Stalin notes

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Germany within the borders at the time of the Stalin Notes in 1952 before the accession of the Saarland , with special status for Berlin and without Eastern Territories (according to paragraph 7 of the 1st Stalin Note)

On March 10, 1952, Josef Stalin offered the Western powers ( France , Great Britain , USA ) in a note negotiations on the reunification and neutralization of Germany . This note and Stalin's replies to the Western powers' responses are known as the Stalin Notes .

Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer , the West German public and the Western powers rejected the Stalin notes as a disruptive maneuver with which Stalin wanted to hinder the West integration of the Federal Republic of Germany . This is also the prevailing opinion in historical science today . A minority, however, believed and still believe that Stalin was serious about his proposal. The historian Rolf Steininger is the best-known representative of this direction today. The opening of archives, especially on the part of the USA in recent years, at least made it clear that the Western victorious powers were also considering accepting the note and allowing a neutral, reunified Germany. As a result, positions that assume the Stalin Note to be serious have received new impetus.

Starting position

After the end of the Second World War in 1945, the so-called Cold War broke out , in which Europe and Germany were divided into East and West. In Germany in 1949 the parliamentary-democratic Federal Republic of Germany was formed in the west, and the German Democratic Republic created by the Soviet Union in the east . The prospect of reunification had become a long way off because of the incorporation of East and West Germany into the respective power blocs. The communists feared losing their power in free elections.

The Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Konrad Adenauer ( CDU ) was of the opinion that reunification was not possible under the given circumstances, but that it was necessary to connect the Federal Republic more closely with the West. Therefore he strove for (West) European unification, including in military questions. The Federal Republic was to receive an army that could be integrated into an overall western armed forces. This was first attempted with the European Defense Community (EDC) (and achieved in 1955/1956 via NATO ). After the rejection of the Stalin Notes, the EDC treaties were signed as planned in May 1952, but not ratified by the French parliament afterwards . Stalin and the GDR condemned the EVG, although a " barracked people's police " had already been set up in the GDR .

A peace treaty between Germany and the victors of the Second World War was still pending. On the reunification issue, the East demanded that a peace treaty be negotiated first, while the West demanded free elections in all of Germany first. The Stalin Notes can be seen as an extension of the Eastern (propaganda) efforts to blame the failure of reunification on the West.

On September 15, 1951, the GDR government offered the federal government a meeting to discuss the holding of elections. However, the federal government refused to hold talks with the SED because this would have meant the de facto recognition of the GDR as a state with equal rights. The contacts always went through the victorious powers. Instead, the federal government wanted a United Nations commission to examine whether free all-German elections were possible.

At the request of the Western Powers, this commission met in December 1951. The GDR government, however, refused her entry; in their opinion, the examination should be carried out by a commission of the victorious powers.

The first Stalin note

On the occasion of a preliminary conference in Paris, the SED had the idea that the two German states should ask for a peace treaty to be dealt with on the agenda. The Soviet leadership took up the idea of ​​offering negotiations on the peace treaty to the Western powers. Although the foreign ministers' conference did not take place, the Soviet government continued to pursue this plan, fearing both the Western demand for free elections and the incorporation of (yet to be established) West German armed forces into a Western alliance.

Therefore, the SED took the initiative in the question of a peace treaty in order to parry the Western election demand. The government of the GDR should first appeal again to the four powers to start negotiations on a peace treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany. After about two months, the Soviet Union could then present its concept.

The first draft of this concept was presented to Stalin as early as August 1951. After numerous corrections and fundamental conceptual changes had been made to the draft, the final version was ready for publication seven months later.

On March 10, 1952, Andrei Gromyko , the deputy Soviet foreign minister, presented the three western occupation powers ( USA , Great Britain , France ) with a diplomatic note on the solution of the German question . For this purpose, a four-power conference should be convened. The grade contained the following points:

  • A peace treaty between all those involved in the war was to be concluded with Germany, and an all-German government was to be involved in drafting it. The Allies would have to agree on the formation of this government.
  • Germany was to be reunified within the borders established by the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers.
  • All armed forces of the occupying powers should be withdrawn from Germany no later than one year after the peace treaty came into force.
  • Germany would be granted democratic rights such as freedom of assembly, freedom of the press and a pluralistic party system. (However, free elections were not explicitly mentioned.)
  • The denazification should be terminated.
  • Germany should not enter into any coalitions or military alliances directed against any state that had participated with its armed forces in the war against Germany.
  • No trade restrictions would be imposed on Germany.
  • Germany would be allowed to set up national armed forces necessary for defense and to produce the necessary war material.

Reply note from the Western Powers

Soviet action like the March Note had already been more or less expected from the Western powers in view of the fact that Stalin had not yet interfered in Western integration. However, no one wanted to start negotiations with the Soviet Union as long as the treaties for the integration of the Federal Republic into the West had not been signed. The reply from the Western powers was accordingly designed to delay peace treaty negotiations for the time being.

Only after the final formulation by the foreign ministers of the Western powers had already been made was Adenauer's opinion asked, so that he could have brought about only minor changes. Although he mistrusted Stalin's March note, he asked not to reject it in principle in the reply note. It should not give the impression that the West is harshly rejecting the offer.

On March 25, 1952, the first note of the governments of Great Britain , France and the USA was delivered in Moscow . It contained the following points:

  • Prerequisites for the commencement of peace treaty negotiations must be: Examination of the UN Commission with regard to free elections in Germany as a whole, holding free elections, and only then the formation of an all-German government;
  • Rejection of the borders of Potsdam (the Oder-Neisse line ), since these borders would only apply until a peace treaty is drawn up;
  • Germany has the right to enter into any alliance within the framework of the UN Charter;
  • Full approval of the Western powers to integrate Germany into a defensive European alliance, which was to be understood as a clear reference to the EDC . An independent German army is a step backwards into the former European conditions of militarism, rivalry and aggression.

Reactions in the Federal Republic of Germany

The priorities of the Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer were clear: West integration of the Federal Republic and reunification only as an abstract and not really expected long-term goal. “The restoration of German unity in a free, united Europe” was indeed the primary goal of his government. In a free, united Europe, this should mean for him that reunification could only have taken place after the West integration of the Federal Republic was secured. His idea even went so far that, at the same time as reunification, Eastern Europe would also experience an upheaval. If, however, the integration of the Federal Republic into a Western European alliance did not succeed, West Germany would inevitably be drawn into the pull of the Soviet Union. An army that could guarantee the security of a neutral Germany would not be financially viable by Germany alone, he said. Adenauer therefore assumed that two German states would coexist with each other for an incalculable amount of time, and pursued this as a subtle goal.

For this reason, he presented the March Note as a mere interference, the purpose of which was "to drag the FRG down to the unfree status of a satellite state and to make the unification of Europe impossible". He therefore wanted to continue all negotiations with the Western powers "as if the Note did not exist".

Adenauer's view that Stalin's offer was not meant seriously was shared far and wide. But there were different opinions about how to react to the offer. The Federal Minister for All-German Issues Jakob Kaiser ( CDU ) had previously promoted a Germany as a mediator between East and West with his “bridge theory”. Although he agreed with Adenauer in the demand for free elections and the rejection of the Potsdam borders, he nevertheless took the Soviet proposals very seriously. In a radio address on March 12, 1952, Kaiser attributed considerable political importance to the note, although he expressed the view that it should be viewed with “the greatest caution”. He called for the proposals of the Soviet Union to be carefully explored so as not to miss any opportunity for reunification.

Similarly, other ministers and parts of the FDP believed that Stalin's offer should at least be examined seriously so that the world public does not get the impression that reunification is failing because of the attitude of the Federal Republic. And on the occasion of such an examination it quickly becomes abundantly clear that Stalin is not serious about his offer. He was then exposed.

Adenauer, on the other hand, saw many disadvantages in a "test":

  • A conference could be dragged out by the Soviet Union, while the Western link would be postponed for the time being. If the West were to leave the conference annoyed, Stalin could blame the West for the failure of the talks.
  • Because of the Second World War, it is essential that the Federal Republic appears to the West as a reliable partner. Accepting the offer would destroy this impression (so-called Rapallo complex).
  • In addition to the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic would also take part in the conference proposed by Stalin. This would mean that the GDR would be recognized by the west, and Stalin would have already achieved a goal without giving up anything.
  • And even if Stalin's offer was meant seriously - according to historian Andreas Hillgruber, Adenauer was afraid of a neutralized Germany as a whole. He did not trust “the Germans” to behave responsibly in such a difficult situation between East and West. Adenauer shared this fear with the Western powers. Adenauer was also against neutrality because Germany alone could not defend itself against the (nuclear) Soviet Union.

In general, Adenauer was in agreement with his ministers, the opposition SPD and the broader population: the offer of the dictator Stalin was not meant seriously and the demand for free elections had to be upheld. But there was still a feeling of unease that the Federal Republic of Germany could do nothing against the division of Germany.

Reactions of the GDR leadership

A woman reads an extra edition of the Leipziger Volkszeitung on the Stalin Note

The note was officially received with enthusiasm in the GDR. The SED party organ Neues Deutschland attached enormous importance to it "for the struggle of the patriotic forces of the German people for peaceful reunification", whereby with patriotic forces mainly communist forces were meant.

GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl ( SED ) indicated in a government statement of March 14th how the draft treaty was interpreted by the GDR government. In it he described the GDR as a democratic and free state and the Federal Republic of Germany as undemocratic and fascist. Groups hostile to peace and democracy should not exist in a united Germany. In addition, Germany as a whole must align itself with the GDR's five-year plan. Finally, Walter Ulbricht , General Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED, made an unequivocal statement on the interpretation of the note. It should be understood as an action against the “General War Treaty ” (meaning the German Treaty), through which Germany would become dependent on the West. However, Germany could only develop freely and peacefully in the communist, so-called “world peace camp”.

The further exchange of notes

The second exchange of notes

In the second Stalin Note of April 9, 1952, the Soviet Union maintained that negotiations had to begin with the foundations of the peace treaty and the formation of an all-German government. Although Stalin accepted that free elections were the basis of an all-German government, the examination of the requirements should be carried out by the victorious powers , not by the United Nations . Stalin also stuck to the Oder-Neisse border , and on the alliance question he now formulated even more generally that re-armed Germany should not participate in alliances that were aggressively directed against other states.

In the second western note (May 13, 1952) it was emphasized again that a freely elected all-German government had to take part in the treaty negotiations. It was now agreed that the election test could also be carried out by a commission of the victorious powers, but that the commission should not have direct government representatives, but rather “impartial members”. The question of sequence remained: first free elections (West) or first negotiations (Stalin).

The third exchange of notes

The day before the EVG treaty was signed, the Soviet Union presented a third note (May 24, 1952). It criticized Stalin West contracts (which, according to Germany treaty should also apply after reunification) and accused the Western powers to delay the negotiations on a peace treaty. The all-German government in the treaty negotiations must also remain under the control of the victorious powers.

For its part, the West (July 10, 1952) criticized the centralization, collectivization and changes in the judiciary in the GDR that the SED had previously decided. At a conference, according to the western note, a peace treaty should not be negotiated, but a decision should first be made by an election review commission. Another difference of opinion was the question of whether the Potsdam resolutions could be the basis for negotiations - according to the West, these resolutions contradicted all developments since 1945.

The fourth exchange of notes

In its final note of August 23, 1952, the Soviet Union mainly reiterated its demands and accusations. But after the West had conceded an election review commission not through the UN, but rather through the victorious powers, the Soviet Union suddenly rejected an international election review commission altogether. Instead, the two German states should set up a joint commission. However, this had already been rejected by the Western powers in 1951.

For this reason, in their answer of September 23, 1952, the Western Powers limited themselves to repeating their previous views and renewing the proposal for the formation of an impartial commission by the four powers.

If the fruitlessness of the exchange of notes after the first Western note had only been determined internally in the East as in the West, this view was also expressed publicly through the (rather polemical) content of the last four notes. The signing of the two Western Treaties (on May 26 and 27, 1952) emphasized this.

The debates about a "missed opportunity"

As already seen, most observers and politicians agreed on the essential points. In retrospect, however, there were several debates about the question of whether a real chance for reunification had been missed in 1952. In fact, there were two issues at stake:

  • The more concrete and researchable question revolves around Stalin's motives for his willingness to actually allow a neutralized, democratic Germany as a whole (and thus to give up the GDR ). Skeptics say no. A completely unbound Germany could in principle be just as unpleasant for Stalin as it was for the West. The existence of the GDR had great advantages for Stalin:
    • As one of three victorious and four occupying powers of World War II, the Soviet Union enjoyed original prestige.
    • The Soviet occupation rights on the territory of the GDR were generally recognized by the Western powers.
    • The GDR was an important Soviet bridgehead in the middle of Europe; this especially from the time when Soviet troops had left Czechoslovakia and Poland again. The GDR was an important bracket in the system of the Soviet satellite states.
    • the GDR leadership was (for the most part) a particularly loyal vassal of the Soviet Union.
    • The GDR made reparations to the Soviet Union and deployed soldiers.
    • The bismuth AG promoted much uranium for the Soviet atomic bomb project
    • In the GDR there were many competent companies in mechanical and plant engineering
    • Comparisons with Austria - from which the Soviet Union withdrew in 1955 - do not work, since Austria has a much lower strategic and economic weight than Germany. In addition, Austria had a state government as early as 1945 (see Occupied Post-War Austria , Austrian State Treaty of May 15, 1955 )
  • A more political and speculative question is whether such a Germany would have been desirable.

Skeptics think:

Above all, the behavior of the federal government and the Western powers were up for debate. The critics included the publicist Paul Sethe , the historians Wilfried Loth , Josef Foschepoth , Karl-Gustav von Schönfels and above all Rolf Steininger . Their views were answered by Gerhard Wettig , Gottfried Niedhart and later Hermann Graml , among others .

One of the statements that critics have repeatedly made is that Adenauer from the Rhineland did not want reunification with the Protestant Prussian East at all. Adenauer's attitude in the Weimar Republic (he wanted an independent Rhineland within the Reich) was used against him, but cannot be proven as a motive with sufficient certainty. But Adenauer also had a rational motive: many of the SPD's main areas were in the GDR. With the eastern zone, Germany as a whole would have become more Protestant and probably also more social democratic than the Federal Republic of the three western zones.

The debate had two high points: towards the end of the 1950s and then again after the Western powers' archives were opened in the mid-1980s. More recent research since the 1990s also includes the archives of the former Eastern Bloc and contributes to the continuation of the discussion.

Discussion in the 1950s

The Dutch historian Ruud van Dijk notes that in later discussions Stalin was accorded much greater sincerity than in 1952. However, the clearer it became that the chances of a reunification of Germany were dwindling, the more heated the debate about whether 1952 was not an important opportunity had been missed. According to Manfred Kittel , the discussion increased as the chance of reunification decreased.

In journalism , it was Paul Sethe who most sharply criticized Adenauer's failure to respond to Stalin's offer. Sethe had been co-editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung at the beginning of the 1950s and in his comments had spoken out in favor of at least sounding out the seriousness of the Stalin notes. He saw the neutralization of Germany as a reasonable price for reunification. He completed the idea of ​​“missed opportunities” in his book “Between Bonn and Moscow” in 1956 and thus laid the foundation for a decades-long debate about the Stalin notes.

The idea attracted attention through a Bundestag debate on January 23, 1958. The CDU / CSU ruled with the small DP when two former federal ministers spoke up, Thomas Dehler ( FDP ) and Gustav Heinemann (first CDU , SPD since 1957 ). Both had left the federal government at the time in a dispute with Adenauer. They accused Adenauer of not having done enough for reunification.

Discussion in the 1980s

The debate re-emerged in the 1980s when the Western archives were opened to historians. The archives of the Soviet Union and the GDR were not yet accessible at this time. In 1985, Rolf Steininger asked in his contribution “A chance for reunification?”, Which was mainly based on Western sources, whether an important opportunity was missed at the time. Steininger and others answered the questions in the negative as to whether Germany should have inevitably been divided and whether Adenauer's course was the best possible path. His reasoning is based on three assumptions:

  • Stalin's offer was meant seriously;
  • the Western powers intended to sound out Stalin's offer;
  • Adenauer tried to prevent any attempt in this direction.

Hermann Graml, however, justified the behavior of the Western powers. On the basis of the Western archives, too, he attached little importance to Adenauer's influence on the negotiations. Graml interpreted the note itself and the “planned” failure of the negotiations to mean that the Soviet Union wanted to create an alibi for itself in order to be able to promote the integration of the GDR into the Eastern Bloc .

After opening the Soviet archives

After a partial opening of the archives of the former Soviet Union, the historical dispute over whether the Stalin notes were just a disruptive maneuver continues. Peter Ruggenthaler, who evaluated files from the central party apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for his publication , including papers from Molotov , answered the question in the affirmative.

Ruud Van Dijk gives several reasons in his paper that the notes were probably not meant seriously. For example, there were no considerations or scenarios in case the Western powers were to act on the proposal. This is the opinion of the vast majority of historians. However, the research situation is not completely clear due to the poor source situation and some authors cite doubts. Hans-Heinrich Nolte claims that Stalin was actually ready for a reunification of Germany as a neutral state, but that this proposal was not taken seriously in the West. Klaus Kellmann judges in his Stalin biography that Stalin only wanted to sacrifice “some things in the GDR” with the document of March 10th. "All of the following letters must be described as pure propaganda ."

See also

literature

  • Bernd Bonwetsch : The 1952 Stalin Note - no end to the debate. In: Yearbook for Historical Research on Communism. 2008, ISSN  0944-629X , pp. 106-113.
  • GA Bürger (di: Gerhard Welchert): The legend of 1952. On the Soviet March note and its role in post-war politics. 3. Edition. Rautenberg, Leer (East Friesland) 1962.
  • Hermann Graml : National State or West German Partial State. The Soviet Notes of 1952 and Public Opinion in the Federal Republic. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . 25, 1977 (PDF; 22 MB), pp. 821-864.
  • Hermann Graml: The legend of the missed opportunity. On the Soviet music campaign of 1952. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 29, 1981 (PDF; 8 MB), pp. 307-341.
  • Jochen P. Laufer: The Stalin Note of March 10, 1953 in the light of new sources. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 52, 2004 (PDF; 8 MB), pp. 99–118.
  • Wilfried Loth : Stalin's unloved child. Why Moscow didn't want the GDR. Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, Munich 1996, ISBN 3-423-04678-3 .
  • Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut : France and German unity. The attitude of the French government and the public to the Stalin notes in 1952 (= series of the quarterly books for contemporary history . Volume 56). Oldenbourg, Munich 1988. Also dissertation Cologne 1987.
  • Gottfried Niedhart : Silence as a duty. Why Konrad Adenauer did not sound out the Stalin Note of March 10th. In: The time . March 13, 1992.
  • Peter Ruggenthaler (ed.): Stalin's great bluff. The history of the Stalin Note in documents of the Soviet leadership. Oldenbourg, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-486-58398-4 ( series of the quarterly books for contemporary history 95).
  • Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.): The legend of the missed opportunity. The Stalin Note of March 10, 1952. Belser, Stuttgart et al. 1982, ISBN 3-7630-1196-X ( Rhöndorfer Talks 5).
  • Rolf Steininger : A chance for reunification? The Stalin Note of March 10, 1952. Presentation and documentation based on unpublished British and American files. Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, Bonn 1985, ISBN 3-87831-416-7 ( Archive for Social History. Supplement 12).
  • Gerhard Wettig : Stalin - Patriot or Democrat for Germany. In: Germany archive . 28, 7, 1995, pp. 743-748.
  • Gerhard Wettig : The Stalin Note. Historical controversies as reflected in the sources , be.bra verlag, Berlin 2015 ( ISBN 978-3-95410-037-8 ).
  • Jürgen Zarusky (Ed.): The Stalin Note from March 10, 1952. New sources and analyzes. Oldenbourg, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-486-64584-6 , ( series of the quarterly books for contemporary history 84).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Frank EW Zschaler: Elite change as an indication of Sovietization processes in East Germany 1949 to 1958 , in: Forum for East European History of Ideas and Contemporary History , vol. 13 (2009), no. 2, pp. 167-189, here p. 175, note. 26 .
  2. Adenauer's missed chance for reunification , article from November 6, 2011 by Lars-Broder Keil on Welt Online
  3. ^ Gerhard Wettig: Review of Peter Ruggenthaler: Stalin's great bluff. The history of the Stalin Note in documents of the Soviet leadership. Munich 2007. In: H-Soz-u-Kult, January 7, 2008 .
  4. ^ Peter Ruggenthaler: Stalin's great bluff. The history of the Stalin Note in documents of the Soviet leadership. Munich 2007.
  5. Hans-Heinrich Nolte : Small history of Russia. Bonn 2005, p. 280.
  6. Klaus Kellmann: Stalin. A biography , Primus, Darmstadt 2005, p. 256.
  7. Fred S. Oldenburg: Review , in H-Soz-Kult July 15, 2002.
  8. Hans-Erich Volkmann : Review in the FAZ of April 5, 2002, p. 8.