Conceptual relationship

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Conceptual relationship (also: conceptual relationship ) is the (logical) relationship between concepts .

The doctrine of the relationships between concepts is part of the classical conceptual logic , finds its linguistic equivalent in the doctrine of the semantic relations and is currently still part of the scientific methodology .

Fundamental to the doctrine of conceptual relationships is the distinction between intension and extension of a concept - or in words of traditional logic between content and scope of a concept.

According to DIN for conceptual terminology, a conceptual relationship should be based on the characteristics of the concepts. This means an intensive, content-related or semantic alignment of conceptual relationships. This presupposes that the extension of a term depends on its intention.

The conceptual relationships can be represented intensional or extensional. However, an extensional, i. H. a representation based on the respective scope of terms. If the extension depends on the intention, an extensional representation does not mean primacy of the extension over the intention, but merely a better clarity.

The terminology of the distinctions is quite inconsistent. Ambiguity in terms is so inevitable.

Incompatible terms (incompatibility)

term

The terms A and B are incompatible ( disjoint , incompatible, mutually exclusive) if there is no object that belongs to the extension of both A and B.

species

There are three types of incompatible terms:

  • ancillary terms
  • complementary terms
  • disparate terms.

Subsidiary terms

Subsidiary terms (also: coordinated terms) are mutually exclusive terms that are subordinate to a common generic term, i.e. H. have a feature of the common generic term.

  • Example 1: Portuguese - German (generic term: European)
  • Example 2: cat - dog (generic term: pet)

In linguistics, instead of coordinated terms, one also speaks synonymously of cohyponyms .

Complementary terms (complement, complementarity)

Two mutually exclusive terms A and B are complementary (there is the relation of the complement , a complementary relation ) if the extension of A is the complement set of the extension of B, i.e. H. the entire universe of discourse falls under either A or B.

  • Example 1: Human - Non-human (area: living beings)
  • Example 2: Americans - Non-Americans (Domain: People)

Several mutually exclusive terms, the extensions of which cover an entire area, represent a classification or (method-appropriate) division.

  • Example 1: Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday | Friday | Saturday (range: working days)
  • Example 2: Tomorrow | Morning | Noon | Afternoon | Evening | Night (range: day)

Disparate terms

Terms that are mutually exclusive in terms of their scope are disparate if they do not have a common related generic term, in other words: they have nothing in common and belong to completely different orders.

  • Example 1: square - elephant
  • Example 2: soul - moon

Conceptual disparity is the norm.

Compatible terms

term

Concepts are compatible with each other (also: do not exclude each other, are interfering ), if there are objects that belong to the extension of both the one and the other concept.

species

The ratio of the extensions of two compatible terms A and B can be different:

  • the extensions of the terms A and B are identical (also: equipollence, equivalence);
  • the extension of the term A is contained as a real subset in the extension of the term B (superior and subordinate);
  • the extension of the term A is (only) partially identical to the extension of the term B (interfering terms (in the narrower sense)).

Extensionally identical terms (equipollence, equivalence)

The terms A and B are extensionally identical (traditionally: equal in scope ) if all elements of the extension of the term A are also elements of the extension of the term B - and vice versa. In this case one speaks of equipollence or the equivalence of the terms.

  • Example 1 (classic): living beings with a heart - living beings with a kidney
  • Example 2 (classic ( Frege )): evening star - morning star (= Venus)

As the examples show, the special case of only extensional identity in the case of intensional difference is to be distinguished from the case of synonymy , which presupposes dimensional identity (or more weakly: at least dimensional similarity) which implies extensional identity.

The case of simultaneous intensional identity and extensional difference is not possible.

Real subset (superior and subordinate)

Is the extension of the term A a real subset of the extension of the term B - d. H. All elements of the extension of the term A are also elements of the extension of the term B and there are further elements in the extension of the term B - one speaks of subordinated concepts or of the relation of superordinate and subordinate or only of subordination . The terms are called sub-terms or generic terms - or subordinate (sub-) category or superordinate category.

  • Example 1: Mouse - Mammal
  • Example 2: tulip - plant

In the terminology of traditional logic , a subordinate term is also referred to as a species term of the superordinate generic term. However, two additional conditions must be met: the at least two species concepts must exhaust the scope of the genus and be disjoint.

The theory of species and genus plays an important role in the classical theory of definitions .

Species terms are called contrary in traditional logic if their extensions do not exhaust the entire extension of the generic term. As incompatible concepts, they cannot be the case at the same time, but cannot be the case at the same time (cf. contrary contrast ). Contrary species terms are incompatible coordinated terms (see above).

Species terms are called contradictory in traditional logic if a generic term has only two specific terms, i.e. the extensions of the specific terms exhaust the extension of the generic term. Adversarial species terms are incompatible complementary terms (see above).

In linguistics, in the case of real extensional subsets, one speaks synonymously of hyponymy (subordination) or hyperonymy (superiority) and with regard to the terms ("words") of hyponym or hyperonym .

If one understands a general term under category in the broader sense, the subordination to a general term can also be called categorization . As a rule, there is no one-to-one relationship between the sub-term and the generic term, so that different categorizations are possible.

  • Example 1: dog - carnivore
  • Example 2: dog - pet

Hierarchically linked categories, which are called taxonomies , arise through superordinate and subordinate order .

Interfering terms (in the narrower sense)

Compatible terms are also called interfering ( mutually overlapping ) terms. If one wants to exclude the special cases of the extensional identity or superordinate and subordinate, it is advisable to speak of interfering terms in the narrower sense (also: non-subordinated terms ).

  • Example 1: nun - nurse
  • Example 2: Carnivore - Flower

See also

literature

  • Brun, Georg; Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn: Text analysis in the sciences. - Zurich: vdf (UTB No. 3139). - ISBN 978-3-8252-3139-2 ., Pp. 249-253
  • Buth, Manfred: Introduction to formal logic. Lang, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, p. 19 ff.
  • Herberger, Maximilian; Dieter Simon: Theory of Science for Jurists: Logic, Semiotics, Empirical Sciences. Metzner, Frankfurt a. M. 1980, pp. 252-260.
  • Tatievskaya, Elena: Introduction to propositional logic. Berlin: Logos Verlag 2003, p. 62 ff.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Buth, Manfred: Introduction to formal logic. Lang, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, p. 19 f.
  2. ^ Meibauer: Introduction to German linguistics. 2nd edition (2007), p. 351
  3. ↑ Herberger, Maximilian; Dieter Simon: Theory of Science for Jurists: Logic, Semiotics, Empirical Sciences. Metzner, Frankfurt a. M. 1980, p. 255
  4. ↑ Herberger, Maximilian; Dieter Simon: Theory of Science for Jurists: Logic, Semiotics, Empirical Sciences. Metzner, Frankfurt a. M. 1980, p. 256
  5. ^ Tugendhat / Wolf: Logical-semantic propaedeutics. (1983), p. 72
  6. ↑ a b Cf. Dürr / Schlobinski: Descriptive Linguistics. (2006), p. 169
  7. ↑ So probably rainbow / Meyer: Dictionary of philosophical terms. Meiner, Hamburg 2005: Concept
  8. ↑ Rainbow / Meyer: Dictionary of Philosophical Terms. Meiner, Hamburg 2005: Concept
  9. ↑ Tatievskaya, Elena: Introduction to propositional logic. Berlin: Logos Verlag 2003, p. 62