Foreign representation of the Austrian socialists

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The Foreign Mission of Austrian Socialists (AVOES) was founded at the end of March 1938 as the only advocacy group for Austrian social democracy recognized by the Second International by Otto Bauer , Joseph Buttinger and Friedrich Adler . With the principles of its exile work laid down in the Brussels Declaration on April 1 and 2, 1938 (concentration on supporting an all-German revolution after Hitler , refusal to cooperate with other Austrian exile groups), the AVOES had a decisive influence on the entire Austrian exile policy, as it promoted education a representative diplomatic mission or government in exile. In a post-war Austria threatened by partition, this should ultimately prove to be advantageous in terms of regaining full sovereignty of the country.

Organization history

Foundation (1938)

The diplomatic mission of the Austrian Socialists (AVOES) emerged from the merger of the top committee of the Revolutionary Socialists (RS) under Joseph Buttinger with the Foreign Office of the Austrian Social Democrats (ALÖS) under Otto Bauer at the end of March 1938 in Brussels.

The constituent meeting of AVOES took place from April 1st to 2nd, 1938 under the leadership of Joseph Buttinger . In addition to Buttinger and Otto Bauer, the social democratic functionaries Friedrich Adler , Otto Leichter , Oscar Pollak , Josef Podlipnig , Karl Hans Sailer and Manfred Ackermann took part. At this meeting, the statutes and goals of the organization's work in exile were determined and unanimously decided. The main features of the exile work were published as the Brussels Declaration (also called the Brussels Manifesto or Brussels Resolution). This declaration was supplemented on November 3, 1938 by the "War Declaration of the AVOES".

The AVOES was a pure cadre party, to which only people could belong who were active as functionaries for the RS or the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) before 1938 . The number of members fluctuated, but always remained below the number 15. Its seat was Brussels (1938), then Paris (1939/1940), for a short time Montauban (southern France) and then New York. The London Bureau of the Austrian Socialists , headed by Oscar Pollak, can be seen as a branch of AVOES. The authority of the AVOES was based on the recognition as a representative of the Austrian Social Democrats by the Second International and the membership of Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler, who was the General Secretary of this International .

Brussels Declaration

Since the minutes of the AVOES meeting in French exile were lost along with the relevant correspondence, the content of the manifesto can only be reconstructed from the AVOES publications. The main features:

  • The aim of the AVOES is not the fight or the promotion of the fight against Hitler, but the promotion of a revolution after Hitler,
  • " An anti-fascist war to defend or rebuild the defeated democracies is out of the question ."
  • The hoped-for revolution must not be ordered from outside; it must emerge as an autarkic movement from within the country itself. In order to give this revolution a corresponding impact, it must take place in the whole of Germany, so the connection cannot be reversed.

Otto Bauer also commented on this:

" " The socialists [...] [...] in Brussels found that the Austrian people could not be liberated by tearing them away from the Reich, but only by the all-German revolution against German fascism. You have to oppose the irredentist-separatist slogan of the defeated patriots with the all-German revolutionary solution " "

  • The most important task of the diplomatic mission abroad is to create maximum room for maneuver for the revolutionary movement in the country and also to create favorable conditions in terms of foreign policy, i.e. above all to prevent the formation of representative national diplomatic missions or governments abroad and, to avoid dependencies, not to cooperate with host countries.

If, in connection with the manifesto, the active warfare against Hitler fascism or the active support of such a struggle is repeatedly propagated in contemporary publications, this is not reflected in practice. Also in the minutes of the AVOES, the ALC and the London Bureau there are no references to attempts to initiate or support a resistance in the country or even to establish contacts with Austria. The struggle against the Hitler regime was exhausted - entirely in the sense of the declaration - in its condemnation and general calls for its destruction. Although the manifesto did not rule out any active participation in the anti-fascist struggle, it made it dependent on conditions that were hardly acceptable in the host countries (full freedom of propaganda, including on the radio, indoctrination of prisoners, etc.) Buttinger will justify this abstinence in his book that the continuation of the struggle of the Revolutionary Socialists in the country would have been a "futile, suicidal adventure" . He had therefore never lifted the three-month moratorium on action that he had imposed on the local party organization before leaving abroad.

Ultimately, the importance of the Brussels Declaration lies in the fact that it remained the guideline for the policy of socialist exile until the end of the war and was decisive in preventing the formation of a representative Austrian diplomatic mission abroad.

French exile (1938-1940)

In May 1938, AVOES moved its headquarters from Brussels to Paris, where it made contact with the (few) organizations with which it wanted to cooperate. An agreement was reached with the representatives of the Austrian Communists ( KPÖ ) on May 13, 1938 on cooperation in the journalistic area on a case-by-case basis. However, this very loose cooperation comes to an end with the resumption of the struggle of the COMINTERS against international social democracy shortly after the start of the war. Negotiations regarding close cooperation with the German socialists are likewise unsatisfactory. A “cartel application” by AVOES, which is submitted to the Social Democratic Party of Germany ( SOPADE ) together with the (German) group Neu Beginnen and the (German) Socialist Workers' Party (SAP) , is rejected. As the only recognized representative of the quarreling German Social Democrats, SOPADE argues that with the AVOES, which is also recognized by the Second International , a cartel relationship already exists and a cartel with the other two parties would merely institutionalize the fragmentation of the German Social Democrats. After another joint, again unsuccessful attempt in October 1938, this project was abandoned.

After the outbreak of war at the latest, the corset that was tied with the Brussels Declaration will be too tight for the mass of AVOES members . The endeavor goes in the direction of more public relations and cooperation with the host countries, at least in organizational issues and engagement in the fight against Hitler. These endeavors found a prominent spokesperson in Julius Deutsch , who was exiled from Spain in June 1938. When these intentions were blocked by Buttinger with the help of Adler and Bauer, the tensions within the AVOES repeatedly took on a serious character, which undoubtedly contributed to Otto Bauer's early and early death in July 1938. Bauer's demise leads to a shift in the balance of power within the organization. Friedrich Adler, who is fully employed as secretary of the Second International and who now manages the party funds alone, is now solely an arbitrator, which makes him the actual decision-making body in the AVOES. He will perform this function more involuntarily than voluntarily regardless of all organizational and functional changes as well as resignations until the end of the war. As a staunch supporter of the Brussels Declaration and the War Declaration, which also includes Buttinger and his confidants Podlipnig, Hubeny and Otto Bauer II, he also holds the AVOES functionaries, who are more willing to collaborate, at least de facto by virtue of his authority and unrestricted financial control over the party funds most recently on the Brussels anti-cooperation course.

After the start of the war, tensions within the AVOES intensified again, especially when the leadership of the AVOES refused to participate in a purely organizational consolidation of all Austrian exiles. France reacts with the temporary internment of all Austrians. In the course of the German advance in France, AVOES is forced to relocate its headquarters from Paris to southern France (Montauban).

Work in exile in New York and London (1940–1942)

Before and after the German victory in France, the AVOES officials left France and continued their work in New York and London. The crowd established itself in the United States (New York). In London, the actual political center of the Austrian exile, Oscar Pollak and Karl Czernetz represented the interests of AVOES. Karl Heinz worked in Sweden , who cooperates with the London Bureau . After his departure, the young Bruno Kreisky will take over the management of the business. His advocacy of an independent Austria and cooperation in the fight against Hitler, however, had no influence on the social democratic exile policy outside of Sweden.

new York

Buttinger and Podlipnig planned to leave the AVOES in mid-1940 under the impression of the crushing defeat of European social democracy, the permanent clashes with the majority of AVOES members and the dependence on the support of Friedrich Adler. Podlipnig took this step when he arrived in the USA. Buttinger, Hubeny and Otto Bauer II did not follow him until December 1941. After Buttinger's departure, Friedrich Adler wanted to dissolve the diplomatic mission abroad. In the middle of the debate on this subject, however, the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor burst , which was followed shortly afterwards by the news that Germany had declared war on the USA. Since these events decisively changed the status of the Austrian exiles and a representation to safeguard the interests of the Social Democrats in the USA seemed more important than ever, the AVOES was dissolved as agreed, but a new representation of interests was established with the Austrian Labor Committee (ALC) .

London

From the start of the war until the end of 1940, the policy of exile in Great Britain was influenced by the British fear of invasion and the resulting internment of exiles from enemy countries. After the immediate danger of invasion ended, London quickly developed into the real center of Austrian exile policy. At the end of 1941, eleven organizations of the Austrians in exile came together to form a working group led by (camouflaged) communists under the title Free Austrian Movement (FAM). In accordance with the Brussels Declaration , the AVOES officials Oscar Pollak and Karl Czernetz refused to join the FAM with their London Bureau , which was founded in April 1941 and is referred to in the statutes as the "party office". With the German attack on the Soviet Union and its turn to cooperation with the West, the pressure on the London Bureau to cooperate with the FAM increased. When they continued to refuse any cooperation, the mass of members of the Austrian Labor Club , the membership organization of the London Bureau, exodus . The situation for the London Bureau becomes critical with the Moscow Declaration of October 31, 1943, in which the Allies committed themselves to the re-establishment of a sovereign Austrian state, which the AVOES always rejected. In view of the danger of being finally pushed into political sideline, the London Bureau jumped over its shadow and founded an Austrian Representative Committee on November 3, 1943 as a reservoir for “all forces of the Austrian people” involved in the establishment of a Want to participate in the “independent, truly democratic Austrian republic”. Pollak thus anticipated the establishment of an Austrian National Committee by the FAM. Since Pollak was clear that his low-membership, hardly representative organization could in no way count on support from the disproportionately stronger FAM and recognition from the Allies, he de facto nevertheless acted in the sense of the anti-cooperation Brussels Declaration, which even Adler found appreciative words after initial criticism let.

Dissolution of AVOES and the establishment of the ALC (1942)

The statute is closely based on that of the AVOES, so it is still based on the Brussels Declaration . Although the ALC was not declared as the successor organization to the AVOES, the new organization is still rated as the only internationally recognized diplomatic mission of the Austrian socialists due to the leadership and participation of Friedrich Adler. In this way, the ALC succeeds in preventing all amalgamations of the Austrian organizations in exile to form a representative foreign mission recognized by the Allies or at least by the USA and Great Britain and also to prevent the establishment of an Austrian combat battalion under the US flag, which was initiated by Otto Habsburg .

Analysis and Impact

The Brussels Manifesto did not represent a political break, but the uncompromising escalation of Otto Bauer's policy of Austromarxism . Convinced of the imminent and inevitable collapse of capitalism, everything was put on the post-Hitler revolutionary card. The conceptual mistake: Thanks to his support in the population and his instruments of repression, Hitler could only be overthrown because of a failed foreign policy and as part of a war. In the course of such a fall, however, it was not to be expected that the potential victors of an autonomous revolution (civil war) would stand idly by.

The lack of an Austrian diplomatic mission or government in exile prevented by the functionaries of the AVOES should ultimately have a positive effect on the sovereignty of the country. The Soviets tried to fill the political vacuum that had arisen due to the lack of a government in exile or a foreign representation of the Austrians before the end of the war with a government that was convenient for them, relying on the Social Democrats who remained there. They were expected to be more willing to cooperate than those in exile. But also Karl Renner , who had been commissioned to form a provisional government against the will of the Western Allies and the KPÖ in April 1945, disappointed. Neither before nor after the November 1945 elections could he be moved to a popular front with the communists. In addition, the old electorate of the Landbund and the Christian Social Party formed astonishingly quickly into the powerful ÖVP , which received an absolute majority in the first free elections after the end of the war. Moscow now felt compelled to recognize a concentration government that was not led, as expected, by the functionaries of a popular front, but by commoners. This laid the foundation for the “special case” of Austria, which was to bring the country full sovereignty as early as 1955.

Remarks

  1. ^ "The political position and the activities of the diplomatic mission during the time of the acute danger of war" published in the "RS-Korrespondenz" No. 5 of November 2, 1938
  2. ↑ RS correspondence No. 5/1938 of November 3, 1938
  3. ^ The Socialist Struggle No. 1 of June 2, 1938, page 4
  4. ↑ RS correspondence No. 5/38 of November 3, 1938
  5. ^ Buttinger: Using the example of Austria, page 553

literature

  • RS correspondence from 1938 (official organ of AVOES)
  • The socialist struggle (Official organ of AVOES)
  • Joseph Buttinger : Using Austria as an example. A historical contribution to the crisis of the socialist movement . Verlag für Politik u. Economy, Cologne 1953.
  • Helene Maimann : Politics in the waiting room. Austrian policy in exile in Great Britain 1938–1945 . Böhlau, Wien et al. 1975, ISBN 3-205-08566-3 , ( Publications of the Commission for Modern History of Austria 62), (At the same time: Wien, Univ., Diss., 1975).
  • Manfred Marschalek (Ed.): Underground and Exile. Austria's socialists between 1934 and 1945 . Löcker, Vienna 1990, ISBN 3-85409-137-0 , ( Socialist Library Department 1: The History of Austrian Social Democracy 3).
  • Hans Egger: The politics of the foreign organizations of the Austrian social democracy in the years 1938 to 1946. Thought structures, strategies, effects . Vienna 2004, (Vienna, Univ., Diss., 2004).