Waiver of first use

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The renunciation of the first use ( English : No first use policy ) describes in connection with nuclear weapons the voluntary and officially declared unilateral commitment of a state not to use its own nuclear weapons in the event of a military conflict as long as there is no attack with nuclear weapons against its own territory or the own population takes place. Refraining from using nuclear weapons against countries that do not have their own nuclear weapons, while retaining the option of a first strike against other nuclear powers , is sometimes incorrectly referred to as refraining from first use . The renunciation of the first use has been a continuously controversial topic since the first use of nuclear weapons on August 6 and 9, 1945 by the USA against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki , the subsequent commissioning of such weapons by other countries and the resulting nuclear armament. So far, of the known nuclear powers, only the People's Republic of China and India have announced their waiver of initial use.

Pros and cons of doing without

During the Cold War between NATO and the Soviet Union and its satellite states was on the part of NATO from 1954 to 1967, the strategy of massive retaliation (English: Massive Retaliation ). This strategy was based on the existence of a US lead and advantage in terms of the number of nuclear weapons, but especially the means of delivery. At that time, the US nuclear power was largely based on the overwhelming strategic bomber fleet of the Strategic Air Command . According to this doctrine, every Soviet attack, including, for example, an invasion of Western Europe with conventional weapons , would have resulted in the immediate and massive use of US nuclear weapons. Since the late 1950s, the situation began to change. The Soviet Union soon gained an effective vehicle of its own as a result of its advances in intercontinental missile technology . The launch of Sputnik I as the first artificial satellite in October 1957 acted as a beacon and caused consternation in the West. Short-term blows to the previously virtually invulnerable North America now moved into the realm of the possible. The further nuclear armament of the USSR since the beginning of the 1960s gradually proved that the first US nuclear doctrine was unsuitable: Both sides had now soon acquired the ability to strike a massive retaliatory strike even after a first strike by the opposing side. This resulted in a designated as a "balance of terror" situation of "mutual Assured Destruction" (English: mutual assured destruction , or MAD ). The strategy of massive retaliation was replaced in 1967 by the concept of a graduated and unpredictable response to an attack by the Warsaw Pact (English: Flexible Response ). This strategy was in place with NATO until the end of the Cold War.

The option of the first use of nuclear weapons, the so-called first strike, was seen in this context as an effective means of deterrence and thus of maintaining peace. In view of their numerical inferiority in the conventional area, the NATO states in particular saw this possibility as necessary to maintain the balance of horror. Even today, the deterrent effect of the threat of an atomic first strike is cited as the main argument for maintaining this option. The argument of deterrence and the unpredictability and unpredictability of the consequences of an attack on NATO's allies resulting from the nuclear potential of NATO countries is also part of NATO's currently valid strategic concept.

The most important counter-argument is the danger that the option of the first strike will lead to further nuclear armament and the spread of nuclear weapons. The reason for this is that if there is a threat of a nuclear first strike, other states seek possession of nuclear weapons in order to counteract this threat through the principle of deterrence mentioned above. An example in support of this argument is the use of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan from 1998 and the subsequent mutual nuclear armament of these two countries. As it becomes more widespread, the risk of the use of nuclear weapons and accidents in their manufacture and handling increases.

When weighing up the pros and cons of not doing the first job, it must also be taken into account that from a legal point of view, this is a voluntary and non-binding commitment without any consequences under international law. The evaluation of such a declaration and the reasons possibly underlying it is therefore at the discretion of each individual country. It is also dependent on other factors, such as the other military and foreign policy activities and positions of the country making such a declaration. On the other hand, not using it for the first time is generally seen as an important confidence-building measure in relations between different countries.

Legal position

The question of whether and, if so, under what conditions, the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of use is compatible with international law, touches on a number of legal norms and agreements, depending on the argumentation, such as:

In the assessment, the special characteristics of nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use also play a relevant role, as does the weighting of contractually fixed law versus customary law .

A final assessment of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of use has not yet been carried out by competent institutions. The International Court of Justice dealt with this question in an advisory opinion published on July 8, 1996 in response to an inquiry by the UN Secretary-General (on behalf of the UN General Assembly ) dated December 19, 1994 (original text of the inquiry : Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law? ). In the legal norms examined, the court did not find any general or specific regulation which per se represents an answer to the question asked (paragraph 74 of the decision of July 8, 1996).

In paragraph 95, the court concluded that, on the basis of the arguments and opinions available to it at the time of the opinion, it was not possible to make a definitive assessment of the question of whether the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of use are affected by the rules of international humanitarian law Prohibit the use of weapons and methods of warfare that do not distinguish between military and civilian targets. In paragraph 96 of its decision, the court further emphasized the right of every state to its existence and to self-defense against threats to its existence and in paragraph 97 refrained from making a final assessment of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of use in corresponding situations.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contains the obligation for the five nuclear powers that have acceded to the treaty to completely disarm their nuclear weapons, but without any specific time targets. The treaty does not contain any restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons.

Current developments

In the United States, the government has been considering changing its own position on the initial use of nuclear weapons for several years. This is taking place against the background of the changed geopolitical situation after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the worldwide spread of terrorist movements. These considerations, which have not yet been concluded, envisage the possible use of nuclear weapons against, for example:

  • an aggressor who uses or plans to use weapons of mass destruction against the US armed forces, their allies or parts of the civilian population
  • an aggressor whose arsenal of weapons of mass destruction could only be completely destroyed with nuclear weapons

In 2003, before the start of the Iraq War , Geoff Hoon, the UK's Defense Secretary , declared that Britain would use nuclear weapons if its own troops were to be attacked with chemical or biological weapons . Before the Second Gulf War in 1991, the then US President George HW Bush made a very similar declaration to the Iraqi government.

French President Jacques Chirac also announced in January 2006 that France would reserve the right to retaliate in “unconventional” ways against states using terrorist means against the country or its allies. To what extent there will be a corresponding change in the French nuclear doctrine based on this statement cannot yet be foreseen.

Position of the known nuclear powers

United States of America

The US has not yet announced that it will not be using it for the first time. Given the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact states in the field of conventional military technology, the country was not ready to take such a step during the Cold War. The argument of deterrence through the option of a nuclear first strike was and is part of American military doctrine even after the end of the Cold War.

The current position of the US provides for the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Exceptions to this are direct attacks against the territory, the population or the army of the United States or its allies when carried out by a non-nuclear power that is allied with a nuclear power in such a conflict.

The nuclear doctrine of the United States of America also provides for a so-called "atomic shield" for Australia, Japan, South Korea and the non-nuclear powers among NATO partners. This means that the US is also ready to use its nuclear weapons if one of these countries is attacked under the conditions mentioned.

The US nuclear weapons inventory is estimated to be around 10,350 warheads, of which around 5,300 are in operational condition. 4,530 of the active warheads are strategic. Of these, around 1,150 are on land-based missile systems, 1,050 on bombers and 2,016 on submarines. Of the 780 deployable tactical warheads, around 200 are stationed on ground missiles and 580 on bombers. It is estimated that the United States has at least ten submarines in constant use carrying ready-to-launch nuclear weapons.

The United States has been a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since it was signed in 1968. The country signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996, but has not yet ratified it.

Soviet Union and Russia

At the time of the Cold War, the Soviet Union renounced its initial deployment in 1982 and repeatedly called on the nuclear powers among the NATO countries, namely the USA, Great Britain and France, to undertake similar voluntary commitments. The declaration of the Soviet Union was seen in the West as an attempt to weaken the support of the United States, especially among the population of its European allies, who were mostly skeptical or even negative about nuclear weapons. The background was the high superiority of the Eastern Bloc in conventional weapons. An initial use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union was thus superfluous. Conversely, because of its conventional inferiority, the West could not do without the threat of a first call in the event of a Soviet attack.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia took over its nuclear weapons, including those previously stationed in Kazakhstan and Belarus , while Ukraine itself disarmed the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory when it gained independence. In 1993, Russia decided not to renew the Soviet Union's waiver and in 1997 explicitly reiterated this position.

Russia's current stance is identical to that of the United States. Russia has also agreed to a nuclear shield for Belarus. In addition, on September 3, 1994, Russia concluded a bilateral agreement with the People's Republic of China to waive the first deployment between the two countries.

At the end of 2007 Russia had around 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads, including around 1,700 land-based, 600 sea-based and over 800 nuclear cruise missiles on long-range bombers. The country committed itself in 2002 to decommissioning and destroying its tactical warheads by 2004. However, it is unclear whether this commitment was met, so the actual number of tactical nuclear weapons is unknown. Russia likely has at least two submarines with nuclear weapons in constant use.

The country has been a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1968 , as the legal successor to the Soviet Union. In 2000 the country ratified the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Great Britain

Great Britain, like the United States, has never announced a complete waiver of the initial deployment. The UK's current position is identical to that of the US.

Britain's nuclear weapons inventory is estimated to be less than 200 strategic and sub-strategic warheads on appropriately equipped submarines. Ground-based missile systems and bombers armed with nuclear weapons were decommissioned after 1998. A British Navy submarine armed with 48 operational nuclear warheads is constantly on patrol. However, the UK's nuclear weapons are not currently aimed at any specific target, their deployment involves a lead time of several days.

Great Britain has been a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1968 and ratified the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1998.

France

France , too, has so far not given up on the initial deployment. France's position is largely identical to that of the United States and Great Britain. The French nuclear doctrine, however, contains the concept of the “last warning” (French ultime avertissement ) as a special feature . It is a single, limited nuclear attack on a military target. This attack before a massive use of nuclear weapons is intended to demonstrate the determination of France to a possible opponent. An opposing power could then still prevent an escalation by withdrawing.

The nuclear arsenal of France is estimated at about 350 nuclear warheads on board 60 bombers and four submarines. Since 1996, the country has viewed all of its nuclear weapons as strategic weapons. Ground-based missile systems were decommissioned after 1996. France, like Great Britain, has a nuclear-armed submarine in constant use.

France has been a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1992 and also ratified the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1998.

People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China, the fifth nuclear power during the Cold War, had declared its unreserved renunciation of first use as early as October 16, 1964, shortly after its own nuclear weapons became operational. This declaration was renewed repeatedly, for example on April 5, 1995 and in June 2005 at the request of the USA. However, China's nuclear weapons were considered inferior to those of the US, Russia, Great Britain and France in terms of range and accuracy. A doctrine that includes a possible first strike was therefore never a realistic option for China, according to many military experts.

The official position of the People's Republic of China provides for the unreserved waiver of the initial deployment under all circumstances. In relation to non-nuclear powers, China also refrains from using and threatening to use nuclear weapons under all circumstances. It is unclear, however, whether this stance includes a renouncement of the use of nuclear weapons on one's own soil in defense against an invasion.

In January 1994 the People's Republic of China submitted a proposal for a mutual agreement between the then five nuclear powers to renounce the first strike to the United States, Russia, Great Britain and France and proposed appropriate negotiations to these countries. The aforementioned agreement with Russia resulted from this initiative.

The inventory of Chinese nuclear weapons is estimated at around 400 strategic and tactical warheads. There is no reliable information about the distribution with regard to different carrier systems and the provision of bombers or submarines in constant use.

China has been a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1992 and signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996, but has not yet ratified it. The country is also the only one of the five nuclear powers in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that has signed the IAEA Additional Protocol. This protocol provides for the readiness for unannounced inspections of all nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency .

India

After India carried out a total of five successful nuclear tests on May 11th and 13th, 1998 and shortly thereafter began to manufacture nuclear weapons, the declaration of renouncement of the first use followed in August 1999 as part of the publication of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine. India has also undertaken not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers under any circumstances.

In addition, India declared its readiness to take part in negotiations on a general waiver of first use by all nuclear powers and to support the inclusion of the use of nuclear weapons as a war crime in the statute of the International Criminal Court .

India's nuclear arsenal is estimated at 30 to 35, but possibly up to 150, warheads according to various sources. The country's stocks of weapons-grade plutonium are likely to be sufficient to produce 40 to 90 warheads.

India has not yet signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Pakistan

Pakistan demonstrated its ability to manufacture nuclear weapons by carrying out five nuclear tests on May 28, 1998, and only briefly after India. As part of its nuclear doctrine, the country explicitly reserves the option of a nuclear first strike. In November 2008, however, the incumbent President of the country Asif Ali Zardari announced that he would campaign for an official declaration by the country to renounce the first use and for a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia .

The nuclear weapons inventory of Pakistan's nuclear forces is estimated at 24 to 48, possibly up to 75, warheads, depending on the sources. The amount of plutonium available is sufficient to produce 30 to 50 warheads.

Pakistan has not signed up to either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

North Korea

Under Kim Jong Il, North Korea renounced the first strike in 2006, but in the years that followed, under Kim Jong Un, repeatedly threatened the United States and South Korea with first deployments of its nuclear weapons . According to Kim on May 8, 2016, North Korea will only use its own if its sovereignty is threatened by hostile powers with nuclear weapons.

Position of the de facto nuclear powers

Israel

Although Israel neither officially confirms nor denies possession of nuclear weapons, it is considered certain that the country possesses appropriate weapons and can therefore be counted among the de facto nuclear powers. With this ambivalent attitude, however, Israel puts itself in a politically difficult position, as a declaration to renounce the first use would openly confirm possession of nuclear weapons, which would contradict the goal of a Middle East without weapons of mass destruction , which is supported by the country itself . Instead, Israel stated that it would not be the first country in the Middle East to formally introduce nuclear weapons in the region . However, if Israel's existence should be threatened, the Samson option could be used as a last resort , a strategy in a conceivable defense scenario that would provide for massive retaliation with nuclear weapons exactly as soon as the state of Israel had been substantially damaged, or briefly before the destruction. This doctrine, which relates to theoretical war and defense scenarios, can thus indirectly be assessed as a possible waiver of the initial deployment.

literature

  • Rhona MacDonald: Nuclear Weapons 60 Years On: Still a Global Public Health Threat. In: PLoS Medicine . 2 (11 )/2005. Public Library of Science, e301, ISSN  1549-1277
  • Harold A. Feiveson, Ernst Jan Hogendoorn: No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. In: The Nonproliferation Review. 10 (2) / 2003. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ISSN  1073-6700

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Party congress: Kim says North Korea will not use nuclear weapons for a first strike. Spiegel online from May 8, 2016
  2. ↑ Lionel Beehner: Israel's Nuclear Program and Middle East Peace . ( Memento of February 9, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Council on Foreign Relations , February 10, 2006 (accessed November 3, 2007)