Talk:Battle of Britain

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Aftermath and lack of Luftwaffe armour-piercing bomb?

Comments such as "Some modern military historians suggest"...gives the impression that this may be a minority view, which may not be the case. It is better to provide examples of who the historians are, and allow the reader to research supporting material.

The statement made about the Luftwaffe not having armour piercing bombs capable of dealing with the deck armour of British Battleships is quite erroneous; The "PC" and "PD" series http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/bombs.html, especially the 500 pound bombs, capable of being carried by the Ju 87, were in use in 1940. Len Deighton, in particular, may be an excellent writer but many of the conclusions drawn in his book are nonsense. The Luftwaffe did a great deal of damage to the RN, especially its destroyers and cruisers, which were poorly armed against air attack, in the Mediterranean in 1941 and 1942. There is no reason to believe that the same might not have happened in 1940 in the North sea and Channel had air superiority been achieved. Then again, look at how many Allied ships that had been sunk or badly damaged by air attack in 1940 List of shipwrecks in 1940. Again, the case is hypothetical...Minorhistorian (talk) 06:39, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

I can't claim a specialty in the area, but a 500pdr seems pretty small against a BB, to me, especially when the std SBD load for that was a 1000pd SAP. It's not "no AP", it's "no AP able to do enough damage". AFAIK, that's still an open question. Trekphiler (talk) 10:54, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

If you look at the link given the Luftwaffe had heavier bombs, up to 1,600 lb, capable of doing more than enough damage to sink or cripple a BB; the bombs used by the Japanese to sink and damage USN BBs at Pearl Harbor weighed 800 kg (roughly 1,760 lbs), and the US BB had heavier deck armour than their British equivalents. http://plasma.nationalgeographic.com/pearlharbor/history/pearlharbor_facts.html I used a 500 pdr as an example of the minimum load that could be carried by the Ju 87, one of the aircraft types responsible for causing heavy damage to the RN in the Med. The Ju 87B was capable of carrying an 1,100 lb bomb on the fuselage rack http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/pc1000.htm and was potentially capable of doing a lot of damage; IMHO "no AP able to do enough damage" is still not correct.Minorhistorian (talk) 12:16, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

While I'm sure many of Deighton's conclusions are suspect or are superseded by more scholarly works, Macksey was also cited as a source for that argument and I'm not sure if it came from Deighton at all. It conflicts with his statement on p. 51 that "There would have been no insurmountable problems for invasion fleets and airborne units if the air were entirely German." Anyway, changes look good to me, thanks. . . dave souza, talk 12:22, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

Yep, I'm probably being a bit harsh on Deighton and I have only skimmed through "Fighter" for the first time in years, and I haven't read Macksey yet, so fair enough.Minorhistorian (talk) 12:50, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

I'm not gonna say GAF could not do it, just it's still an open question absent better sourcing. Somebody obviously thought it was problematic, or the issue would never have arisen. Trekphiler (talk) 07:58, 13 April 2008 (UTC)

Not sure about naval ordnance, but a similar claim was noted to Paul Deichmann (see Luftflotte 2) during his writing of the Luftwaffe Operations in Support of the Army for the United States Historical Division (German Air Force Historical Project) in the 50s. This was noted by Dr. Alfred Price in his edited edition which is freely available in paperback.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 08:27, 13 April 2008 (UTC)

I'll do some more research when I have some spare time. However, the article in question says that in 1940 the Luftwaffe, unlike the Japanese during the destruction of the fleet at Singapore, did not have armour-piercing bombs, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/08/24/nbattle24.xml which is factually wrong. If there was a shortage of supply of these weapons, which is far more likely, then why not say so?

In a website on the development of German guided missiles and glide bombs: In 1940, the RLM adopted Kramer's control system utilizing the SD 1400X armor-piercing bomb. http://www.ctie.monash.edu.au/hargrave/rpav_germany_hr.html although this was an SAP rather than an AP weapon. My point still remains, although the authors state that the Luftwaffe had no AP bombs where is their evidence for saying so?Minorhistorian (talk) 04:06, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

The Torygraph has been known to completely misrepresent their sources, as in the case of peppered moth evolution#Criticism and controversy, so it would be better to check the History Today article to see what the historians actually wrote. From the usual unreliable Deighton which I have to hand, p 143 notes that "Hitler had taken a personal interest in the Luftwaffe's bomb shortage (refusing until 12 October 1939 to allow the manufacture of more of them, on the grounds that Britain and France would soon make peace)", so at first glance a bomb shortage seems credible. As I recall, there was great reluctance in the Royal Navy at that time to accept that aircraft could sink a capital ship, and the current claim seems to restate that idea. The newspaper article is stirring it, pushing a claim which is of little relevance to the significance of the air battles. Again, Deighton p. 51 reports that Churchill did not take the invasion threat seriously, and any invasion at that stage of the war would have been cut to pieces, but if fighter command had been eliminated, bombers could have knocked out the other defenses one by one. From their reported statements, the naval historians Brian James and Dr Andrew Gordon set up a straw man claim to demolish alleged misperceptions of the importance of the air war. .. dave souza, talk 08:15, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

I would agree; there appear to be some silly, sweeping statements being made by James and Gordon, such as this one:

"Even if the RAF had been defeated the fleet would still have been able to defeat any invasion because fast ships at sea could easily manoeuvre and "were pretty safe from air attack"".

I guess the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica didn't really sink several destroyers and cruisers in the Med. Or maybe they were all stationary? The Japanese fluked their attacks on the Prince of Wales and Repulse, not to mention the Hermes and the Vampire. The Americans somehow managed to sink four carriers at Midway. One or two ships were possibly sunk through air attack in Iron Bottom Sound and around Guadalcanal in 1942. And I have a suspicion that the Americans sank some ships by air attack around the Philippines in 1944? Mind you, it was just some lucky hits. For people who are supposed to be experts, if they have been quoted in context, they hold views about the possibilities of air attack which would have looked good in the 1930s.Minorhistorian (talk) 09:17, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

Whew. If that's expert research, I despair. I'd wonder what production of the SD1400 looked like in 7-9/40. Also, don't forget, Germany had issues with explosives production (not yet? or irrelevant to AP weaps?). Trekphiler (talk) 14:55, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

I think it was more likely that the Luftwaffe may have been hampered by a shortage of supply of ordnance rather than a total lack thereof. Stephen Bungay makes the point in The Most Dangerous Enemy that the German war production was still way behind that of Britain in 1940, and that British industry was more efficient and more productive than the German, which is the complete opposite of the so-called Teutonic Efficiency inspired by Nazi propoganda (pp 94-95).Minorhistorian (talk) 11:36, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

Teutonic Efficiency? Looking at the farcical state of aircraft production, I'm not surprised; even had Germany been at full stretch, I have a hunch Britain could have outproduced her. Trekphiler (talk) 19:41, 19 April 2008 (UTC)

A couple of points based on fairly extensive reading about naval warfare in this period.

"Did the Luftwaffe have armour-piercing bombs" is not the same question as "could the Luftwaffe stop the Royal Navy destroying a German invasion." There is potentially a lot of confusion about this.

Firstly, the only reliable way to sink a battleship is to put a bomb or shell through its armour deck and into its engines and magazines, or to torpedo it enough to sink it. I believe the Luftwaffe did not have any torpedo-equipped aircraft, at least not in 1940. Obviously they had bombers. However, an armour-piercing bomb has to be dropped from a high altitude to pierce the deck armour of a battleship. For instance, is the heaviest German AP bomb was 1500lbs, then the bomb could only penetrate when dropped above 5,000ft. The standard bomb-release height of a Stuka was 500ft. It is worth noting that none of the American battleships at Pearl Harbour had their armour decks penetrated. (Arizona, which was sunk by a high-altitude bomb, suffered a hit to a secondary magazine above the armoured deck which then set off the main magazines.) It is still possible to do a lot of damage to a battleship from the air; would that damage have been enough to prevent them from interfering with a German invasion? Who knows?

However, most of the ships the RN would have to counter an invasion would be cruisers, destroyers, and smaller vessels. All of these were vulnerable to air attack. Exactly what the outcome of an encounter between a swarm of Stukas and Me110s, and a swarm of destroyers and motor-boats, is the sort of imponderable that serious historians tend to avoid. However, Derek Robinson argues in Invasion 1940 that the RN's superiority in small warships was so great that even with no RAF present there would have been no hope for the German invasion fleet.

regards, The Land (talk) 09:43, 5 July 2008 (UTC)

Added, information from well researched article of the Bof B from the German perspective

I came across these articles http://ftp1.us.proftpd.org/hyperwar//ETO/BOB/BoB-German/index.html http://ftp1.us.proftpd.org/hyperwar//ETO/BOB/BoB-German/BoB-German-A.html#addendum while looking into "Beppo" Schmid, who did a deal of disservice to the Luftwaffe throughout WW 2...well researched and very interesting, and also available as a downloadable pdf file; http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdf Minorhistorian (talk) 13:19, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

Gallery section of leaders

I am not sure why this section was added, especially right in the middle of the article. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 17:04, 28 June 2008 (UTC).

The Battle of Britain was dominated by several strong personalities, not the least of which were Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler; there are a lot of references to both throughout the article, so why not have their photographs included? From what I can see every book and the vast majority of articles dealing with the battle have photos of at least these two, so what's the harm of Wikipedia following suit? (As I said some time ago, it seemed odd that an article on the battle which was dominated by some strong personalities had no photographs of at least some of those people.) Come to that, why was the photo of George VI and Elizabeth removed???.Minorhistorian (talk) 02:24, 30 June 2008 (UTC)

I wouldn't call the the Royals strong personalities, besides its overkill. But I don't have a problem with Military/political leaders (of course some were both). The fact tag was added to your ref, Minor', because it did not have page number - I did put this in the edit summary. Dapi89 (talk) 10:52, 30 June 2008 (UTC)

The Royals might not have been "strong personalities" in the Churchill/Hitler mould, but they did play an important role in boosting the morale of the wider community (albeit, there were parts of the community which at first viewed them with suspicion), plus they showed some courage in staying in London throughout the Blitz. (Contrast this with Hitler, who had absolutely no feeling for the suffering of the German civilians and who never visited bombed cities.) As someone who played an active role in the RAF, being the first member of the Royal family to serve and working his way up the ranks (in the process becoming the first British monarch to learn to fly) it could be argued that George VI was a "military leader" ;-). From those perspectives, is it "overkill" to have a photo of them? Minorhistorian (talk) 12:17, 30 June 2008 (UTC)

The answer to that would be "yes". It should be moved to the Blitz article, as the bombing took place on 13 September. King George did not take an active part in this Battle. It would imply critical military leadership (I note Hitler is not mentioned in the info box, or Churchill). Dapi89 (talk) 12:49, 1 July 2008 (UTC)

Ooops, lack of pp numbers was an oversight.Minorhistorian (talk) 12:17, 30 June 2008 (UTC)

I thought so. Dapi89 (talk) 12:50, 1 July 2008 (UTC)

Irving source

Given David Irving's subsequent reputation, i sit really a good idea to use him as a source? David Underdown (talk) 12:36, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

Unless somebody can point out errors in his earlier works I don't see why his rather substantial material on World War II should be left out, he did have a fairly good name as a historian prior to the Holocaust-debacl~e, AFAIK. His book on Rommel is one of the better books I've read, both in the terms of sources, information and a fairly neutral treatment of the subject. Abel29a (talk) 15:57, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

I did wonder about that, but this "fear" seems irrational. This book is well received, and is well researched, as he uses war time sources (having become friendly with many of the ex-OKW Officers). As he is not making any controversial/political/philosophical points, it is okay. His texts are all supported by footnotes, some of which I have included in the article, and it reads in a very matter of fact way, with no implication of Historical revisionism. Dapi89 (talk) 00:15, 5 July 2008 (UTC)

It probably is OK, but his status is such that I thought it better to have a bit of discussion we could point to here to show that we'd really thought about it, rather than including his work blindly. Though I note that our article on him hear does say that even his earlier work is regarded with some suspiscion. David Underdown (talk) 08:26, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

Although his earlier work is regarded with suspicion, I think in the context in which it has been included in this article is okay - there's nothing particularly controversial or political involved. Of course, if reliable information can be found that refutes Irving's research, a rethink would be in order.Minorhistorian (talk) 09:28, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

I have added {{Verify credibility}}, because anything the Irving has said or written needs to be checked against the work of a reputable historian. Irving should not be used without support (in which case the other historian can be cited) to quote Evans:

Not one of [Irving's] books, speeches or articles, not one paragraph, not one sentence in any of them, can be taken on trust as an accurate representation of its historical subject. All of them are completely worthless as history, because Irving cannot be trusted anywhere, in any of them, to give a reliable account of what he is talking or writing about. ... if we mean by historian someone who is concerned to discover the truth about the past, and to give as accurate a representation of it as possible, then Irving is not a historian. (Richard J. Evans Holocaust Denial On Trial)

--Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 13:11, 16 September 2008 (UTC)

Irving has always been known for detailed and accurate work. His previous work should not be affected by his more recent statements. (T A) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 153.26.241.6 (talk • contribs) 14:21, 16 September 2008

IP 153.26.241.6. (754th Electronic Systems Group) do you have a reliable source to back up your analysis? As Evans describes in 5.2 The Bombing of Dresden in 1945, Irving's work on Dresden is sloppy to say the least, and that is something he originally published in the early 60s. Irving is not a reliable source. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 15:40, 16 September 2008 (UTC)

You're the bomb

(Copied from Operation Sealion) This offers a source for German lack of AP bombs. TREKphiler 04:59, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

This article is the same on that has already been discussed in "Aftermath and lack of Luftwaffe armour-piercing bomb?" The historical value of the analysis is limited because the researcher have been unrealistic about the possibilities of air attack against ships during WW II. (It could also be argued that armour piercing bombs did not have to be used to sink or immobilise Destroyers and Cruisers. The British ships were inadequately armed with AA weapons against air attack; sinking these could have rendered the British BBs vulnerable to U-Boats).Minorhistorian (talk) 23:40, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

Posted FYI, no comment on its contents. I do think you overestimate the vulnerability of BBs to subs, & if BBs (& arguably CCs, not exactly thin in deck armor) are more/less invulnerable to a/c, they're a threat to the invasion force. I don't know how vulnerable, & I don't suggest inclusion, just consideration for anybody who's going to change it. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 10:23, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

INFO BOX DETAILS

Can someone clarify the details on the German side: 1,887 total - is this for aircraft ? , how then was there 2,500 pilots killed. Some of the aircraft are bombers, dive bombers, ME 110 with multi crews if so should it read 2,500 airman ? Jim Sweeney (talk) 06:55, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

Agreed this does need revision, which has now been done.Minorhistorian (talk) 11:16, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

Indeed the forces and losses section is so complex that IMHO the best way to present it would be to list the losses claimed by authors - they all seem to count it differently, some count only destroyed in combat, other include accidents and destroyed on ground, some only Fighters on the RAF side some include bombers as well etc.

The forces available to the sides is confused as well, as it would appear to me it lists servicable/combat ready fighters for the RAF FC at the start of the battle (many hundred fighters were also available at fighter Sqns, but not servicable), whereas the LW strenght is reported as 'on hand' numbers, ie. non-servicable a/c included, whereas after the BoF the units suffered from relatively low servicibiliy rates. Its comparing apples to oranges. Kurfürst (talk) 08:37, 25 July 2008 (UTC)

Additions to 109 vs Spitfire in section on aircraft

I'm not sure that extending the section on aircraft performance comparisons serves any real purpose in an article which, strictly speaking, is about the Battle of Britain as a whole; the Spitfire Vs 109 section is probably a tad too long as it is - surely this type of information is more appropriate in the articles on the Spitfire and 109? It could also be argued that there should be an extension to the 109 vs Hurricane plus a 109 vs Defiant analysis could be added as well. And to be completely balanced the same should be done for the 110 vs RAF fighters - where, then, could it all end? I've cut and copied the added paragraph here for further comment.

Performance- and air combat comparison that has been performed at the E-Stelle Rechlin in Germany between Bf 109 E and Bf 110 C and captured Spitfire, Hurricane and Curtiss Hawk-75 fighters showed radically different conclusions compared to that of RAE in Britain:

The Bf 109 E type clearly outperforms all foreign planes. Speed: the Spitfire is at 0 m by ca. 20 km/h, at 4 km by ca. 10 km/h, Hurricane and Curtiss at 0 and 4 km altitude by ca. 60 km/h. A similar superiority of the Bf 109 E exists in the climb performance as well. [...] In summary, it can be said that all three enemy planes types are inferior to the German planes regarding the flying qualities. Especially the Spitfire has bad rudder and elevator stability on the target approach. In addition the wing-mounted weapons have the known shooting-technique disadvantages.

Opinions on adding this?Minorhistorian (talk) 23:23, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

Take it out. A brief summary saying the aircraft were comparable with links to the individual articles, or (if there's enough material, & enough support) a separate comparative page, is plenty. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 10:14, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

Comparison of the opposing armies are rather standard in description of historical Battles; the Battle of Britain was an air battle, and as such, mainly fought by fighters, at least this seems to be the general focus amongst historians writing on the Battle of Britain. So comparison of the opposing fighters is relevant, at least it is done by every major book dealing with the subject, at least to some extent.

In any case, I think that the German evaluation of the opposing fighters is just as relevant as the British one, already quoted, from two organisations, for the sake of objectivity and letting the reader get the whole picture. Presenting the dismissive British opinion of the time (and, as I am being personally familiar with the original reports, selectively) does not serve the objectivity of this article.

Please restore the comments as they were.

Kurfürst (talk) 10:18, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

Taking your points; So comparison of the opposing fighters is relevant, at least it is done by every major book dealing with the subject, at least to some extent.

Which is exactly what has been done here. There is also another article Battle of Britain Aircraft which covers similar ground, so the comparison of the opposing armies and aircraft is well covered.

In any case, I think that the German evaluation of the opposing fighters is just as relevant as the British one, already quoted, from two organisations, for the sake of objectivity and letting the reader get the whole picture.

The only report cited comes from an RAE evaluation of the Bf 109. A comment has been added that the condition of the airframe and engine of the 109, and a lack of oxygen gear during some tests, could skew the test results unfavourably cf a new operational 109. What more needs to be added?

The German view of the RAF fighters is discussed by Mölders; again, the fighters flown by the Luftwaffe lacked equipment that was standard for B of B period aircraft. Ergo: the reader does get a reasonably objective picture.

Presenting the dismissive British opinion of the time (and, as I am being personally familiar with the original reports, selectively)...

I too am familiar with the original reports from both sides; to categorise the British opinion of the time as "dismissive" presumably means that the objectivity of the German opinion of the time is impeccable? Where's the evidence for that? Using such an argument it can be shown that each report is as "dismissive" as the other and that all such reports are coloured by a certain degree of propaganda. How much of the report needs to be cited before it can be regarded as non-selective? (The reports can be found http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfire-I.html and http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1vrs109e.html) This section is already getting overloaded; it would be better to work on the main Battle of Britain Aircraft article, which needs proper references, notes and citations as it is.Minorhistorian (talk) 12:11, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

Perhaps then the whole question of opposing aircraft in the Battle of Britain would be needed to be moved the Battle of Britain Aircraft article. Until then, however, I do not see the need for quoting reports from one side only. Certainly the section can bear 4 or so additional lines of text.

Kurfürst (talk) 21:25, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

Until then, however, I do not see the need for quoting reports from one side only.

Kurfürst, this is dishonest - quoting a section of a flight report written by Mŏlders is hardly "quoting reports from one side only".Minorhistorian (talk) 23:41, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

I agree with Minor' and Trek' on this one. Dapi89 (talk) 00:50, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

It seems to me that Kurfürst, with the best of intentions, is always wanting the 109 and Luftwaffe fighters to have the "last word". Go over to the Battle of Britain Aircraft, where much of this information is now located. Supermarine Spitfire has also been "modified" to suit. Here we have situations where unverifiable or hard to access references are being cited because, Kurfürst calls them (for example) ...more reliable and referenced information (Revised section on 100 octane fuel).

Well, hang on here, how does anyone else know that the information cited is any more reliable and better sourced than that which has already been cited? There is no indication as to when the cited report was written, and by whom or by what organisation. The information supplied, it seems, cannot be verified without accessing the Australian War Memorial archives. I've tried and failed to find this document. It's probably available, but it may take a bit to find a copy. Kurfürst has also attempted to quietly dump information which comes from a (in his view) revisionist website. What the heck does that mean? How did Kurfürst reach this dismissive conclusion?

He is also using German flight reports as the basis for his analysis of the control characteristics of the RAF fighters, whilst ignoring RAE and A&AEE and RAF pilot reports which, in his view, are dismissive or revisionist; again, I ask, where is the evidence for this? Kurfürst hasn't yet responded to the first time I asked this question. Incidentally, I note that several phrases (longitudinally unstable and bad rudder and elevator stability on the target approach) from the German flight test reports have been added in comments on the Spitfire, without actually citing where these remarks originated. It could equally be argued that the Germans during WW 2 were as dismissive in their flight reports on captured enemy aircraft as the British apparently were. To regard one source of material as dismissive and revisionist (sic) without evidence, while being prepared to use contestable material from another source without citation is, IMHO, hypocritical, and serves to create needless friction without possibility of resolving the conflict

Personally, I couldn't care less about the Spitfire V 109 schtick, but I strongly protest at the way in which source material is being misused.Minorhistorian (talk) 13:14, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

I'd say summarize, then delete the rest; there's way too much detail for the subject... TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 00:40, 9 August 2008 (UTC)

Unreadable info box

In the info box, in the box called "Casualties and losses":

"1,887 total. 2,500 pilots and aircrew killed." looks very strange. I had to read it a lot of times over and over again before I realised 1,887 total. and 2,500 pilots and aircrew killed. were two different descriptions. There is no brake between "total" and "2.500" making me wonder what they could possibly mean with "1,887 total. 2,500". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.217.101.237 (talk) 16:24, 31 July 2008 (UTC)

Its easy to understand. The number of the aircraft, then the pilots and aircrew that died in them. Dapi89 (talk) 20:45, 31 July 2008 (UTC)

List of sources

FYI, a list of sources on this subject can be found here: [1]. Cla68 (talk) 03:39, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Losses and the Luftwaffe after the Battle of Britain

In the 'Aftermath' section, it is noted: In losses of aircraft and experienced aircrew, the battle was a blow from which the Luftwaffe never fully recovered. It had significantly fewer bombers at the start of Operation Barbarossa, some 929 machines, because of losses sustained over Britain.

I am not sure if that is what Bergström, who is being referenced here, actually writes, as I do not have access to his books. I doubt it, however. The Luftwaffe frontline strenght certainly did not decrease as a result of the Battle of Britain, as reinforcements and production was more than sufficient to replace losses, and, to replace the existing types with more modern type of aircraft, withdrawing the older models (ie. by the start of Barbarossa, much of the 109E fleet was now replaced by the new 109F).

It is also contestable on grounds of Luftwaffe reported strenghts. Olaf Groehler, in 1975, for example reports the LW frontline strenght (not including a lot of aux. and non-combat oriented units) gives the LW strenght as 5298 on 11 April 1940 (before the Western Campaigns), of which 1356 were S-E fighters, 1711 being bombers and 414 being dive bombers. A day before Barbarossa, 21 June 1941, he reports 5599 aircraft, (ie. some 300 aircraft increase) including 1440 S-E fighters, another 263 in a new category, the night-fighters, 1511 bombers and 424 dive bombers. Therefore the claim that only 929 bombers were in the Luftwaffe (which I suspect is a misunderstanding of the original text) is wrong, as is the conclusion that this was due to some 'irreversible blow' suffered during the BoB. It may well be that 929 or so bombers were employed against Russia, while the others elsewhere in the West and in the Med. In any case, the claim that the BoB was some sort of a death blow to the LW lacks solid foundation. It certainly suffered considerable losses, as did the RAF which lost apprx. 100% of the fighter and bomber force it started the Battle with, but even in absolute terms those losses were not irrecoverable; the LW already lost about the same number of aircraft during the two months of the Battle of France as it did during the four months of the Battle of Britain; yet it was was capable of launching the BoB offensive just a month later, as it was capable of seizing complete air dominance over the Eastern front in 1941. Therefore I think that particular sentence is contenstable and should be removed. Kurfürst (talk) 16:15, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

This is the issue, whether you doubt an author or not, removing the information is acceptable but be prepared to provide an alternative that is verifiable. The listing of aircraft strength that you have used does not identify repair/maintenance totals nor deployment. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 16:27, 23 August 2008 (UTC).

I am not sure what you mean under does not identify repair/maintenance totals nor deployment'. The contestable claim that was being made was that losses in the Battle of Britain were such that it crippled Luftwaffe strenght. OTOH strenght figures for the LW before BoB and just before Barbarossa show this was simply not the case. How and to what theatres that unbroken force deployed is immaterial to the question. Only thing that matter is the size of the Luftwaffe force before and after the Battle in the next major air campaign, and this shows by all sources that the force did not shrink as a result of BoB losses. I think someone is using the Bergström figure of bombers deployed for Barbarossa with a logical fallacy to 'prove' - while forgetting about the bigger picture and other theatres of operations - the numbers shrank by mid-1941 - which is false. Kurfürst (talk) 20:39, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

It doesnt actually matter if the quote is true or not it just has to be a reliable source. If you have an alternate view then you can rework the sentence to show that another view exists and provide an additional reliable source for that view. You cant just delete a sentence because you disagree with it, it is not our job to make judgements on what the sources say just to present them in the article. A bit of original research on your figures above shows the bombers down 200 a drop of 13 percent. MilborneOne (talk) 17:47, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Well there is serious doubt that Bergstörm actually writes such things, and this has been not the wishful thinking of some tendentious editors here. Until it can be properly verified that it is a direct quote from Bergström - which is unlikely - it is the most prudent to remove it as a likely misquote. The claim requires verification or direct quote. Kurfürst (talk) 20:39, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Kurfürst's figures are very inaccurate and are not given appropriate breakdowns by the author he claims to be quoting.

I am afraid Dapi89 is refraining to rhetorics instead of proper sourced arguements.

Bergstrom's sources are primary.

So are Groehlers. In fact, it is very likely that Bergström actually relies heavily on Groehler or on the same sources Groehler has used. What is very doubtful is your 'interpretation' of Bergström.

Bergstrom research indicates 4,389 aircraft committed in to Opp. Barb. Of these 2,598 were combat aircraft, of which 1,939 were serviceable for operations. Given the Luftwaffe was to lose 2,093 between 22 June-6 December '41, with another 1,362 damaged, they were only able to operate 500+ in the Battle for Moscow, 90 percent of their EF strength at that point, due to losses. Plus a further 981 aircraft allocated to Barb' belonged to the Finns, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. A further 556 aircraft were tactical reconnaissance, of which 252 actually belonged to German Army, but appear of Luftwaffe strength returns.

Well this is in very good agreement with Groehler's figures. Groehler lists 2461 aircraft of various kinds belonging to Luftflotten 1, 2 4 and 5, and mentions further 594 aircraft (liason, recon) attached to the Heer. A Grandtotal of 3055 deployed for Barbarossa. Of course this has nothing to do with the false claim that the Battle of Britain would have dealt a 'blow' to Luftwaffe strenght during the Battle of Britain from the the LW could not recover. It is seriously doubtful that this is a direct quote from Bergström, and a logical fellacy from someone who is using Bergström as a reference to his own claims..

You’re author does not provide the specific information.

This is pure rhetorics and is being made up. In my edition of Groehlers, page 197, Grohler actually gives detailed order of battle for the Eastern Front, borken down by type of aircraft and Luftflotte, as detailed above. It is in good agreement with Bergström. Obviously, you are attempting to dismiss a source which you have not even read by making up false claims about it.

Production figures are also incorrect. Production figures did not increase until January 1942 when Milchs reforms quadrupled production to 1,200. In April – October, according to Milch, huge problems were encountered with engine production. The main reason the main assault came two weeks into August was because the Luftwaffe needed a month to recuperate and restore it units to significant strength (even then large number of Luftwaffe units began the battle with 60/70% of official allocation due to powerplant production figures being so low). Just 841 Bomber (not counting serviceable vs non-serviceable) were available on 30 June 1940 and just half of this total by December, despite replacements.

No production figures were quoted so I am afraid you are making up something here - again. Simple fact again that the Luftwaffe's frontline strenght was maintained despite losses in the Battle of Britain, which were not particularly heavy compared to the French campaign I might add. Any speculation on how this force was deployed, and lenghty bashing of the Luftwaffe production and how the Russian campaign developed is completely immaterial to the subject, only serving to reinforce to suspicion that this claim was made up by you, while hiding behind Bergstrom as a reference. Kurfürst (talk) 20:39, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

SE fighter strength was no where near 1,440! That figure is absurd! This figure was actually 763 in Russia and another 200 in Europe and North Africa!

Well, German strenght returns show 1440 SE fighters on 21 June 1941 (Groehler), and another set of figures (taken from BAMA archive material, and published here show 1213 in daylight fighter units on 28 June 1941. Just before the Battle of Britian, on 29 June 1940, fighters numbered 1170. I.e. six days after Barbarossa launched, the Luftwaffe had more and more modern fighters than it did before the Battle of Britain. A truely devastating blow indeed...!

Furthermore very few German Kampfgeschwader’’ were left in the Western Theatres. According to de Zeng et al's work in the two volumes, "Bomber units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45", just two units (III./KG 26 and III./KG 30) remained in combat operations outside of Russia from June-December 1941, with a combined strength of 72 (no indication of serviceable machines out of the 72 is given). Others existed but were either reformations/new formations or converting to a different type and did not have their machines at the time. The ill-informed opinions about the Luftwaffe being able to “seize” air dominance is also incorrect. The Luftwaffe never ever achieved air supremacy in the East, only air superiority, over the areas where it concentrated its strength. Despite its losses the Soviet maintained significant numbers all along the front. This is typical of how the Luftwaffe was woefully unprepared and incapable achieving total victory in Russia. Not to mention it began the campaign with a total inadequate number of aircraft, which was not helped by the losses over Britain. Dapi89 (talk) 19:22, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Fairly irrelevant claims to the point being discussed, I am afraid..

One final note, as it is appearantly you are here who is claiming that the LW losses were such in the Battle of Britain that they were irreplacable and the LW strenght decreased after the Battle, the burden is proof is upon you by showing us figures with references for the entire Luftwaffe. Kurfürst (talk) 20:39, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Absolute tripe. Bergstrom uses primary source, particularly the German archives. Murray has got his figures wrong for total strength, which is why I have added a note by Milch to prove this is so - production was inadequate. You have consistently removed information, cited information, that directly referrs to the decline in bomber strength. This has been restored. The argument here, one that seems to have passed you by again, is bomber numbers. We are talking about the bomber arm. This probably why you are disliked by a number of well regarded editors. You like to exalt the German "successes" and downplay their short commings. Further more I am going to add de Zeng's work, just so you can see the total strength of the German bomber arm, using the War diaries of the various units, and German archive material, so you can see exactly what number of bombers operated outside of Russia. Perhaps that will shut you up. Dapi89 (talk) 21:17, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Reverted Dapi89s repeated attempts to first misquote Murray, and then deleted the strenght reports by him altogether. Dapi89`s earlier revert was simply a return to his misquote of Murray. Note: Murray link (availabe as a free dowload here, check Page 80 for Luftwaffe strenghts is in full agreement with Groehler regarding aircraft strenghts, dimissed earlier by Dapi 89. Murray's Table XII clearly shows that aircraft strenght did not decline after or due to the Battle, which was the contestable, now proven to be false claim by Dapi89. Dapi89 is simply doing a tendentious editing, misquotes sources and removes the properly sourced and verifiable source material when it disproves his claims.

This user, Dapi89, should be blocked as a warning for personal attacks, misuse of sources and tendentious editing. Kurfürst (talk) 21:23, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

This is a content dispute, keep your comments to that issue solely. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 21:35, 23 August 2008 (UTC).

Actually I have not violated the three revert rule, you have. Perhaps you should keep your abusive mouth closed and avoid drawing attention to that? The dispute here is the decline in bomber figures, in which I have now added de Zeng's work. It depreciated by 200. This is significant. On top of that Milch reveals production of twin engined aircraft was inadequate due to failing powerplant production levels. Bomber levels indicate a consistent decline after the Battle of Britain (in fact as early as the French campaign). And as Bzuk said, keep the acid tongued bullshit to yourself. Dapi89 (talk) 21:42, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Now this is the time to "take a deep breath" and perhaps let things go for awhile. It's a topic that has consumed many researchers and it may need to be first tried out here on this talk page in a suggested edit before being committed to the main body of text. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 21:48, 23 August 2008 (UTC).

The initial text, Bzuk, as everyone knows, was about the fall in bomber numbers which entered a terminal decline during the BoB. A 13-14% destruction rate of its pre-Britain levels is significant enough, even more so when it never reached those numbers again. Dapi89 (talk) 21:53, 23 August 2008 (UTC) Oh, and I agree with your opinion about this, but the above user is and has proved he cannot and will not work with others, so I am not sure if it will be achieved. Dapi89 (talk) 21:55, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

I agree that that is the conventional thought which has been prevalent in nearly all the references extant. What is being challenged is the viability of the statistics based on some new sources. This may be resolved by actually quotes for the diverging references and then make a determination. Right now, I am definitely leaning towards the current accepted notion of a deprecated Luftwaffe force but it has driven me to look up items in my private library. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 22:06, 23 August 2008 (UTC).

It seems Kurfürst has been blocked, and is now using his IP account to delete more text. I thought this was something called a scokpuppeting? I can't revert again. Yes Bzuk I agree. The total figure of every type of machine was slightly more than 1940. This latest "episode" is about bomber fgures. Total German bomber figures fell by 200, as confirmed by two other sources excluding Bergstrom. Three is enough, I think, to confirm this. Dapi89 (talk) 00:01, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

In this vein, let me raise 2 concerns.

"1,107 single- and 357 twin-engined fighters on strength"

How many actually serviceable? And

"The theories of strategic bombing, which hinged on the collapse of public morale, were undone"

This is the usual position, & the standard measure used by Bomber Command, despite no evidence of it. Goebbels suggested (correctly, IMO) it was gov't morale that pertained; as Galbraith has said, people will prefer even a bad gov't to a bomber overhead. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 14:14, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

Belligerents

what about poland in infobox? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 79.185.253.36 (talk) 18:15, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

No. Polish pilots are given credit as a part of the nations that took part, but the only sovereign Allied nation was Great Britain. Please read the article. Dapi89 (talk) 19:36, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

where are canada, australia, new zealand or south africa? i'm sure as part of the British Commonwealth Air Training Program they must have had pilots involved in this fight. as well, weren't there american volunteers? The Fix 20:33, 28 August 2008 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Sixer Fixer (talk • contribs)

They all took part as formations of the RAF, so only the UK is credited as a belligerent. David Underdown (talk) 20:54, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

We have had this discussion several times. There is a separate page Non-British personnel in the RAF during the Battle of Britain that records details of the various non-British pilots who fought in the BoB, although some of this information has been re-added back into this article (in fact duplicated in two seperate sections for some reason). No one is trying to minimise or otherwise dishonour the pilots of other nationalities that took part in the Battle of Britian but they all did so as part of the RAF and therefore the only belligerant was the United Kingdom. --Shimbo (talk) 21:56, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

I assume you are referring to the paragraphs I have added describing the combat experience of the Polish and Czech pilots compared with their British and Commonwealth counterparts? Surely there is no harm in describing something of the combat experience the Poles in particular had cf their counterparts from other nations within the RAF? The article you've pointed out skims over such information and certain points in that article either need clarification or can be disputed (eg:"many tried to ram the German planes, sacrificing themselves to destroy German bombers" may be colourful and it may be in error); nor is it linked in any way to the main Battle of Britain article, even though it has existed for over a year.Minorhistorian (talk) 02:14, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

I correct myself, the article is linked but only in the last paragraphs of a long article, where it is easily overlooked.Minorhistorian (talk) 02:17, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

Describing the Polish experience is good work, but IMO it belongs on Non-British personnel in the RAF during the Battle of Britain as you say, this is already a large article (far too large IMO). If the Polish or Czech sections of 'Non-British personnel in the RAF during the Battle of Britain' are incorrect then they let's edit them not add similar but different information in two places on this page. If the link is not prominent enough then let's edit it to make it more prominent. The solution IMO is to take the second section that describes the non-British contribution and merge it with the very similar section headed Pilots, then add a 'Main Article link to Non-British personnel in the RAF during the Battle of Britain and move the more detailed information there. Edit: I have made the changes I suggested above, I hope that is OK. --Shimbo (talk) 07:51, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

I see no problem with that, although others may not agree. What is important is that IMO the contribution of the Poles and Czechs, who were in most cases far more experienced than the bulk of the RAF aircrew of the time, not be overlooked. Cheers!Minorhistorian (talk) 13:17, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

I hope you are happy with the changes I have made. As I say there is no intention on my part to downplay the role of anyone. I notice there is another section where the contribution of the non-British pilots is mentioned (as part of the 'Luftwaffe targets RAF airfields' section. --Shimbo (talk) 17:10, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

Did we not have this discussion before and conclude that the British Empire was the main Allied entity that took part as opposed to the UK? This seems to have been reverted in the info box --Sf (talk) 20:26, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

Just a point regarding the questions of sovereignty of Poland during the Battle and its status as a distinct belligerent. (And please be gentle as this is my first ever step into Wikipedia. Please do let me know if my etiquette’s not up to scratch).

The Wikipedia article ‘Polish Air Forces in France and Great Britain’ states the following “On August 5, 1940, the British government finally accepted the Polish Air Force as a sovereign, allied military formation. From then on the airmen were part of the Polish Army, flying their own standards and wearing British uniforms but with Polish rank insignia. Although still subordinate to British command, the Polish units were directly subordinate to a Polish inspector of the Air Forces, who in turn was responsible to the Polish government.”

Prior to the August 5 Anglo-Polish agreement on the Polish Armed Forces, an earlier agreement had been signed on 11 June 1940 but solely to allow for the provision of Polish personnel for use in RAF units, and only under RAF command. The August 5 agreement recognised the sovereign nature of the Polish state and the role to be played by the Polish Armed Forces under sovereign Polish control whilst in British theatres of war (Poland in the Second World War, J Garlinski, 1985).

It is also interesting to note that RAF records recognise the particular status of the Polish Air Force (post August 5 1940) by specifically refering to Polish squadrons with the ‘Polish’ suffix. For example, ‘303 (Polish) squadron’. This notation was agreed alongside the use of Polish Air Force checkerboards on aircraft and the flying of the Polish Air Force ensign at stations hosting PAF units.

The question of sovereignty is also supported by the fact that war materiel used by post-August 1940 Polish forces in the West was effectively purchased (via British loans) using the gold reserves of the Second Polish Republic as administrated by the Polish Government-in-Exile. Therefore I would suggest that during a substantial part of the Battle of Britain, Poland did indeed fight as a sovereign power with executive control over its armed forces.

In further support of this claim, I would also refer to the war aims of the Polish Government-in-Exile. They were specifically designed to ensure that the sovereignty of the Polish state was widely recognised and appreciated by the Allies. This was particularly important given that Polish territory was occupied by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia during that period. Any abrogation of sovereignty in such circumstances would have resulted in the de facto demise of the Polish state.

More subjectively, the issue of belligerent status takes on a greater importance when viewed against the refusal of the British government to allow the Polish Armed Forces to be represented at the VE-day celebrations. This was due to Soviet diplomatic pressure (following Katyn and the Soviet breaking of diplomatic relations with Poland) and was closely tied to 1944-5 disputes regarding Polish sovereignty.

In summary, I would suggest that the article’s belligerents section should include Poland. Although I am no expert on Czechoslovak wartime history, I suspect there lies another and similar case to consider. Kopello (talk) 02:15, 22 September 2008 (UTC)

The key fact is that they were still under full RAF operational command, otherwise similar cases could be made for the other Commonwealth air forces too. I seem to remember that in earlier discussions on this subject, some doubt was cast on the dates given in the article to which you refer as well, but I could be wrong on that point. David Underdown (talk) 11:13, 22 September 2008 (UTC)

Yes, here we go Talk:Battle of Britain/Archive 5#Belligerents and outcome, the dates given in the wikipedia article to which you refer are apparently wrong. Whilst the Polish Army and Navy were made fully sovereign in 1940, the air force was not until 1944, according to a good academic reference. David Underdown (talk) 11:18, 22 September 2008 (UTC)

Article is too long and Unbalanced

I wonder if we could create some more subsidiary pages in order to make this article a more manageable size. At the moment a reader can't get an understanding of what actually happened in the battle without pageing down twenty times through background information. I'm particularly thinking of the sections on tactics and control systems - all good information but it unbalances the article. --Shimbo (talk) 08:32, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

My fault on some of this; one of the reasons the Battle of Britain is so interesting is that it was the first "pure" air battle of the war. As such there were many complexities surrounding the control, tactics strategy etc which deserve some explanation. I do think you are right, however, that the events of the actual Battle have been pushed further down the page as more information has been added. I tried to add more material on day to day events, only to told that this was not the intention of the article. IMHO the day-to-day events of the battle deserve more than a skim over the surface which has omitted a lot of important events. That's not to belittle the work of other editors who may have different views.Minorhistorian (talk) 13:11, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

There is always a trade off between comprehensiveness and readibility IMO. Subsidiary pages are the way to go IMO and one of those could be a detailed day-by-day timeline of the battle. I'll create them if you like, or you go ahead.--Shimbo (talk) 17:10, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

Minor, I think I gave you heat for that. Let me explain. I take this page as an introduction for those knowing nothing, or next to nothing, about the Battle. If you're inclined to create a daughter page of the day-by-day events, in the fashion Macksey adopted for his fictional account, I'll join you in getting it in shape with pleasure, 'cause it'd be interesting & useful. It'd also settle, or avoid, a continuing debate here. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 04:41, 30 August 2008 (UTC)

As tempted as I am I'll have to beg off such a project. At the moment I'm way overcommitted as it is; with the end of winter doldrums in my part of the world I'm going to have far less time on the internet and I have several other articles to finish off. However I do take your point - there is a lot of information to wade through and I wonder whether it would be better to have a separate article to deal with some of the tactical and control analysis, leaving a brief introductory paragraph in the main article? Right now I'm reluctant to make too many changes without knowing the views of other editors.Minorhistorian (talk) 23:40, 31 August 2008 (UTC)

I leave the offer open for anybody willing to take it on. I've got enough to do without trying it, but I'm happy to assist anybody who does. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 00:03, 1 September 2008 (UTC)

I must say, as someone who just dropped in on the article seeking a vague outline, I found it all very, very interesting and informative, even if it is long. I don't rembember reading elsewhere such a satisfyingly clear overview. Cooke (talk) 10:38, 24 September 2008 (UTC)

Delete Further reading section

Given the size of this article I suggest that the "Further reading" section is removed. If it is to stay then I suggest it contains nothing but companion volumes to works cited, and perhaps a link or two to external bibliographies --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 15:48, 16 September 2008 (UTC)

According to one theory

We've got a battle of statistics, now, & it's unpersuasive, not to mention confusing for the uninitiated. Strength returns are notoriously unstable, given intensity of action, readiness states, production, training, crew quality, mission type, & assorted other factors, so taking any one month as definitive is a bit like saying a actress's movie did better because she was a blonde in it, rather than a brunette. For those who don't know better, it's very misleading. I suggest we mention the argument, but try & get broader numbers, for average strengths over a period, & include production & loss numbers if we're going to put in any at all (which I'm dubious about), to try & show a more truthful, & clearer, picture of the Battle's impact, if we're to leave it in at all. Otherwise, I'd say mention the conflicting arguments, but don't put any numbers on them, just mention a debate over decline/not (& explain what factors are in play?), & let interested readers go to the sources for themselves. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 16:47, 11 October 2008 (UTC)

Aftermath

This whole section:

According to one theory, losses of aircraft and experienced aircrew in the Battle may have been a blow from which the Luftwaffe never fully recovered. Supporters of this theory argue that only 929 bombers took part in Operation Barbarossa out of 1,511 level bombers available to the Luftwaffe on 21 June 1941; this latter figure was was significantly higher (1,711) on 11 May 1940., showing a drop of 200 from May 1940ⁱ Records of bomber strengths however reveal that the decrease occurred as a result of the Battle of France: the Luftwaffe possessed 1,380 level bombers on 29 June 1940, prior to the Battle, and 1,423 level bombers on 2 November 1940, at the end of the daylight phase of the bomber offensive, which British historians traditionally identify as the end of the Battle. Just prior to Barbarossa. In a similar manner, it is also claimed that inadequate production levels in German factories also were a factor, with an average 250 single-engined and 64 twin-engined fighter aircraft produced per month during early 1941. As a result, it is claimed, that the number of German front line aircraft was declining, a problem which would not be resolved until early 1942, with a huge effort to expand production, reaching 1,200 by March/April. Conflicting reports of front line status should be noted with totals cited of 1,107 single- and 357 twin-engined fighters on strength prior to the Battle on 29 June 1940, compared to 1,440 single-engined fighters and 188 twin-engined fighters on 21 June 1941; but the existence of the new night fighter arm - which had 263 aircraft in addition - that was created from existing single-and twin-engined fighter units, should also be noted.)

is not only very difficult to read and understand, it is getting into the realms of Wikipedia:No original research- eg; Synthesis occurs when an editor puts together multiple sources to reach a conclusion. Even if published by reliable sources, material must not be connected together in a way that constitutes original research. If the sources cited do not explicitly reach the same conclusion, or if the sources cited are not directly related to the subject of the article, then the editor is engaged in original research. Phrases such as According to one theory, it is also claimed, it is claimed and Conflicting reports are indicative of presenting an argument to support one point of view, which goes against Wikipedia:Neutral point of view.Minorhistorian (talk) 21:59, 11 October 2008 (UTC)

I agree. Also Kurfurst is messing around with cited sources, changing them to represent something they do not say. I have the book so I can scan the pages and place them here. Murray does not say the decrease was a result of the Battle of France at all. He covers losses for the period May - September 1940 (p. 54) making it impossible to tell. Kurfurst is using the table of p. 54 and "subing" the strength 29.6.40 from 4.5.40 (p. 54). This is OR. And it ignores several heavy raids and heavy losses some German bomber units, particularly LG 2, suffered over Britain during June. Dapi89 (talk) 15:59, 12 October 2008 (UTC)