "the full power of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs", but nonetheless listed a number of legislative, military and international restrictions.

Further provisions of the general treaty and the supplementary treaties were expressed in the special rights of the Western powers, subject to those rights and responsibilities that affected Berlin and Germany as a whole , the final peace settlement and German reunification .

Emergence

prehistory

The situation in the early Federal Republic

With the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 , the state of war with the Allies was not ended. Germany was still occupied by their troops, which were supposed to prevent Germany from endangering the neighboring states, and an occupation statute restricted Germany's sovereignty . In the dispute with the Allied High Commission , the German Federal Government obtained a number of regulations and concessions which, although not yet able to repeal the occupation regime, enabled greater independence and a say.

As early as November 1949, the Allied High Commission abolished the license requirement for the establishment of political parties, and in April and July 1951 it reduced its production restrictions for German industry. In small steps the Federal Republic regained its internal sovereignty, only not in the military field. An allied law that came into force on June 1, 1950, summarized all the prohibitions that were supposed to ensure the disarmament and demilitarization of the Federal Republic in the industrial sector. At the same time, however, the number of future German army units was being discussed. After having initially had to make do with a "Foreign Affairs Office" in the Federal Chancellery ("Blankenhorn Office"), a foreign ministry was set up after a revision of the occupation statute in March 1951 : for the signing of the founding treaty of the coal and steel union on April 18, 1951 the Federal Republic received a minimum of external sovereignty.

In the months before the attack on North Korea, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was concerned that the Red Army was far superior to the armed forces of the Western powers in Western Europe. In talks with the High Commissioners, he had asked permission for a federal police organization to counterbalance the quasi-military border forces that had been established in the Soviet zone since the spring of 1948, while in West Germany , apart from auxiliary personnel for the occupation troops, nothing like it. In June 1950 he offered the High Commissioners the first opportunity to participate in German soldiers in the form of voluntary associations, who could be trained inconspicuously in France and controlled from Paris.

Korean War and US efforts for a German defense contribution

With the beginning of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, the USA shifted its involvement from Europe to East Asia . Their considerations of using West Germany's military potential to defend Western Europe were still opposed by the demilitarization provisions of the German surrender and the Potsdam Agreement . After the events of the Second World War, this and the international security system at the time, including the Charter of the United Nations, were driven by the idea of ​​“being safe from another German attack”. Now at the latest the victorious powers began to make efforts to make German forces usable again for the defense of the free world and to integrate the Federal Republic as an active partner in their security system.

The war in Korea and the fear of a new world war in the public perception corresponded to internal threat scenarios of the US military, which had called for an armament of the Federal Republic since 1950. The Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe in the wake of World War II , the Communist Revolution in China in 1949, and the Korean War appeared as evidence of the aggressiveness of international communism. This now resulted in the deployment of German soldiers, which was previously inconceivable for the European states that had been occupied by the troops of the Wehrmacht. From an Anglo-American perspective, West German soldiers were required in the acute Korean crisis.

The American High Commissioner for Germany, John Jay McCloy, was to take part in the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Western Allies, which was called to New York in September 1950, as the Executive Chairman of the Allied High Commission. In a report to the US National Security Council on July 3, 1950, the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson called for “Germany to be brought into close and firm ties with the West as quickly as possible and conditions to be created under which West Germany's potential will finally be established can be added to the potential of the West ”. The topic should be dealt with at the conference of foreign ministers.

Adenauer's memoranda of August 29, 1950 for the Western Powers

In preparation for the conference of foreign ministers, McCloy asked Chancellor Adenauer on August 24 to present his views on the relationship between the Federal Republic and the Allies. Adenauer then had two memoranda drawn up on August 29, the "Memorandum on the question of the reorganization of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the occupying powers", which he also had printed in his memoirs, and the "Memorandum on the security question". The thought of handing over both memoranda at the same time came shortly before the handover. Adenauer did not bring about a formal cabinet resolution on the two memoranda. This presented the ministers with a fait accompli. With the exception of Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann , however, they subsequently agreed. Nevertheless, there was a scandal about this solo effort. Heinemann therefore left the government and the CDU. He later became a spokesman against rearmament.

In the "Memorandum on the question of the reorganization of the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the occupying powers", Adenauer asked for a comprehensive redesign of the Federal Republic in return for fulfilling the obligations which the Federal Republic "grew in the context of the European community from the current situation and its particular dangers" Legal status of the Federal Republic, which must bring it more "freedom of action and responsibility". By this he meant the end of the state of war and the repeal of the occupation statute, which at that time had only been in force for a year. Relations with the victorious powers should increasingly be determined by contractual agreements. There was no mention of a military engagement by the Federal Republic here.

It was only a topic in the much more detailed Security Memorandum. In it, Adenauer declared that the Federal Republic was ready “to make a contribution in the form of a German contingent in the event that an international West European army is formed.” The armament of the GDR was just as dangerous as the North Korean People's Army , which triggered the Korean War with its attack on South Korea had that the barracked people's police could strike at any time. He therefore asked for the occupation troops to be strengthened to protect the Federal Republic and also offered to set up a federal police force , which could possibly be armed and deployed militarily and which was supposed to guarantee the internal security of the Federal Republic. However , he still refused to remilitarize Germany by setting up its own national armed forces. By deliberately using ambiguous language, Adenauer succeeded in offering a German military contribution and at the same time rejecting remilitarization, which was unpopular in the Federal Republic.

On September 19, 1950, the foreign ministers of the USA, Great Britain and France Dean Acheson, Anthony Eden and Robert Schuman declared at a meeting in New York that they were ready to strengthen their armed forces in West Germany, to revise the occupation statute and to negotiate the establishment of a European one Army with West German participation as part of a European defense community.

The threat scenario that the Chancellor outlined in his security memorandum of August 29, 1950 and submitted to the Allied High Commission for these meetings is described by the historian Ludolf Herbst as "excessive". His biographer Henning Köhler writes of Adenauer's real "war hysteria" in the spring and summer of 1950. Adenauer's request to build a strong federal police force was nevertheless rejected: the skeptical French had prevailed against the Americans, who would have agreed to such an immediate German measure.

Negotiations 1951/52

A year later the state of war between the Western powers and Germany was ended. On September 14, 1951, the foreign ministers of the three Western powers announced in Washington their intention to “include a democratic Germany on the basis of equality in a continental European community”. On October 24, 1951, France's High Commissioner André François-Poncet presented the Federal Chancellor with a first draft of a general contract. The latter was deeply disappointed by the poor concession of the victorious powers in questions of German sovereignty and declared that no federal government could submit such a treaty to the Bundestag . In the several months of negotiations between the West German government and the High Commissioners that followed, Adenauer made sure that his cabinet, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag and the public only received as little information as possible. As Chancellor and Foreign Minister , he centrally steered the complicated negotiation process himself; Walter Hallstein and Herbert Blankenhorn were at his side as chief advisors . The various working groups of experts were headed by Wilhelm Grewe . From a German point of view, the negotiations were very unsatisfactory, because neither the membership in NATO that Adenauer was striving for nor equal rights in military or arms policy was achieved.

One of the most difficult problems, which was still unsolved in November 1951, when Adenauer was already traveling to Paris to initial the general contract, was the Oder-Neisse border. Adenauer wanted his contractual partners to commit to the reunification of Germany , within the borders of 1937 . That would have meant that the USA, Great Britain and France should have officially declared their intention to end the Polish and Soviet administration in the former eastern regions of Germany . They could not get involved in such revisionism ; Adenauer had to give in here.

Another thorny problem was the so-called binding clause, which said that the Western Treaties should also apply irreversibly to a future reunified Germany. Whether it was included on Adenauer's initiative, as Hans-Peter Schwarz assumes, or, according to Köhler's account, rather the result of detailed negotiations between Grewe and McCloy's legal advisor Robert R. Bowie, is controversial. With this clause, the West German side wanted to prevent the Allied Control Council from reviving in the event of reunification , whereas the Western powers wanted a reunified Germany not to fall into the Eastern bloc or into "precarious [...] neutrality " (Grewe). The clause was extremely controversial within Adenauer's cabinet. At the first consultation of the treaty, which Adenauer himself had kept secret from the cabinet for a long time, the approval of the Minister for Displaced Persons, Hans-Joachim von Merkatz ( DP ) , is said to have only been obtained by dealing with the passage after a lunch break during which wine was consumed and toasted it particularly often. In the further course, the resistance of some CDU ministers also proved to be so strong that Foreign Minister Acheson and the American envoy Philip Jessup and Heinrich von Brentano , the chairman of the CDU / CSU parliamentary group , drafted a compromise formula that was so awkwardly worded, that it could be understood as a softening of the binding clause. With this change in the last minute of the contract was Germany on 26 May 1952 at the Federal Hall of Bonn Federal house be signed.

EVG

At the same time, negotiations between France, the Benelux countries, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany on a European Defense Community were in progress: following on from the European integration that had started with the European Coal and Steel Community founded on April 18, 1951, the armed forces of the participating countries from the divisional level upwards, the command level and the military supply upwards are organized supranationally in order to reconcile the German claim to equality with the French need for security. One day after the Germany Treaty, the EVG Treaty was signed on May 27, 1952 in Paris .

Negotiations for a European Defense Community caused concern in the Soviet Union. On March 10, 1952, the Soviet government proposed a peace treaty to the Western powers for a reunified Germany in the " Potsdam borders ". It stipulated that Germany would not be allowed to enter into a military alliance directed against a former enemy of the war. The western powers refused. To this day it is controversial whether the Stalin notes actually wanted to give up the SED state in order to prevent the rearmament of Germany and its integration into the Western military alliance, or whether it was just disruptive maneuvers against Adenauer's western policy.

Domestic political debate in the Federal Republic

The German Treaty and the EVG met bitter resistance from the SPD opposition, which feared that rearmament and integration with the West would reduce the chances of reunification. The party chairman Kurt Schumacher stated categorically in an interview on May 15, 1952: "Whoever agrees to this general contract ceases to be a German". The debates in the Bundestag were correspondingly heated: In his speech on July 9, 1952, with a view to the binding clause, Carlo Schmid considered it unlikely that the Soviets would ever allow free all-German elections “if it is to be certain from the outset that the part of Germany, which they give up, due to a treaty obligation created today, is to be added to a bloc that this Russia simply perceives as hostile ”. Erich Ollenhauer declared on March 19, 1953: "The integration of the Federal Republic into the military defense system of the West [...] can only lead to a deepening of the division of Germany". Adenauer, on the other hand, argued that the alliance was a prerequisite for both reunification, which "can only be achieved with the help of the three Western Allies", and the security of the Federal Republic: This is endangered by the "aggressive expansion policy of Soviet Russia", there is a threat of "slavery and exploitation" . On March 19, 1953, the Bundestag passed the treaties with the votes of the CDU / CSU , FDP and DP, and on May 15, the Bundesrat also approved . Nevertheless, the Germany Treaty could not yet come into force, because on May 11, 1953, the SPD had brought an action for review of norms at the Federal Constitutional Court . This should clarify whether the German military contribution accompanying the EVG contract is compatible with the Basic Law . Before the ruling by the Karlsruhe judges, Federal President Theodor Heuss did not want to sign the relevant laws. He himself had asked the Federal Constitutional Court for an opinion on this question as early as 1952, but allowed himself to be persuaded by Adenauer's pressure to withdraw his application.

Failure of the EVG and revision 1954/55

The ratification dragged on because the French parliament only wanted to ratify the Germany and the EDC treaty at the same time. The reservations against the German military were still great seven years after the end of the Second World War. With a view to the military defeat in the Indochina War , the EVG appeared to some parliamentarians as the gravedigger of France's world power role or as a pioneer of a new armed forces . On August 24, 1954, a majority in the National Assembly declined to discuss it. The EVG contract had thus failed and the Germany contract had to be renegotiated. Great Britain and the USA took the initiative for this. In the London Nine Powers meetings with Canada , France, Italy, the Benelux countries and the Federal Republic from September 28 to October 3, 1954, they worked out the London Acts , which, among other things, included the conclusion of the German Treaty and the admission of the Federal Republic to recommended NATO via a detour via a WEU to be founded. On this basis, three committees of experts drafted the Paris Treaties from October 4 to 16, 1954 in the French capital , which were adopted by several intergovernmental conferences on October 19, 1954. They were signed in Paris on October 23, including the Germany Treaty. After its ratification, it came into force on May 5, 1955. Four days later the Federal Republic was accepted into NATO.

During the negotiations in Paris, some articles of the Germany Treaty were revised. The Allies' general emergency reservation was removed from the Germany Treaty. The Western Powers also accepted that all possibilities of direct interference in government and administrative powers as well as in the case law of the Federal Republic would no longer apply. A revision of the German treaty was now possible “in the case of the reunification of Germany or an international agreement on measures to bring about the reunification of Germany achieved with the participation or with the consent of the states that are members of the treaty”. In the newly drafted Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Germany Treaty, the Western powers insisted on their "rights to continue to be maintained with regard to the stationing of armed forces in Germany", expressly tying this to a "full agreement" of the Federal Government. The controversial "binding clause" was deleted - also because in the meantime no further Soviet offers with regard to the reunification of Germany were to be expected, which could have tempted the Germans.

The sovereignty restrictions through the reservation rights remained in force, those with regard to the state of emergency only until the Federal Republic of Germany passed its own emergency laws. This happened in 1968. Other restrictions on sovereignty continued until the reunification of Germany in 1990. During the Nine Powers Conference, Adenauer also conceded restrictions on equality within NATO and the WEU: The Federal Republic was therefore not allowed to manufacture ABC weapons or certain types of heavy weapons such as guided missiles, larger warships and strategic bombers . Overall, the provisions agreed in 1954 for the Federal Republic of Germany were significantly more favorable than those of 1951/52, which is why Hans-Peter Schwarz describes the failure of the EVG, which made the renegotiation necessary, a "stroke of luck" for Adenauer.

With the entry into force of the final version of October 23, 1954 on May 5, the occupation statute was also repealed, the Allied High Commission was dissolved and the instruments of ratification for the Paris Treaties were deposited in Bonn. The Allied High Commission and the offices of the State Commissioners were dissolved on that date. On June 7, 1955, the “ Amt Blank ” became the Federal Ministry of Defense , its head Theodor Blank became the first Federal Minister of Defense.

Content

The Germany Treaty replaced the Occupation Statute from 1949. As a "bridging treaty ", it was intended to fill the vacuum created between surrender after the Second World War and the future peace treaty

He gave the Federal Republic “the full power of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs, subject to certain treaty provisions”. This enabled it to establish diplomatic relations with other states . The so-called allied reservation rights related to “Berlin and Germany as a whole including the reunification of Germany and a peace treaty settlement” (→  four-power status ). Further paragraphs gave the three protecting powers rights in the event of an emergency in their armed forces stationed in the federal territory, which threatens their security. A few reservations regarding occupation law remained with the Three Powers, such as the Allies' right, later criticized in the NSA affair in 2013, to monitor German mail and telecommunications or to allow their secret services to move freely in Germany. The German historian Heinrich August Winkler therefore denies that the Germany Treaty made the Federal Republic sovereign in the true sense of the word, the American historian Dennis L. Bark calls the Germany Treaty a “revised occupation statute”.

The contracting parties agreed on the goal of the reunification of Germany in freedom and a peace treaty for all of Germany, whereby the definition of its borders was reserved for a future peace treaty. Almost all limitations and restrictions on German production and trade were lifted. Two exceptions remained: the construction of airplanes was prohibited, as was the manufacture of nuclear weapons (→  nuclear weapons in Germany ). From then on, the occupation statute based on martial law was no longer the legal basis for the stay of foreign troops on the territory of the Federal Republic , but contractual agreements between states with equal rights. Furthermore, the treaty provided for the admission of the Federal Republic to the United Nations (UN).

In Art. 7 Paragraph 2 of the Germany Treaty, the signatory states agreed as a common goal, "a reunified Germany, which has a free-democratic constitution similar to that of the Federal Republic and which is integrated into the European community". In the revised Germany Treaty, the Federal Republic received the assurance that a future reunified Germany could freely decide on its military ties. However, it had to do without the production of nuclear and other heavy weapons.

According to Grewes, this treaty stipulated a future unified Germany neither on a specific form of government nor on a social order and also left open whether it would constitute itself as a nation state or as part of a European federation .

The Germany Agreement was supplemented by the Agreement on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Armed Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany ( Troop Agreement ), the Financial Agreement , which regulated the maintenance of these armed forces, and the Transition Agreement , which regulated issues arising from war and occupation.

On October 23, 1954, the Agreement on the Residence of Foreign Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany ( Federal Law Gazette 1955 II p. 253 ) between the Federal Republic and eight contracting parties ( Belgium , Denmark , France, Canada, Luxembourg , the Netherlands , the United Kingdom and the United States of America ) created a contractual basis for the rights and obligations of the foreign armed forces in West Germany. The so-called troop contract continues to apply after the conclusion of the two-plus-four contract and can be terminated by both parties with a two-year notice period (exchange of notes of September 25, 1990, Federal Law Gazette II p. 1390 and November 16, 1990, Federal Law Gazette II p . 1696 ). It still does not apply in the new federal states and Berlin .

In 1957, the German Democratic Republic concluded the agreement with the Soviet Union on the temporary residence of Soviet armed forces on the territory of the GDR , which regulated the right of the Soviet army to reside in the GDR. After reunification in 1990, two contracts were signed with the Soviet Union for their withdrawal, including a. the troop withdrawal agreement of October 12, 1990 ( Federal Law Gazette 1991 II pp. 256, 258 ). The last Russian soldiers were withdrawn in the summer of 1994.

In accordance with the Armed Forces Residence Act of July 20, 1995 ( Federal Law Gazette II, p. 554 ), the Federal Government can also conclude agreements with foreign states on the entry and temporary stay of their armed forces in Germany for exercises, transit by land and training of units, as has been the case with Poland and the Czech Republic .

designation

According to the Adenauer biographer Henning Köhler, the designation Germany Treaty went back to the head of the Federal Chancellery, Otto Lenz , who proposed it on April 30, 1952 as a replacement for the previously common name General Treaty. Adenauer subsequently tried in vain to get this designation, which he thought was more favorable "for propaganda ", through the High Commissioners. According to Wilhelm Grewe, the head of the German delegation for the negotiation of the Germany Treaty to replace the Occupation Statute, it was Adenauer himself who coined the term, especially with a view to the foreseeable domestic political dispute. He was unable to convince his American, British and French negotiating partners of this; they preferred to call the contract the Bonn Treaty or the Bonn Conventions . On May 15th an agreement was reached on the official name Treaty on Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers . In everyday linguistic usage in the Federal Republic of Germany, the more catchy term Germany Treaty or General Treaty, which are often used synonymously, prevailed. The diplomat Ellinor von Puttkamer , on the other hand, differentiates in her presentation of the prehistory of the Paris Treaties between a superordinate Germany treaty and its parts: general treaty, troop treaty, financial treaty, transition treaty and tax agreement. In the public parlance of the GDR, the general contract was denounced as a general war treaty, about which the “White Book on the General War Treaty” provided propaganda information. With this and numerous other war compounds, the SED propaganda consistently intended to suggest “the inevitability of Bonn politics leading to a new war”.

Adenauer's goals

Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer pursued a policy of resolute integration with the West , with which he made the Federal Republic a trustworthy partner of the Western Allies against the backdrop of the Cold War . Therefore, they were ready to grant them state sovereignty. In research, this gain in sovereignty is often seen as the most important motive of Adenauer. Adenauer biographers, on the other hand, deny that the Federal Chancellor instrumentalized the security issue in order to achieve the sovereignty of the Federal Republic. Hans-Peter Schwarz states that the two questions were only linked in August 1950: In the months before that, Adenauer had been “fixated” on a possible Soviet attack, which seriously worried him. Köhler suggests the opposite interpretation, namely that the Western powers concluded the Germany Treaty "in order to moderate and channel Adenauer's impetuous urge to rearm". Accordingly, the Chancellor's first goal would not have been to gain sovereignty, but to rearm. When he had the chance to get both, he sought the conclusion of a peace treaty between a sovereign Federal Republic and the Western powers.

A spring discovered in 1986 sheds a different light on Adenauer's goals. On December 15, 1955, through the German Ambassador Hans-Heinrich Herwarth von Bittenfeld , he had the British government confidential and yet openly informed that he had no confidence in the German people and feared that one of his successors would come to an understanding with Russia “to the detriment of Germany could". That is why "integration with the West is more important to him than reunification". According to this understanding, the ties to the West were not a means by which Adenauer believed he could achieve national goals, but an end in itself, because only it seemed to offer him security from a new totalitarian temptation of his compatriots.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Rudolf Morsey : The Federal Republic of Germany. Origin and development until 1969 (=  Oldenbourg floor plan of history , vol. 19). Oldenbourg, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-486-70114-2 , p. 28 f. (accessed via De Gruyter Online); Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery: Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2013, p. 84 f.
  2. ^ Peter Graf Kielmansegg : After the disaster. A history of divided Germany . Siedler, Berlin 2000, ISBN 3-88680-329-5 , p. 142.
  3. ^ Rudolf Morsey: The Federal Republic of Germany. Origin and development until 1969 (=  Oldenbourg floor plan of history , vol. 19). Oldenbourg, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-486-70114-2 , p. 268 (accessed from De Gruyter Online).
  4. ↑ Ellinor von Puttkamer: Prehistory and Conclusion of the Paris Treaties of October 23, 1954 . In: ZaöRV 17 (1956/57), pp. 455 ff. ( PDF ).
  5. ↑ Manfred Görtemaker : Brief history of the Federal Republic . Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2005, ISBN 3-596-16039-1 , p. 98.
  6. ↑ Jost Dülffer : Europe in the East-West Conflict 1945–1990 , Munich 2004, ISBN 3-486-49105-9 , p. 174 f.
  7. ↑ Quoted from Manfred Görtemaker: Little History of the Federal Republic , Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 98 f.
  8. ↑ Konrad Adenauer: Memoirs 1945–1953 . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1965, pp. 358 f .; online at konrad-adenauer.de, accessed on March 19, 2018.
  9. ↑ Memorandum of the Federal Chancellor on the internal and external security of the federal territory , August 29, 1950 on the website of the Federal Archives , accessed on January 6, 2018. According to Henning Köhler, this was "a deliberate deception of the cabinet", Köhler: Adenauer. A political biography , Propylaen, Berlin 1994, p. 627.
  10. ^ Hans-Peter Schwarz : Adenauer. The climb. 1876-1952 . DVA, Stuttgart 1986, p. 763 f.
  11. ↑ Manfred Görtemaker: Little History of the Federal Republic , Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 99.
  12. ^ Manfred Görtemaker: History of the Federal Republic. From the foundation to the present. Beck, Munich 1999, p. 298.
  13. ^ Marianne Howarth: Stations on the Germany Treaty: From Occupation Statute to Obtaining Sovereignty , in: Heiner Timmermann (Ed.): Germany Treaty and Paris Treaties. In the triangle of the cold war, the German question and European security. Lit Verlag, Münster 2003, p. 41 ff., Here p. 50.
  14. ^ Hans-Peter Schwarz: Adenauer. The climb. 1876-1952 . DVA, Stuttgart 1986, p. 764 ff .; Manfred Görtemaker: Small history of the Federal Republic . Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 99; Henning Köhler: Adenauer. A political biography. Propylaen, Berlin 1994, p. 627 ff .; Peter Graf Kielmansegg: After the disaster. A history of divided Germany . Siedler, Berlin 2000, pp. 141 ff.
  15. ↑ Martin Wengeler : From the military contribution to peace missions. On the history of the linguistic legitimation and combating of armaments and the military . In: Derselbe and Georg Stötzel (eds.): Controversial terms. History of public language use in the Federal Republic of Germany. De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1995, ISBN 978-3-11-088166-0 , p. 132 (accessed from De Gruyter Online).
  16. ↑ Ludolf Herbst: Option for the West. From the Marshall Plan to the Franco-German Treaty , dtv, Munich 1989, p. 95.
  17. ^ Henning Koehler: Adenauer. A political biography , Propylaen, Berlin 1994, p. 611 ff.
  18. ↑ Dennis L. Bark: The Berlin question 1949–1955. Basis for negotiation and containment policy (= publications of the Historical Commission in Berlin 36). De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1972, ISBN 978-3-11-084315-6 , p. 176 f. (accessed via De Gruyter Online); Hans-Peter Schwarz: Adenauer. The rise 1876–1952. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1986, p. 768 ff.
  19. ^ Gregor Schöllgen : The foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. From the beginnings to the present , 3rd edition, Beck, Munich 2004, p. 31; Joint Resolution of the United States Congress of July 12, 1951; Note from the British High Commissioner to the Federal Republic of July 9, 1951.
  20. ↑ Germany Treaty . In: Carola Stern , Thilo Vogelsang , Erhard Klöss and Albert Graff (eds.): Dtv lexicon on history and politics in the 20th century. Revised and revised edition, Munich 1974, vol. 1, p. 187.
  21. ^ Hans-Peter Schwarz: Adenauer. The climb. 1876-1952 . DVA, Stuttgart 1986, pp. 884-888.
  22. ^ Hans-Peter Schwarz: Adenauer. The climb. 1876-1952 . DVA, Stuttgart 1986, p. 891 ff.
  23. ^ Ludolf Herbst: Style and scope for action in West German integration policy , in: Ludolf Herbst, Werner Bührer, Hanno Sowade (ed.): From the Marshall Plan to the EEC. The incorporation of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western World , Oldenbourg, Munich 1999, ISBN 3-486-55601-0 , pp. 3-18, here p. 15; Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German history II. From the “Third Reich” to reunification , Beck, Munich 2014, p. 151.
  24. ^ Hans-Peter Schwarz: Adenauer. The climb. 1876-1952 . DVA, Stuttgart 1986, p. 889.
  25. ^ Henning Koehler: Adenauer. A political biography. Propylaea, Berlin 1994, p. 678 f.
  26. ^ Wilhelm Grewe: Germany Treaty . In: Werner Weidenfeld, Karl-Rudolf Korte (ed.): Handbook on German Unity 1949–1989–1999 . Campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1999, p. 296.
  27. ^ Adolf M. Birke : Nation without a house. Germany 1945–1961 . Siedler, Berlin 1994, p. 300 f .; Henning Köhler: Adenauer. A political biography. Propylaeen, Berlin 1994, p. 678 ff.
  28. ↑ Helmut Vogt : Guardians of the Bonn Republic. The Allied High Commissioners 1949–1955 , Schöningh, Paderborn 2004, ISBN 3-506-70139-8 , p. 146.
  29. ↑ Introduction. In: Horst Möller and Klaus Hildebrand (eds.): The Federal Republic of Germany and France: Documents 1949–1963. Vol. 1: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. KG Saur, Munich 1997, ISBN 3-598-23681-6 , p. 15 f. (accessed via De Gruyter Online); Manfred Görtemaker: History of the Federal Republic. From the foundation to the present. Beck, Munich 1999, pp. 302-305.
  30. ↑ For example, Peter Ruggenthaler believes in a trick: Stalin's big bluff. The history of the Stalin Note in documents of the Soviet leadership. Oldenbourg, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-486-58398-4 ( series of the Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 95) (accessed via De Gruyter Online); Wilfried Loth : Stalin's unloved child. Why Moscow didn't want the GDR. Rowohlt, Berlin 1994, pp. 175–184, however, sees the Stalin notes as a missed opportunity.
  31. ↑ 60 years ago: Yes to the Germany Treaty on bundestag.de, 2013 (here the quotations, accessed on March 2, 2018); Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German history II. From the “Third Reich” to reunification. Beck, Munich 2014, p. 152.
  32. ↑ Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariety: France and Germany. The history of their relationships 1815–1975 . Beck, Munich 1982, p. 428 f .; Introduction. In: Horst Möller and Klaus Hildebrand (eds.): The Federal Republic of Germany and France: Documents 1949–1963. Vol. 1: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. KG Saur, Munich 1997, p. 16 ff. (Accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  33. ^ Manfred Görtemaker: History of the Federal Republic. From the foundation to the present. Beck, Munich 1999, pp. 323-328; Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German history II. From the “Third Reich” to reunification. Beck, Munich 2014, p. 163 ff.
  34. ↑ Treaty on Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers (Germany Treaty) in the amended version of October 23, 1954. In: Joachim Jens Hesse and Thomas Ellwein (ed.): The government system of the Federal Republic of Germany. Vol. 2: Materials. De Gruyter Law and Politics, Berlin 2004, ISBN 978-3-899-49113-5 , pp. 14-18 (accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  35. ^ Peter Graf Kielmansegg: After the disaster. A history of divided Germany . Siedler, Berlin 2000, p. 147.
  36. ↑ Bruno Thoss : The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the WEU and NATO in the area of ​​tension between bloc formation and détente . In: Military History Research Office (Hrsg.): The NATO option. Beginnings of West German Security Policy (=  Beginnings of West German Security Policy 1945–1956 , Vol. 3). Oldenbourg, Munich 1993, pp. 1-234, here pp. 55-58 (accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  37. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German history II. From the “Third Reich” to reunification. Beck, Munich 2014, p. 164.
  38. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German history II. From the “Third Reich” to reunification. Beck, Munich 2014, p. 164.
  39. ↑ Quoted from Rudolf Morsey: The Federal Republic of Germany. Origin and development until 1969 (=  Oldenbourg floor plan of history , vol. 19). Oldenbourg, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-486-70114-2 , p. 171 (accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  40. ↑ BGBl. 1955 II, p. 305 ff.
  41. ↑ Werner Weidenfeld, Karl-Rudolf Korte (ed.): Handbook on German Unity 1949–1989–1999. Updated new edition, Campus, Frankfurt am Main 1999, p. 296 f.
  42. ^ Wilhelm Grewe: Germany Treaty . In: Werner Weidenfeld, Karl-Rudolf Korte (ed.): Handbook on German Unity 1949–1989–1999 . Campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1999, p. 293.
  43. ↑ Josef Foschepoth : Monitored Germany. Post and telephone surveillance in the old Federal Republic , Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2012; 4th revised edition 2014, ISBN 978-3-525-30041-1 (= publication series of the Federal Agency for Civic Education , vol. 1415, Bonn 2013), page number missing.
  44. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German history II. From the “Third Reich” to reunification. Beck, Munich 2014, p. 151; on limited sovereignty Georg Ress : Basic Law . In: Werner Weidenfeld, Karl-Rudolf Korte (ed.): Handbook on German Unity 1949–1989–1999. Updated new edition, Campus, Frankfurt am Main [u. a.] 1999, p. 408; Gregor Schöllgen: The foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. From the beginnings to the present , 3rd edition, Beck, Munich 2004, p. 256; Josef Foschepoth: Monitored Germany. Post and telephone surveillance in the old Federal Republic , 5th edition, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2017, p. 11, 24.
  45. ↑ Dennis L. Bark: The Berlin question 1949–1955. Basis for negotiation and containment policy (= publications of the Historical Commission in Berlin 36). De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1972, ISBN 978-3-11-084315-6 , p. 223 (accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  46. ↑ Jost Dülffer: Europe in the East-West Conflict 1945–1990 , Munich 2004, p. 43.
  47. ^ Wilhelm Grewe: Germany Treaty . In: Werner Weidenfeld, Karl-Rudolf Korte (ed.): Handbook on German Unity 1949–1989–1999 . Campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1999, p. 296.
  48. ↑ Christian Raap: The sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany with special consideration of the military sector and German unity (=  writings on constitutional and international law. Vol. 46). Lang, Frankfurt am Main [a. a.] 1992, ISBN 3-631-44245-9 , p. 236 f. (also: Würzburg, Universität, Diss., 1991).
  49. ↑ Agreement between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on issues related to the temporary stationing of Soviet armed forces on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (Armed Forces Agreement) of March 12, 1957 . In: Archiv des Völkerrechts 29, Nr. 1/2 (1991), pp. 169–174.
  50. ^ Henning Koehler: Adenauer. A political biography. Propylaen, Berlin 1994, p. 680 f .; Gregor Schöllgen: The foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. From the beginning to the present , 3rd edition, Beck, Munich 2004, p. 31.
  51. ^ Wilhelm Grewe: Germany Treaty , in: Werner Weidenfeld, Karl-Rudolf Korte (ed.): Handbook on German Unity 1949–1989–1999 . Campus, Frankfurt am Main / New York 1999, p. 292; Website of the Rhineland Regional Council ( Memento from March 8, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), Rechtslexikon.net . Both accessed on March 8, 2014.
  52. ↑ Germany Treaty . In: Carola Stern, Thilo Vogelsang, Erhard Klöss and Albert Graff (eds.): Dtv lexicon on history and politics in the 20th century. Revised and revised edition, Munich 1974, vol. 1, p. 187; Adolf M. Birke: Nation without a house. Germany 1945–1961 . Siedler, Berlin 1994, p. 299; Manfred Görtemaker: History of the Federal Republic. From the foundation to the present. Beck, Munich 1999, p. 326; Marianne Howarth: Germany, Great Britain and International Politics 1952–1956 . In: Heiner Timmermann: Germany Treaty and Paris Treaties. In the triangle of the cold war, the German question and European security . Lit Verlag, Münster 2003, p. 112; Rudolf Morsey: The Federal Republic of Germany. Origin and development until 1969 (=  Oldenbourg floor plan of history , vol. 19). Oldenbourg, Munich 2007 ISBN 978-3-486-70114-2 , p. 32 (accessed from De Gruyter Online); Contribution to Germany Treaty ( memento of August 23, 1999 in the Internet Archive ) at the Lebendigen Museum Online , accessed on February 2, 2018.
  53. ↑ Ellinor von Puttkamer: Prehistory and Conclusion of the Paris Treaties of October 23, 1954 . In: Journal for Foreign Public Law and Völkerrecht 17 (1956/1957), pp. 448–475, here p. 451 ( PDF ).
  54. ↑ Michael Lemke: Unity or Socialism? The German policy of the SED 1949–1961 , Böhlau, Cologne [u. a.] 2001 (= Zeithistorische Studien, Vol. 17), pp. 198, 224, 233.
  55. ^ Office for Information of the GDR (ed.): White Book on the General War Treaty , Berlin 1952.
  56. ↑ Martin Wengeler: The language of armament. On the history of the armaments discussions after 1945. Springer, Wiesbaden 1992, ISBN 978-3-8244-4105-1 , p. 132 f.
  57. ↑ See for example Anselm Doering-Manteuffel : The Federal Republic of Germany in the Adenauer era. Foreign policy and internal development 1949–1963. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1983, p. 55; Adolf Birke: Nation without a house. Germany 1945–1961. Siedler, Berlin 1994, p. 339; Corinna Schukraft: The beginnings of German European policy in the 50s and 60s. Setting the course under Konrad Adenauer and maintaining the status quo under his successors Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg Kiesinger. In: the same, Ulrike Keßler et al .: German European Policy from Konrad Adenauer to Gerhard Schröder . Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2002, p. 14; Michael Gehler : Germany. From division to unification. 1945 until today. Böhlau, Vienna / Cologne / Weimar 2010, ISBN 978-3-205-79076-1 , p. 96 (accessed via De Gruyter Online).
  58. ^ Hans-Peter Schwarz: Adenauer. The rise 1876–1952. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1986, p. 764.
  59. ^ Henning Koehler: Adenauer. A political biography. Propylaea, Berlin 1994, p. 612 u. 681; so also Lars-Broder Keil and Sven Felix Kellerhoff : German Legends. About the 'stab in the back' and other myths of history. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin, 2002, pp. 153-168.
  60. ^ Josef Foschepoth: Western integration instead of reunification. Adenauer's Germany Politics 1949-1955 . In: Josef Foschepoth (Ed.): Adenauer and the German question. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1988, p. 55 f .; Henning Köhler: Adenauer. A political biography. Propylaea, Berlin 1994, p. 870.

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