Stanislav Evgrafowitsch Petrov

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Stanislaw Petrov, 2016

Stanislav Evgrafowitsch Petrow ( Russian Станислав Евграфович Петров , scientific transliteration Stanislav Evgrafovič Petrov ); (* September 7, 1939 in Chernigovka near Vladivostok; † May 19, 2017 in Fryazino near Moscow) was a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet air defense forces . On September 26, 1983, as a senior officer in the command center of the Soviet satellite surveillance system, he correctly classified a system-reported attack by the United States with nuclear ICBMs on the USSR as a false alarm . The false alarm was triggered by a satellite of the Soviet early warning system , which, due to faulty software, interpreted a sunrise and reflections in the clouds as a rocket launch in the USA. By intervening and stopping hasty reactions, Petrov possibly prevented the initiation of a nuclear war , the feared Third World War .

For reasons of military secrecy and because of political tension, Petrov's actions were not made public until the 1990s.

Background (Cold War)

Since 1947 at the latest, the USA and the USSR have been involved in a so-called Cold War that has been waged with varying degrees of intensity . The tensions between the two superpowers led to the formation of the two alliance systems, NATO and the Warsaw Pact . An unprecedented arms race has taken place since the early 1950s . A nuclear strategy emerged around nuclear weapons . By the end of the 1960s, the USSR had offset the USA's initial lead in strategic nuclear weapons (see ICBMs , strategic bombers ) by massively upgrading its land- and sea-based ICBMs , so that approximate parity was established. A phase of détente and the SALT negotiations in the early 1970s could not stop the arsenals from growing further. Both parties tried to consolidate their positions with the help of new technologies (cf. e.g .: multiple warheads ).

When tensions intensified again around 1980, both sides had already accumulated many times the nuclear destructive power required to wipe out the enemy - and the rest of humanity - ( overkill ) . In the event of an opponent's first strike , retaliation should be triggered in the form of the total annihilation of the attacker ( mutual assured destruction ) . In reality, the plans for a nuclear war - contrary to the impression that was conveyed in public - did not aim to strike back only after receiving the enemy first strike - retaliation after ride-out - but rather because of the vulnerability of their own command and control - and communication systems (C3) to trigger one's own counter-attack within a few minutes after receiving the warning of approaching enemy missiles and bombers : Launch on Warning . The prerequisite for this fragile balance between the superpowers was the existence of a highly developed automatic early warning system for monitoring the air and space using radar stations and satellites .

In 1983 the relationship between the two blocs was additional because of Ronald Reagan's designation of the Soviet Union as the " Empire of Evil " and the announcement of the SDI missile defense program in March and as a result of the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 by the Soviet Union on September 1 curious; excited. At least the KGB was also concerned about perceived plans for the US command post exercise Able Archer 83 in November .

The incident on September 26, 1983

On September 26, 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov was the officer on duty in the Serpukhov -15 bunker (about 50 kilometers south of Moscow ). Its task consisted of computer and satellite-based surveillance of the airspace. In the event of a nuclear attack on the USSR, the strategy provided for an immediate nuclear counter-attack by all means.

Shortly after midnight, the computer reported the launch of a nuclear missile aimed at the Soviet Union in the US state of Montana. After an enemy missile launch, the Soviet leadership had 28 minutes to - irrevocably - decide on a counter-attack. Petrov stayed a quarter of an hour to brief his superior. Since the rocket launch was supposed to have come from a single base according to the system, Petrov considered a first strike unlikely. In addition, the reliability of the satellite system ( Kosmos 1382 ) had previously been questioned several times. Petrov could not see a missile on satellite images from the US military base. However, since the basis at that time was exactly on the day-night boundary, the images were only of limited informative value. Petrov reported a false alarm to the military leadership. A short time later the computer system reported a second, third, fourth and fifth missile fired. Since the satellite system ultimately reported no further missiles, Petrov continued to assume a false alarm, since, in his opinion, an actual nuclear strike should have taken place with significantly more missiles. No other data were available to him to check his classification in the relevant period. The land-based Soviet radar could not provide any additional data because its range was too short. It was only after 17 minutes that it became clear from the data from the surface radar that no missiles were actually approaching.

During this decision-making phase, Petrow was under considerable pressure: on the one hand, forwarding incorrect satellite data (false warning) would lead to a Soviet nuclear first strike. On the other hand, in the event of an actual US attack, dozens of nuclear warheads would immediately fall on Soviet territory, and its classification of the satellite warning as a hoax would severely limit the Soviet options for action. This was also due to the fact that the Soviet Union had only partially developed a decentralized second strike capability as a countermeasure against beheading strategies .

In the morning it was found that the satellite-based Soviet early warning system had misinterpreted solar reflections on clouds near Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana , where US ICBMs were also stationed, as missile launches.

Even if the Soviet high command and the state leadership should ultimately have given the order to counterattack, Petrov's behavior interrupted the hierarchical chain reaction in good time, leading to a possible nuclear war.

Further life

Petrov was neither commended nor rewarded for his behavior by his superiors - but neither was he punished. A medal award originally planned for his actions did not materialize, because when the reason for the vulnerability of the system became apparent, superiors preferred secrecy in order to save face. However, he later received a medal for other services to the construction of the facility and was ultimately promoted. He left the military the following year for purely family reasons, but later returned to his previous post as a civilian. Petrov died on May 19, 2017 in Fryazino near Moscow, where he had lived for the last decades of his life.

Honors and commemorations

The entrepreneur Karl Schumacher from Oberhausen visited Petrow in 1998 in Russia to thank him for his behavior and invited him to Germany. In 1999 Petrow visited Oberhausen, gave radio and television interviews and discussed with Oberhausen students.

The Association of World Citizens , based in San Francisco, presented Petrov with the on May 21, 2004 in Moscow - where he was also presented with the award - and on January 19, 2006 at the UN headquarters in New York World Citizen Award .

Petrow (left) at the Dresden Prize award ceremony, 2013

On February 24, 2012, Stanislaw Petrow was awarded the German Media Prize. On February 17, 2013, he was awarded the Dresden Prize 2013, endowed with 25,000 euros, in the Dresden Semperoper .

At the beginning of July 2018, the city of Bonn received a citizen's application to rename a square named Archipov-Petrov-Platz after Petrow and Vasili Archipow , which had probably also prevented a nuclear war . However, the application was rejected.

monument

On the 2nd anniversary of his death in 2019, memorial plaques in three languages ​​for Petrow were set up in Oberhausen . The inscription reads:

"If he had followed the computer reports, there would have been an immediate atomic counter-attack and the death of millions of people in the USA, Europe and Russia."

The daughter and son of Petrov were present at the unveiling of the tablets.

documentary

The Danish film director Peter Anthony accompanied Stanislaw Petrow over a period of 10 years for the 2014 documentary (and with post-flash flashbacks) The Man Who Saved the World .

Popular culture

  • In 2011, the German electronic formation ['ramp] dedicated their album return to Stanislaw Petrow (mistakenly noted in the booklet as "Vladimir" due to a name that was misrepresented in the media).
  • In 2019 the punk rock band Krachmakers dedicated a German-language song to Stanislaw Petrow on a vinyl single.

See also

  • RJaN (largest and most important Soviet intelligence service during the Cold War)
  • Vasily Archipov (Soviet naval officer who was aboard the B-59 submarine equipped with nuclear torpedoes during the Cuban Missile Crisis )
  • The American film WarGames, also made in 1983, deals with a similar scenario in which a (albeit American) commander doubts the reality of the rocket attack displayed by the computer.
  • The 1986 Soviet film drama Letters from the Dead describes the world after a nuclear war triggered by a computer error.

Web links

Commons : Stanislaw Evgrafowitsch Petrov  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Ingeborg Jacobs: "Stanislaw Petrow: The man who prevented the nuclear war. Who will save us next time? ”Ffm 2015: 49
  2. ibid: 48
  3. Obituary. In: WAZ Oberhausen. September 9, 2017. Retrieved September 10, 2017 .
  4. Karl Schumacher: Stanislaw Petrow has died. September 7, 2017. Retrieved September 10, 2017 .
  5. ^ Roland Oliphant: Stanislav Petrov, the 'man who saved the world' dies at 77. In: telegraph.co.uk. September 18, 2017, accessed September 18, 2017 .
  6. a b Benjamin Bidder: The man who prevented the Third World War , in: one day , April 21, 2010.
  7. According to an interview with Petrow, FAZ.NET (February 18, 2013, accessed February 21, 2013), 1993 through an article in Pravda; also the interview in welt.de (February 29, 2012, accessed February 21, 2013); According to Spiegel Online (April 21, 2010, accessed on February 21, 2013) in 1998 through an interview with Colonel General Votintsev
  8. Heike Vowinkel: “Hell started at 0.15 am” Interview with Petrow in Welt Online. February 27, 2012. Retrieved February 28, 2012
  9. Friedrich Schmidt: The man who saved the world. On the death of Stanislaw Petrov, who as a Soviet lieutenant colonel once prevented a nuclear war . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of September 20, 2017, p. 7.
  10. Friedrich Schmidt: The man who saved the world. In: FAZ.net . September 19, 2017, accessed October 13, 2018 .
  11. a b Petrow's decision. Die Zeit , September 18, 2008, accessed October 4, 2011 .
  12. The undertaker who dug up the savior of the world at rp-online.de, accessed on July 14, 2019
  13. German Media Prize 2011 for Dr. Sakena Yacoobi, Dr. Mitri Raheb, Stanislaw Petrow and Dr. Denis Mukwege. German Media Prize, archived from the original on January 30, 2012 ; Retrieved February 24, 2012 .
  14. ^ Portrait of Stanislaw Petrow online at the Dresden Peace Prize (Friends of Dresden Germany eV) . Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  15. “I didn't want to be to blame for the Third World War.” On dradio.de , February 17, 2013. Accessed March 16, 2013.
  16. Commemoration of two world savers , Neues Deutschland, August 31, 2018
  17. ^ Archipov-Petrov-Platz rejected for Bonn , Neues Deutschland, 7 September 2018
  18. a b Kai Spanke: A memorial for the man who saved the world. In: FAZ. May 20, 2019, accessed May 21, 2019 .
  19. The man who saved the world / The man who saved the world. 105 min. (Imdb 2277106)
  20. The Man Who Saved the World on Vimeo
  21. Recordings. Beehoover , accessed November 16, 2011 (“Stanislav Petrov” on “Heavy zooo” (2008)).
  22. The Sorcerer's Apprentice - Rimini Protokoll. Retrieved July 16, 2017 .
  23. Dedication "this album is dedicated to vladimir petrov." at Discogs
  24. discogs.com: Krachmakers