Decapitation blow
Decapitation ( English decapitation strike ) is a term used in military strategy . It describes a massive strategic attack on the political and military leadership structures of the opponent with the intention of eliminating or at least decisively restricting the opponent's ability to (military) counter-strike.
A decapitation attack can be carried out with suitable conventional as well as with nuclear weapons. This term was used, among other things, in connection with the Iraq war of 2003, when the US undertook a targeted air strike with bombers and cruise missiles against the Iraqi political leadership, which however failed. His goal was the elimination of Saddam Hussein and the Government sapparates of Iraq .
theory
According to current theories, a decapitation strike should be carried out by means of a targeted surprise attack with mobile units such as precise rockets, bombs and / or special forces. The aim here is to eliminate the opponent's telecommunications and command structures to such an extent that a counter-reaction is made almost impossible , while avoiding large losses among the population and civil infrastructure . This first strike is therefore primarily aimed at
- political leadership bodies such as ministries and government centers
- military command posts and command centers, early warning centers, radar stations
- Telecommunication and data connections and their nodes (land and satellite based )
If it is successful, the military exchange of blows will be limited to the lowest possible level; the opponent retains the weapons necessary for a counter strike (the so-called second strike ), but can no longer use them, or only to a very limited extent.
The following terms are to be distinguished from beheading:
- Counterforce - attack primarily against military targets of high strategic value (including missile silos, command posts, airfields),
- Countervalue - against large population centers,
- First Strike - the nuclear first strike in general.
medium
In order to be able to carry out a decapitation blow, the attacker must be able to destroy his targets surprisingly, accurately and with a very short warning time for the opponent. Suitable means for this are today nuclear missiles ( SLBM ) stationed on nuclear submarines ( SSBN ), which are deployed near the coasts of the target country. The very short flight time (around three minutes) and high accuracy (in the case of the US Trident D5 , the scattering circle radius ( CEP 50 ) is around 90 meters) and the concealed approach to the enemy's coasts ensure the necessary element of surprise. During the Cold War , the Soviet side viewed the Pershing II , which was deployed in Western Europe as part of NATO retrofitting, as a nuclear weapon with considerable first strike potential due to its very short flight time (around seven minutes), its range (around 1,800 kilometers - Moscow within reach ) and its small circle radius (CEP 50 about 50 meters) the ability to decapitate was assigned.
Countermeasures
During the Cold War, the two superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union, developed and in some cases installed counter-mechanisms and systems that were intended to subvert such an attack. In addition to the measures to decentralize political and military command and control tasks and systems, these concepts were based on the “fail-deadly” principle (to be interpreted as “activation in the event of failure”). On the US side, there was and still is the system of the flying command post ( National Emergency Airborne Command Post , abbreviated NEACP (nickname: Kneecap)), in which a general authorized to release US nuclear weapons takes the place of the president in an emergency can take over.
The counterpart to the Soviet side was the guidance system Dead Hand ( Dead Hand ), which in the case of detected nuclear explosions on the territory of the USSR or failure of the communication links with the political leadership allowed a partial automatic triggering of nuclear retaliation. The Perimetr system mentioned in this context is only supposed to have been set up to maintain the communication connections and not to automatically trigger the counter-attack.
What both superpowers had in common was the delegation of the last authority over the use of weapons to a military leader in place of the president (or general secretary of the CPSU during the Soviet Union ) who could trigger the automated nuclear counter-attack.
Another possibility against the concept of the beheading attack lies in the early delegation of the operational power over the nuclear counter-strike potential to subordinate military command levels.
Common to all of the concepts and systems is the conscious publication of the measures taken so that the potential opponent is informed about them. This is intended to deter him from considering the means of a beheading blow in his strategic planning.
Risks and counter arguments
Even a partially successful decapitation blow carries the risk that the attacked opponent will respond with a comprehensive, massive, possibly nuclear, counter-attack and inflict devastating damage on the attacker.
Deviating strategies for nuclear warfare forego the option of a decapitation attack in the consideration of maintaining the opposing political leadership structures in an exchange of blows with nuclear weapons. Negotiations to end hostilities should therefore continue to be possible.
See also
literature
- Bracken, Paul: The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces . Yale University Press 1985, ISBN 0-3000-3398-2 .
- Angerer, Florian: The conventional decapitation blow in the context of modern wars . vdf Hochschulverlag 2010, ISBN 978-3-7281-3316-8 .
swell
- ↑ "USA are planning decapitation" ( page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , February 14, 2003, at: www.politik.de
- ↑ Definition of the term "deterrence" see Section 6: Colin S. Gray (Security Officer under Ronald Reagan), Statements on target selection
- ↑ Michael Jasinski, Russia: Strategic Early Warning, Command and Control, and Missile Defense Overview ( Memento of the original from April 14, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , March 2001
