Doxastic voluntarism

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Doxastic voluntarism is a technical term in philosophy that means that one can freely and willingly decide for or against an opinion or a belief, i.e. That is, that one can completely control one's beliefs with the help of one's will.

term

The term doxastic voluntarism (from Greek δὀξα, dóxa , opinion , belief , conviction and from the Latin voluntas , will , see also voluntarism ) is used in epistemology (epistemology) by representatives of deontology ( ethics of ought, obligation to a certain ethics ) in connection with reasons of belief to justify certain knowledge . There is a stronger and a weaker concept of doxastic voluntarism. Historically , doxastic voluntarism goes back to Thomas Aquinas , who tried with him to justify faith with the help of will and intellect . Later, René Descartes and John Locke also assumed that one had a duty to ascertain the truth within the scope of one's ability . Because you can, you should strive for the truth to the best of your ability. According to doxastic voluntarism, the will is the reason for a conviction with which a certain knowledge or a certain belief can be justified.

objection

One argument against doxastic voluntarism is:

(1) Epistemic duties regarding the formation of beliefs only exist if we have willful control over our formation of beliefs.
(2) We have no volitional control over our belief formation.

(3) So there are no epistemic duties regarding belief formation.

Doxastic voluntarism is rejected by premise (2). In his book Analytical Introduction to Epistemology, Thomas Grundmann cites three examples that support the rejection of the second premise:

  1. If a truck is racing towards you as you cross the street, there is nothing you can do about your belief that a truck is racing at you.
  2. 2 + 2 = 4. If the result is plausible to you, there is nothing you can do about your belief that 2 + 2 = 4 results.
  3. If you believe that all human beings are mortal, then you automatically consider yourself mortal, no matter how much you struggle against that belief.

According to Grundmann, one cannot deliberately influence the beliefs listed, i. i.e., doxastic voluntarism has been refuted. [Own note: Although one can certainly distinguish between different types of beliefs. The belief that a bus is racing towards me is different from the belief that 2 + 2 = 4. A conviction that something is the case can be distinguished from a conviction why something is the case.] Because of the plausibility of such objections, there are representatives of the compulsory model who have withdrawn to a weakened doxastic voluntarism.

Weakened doxastic voluntarism

A weakened doxastic voluntarism is understood to mean that you cannot control your own convictions with your will, but that you have the duty to critically reflect your own convictions and reasons within the scope of your abilities and strength in order to recognize the truth.

Further objections

Again, there are objections that show that the weakened doxastic voluntarism is wrong in the context of epistemology. It is wrong, among other things, because the performance of epistemic duties has a higher priority than the truth. In other words, if you have tried your best, you have fulfilled your duty within the framework of weakened doxastic voluntarism, even if you have come to false convictions. These assumptions are counter-intuitive and are incompatible with an epistemology whose primary aim is to answer questions about knowledge, knowledge and true beliefs.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Thomas Grundmann: Analytical Introduction to Epistemology. de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2008, p. 239 f.
  2. ^ Doxa. In: Dictionary of Philosophical Terms / Greetings by Friedrich Kirchner and Carl Michaelis. Advanced by Johannes Hoffmeister. Complete new ed. by Arnim Regenbogen and Uwe Meyer. Meiner, Hamburg 2013, ISBN 978-3-7873-2500-9 , p. 160.
  3. ↑ Voluntas. In: Dictionary of Philosophical Terms / Greetings by Friedrich Kirchner and Carl Michaelis. Advanced by Johannes Hoffmeister. Complete new ed. by Arnim Regenbogen and Uwe Meyer. Meiner, Hamburg 2013, ISBN 978-3-7873-2500-9 , p. 713.
  4. ↑ a b Thomas Grundmann: Analytical introduction to epistemology. de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2008, pp. 238–240.
  5. ↑ Rudolf Schüßler: Doxastic Voluntarism with Thomas Aquinas: Will, Intellekt and their difficult relationship to consent ( Memento of the original from October 21, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Retrieved on May 4, 2014 (PDF; 239 kB) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / pe.uni-bayreuth.de
  6. ↑ Edmund Byrne: Probability and Opinion. The Hague 1968.
  7. ↑ a b Thomas Grundmann: Analytical introduction to epistemology. de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2008, p. 242.
  8. ↑ a b Thomas Grundmann: Analytical introduction to epistemology. de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2008, p. 244.
  9. ↑ Thomas Grundmann: Analytical Introduction to Epistemology. de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2008, pp. 244–246 and 262.