Balance of horror

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" Romeo " - 11 megatons of explosive force TNT equivalent thermonuclear bomb

Balance of horror (also MAD doctrine , from English mutually assured destruction , “mutually assured destruction”, whereby MAD translated at the same time means “crazy” or “insane”; dt. Coll. Also atomic fat ) is a Cold War between the A term coined by the USA and the Soviet Union and describes a situation in which a nuclear power is prevented from using nuclear weapons for the first time by the fact that the attacked strike back with a devastating strike even after a nuclear first strikecould. In game theory , the balance of horror is also understood as the “ Nash balance ”, in which once armed, neither side has an incentive to resolve the conflict or to disarm. The balance of terror does not mean a static equilibrium in which the arms race has come to a standstill. Rather, the term describes a dynamic equilibrium in which the mutual threats from the nuclear arms race prevented the escalation into a “hot” war, that is, a direct armed conflict between the superpowers.

term

The term "guaranteed destruction" was coined by the US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and reused in the doctrine of guaranteed mutual destruction . According to the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction”, it was not decisive whether the USA had more or less strategic nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union. The yardstick was not the number, but the ability to survive a first strike and then still have enough nuclear weapons to be able to cause theoretically calculated havoc in the Soviet Union in a counterstrike, namely "guaranteed destruction". In 1965 McNamara defined the capacity of nuclear weapons as “guaranteed destruction” that would be necessary to destroy a quarter to a third of the Soviet population and two thirds of Soviet industry.

In German, "nuclear deterrence" is now often the term ( nuclear deterrence ) used by the end of the Cold War but mostly "balance of terror". Colloquially, the phrase "who shoots first, dies second" stands for this.

Literally speaking, John F. Kennedy spoke of the balance of horror in his inaugural address :

“But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course — both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final. "

“However, neither large and powerful group of nations can take solace from our current politics - both are overwhelmed by the cost of modern weapons, both are rightly deeply concerned about the steady spread of the deadly atom, and yet both vie for the fragile balance of horror to postpone that saves us from that irrevocably last war of humanity. "

theory

Essential elements of the MAD doctrine: Map of radar early warning and air defense stations in Alaska

The basic assumption of the MAD doctrine is that neither side is so irrational as to accept the destruction of their own country in order to destroy the enemy. It is therefore assumed that the opponents will forego an atomic first strike if the opponent still has the possibility of a counter strike afterwards. This leads to a tense, yet stable peace.

In order to be able to implement the doctrine , all potential adversaries must maintain an overkill capacity so that even after the destruction of a large part of one's own nuclear weapons, the remaining smaller remainder would still be sufficient to completely destroy the attacker. The establishment of a redundant system of intercontinental nuclear weapons carriers that is difficult to locate and destroy is also important. One speaks of the “nuclear triad” of strategic bombers , land- and sea-based ICBMs . The latter are very difficult to locate and are therefore particularly suitable as a second strike weapon .

The basis for the balance of terror is a policy of deterrence led by all adversaries. It is a political strategy to reduce the likelihood of a major war, but it coincides with a high risk of escalation and destruction. Because of their use as a deterrent, nuclear weapons are often referred to as political weapons because their purpose is not to use them. In the case of symmetrical power relations (i.e. when all opponents have the same military means), the threat of using nuclear weapons is associated with a risk of self-destruction.

Cold War Balance of Terror

The concept of peacekeeping through mutual deterrence ( dissuasion ) gradually emerged when, after 1945, the widespread destructive power of nuclear weapons penetrated the consciousness of those politically responsible. The term was first used in official US military doctrine in 1961.

The doctrine found its main application in the Cold War period between the superpowers USA and Soviet Union . The MAD doctrine was seen as a guarantee that there could be no direct clashes between the superpowers. Instead, they got into so-called proxy wars indirectly and mediated one another.

Towards the end of the Cold War, the superpowers increasingly turned away from the MAD concept in favor of confidence-building measures, but remained geopolitical antagonists even after 1989 .

To a limited extent, there has been a MAD situation between the two warring states India and Pakistan since they became nuclear powers. Due to the comparatively small nuclear arsenal, a nuclear exchange between these powers would not lead to the extensive annihilation typical of MAD.

Departure from the MAD doctrine

On July 25, 1980, US President Jimmy Carter spoke in Presidential Directive 59 of a " countervailing strategy ". The aim of the US planners was henceforth to be able to win a nuclear war. The declared target of the nuclear warheads was not the Soviet population, but first and foremost the command centers, then military targets. This was linked to speculation that the Soviet Union would give up before the total destruction of the USSR and the United States.

US President Ronald Reagan set in this direction and planned with his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to replace the balance of the MAD with a new strategy of American superiority. By building a comprehensive missile defense system, the United States was to be protected from attacks or counter-attacks from the Soviet Union, while retaining its own first-strike capacity. Supporters of these ideas also spoke of mutual assured security . But in the end the SDI project and with it the undermining of the mutual assured destruction failed due to technical and financial hurdles.

In order to counteract the accidental initiation of a nuclear war, communication mechanisms were installed (e.g. the “ red telephone ” after the Cuba crisis ). By the 1980s at the latest, the concept of the “balance of horror” was increasingly questioned in the public debate. In connection with the NATO double resolution in the Federal Republic of Germany, there was talk of the danger of a destabilization of the global strategic equilibrium through the deployment of 'Euro-strategic' medium-range missiles. There was fear of an “ atomic holocaust ”.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union , tensions between Russia and the United States and between the United States and China were significantly reduced. In both cases, MAD was actually superseded as a model for stability between the nuclear powers, but these countries continue to hold an immediately deployable arsenal of nuclear weapons with multiple overkill capacities - in this respect, the principle of MAD tacitly applies to this day. Although the George W. Bush administration resigned from the ABM treaty , it stressed that the missile defense system it was planning would be built against nuclear blackmail by states with low nuclear capacity (such as North Korea ). Unlike MAD, this principle of asymmetrical warfare excludes the taking of entire populations hostage. However, the Russian government remained reserved when it came to soliciting the US for this strategy, mainly because it fears that it would give the US superiority at all levels and escalation dominance . In response, the Russian government has announced that it will modernize its nuclear weapons in order to counter a potential neutralization of its second strike capacity .

The goal of achieving a “balance of horror” has receded into the background since the horizontal proliferation , which means that although the major nuclear powers are disarming, new nuclear powers are being added. In the case of political or religious fanaticism, for example, an effective deterrent is not to be expected.

criticism

Critics of the MAD doctrine stated that the acronym MAD fits the English term mad ("crazy", "insane") because it is based on some contestable hypotheses :

  • Perfect recognition:
    • The location procedures used must be absolutely error-free, false reports about rocket launches must be categorically ruled out (cf. the Stanislaw Petrov incident)
    • There should be no way for a covert missile launch
    • There should be no alternative to attacking a nuclear missile
    • The weaker interpretation of MAD also depends on the perfect assignment of a missile launch (who should feel the retaliation if a missile launch is identified, for example on the Sino-Russian border?)
  • Absolute rationality (or "irrationality"):
    • " Rogue states " did not develop nuclear weapons (or if they did, they ceased to be rogue states by submitting to the MAD logic)
    • Commanders would have no way of influencing a missile launch
    • All heads of states with nuclear weapons worried about the survival of their citizens. Not only should deterring the enemy work, but also self-deterrence, which prevents those responsible from bringing about a second strike against their own people
    • The leaders also ventured therefore a first strike because they accepted that the enemy missile system failed, or that would effect the already devastating enemy hit mechanisms of self-quenching by the explosive force of the strike weapons is calculated so that only through the counter-attack consequences, such as the Nuclear Holocaust triggered would
    • Both sides assumed that the other side was ready to use their nuclear weapons, so that they were not just " bluffing ". In order for this effect not to occur, each side would have to credibly convey the impression that it is ready to destroy humanity. So there shouldn't be any moral scruples (possibly publicly expressed by those in charge) about preparing the end of humanity. Only this attitude is considered "rational" (although the abbreviation "MAD" expresses self-irony in this regard )
  • Inability to Defense:
    • There should not be any bunkers that might be sufficient to protect their own population and industry,
    • There should be no development of appropriate anti-missile technologies or protective equipment

These assumptions for MAD can be summarized under the following terms: potential, credibility, communication and rationality. Even if they applied to the two antagonists USA and Soviet Union on the whole, it is doubtful to what extent this also applies to some of the current nuclear powers (e.g. North Korea ).

literature

  • Lawrence Freedman: Deterrence , Polity, Cambridge 2004, ISBN 0-7456-3113-4 .
  • Dieter Senghaas: deterrence and peace. Studies on the criticism of organized lack of peace , European Publishing House, Frankfurt am Main 1981, ISBN 3-434-00439-4 .
  • Franz Böckle, Gert Krell (ed.): Politics and ethics of deterrence , Christian Kaiser Verlag, Munich 1984, ISBN 3-459-01558-6 .
  • Rana Deep Islam: The Vanguard of European Security . WiKu-Wissenschaftsverlag, Duisburg 2006, ISBN 3-86553-150-4 and Paris 2006: WiKu Éditions Paris EURL.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ For the paragraph: Dieter Senghaas: Review and outlook on deterrent policy. In: Franz Böckle, Gert Krell (Hrsg.): Politics and ethics of deterrence. Munich 1984, pp. 98-132, here p. 100f.
  2. ↑ Peter Rudolf, "deterrence" in: Dieter Nohlen, Rainer-Olaf Schultze, Lexicon of Political Science, Theories, Methods, Terms 2nd Edition (2004).
  3. ^ A b Henry D. Sokolski, “Getting MAD: Nuclear mutual assured destruction, it's origins and practice” ( Memento of May 27, 2008 in the Internet Archive ), 2004, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, p. 278.
  4. ↑ Christina Ruta: Balance of Terror. Deutsche Welle, October 14, 2012, accessed December 1, 2016 .
  5. ^ Andreas Wenger Continuity and Change in International Security Policy , in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, issue 1/2003.