Battle of Chillianwala

Battle of Chillianwala
Part of Second Anglo-Sikh War
Date January 13, 1849 Location Chillianwala near the River Jhelum, Punjab Result British withdraw, followed by Sikh withdraw; both sides claim victory
Belligerents
British East India Company	Sikh Khalsa Army
Commanders and leaders
Sir Hugh Gough, Major-General Walter Gilbert, Brigadier-General Campbell	Sardar Sher Singh Attariwalla
Strength
16,000 British, 66 guns	23,000 men, 60 guns
Casualties and losses
2,446 men killed, 132 officers killed, 1,651 wounded, 104 missing	3,600 total killed and wounded

The Battle of Chillianwala was fought during the Second Anglo-Sikh War in the Punjab, now part of Pakistan. The battle was a strategic check to Britain, and damaged British prestige in India. The British had a distinct advantage over the Sikhs, but failed to defeat them.

Of the Sikh forces, history knows little, except that the British estimate of 30,000 enemies was significantly exaggerated. The Sikhs had little if any superiority to the British force of 13,000.

Prelude

The Second Anglo-Sikh war broke out in Punjab, which had recently been occupied by the British East India Company, in April 1848 when the city of Multan rebelled under Dewan Mulraj. The East India Company sent several forces of locally raised troops to help quell the revolt. One of these forces consisted largely of Sikhs under General Sher Singh Attariwalla. On September 14, General Sher Singh's army also rebelled. Other than opposition to the British, Mulraj and Sher Singh had no aims in common. Sher Singh decided to move his army north, to join that of his father, General Chattar Singh Attariwalla, who had also rebelled in Hazara.

The East India Company responded by forming an army of the Punjab under Sir Hugh Gough. Gough wished to take the field immediately but was forced to delay operations until December when the monsoon season had ended. Meanwhile, Sher Singh fortified the crossings of the Chenab River.

In late November, Gough attacked Sher Singh's bridgehead at Ramnagar but was repulsed, raising Sikh morale. In December, Gough forced the River Chenab, but then halted, awaiting further instructions from Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India. Early in January 1849, news came that the British had recaptured Multan, but also that the garrison of the key fortress of Attock had defected to Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Afghanistan, who was half-heartedly supporting Chattar Singh. The fall of Attock nevertheless allowed Chattar Singh's army to move south. Dalhousie ordered Gough to seek out and destroy Sher Singh's main army before the Sikh armies could combine, without waiting for reinforcements from the army at Multan.

Initial contact and deployment

Marching towards the reported Sikh position at Rasul, on January 13 Gough's troops drove a Sikh outpost out of the village of Chillianwala. The village of Chilianwalla is situated on the left bank of the river Jhelum, about 85 miles (136 Km) north west of Lahore. At this point, Gough intended to march round to the north of the Sikh position and attack its left flank on the following day, but when some of his artillery engaged hovering Sikh cavalry, Sikh guns opened fire from hitherto concealed positions much closer than he had expected. Since the flank march was now a risky prospect, Gough determined to deploy immediately and attack frontally.

It was estimated by Frederick Mackeson, Gough's attached political officer, that Sher Singh's army numbered 23,000 (although most later British historians put it at 30,000 or more), with some 60 guns. It occupied an extended line almost six miles long, with the river Jhelum covering the left flank and rear. Most of the Sikh positions were concealed in or behind belts of scrub and jungle.

Gough's army was composed of two infantry divisions, each of two brigades, each in turn of one British and two Bengal Native infantry battalions. There was also a cavalry division of two cavalry brigades, of British and Indian cavalry regiments, and a brigade of Bengal Native troops in reserve. His artillery numbered 66 guns, from the Royal Artillery and the Bengal Horse Artillery.

The Left Division was commanded by Sir Colin Campbell. Because the jungle made it difficult to coordinate his two brigades, he ordered the commander of his right-hand brigade, Brigadier Pennycuick, and its British regiment, the 24th Foot, to attack with the bayonet, but then assumed command of his left-hand brigade. On his left flank was a cavalry brigade under Brigadier White.

The Right Division was commanded by the experienced Sir Walter Gilbert. On his right was a cavalry brigade under Brigadier Pope.

The battle

Gough ordered the advance to commence at about 3:00 pm. From the outset, Pennycuick's brigade was in difficulties. The 24th, newly arrived in India, advanced very rapidly, but lost cohesion and also lost touch with the rest of the brigade in the thick scrub. They suffered heavily from Sikh artillery fire. When they reached the main Sikh positions, Sikh resistance was desperate and the 24th were driven back. Pennycuick's brigade eventually became completely disorganised and had to make its way back to the start line in small parties. Pennycuick himself was killed.

Campbell's other brigade and White's cavalry advanced more cautiously, supported by artillery, and had more success.

Gilbert's two brigades also successfully drove the Sikhs before them, capturing or spiking several guns. However, on their right Brigadier Pope (who was almost an invalid) first ordered an ineffective cavalry charge through thorn scrub which threw his brigade into confusion, and then panicked and ordered a retreat. One of his British cavalry regiments, the 14th Light Dragoons, routed. The Sikhs followed up the fleeing cavalry and captured four of Pope's guns. They then attacked Gilbert's right-hand infantry brigade, commanded by Brigadier Godby, from the rear, halting Gilbert's advance, and forcing him to withdraw under heavy pressure.

By now, darkness was approaching. The Sikhs had been driven from many of their positions with heavy casualties, but were still fighting strongly. With some of his formations rendered ineffective, Gough ordered a withdrawal to the start line. Although his units brought back as many wounded as they could, many of them could not be found in the scrub. Many of the abandoned wounded were killed during the night by roving Sikh irregulars. Gough's retreat also allowed the Sikhs to recapture all but twelve of the guns the British had taken earlier in the day.

The final losses to Gough's army were 2,800 men killed, of whom nearly 1000 were Europeans and 89 were British and 43 native officers. HM 24th Foot suffered 590 casualties, over 50 percent. Sikh casualties were harder to estimate, but it is put at around 4,000. An obelisk erected at Chillianwalla by the British government preserves the names of those who fell in the battle.

Result

Both armies held their positions for three days, at the end of which the British withdrew. Sher Singh later withdrew to the north. Both sides claimed a victory. The Sikhs claimed that they forced the British to retreat. The British forces did retreat, but three days after the battle ended. Three days of incessant rainfall prevented the Sikhs from crossing flooded gullies and streams, and the British marched away in reasonable order. Since the Sikhs appear to have disengaged first, the British claim the victory, although they admitted that the Sikhs missed an opportunity to defeat the British outright.

However, the British repulse, together with the loss of several guns and the colours of the 24th and two other regiments, and the rout of the 14th Light Dragoons, dealt a severe blow to British morale and prestige.

At Chillianwala a British Army which had a high European troop component large number Sepoy (regiments), sufficient artillery, two heavy cavalry brigades to ensure that no one could surprise the British army, excellent logistics, little campaign exhaustion having fought no major battle since assumption of hostilities...failed to defeat the Sikhs.

Gough was severely criticised for his handling of the battle, and was relieved of command and replaced by General Charles James Napier. Before Napier could take over command, Gough had fought the decisive Battle of Gujarat.

The Battle of Chillianwala fought on 13 January 1849 is, however, one odd exception and stands out as a battle in which the British failed to defeat their opponents despite having the advantages of weight of numbers, ideal weather and terrain, superior logistics etc

A testimony left by a British observer says:

“The Sikhs fought like devils, fierce and untamed... Such a mass of men I never set eyes on and a plucky as lions: they ran right on the bayonets and struck their assailants when they were transfixed”.

The loss of British prestige at Chillianwala was one of the factors which contributed to the Indian rebellion of 1857 some nine years later. Within the British Army, such was the consternation over the events at Chillianwala that, after the disastrous Charge of the Light Brigade, when Lord Lucan remarked "This is a most serious matter", General Airey replied, "It is nothing to Chillianwala."

References

• This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)

External links

• The Second Anglo Sikh War 1848-49
• Article on the Battle of Chillianwala
• BritishBattles.com