Nuclear strategy

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A nuclear strategy is a strategic concept that includes the threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons for political purposes. Because of their extraordinarily high destructive potential, nuclear weapons have had a special moral and security policy position as weapons of mass destruction since they were first used at the end of the Second World War in 1945 . Nuclear strategies such as massive retaliation or flexible reaction were therefore a defining feature of the Cold War alongside the massive arms race. Because both conflicting parties in this strategic dispute had nuclear weapons at their disposal and technically upgraded them, the non-use of nuclear weapons while at the same time safeguarding security interests was the focus of their nuclear strategies.

After the end of the Cold War, nuclear strategies immediately lost importance. Strategic nuclear matters such as securing lost nuclear warheads, anti-missile shields , “dirty bombs” , non-proliferation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and disarmament projects continue to be important issues in international politics.

Nuclear strategic research was a controversial domain of strategic studies during the Cold War . In doing so, strategy theorists often resorted to findings from game theory , which viewed the common nuclear strategic dilemma of non-deployment as an example of the prisoner's dilemma . Bernard Brodie , Herman Kahn , Albert Wohlstetter and Colin Gray became known in this area of ​​research .

US / NATO strategies

  • Forward defense (forward strategy): Concept of delay of an attack by the Warsaw Pact conventional forces east of the Rhine. Then a nuclear counter-attack by strategic air forces with a conventional counter-offensive with the aim of pushing back the Warsaw Pact. This concept was used from 1950/52 to 1957 - NATO Document 14/1 - and if it had been used would have meant the radiation of large parts of Germany. Due to the increased destruction potential of the nuclear arsenals, it was replaced by 'massive retaliation'.
  • Flexible response (NATO Document MC 14/3): Appropriate response to the attack. As part of the concept of the flexible response from 1967/68 to 1991, NATO developed the triad strategy . This tactic provides for the use of conventional, nuclear tactical and nuclear strategic means in combination or as individual elements. In 1980, the Single Integrated Operational Plan SIOP-5D included around 40,000 possible targets for nuclear attacks.
  • Counterforce doctrine / countervailing strategy : a strategy developed in the USA under President Jimmy Carter , which provides for the flexibility of the nuclear arsenal and the expansion of attack capabilities against hostile (read: Soviet) strategic nuclear weapons in order to enable flexible options below massive retaliation. The countervailing strategy supplemented the counterforce doctrine from 1980 through the US presidential directive (PD 59) and led u. a. for the development of "earth penetration bodies" (rockets, bombs) against hardened targets.
  • Global Strike : Part of a US military strategy for the possible worldwide destruction of strategic and tactical targets with conventional and nuclear means and their combination in a single operation plan OPLAN 8022 . The fight against proliferation targets is an essential part of this concept.

Strategies of the USSR / Warsaw Treaty

  • From 1965 onwards, under Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev , a dual strategy was propagated. Accordingly, the USSR should not wage a nuclear war if it is not imposed by the US or NATO. If nuclear war is necessary, it must also be waged. If necessary, a preventive strike is conceivable.
  • Perimetr (Dead Hand) , stands for a nuclear weapons command system, which should automatically trigger an all-encompassing counter-attack in the event of a nuclear decapitation that would have made the Soviet leadership incapable of action.
  • It was only under Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that a new strategy was developed from 1987 onwards that gave priority to preventing a military conflict over preparing for a possible war ahead.

See also

literature

  • Paul Bracken: The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces . Yale University Press, 1985, ISBN 0-300-03398-2 .
  • Bruce G. Blair: Strategic Command and Control. Redefining the Nuclear Threat . Brookings Institution , Washington DC 1985, ISBN 0-8157-0981-1 .
  • Lawrence Freedman: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 3. Edition. Palgrave, Basingstoke 2003, ISBN 0-333-97239-2 .
  • Herman Kahn : On Thermonuclear War . Princeton University Press, 1960.
  • Henry Kissinger : Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy . Munich 1959.

swell

  1. ↑ Michio Kaku, Daniel Axelrod: To Win a Nuclear War. The Pentagon's Secret War Planes. South end Press, Boston 1987.
  2. ↑ cf. the detailed description under The Creation of SIOP-62 More Evidence on the Origins of Overkill National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 130, gwu.edu, July 13, 2004 .
  3. ↑ MC 14/3 (Final) (PDF; 186 kB)
  4. ↑ Flexible Response- the concept of graduated deterrence

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