Continental Airlines Flight 603
| Continental Airlines Flight 603 | |
|---|---|
 The sister machine N68046 |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Blown tire, deal from the runway |
| place | Runway 06R, Los Angeles International Airport , California , United States
|
| date | March 1, 1978 |
| Fatalities | 2 (according to the count of the NTSB ) |
| Survivors | 198 |
| Injured | 31 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type |
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-10
|
| operator |
Continental Airlines
|
| Mark |
N68045
|
| Departure airport |
Los Angeles International Airport , California , United States
|
| Destination airport |
Honolulu International Airport , Hawaii , United States
|
| Passengers | 186 |
| crew | 14th |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
On March 1, 1978, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 crashed on Continental Airlines flight 603 (flight number: CO603 ) while taking off from Los Angeles International Airport . In the accident, which was caused by the bursting of several landing gear tires during take-off, 2 passengers were killed and another 31 people were injured. Two other passengers died three months later from injuries sustained in the incident.
plane
The aircraft that crashed was a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10. The aircraft carried the factory number 46904, it was the 44th DC-10 from ongoing production, which was finally assembled at the McDonnell Douglas plant in Long Beach , California . The machine completed its maiden flight on May 20, 1972 and was delivered to Continental Airlines on June 23, 1972 , where it has been in continuous operation since then with the aircraft registration number N68045 and fleet number 045 . The three - engine long - range wide - body aircraft was equipped with three General Electric CF6-6D engines. The total operating performance of the machine up to the accident was 21,358 operating hours.
Flight route
On the day of the accident, the aircraft was to be used on the national scheduled flight CO603 from Los Angeles International Airport to Honolulu International Airport . The machine was supposed to take off from runway 06R at Los Angeles International Airport on this flight.
crew
There was a crew of 14 on board. The cockpit crew consisted of three pilots in the functions of flight captain as well as first officer and flight engineer.
- The 59-year-old flight captain Charles E. Hersche flew for Continental Airlines since February 11, 1946 and had type ratings for the aircraft types Douglas DC-3 and McDonnell Douglas DC-10, Convair 340 , Convair 440 , Boeing 707 and 720 as well as Vickers Viscount 700 and 800 . Of his 29,000 flight experience, he had completed 2911 flight hours in the cockpit of the McDonnell Douglas DC-10.
- The 40-year-old first officer Michael J. Provan worked for Continental Airlines since May 23, 1966. He had type ratings for the aircraft types McDonnell Douglas DC-10, Boeing 727 and Lockheed L-100 . By the time of the accident, Provan had gained 10,000 hours of flight experience, 1149 of which with the DC-10.
- The 39-year-old Second Officer John K. Olsen had been employed by Continental Airlines since July 1, 1968. He had 5,000 hours of flight experience as a pilot and 8,000 hours of flight experience as a flight engineer. As a flight engineer on board the DC-10, he had flown 1,520 hours before the accident.
The cabin crew consisted of the flight attendants Judy Blair, Louise Buchanan, Mary Dahse, Janna Harkrider, Norma Heape, Bett Lietz, Carole Mason, Marcia Wagner, Lori Yang and the flight attendant John Woodman. J. Fred Winkler also flew in the position of “in-flight supervisor”.
Passengers
186 passengers had started the flight. In the first class, a Boeing 727 captain from Continental Air Lines who was out of service also traveled with the crew, who supported the crew in evacuating the aircraft after the accident.
the accident
At 9:01 a.m., the crew received clearance to taxi to runway 06R. At 09:22 the clearance was given to let the machine roll to the start position and wait there for the start release. This was granted a minute later, whereby the master delayed the take-off process by not confirming the take-off clearance, as he was of the opinion that the clearance was given too soon after the take-off of another jet-propelled wide - body aircraft and he wanted to avoid flying into its wake vortices . Less than a minute later, the tower controller repeated the take-off clearance, which the master confirmed this time. The machine started at 09:25. During the take-off run, when accelerating to the decisive speed of 156 knots (approx. 289 km / h) and at a distance of 6300 feet (approx. 1920 meters) from the starting point, the tread of the retreaded second landing gear tire of the left main landing gear came loose. The weakened tire was overloaded and burst after the machine rolled 1,800 feet (549 meters). The first tire next to it was exposed to overload and also burst. When the two tire bursts occurred almost at the same time, rim parts were thrown away. A part of the rim perforated the fifth landing gear tire on the left main landing gear, which then also burst. Inside the machine, the burst tires were heard as a loud metallic crack. At a speed of 152 knots (approx. 282 km / h), Captain Hersche initiated an immediate termination of the take-off. The speed of the machine increased to 159 knots (approx. 294 km / h) and then decreased with the expected intensity. Although the aborted take-off was carried out below the decision speed, the pilots soon realized that the machine would not come to a standstill on the remaining 2000 feet (approx. 610 meters) runway length. The speed of the machine decreased more slowly than immediately after the start of the aborted take-off, which was due on the one hand to the reduced braking performance due to three burst landing gear tires and on the other hand to the fact that the runway was wet. Captain Hersche steered the machine to the right away from the center line of the runway with the intention of rolling it past the supports of the approach lights. The DC-10 rolled over the end of the runway and after a further 30 meters the left main landing gear collapsed because it had rolled onto an asphalt surface whose payload was not designed for large aircraft. When the landing gear collapsed, the left wing tank was damaged, causing kerosene to escape, which immediately caught fire. The machine then continued to slide partially on the underside of the fuselage. The DC-10 eventually came to a halt between two supports of the approach lights for runway 24L, 664 feet from the end of the runway.
evacuation
Since the fire had broken out on the left side, all occupants were evacuated via the right side of the machine. All four escape slides were exposed to intense heat during the evacuation and each failed during the evacuation. The crew of the aircraft and an additional pilot who was out of service acted quickly after the emergency slides failed to guide the passengers to alternative emergency exits. According to the aviation accident investigators, this swift action contributed to the fact that the number of seriously and fatally injured people could be reduced considerably. Passengers who were still on board after the failure of the last escape slide had to either jump to the ground or hang down on a rope that hung down from the right cockpit window.
Victim
Of the 200 occupants of the machine, 31 initially suffered non-fatal injuries, including 28 passengers and three crew members. Two passengers were killed during the evacuation. Two more died in hospital three months later.
Aircraft accident investigation
After the accident, the National Transport Safety Authority took over . The subsequent failure of several landing gear tires during a critical moment in the take-off run was found to be the cause of the accident. These events would have led to the flight captain's correct decision to abort take-off. Contributing factors were, on the one hand, the reduced braking force due to multiple tire failures and, on the other hand, the reduced coefficient of friction due to the rain-soaked runway, even though it was grooved for drainage purposes.
During the accident investigation, the investigators also found that the chassis tires of the machine were not of the same quality. The first tire that failed was a completely retreaded used tire that had been given a new tread as part of the retreading process. The tire damage occurred after this very tread came off during the take-off run and thus the structure of the tire was considerably weakened, whereupon it burst under the load of the machine. The failure of the second undercarriage tire was then inevitable, on the one hand because it was now double the weight, and on the other hand because it already had fatigue cracks. The third tire damage was then caused by metal parts of one of the rims of tires 1 or 2 flying around. The failure of the third landing gear tire then led to the landing gear breaking into the non-load-bearing asphalt surface behind the end of the runway. The NTSB investigators also found that the tires were also exposed to increased stress because they were operated with insufficient tire inflation pressure.
consequences
As a result of the accident, the NTSB transport safety authority recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration prohibit the installation of landing gear tires with different load capacities on one axle. In addition, a general increase in the permissible load of chassis tires was recommended.
Recommendations were also made to increase safety in the event of aircraft evacuations. It was recommended that escape slides should be made more resilient and fire-resistant and that additional emergency ropes should be attached to the emergency exits, which could be used in the event of the escape slide failing.
swell
- Accident report DC-10-10, N68045 on the Aviation Safety Network , accessed March 25, 2020.
- Operating history of the machine on planespotters.net .
- The incident in the Federal Aviation Administration's Lessons Learned
Coordinates: 33 ° 57 ′ 0 ″ N , 118 ° 24 ′ 6.1 ″ W.