Belief bias

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Belief bias ( english amounted bias for conviction distortion or belief bias ) refers to a cognitive bias . Here, the strength of arguments is judged on the basis of plausibility ( credibility ), instead of how strong or truthful they actually are for the conclusion . In other words, when people agree with one point of view, they are inclined to believe that the method used to get the results must be correct.

Syllogisms

A syllogism is a kind of logical argument, in which a statement (conclusion) of two or more other ( premises ) of a certain shape closed is. A classic example of a valid syllogism is:

All people are mortal. (= Main proposition)
Socrates is a human. (= Subset)
That is why Socrates is mortal. (= Conclusion)

An example of an invalid syllogism is:

All girls are ambitious.
Girls study hard.
Hence: Girls study hard because they are ambitious.

Typically, a majority of subjects in studies incorrectly identify this syllogism as one in which the premise is drawn. It might be true in the real world that a) girls are studying and b) because they are ambitious. However, this argument is a mistake because the conclusion is not supported by its premises. The validity of an argument is different from the truth of its conclusion: there are valid arguments for wrong conclusions and invalid arguments for real conclusions. Hence it is a mistake to judge the validity of an argument from the plausibility of its conclusion. This is the mistake of reasoning known as belief bias.

causes

In belief bias, incorrect affective predictions are mostly made on the basis of inaccurate “ lay theories ” (experience-based beliefs ) (Hsee & Hastie, 2006). While many theories about issues are helpful and correct, many others are misconceptions. Hsee and Hastie (2006) give the following example of an inaccurate lay theory: “The more alternatives are available, the better.” This theory does not always have to be true. For example, if someone is given a vacation to Hawaii as a gift, they will usually be satisfied with it. If she is given a vacation in Paris, likewise. If, on the other hand, the person is given the choice between Paris and Hawaii, difficulties arise with unrestricted joy. Having alternatives highlights the differences between the options. Suddenly the person is dissatisfied that Paris has no sea and Hawaii has no great museums. These disappointments would not have appeared without the choice.

research

Belief bias is a phenomenon that has been known at least since Wilkins' work in 1928. In the 1940s and 50s he gained in social psychology some attention, namely the question of how stereotypes (beliefs) influence the thinking.

In a series of studies by Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983), subjects were asked to evaluate classical paradigms , with two premises and one conclusion. In other words, the participants were asked to rate the logical validity . However, the subjects showed a belief bias, they proved by their tendency to reject valid arguments with unbelievable conclusions and to approve of invalid arguments with credible conclusions. It appears that instead of formal procedures and the assessment of logical validity, the assessments of the subjects are based on personal convictions.

In order to test to what extent the test persons were influenced by their belief in their real-life correctness when assessing the formal admissibility of the conclusions, or to what extent the test persons had resorted to their experience-based operating mode during processing, the questions about the dimensions valid / invalid ( valid / invalid) and believable / unbelievable varied, resulting in four categories of items. Consequently, these results showed greater acceptance of more credible (80%) than implausible (33%) conclusions. Participants also presented evidence of their logical proficiency and the results got an increase in acceptance from valid (73%) to invalid (41%). In addition, there is a small difference between believable and valid (89%) compared to incredible and invalid (56%) (Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983; Morley, Evans & Handley, 2004).

See also

literature

  • H. Markovits, G. Nantel: The Belief-bias Effect in the Production and Evaluation of Logical Conclusions . In: Memory and Cognition . tape 17 , no. 1 , 1989, pp. 11-17 , doi : 10.3758 / BF03199552 (English).
  • KC Klauer, J. Musch, B. Naumer: On Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning . In: Psychological Review . tape 107 , no. 4 , 2000, pp. 852-884 , doi : 10.1037 / 0033-295X.107.4.852 , PMID 11089409 (English).
  • C. Dube, CM Rotello, E. Heit: Assessing the Belief Bias Effect with ROCs: It's a Response Bias Effect . In: Psychological Review . tape 117 , no. 3 , 2010, p. 831-863 , doi : 10.1037 / a0019634 , PMID 20658855 (English).
  • D. Trippas, MF Verde, SJ Handley: Using Forced Choice to Test Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning . In: Cognition . tape 113 , no. 3 , 2014, p. 586–600 , doi : 10.1016 / j.cognition.2014.08.009 (English).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c The Nature of Reasoning . Cambridge University Press, 2004, ISBN 978-0-521-00928-7 , pp. 300 (English, books.google.com [accessed September 3, 2013]).
  2. ↑ Christopher K. Hsee, Reid Hastie : Decision and experience: why don't we choose what makes us happy? In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences . tape 10 , no. 1 , 2006, p. 31-37 , doi : 10.1016 / j.tics.2005.11.007 , PMID 16318925 (English, maelko.typepad.com [PDF]).
  3. ^ Minna Cheves Wilkins: The effect of changed material on ability to do formal syllogistic reasoning. In: J. Winawer (Ed.): Archives of Psychology . tape 16 , no. 102 , November 1928 ( apa.org ).
  4. ^ Raymond L. Gorden: The Effect of Attitude toward Russia on Logical Reasoning . In: The Journal of Social Psychology . tape 37 , no. 1 , February 1953, ISSN  0022-4545 , p. 103-111 , doi : 10.1080 / 00224545.1953.9921874 .
  5. ^ IL Janis, F. Frick: The relationship between attitudes toward conclusions and errors in judging logical validity of syllogisms. In: Journal of Experimental Psychology . tape 33 , no. 1 , July 1, 1943, ISSN  0022-1015 , p. 73–77 , doi : 10.1037 / h0060675 ( Wrong conclusions through attitude. Loyalty to attitude stronger than logic.).
  6. ↑ a b J. St. BT Evans, JL Barston, P. Pollard: On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning . In: Memory and Cognition . tape 11 , 1983, pp. 295-306 , doi : 10.3758 / bf03196976 (English).
  7. ↑ Nicola J. Morley, Jonathan St. BT Evans, Simon J. Handley: Belief bias & figural bias in syllogistic reasoning . In: The Quartely Journal of Experimental Psychology . 57A, no. 4 , 2004, p. 666-692 , doi : 10.1080 / 02724980343000440 (English).