NATO double decision

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Pershing II, one of the weapon systems established after the double decision

The NATO double resolution of December 12, 1979 consisted of two parts:

  1. The NATO announced the establishment of new with nuclear warheads tipped missiles and cruise missiles - the Pershing II and BGM-109 Tomahawk - in Western Europe at. She justified this as modernizing and filling a gap in the nuclear deterrent caused by the Soviet stationing of the SS-20 .
  2. She demanded bilateral negotiations between the superpowers on limiting their nuclear medium-range missiles ( Intermediate Nuclear Forces - INF - with a range from 1,000 to 5,500 km) at Europe. The French and some of the British nuclear missiles were excluded.

Both parts, missile deployment and arms control , should complement each other and be carried out in parallel.

After the failure of the Geneva negotiations in November 1982, the majority of the population of several NATO countries rejected the planned list. However, a majority of members of the German Bundestag approved it on November 22, 1983. From December 1983 the new nuclear missiles were deployed.

Since 1985, the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev offered extensive nuclear disarmament . In 1987, the USA and the Soviet Union agreed in the INF Treaty to withdraw, destroy and ban the production of all their land-based missiles that could be equipped with nuclear weapons and have a range of 500 to 5500 km and their carrier systems. By May 1991 they fulfilled this contract.


Since 1950, the US has been deploying sea- and land-based nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in Western Europe. NATO, founded in 1949, incorporated these systems into its deterrent and warfare concept as part of the US strategy of massive retaliation for potential Soviet attacks since 1958. The US retained the final decision on their deployment. Because an attack on NATO territory was considered an attack on the US according to the NATO statute, the US remained involved in the defense of Western Europe. The Soviet Union also equipped the troops of the Warsaw Pact, founded in 1955, with nuclear weapons, which they established as a defense against every conceivable attack by the West.

As a defense expert for the SPD, Helmut Schmidt warned in the Bundestag in 1958 that land-based nuclear missiles would make the NATO treaty area a primary target for Soviet preventive attacks and thus enormously reduce the security of Western Europe. They are therefore just as little in the German interest as the Bundeswehr's disposal of its own nuclear weapons, which Konrad Adenauer and Franz Josef Strauss were striving for at the time. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Schmidt renewed his warning: “Equipping the Federal Republic of Germany with nuclear missiles that could destroy Leningrad or Moscow would have to provoke the Soviet Union in the same way that equipping Cuba with such missiles would have to provoke the USA . "

In the 1960s, with a major upgrade of its ICBMs and hydrogen bombs , the Soviet Union reached an approaching atomic balance of terror . Since 1961, the USA and NATO have been developing the strategy of flexible response : a supposedly conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe was to be stopped or deterred selectively with smaller, tactical nuclear weapons ( theater nuclear forces - TNF) against flexibly selected targets on the battlefield. The aim was to avoid an escalation to intercontinental nuclear war. The Pershing II and Cruise Missiles , developed since 1970, were considered to be the first weapon systems whose accuracy and range enabled the desired flexible target selection. The Pershing II could fly up to 1800 km in four to ten minutes, the cruise missiles 2400 km in up to three hours. Both had a very high penetration power and, thanks to their electronic self-steering, a very high accuracy. With these properties, they could be used against military targets and Soviet command bunkers, but according to many scientists, peace researchers and fourteen NATO generals at the time, only in the event of a first strike . Western military experts, who viewed the Pershing II as unsuitable for a first strike, also conceded a considerable destabilizing effect due to its reduced warning time and ground deployment, which would force NATO to use them or lose them at an early stage in the event of war .

It is true that the superpowers committed themselves to the dismantling of all nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 . However, short- and medium-range nuclear missiles were excluded from the 1972 SALT-I treaty for upper limits on strategic nuclear weapons. In this area in particular, the arms race continued unabated, so that arms control in the USA had been considered a failure since around 1975. At the beginning of 1976 the foreign ministers of the superpowers Henry Kissinger and Andrei Andrejewitsch Gromyko reached a compromise on the inclusion of medium-range weapons in the SALT II agreement . However, US President Gerald Ford rejected this.

Soviet SS-20 on mobile launch pad
Comparison of the Soviet SS-20 (left) and the American Pershing II (right)

As a result, the Soviet Union began to gradually replace its older R-12 and R-14 missiles aimed at Western Europe with more modern RSD-10 missiles ( called SS-20s in the West ). They had a range of up to 5000 km and high accuracy, were mounted on mobile launching ramps and were each equipped with three multiple atomic warheads. They were justified with the tactical nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France, which were not under NATO High Command. The SS-20 did not threaten the US's second strike capability because it was based on invulnerable systems, including nuclear submarines .

In June 1976, NATO issued a general warning against a threat to the European equilibrium from Soviet armaments. As Federal Chancellor , Helmut Schmidt warned the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on October 28, 1977 for the first time against an uncontrolled armament of medium-range missiles without mentioning the SS-20. If this branch of arms were not included in the arms control negotiations of the superpowers, then the Soviet Union could undermine the previous strategic balance. As long as a Soviet attack on Western Europe can only be deterred by intercontinental and global nuclear retaliation by the USA, Western Europe remains open to blackmail. That is why Schmidt called on NATO to take countermeasures of its own, with offers of negotiation taking priority. The speech is considered to be the trigger for considerations that led to the double decision. Behind this, there were fundamental doubts as to whether the USA would react to an attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe with intercontinental nuclear missiles, in order to risk counterattacks and thus self-destruction. Because of this risk, the USA also saw a tactical atomic balance in Europe as necessary.

For the US, the limitation of Soviet ICBMs, which threatened itself, remained a priority. Despite Schmidt's warning, US President Jimmy Carter did not include medium-range weapons in the SALT II talks in order to preserve their chances of success. On October 12, 1977, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) set up a High Level Group (HLG) with representatives from twelve NATO countries, which laid the foundations for the double decision. Carter initially rejected land-based medium-range missiles for NATO. From August 1978 he supported the planning for it. At the Guadeloupe Conference in January 1979, he showed himself ready to upgrade or modernize Western European nuclear weapons. Helmut Schmidt now demanded parallel negotiations. After the conclusion of the SALT II treaty in June 1979, Carter wanted to accommodate its opponents in the US Congress , who saw the treaty as a sign of weakness and delayed its ratification. Therefore, and in order to strengthen the unity of NATO, Carter pushed increasingly for a NATO retrofit.

The Federal Republic and the Netherlands wanted to enforce the double decision domestically through a convincing willingness to negotiate. At their request, on April 11, 1979, NATO set up its own body for arms control talks for the first time ( Special Group , from December 1979 Special Consultative Group ). It was supposed to ensure the participation of Western Europeans in future INF negotiations, but remained in the shadow of the HLG.

The Soviet Union continuously tried to prevent the Federal Republic from agreeing to the now foreseeable double resolution. On May 6, 1978 in Bonn , the Soviet head of state Leonid Brezhnev and Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt affirmed the "goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control", which the UN has often proclaimed since 1959, that neither side strives for military superiority and that a balance is sufficient for defense . Schmidt denied that this existed in Europe at that time, as Brezhnev wanted to put it, referring to the known locations of the SS-20. In October 1979 Gromyko appealed to the Federal Government in Bonn to reject the imminent double decision. This will destroy the basis for negotiations. Seven other German-Soviet summits followed by 1983, at which the double decision was the subject.


Medium-range missile MGM-31B Pershing II

Decision making

On December 12, 1979, the NATO states in Brussels decided to station new medium-range nuclear weapons. The reason was: The SS-20, the backfire bomber and modernized short-range missiles would have increased the Soviet superiority in Europe. In contrast, the NATO weapon systems in these areas have remained at the same level or are out of date. In addition, NATO has no land-based medium-range systems. If the Soviet rearmament continues, this calls into question the strategic balance and endangers the credibility of the flexible response .

Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) on M-1014 MAN for four BGM-109 cruise missiles in Belgium

That is why it is now decided to modernize its own Theater Nuclear Force (TNF) with 108 launchers for Pershing II and 464 ground-based cruise missiles of the GLCM type (BGM-109 Tomahawk). Each of these weapons should only receive one nuclear warhead. As soon as possible, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe and the 572 new warheads will be placed in the reduced inventory.

An additional body is also being set up to examine the precise effects of the missile deployment on NATO's overall strategy up to 1980 and to propose adjustments. Furthermore, analogous to the SALT II treaty, the USA and the Soviet Union should negotiate bilateral upper limits for these weapons as soon as possible in order to establish a controlled balance there too. This includes Brezhnev's proposal for a lower balance.

France did not support the decision because the government of Giscard d'Estaing only wanted to negotiate on these after the installation of new NATO missiles and did not want to involve his force de frappe . The decision is less of a military, more of a political decision, which should avoid a decoupling of the USA from the security interests of Western Europe.

Arms policy since 1980

The intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan on December 25, 1979 marked the temporary end of the policy of détente . By the time the missile deployment began in December 1983, new military strategic considerations from the USA were known.

On July 25, 1980, US President Jimmy Carter called for a nuclear counter-strategy in Presidential Directive 59 , thereby initiating a departure from the conventional strategic equilibrium. In December 1980, Pentagon advisers Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne described a surprise atomic attack by the United States with the aim of eliminating the politico-military leadership of the Soviet Union as a necessary option under the title Victory is Possible . They calculated that millions of fatalities in Europe and the USA were acceptable. Since 1981 the Pentagon has focused more on this option of being able to wage, limit and win a nuclear war. In 1982, Colin S. Gray wrote in Air Force magazine : “The NATO plan to deploy 108 Pershing IIs and 464 land-based cruise missiles is not intended to counterbalance the SS-20 ... NATO needs a good number of those 572 launch pads whether the Soviet Union is dismantling its SS-20 to zero or not. ”The Pentagon spoke of the beheading of the Soviet Union: making this possible now appeared to be the real purpose of retrofitting.

The US President Ronald Reagan , who was elected in November 1980, increased US defense spending enormously and rejected the SALT II treaty that had not yet been ratified. He tripled the production of medium-range missiles and spoke of the dead arming of the East. In August 1981, contrary to Carter's refusal , he had the neutron weapon built further. In March 1983 he called the Soviet Union an Empire of Evil , called for a worldwide crusade against communism and announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) about two weeks later . In doing so, he signaled a departure from the ABM Treaty of 1972. The aim of this policy appeared to be to ensure that the United States had uncatchable technological superiority and invulnerability and to render the Soviet second strike capability, on which the strategic balance had been based, ineffective.

Because of this course, the Soviet Union had anticipated a surprise nuclear attack by the West since 1981 and geared its secret services and military to identify indicators for this. In 1982 it declared the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and proposed a corresponding multilateral treaty. The NATO countries and the USA rejected the proposal. Four former US government members, including Robert McNamara and George F. Kennan , proposed this waiver to NATO again in 1982, sparking debate among military experts in Europe. In 1983 McNamara proposed that NATO completely abandon nuclear weapons as an alternative to the upcoming missile deployment. The debate about it intensified the rejection of the double decision in the Western European NATO countries.


In May 1981 the North Atlantic Council commissioned the High-Level Group (HLG) of the NPG to analyze the threat to NATO and to prepare the negotiations on the medium-range systems in Geneva. On November 18, 1981, Ronald Reagan proposed a bilateral zero solution for land-based medium-range missiles to the Soviet Union: The Pershing II and cruise missiles would not be deployed if the Soviet Union scrapped all SS-20s and all of the older SS-4s and SS-5s Department. This must begin immediately after the contract is signed and it must be possible to check it on site by US experts. The neoconservative State Secretary Richard Perle had drafted the offer to secure the USA the initiative in negotiations, to gain time to prepare its own missile deployment, to neutralize disarmament campaigns and to let the Geneva negotiations fail. To this end, the offer was presented as a non-negotiable package that the Soviet Union could only accept or reject. Reagan wrote in a private letter that one had to pretend to negotiate in order to catch up with a Soviet armaments lead. Until the missile was deployed, the US government stuck to this proposal, which provided no mutual concession. Many West Germans also interpreted it as a sham offer, since Reagan's demand for disarmament went beyond the double resolution, he had previously rejected the SALT II agreement and ordered the construction of the neutron weapon.

On November 30, 1981, disarmament negotiations began in Geneva . On May 25, 1982, the Soviet Union proposed a treaty with the following mutual obligations:

  • not to station any new systems of nuclear medium-range systems in Europe,
  • to reduce all medium-range nuclear systems (missiles and medium-range bombers) of NATO and the Warsaw Pact existing in Europe on June 1, 1982 with a range of more than 1000 kilometers to a maximum of 300 systems for both sides,
  • including 255 British and French warheads,
  • To ban cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers and ballistic air-to-surface missiles worldwide.

In July 1982 Paul Nitze (USA) and July Alexandrowitsch Kwizinski (Soviet Union) reached a compromise draft on the so-called forest walk. Both governments rejected this.

On December 21, 1982 the new general secretary of the CPSU Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov offered to unilaterally reduce the then 250 SS-20 missiles to 162 (as much as the sum of the land- and sea-based British and French nuclear weapons) and to move them to the east relocate behind the Urals . In return, the USA and NATO should forego the retrofitting that has been decided upon. The new federal government led by Helmut Kohl (CDU) rejected the proposal because the Soviet Union would keep 486 atomic warheads (compared to 97 western European warheads) and could advance them again at any time. She apparently wanted to prevent retrofitting in order to secure a monopoly on land-based medium-range missiles. With this, Kohl accepted Reagan's demand for the Soviet total abandonment of these weapons, which went beyond the double decision. NATO rejected Andropov's offer as an attempt to split Western Europe and the United States: while the Soviet Union would have retained 42 more SS-20s than at the beginning of the Geneva negotiations, the United States would still have had no land-based intermediate-range systems in Europe.

In February 1983, Reagan gave the Soviet Union four conditions for bilateral negotiations: The goal must be a balance with the United States alone. The French and British nuclear missiles would have to be disregarded. The SS-20 shouldn't just be postponed. An agreement must be controllable.

Both sides continued to arm unabated. According to the Defense Ministry's White Paper, by September 1983 the Soviet Union had 351 operational SS-20s and 248 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.

On October 27 and 28, 1983 in Montebello (Canada), the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) decided to maintain the double decision to withdraw a further 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe by 1988 and not to increase the number of warheads for the new medium-range weapons. Thus, in future, fewer TNFs should be available against conventional attacks and more nuclear weapons that can be used against Soviet territory. Their first use should take place later as part of the flexible response . That should increase the effectiveness of the deterrent. Internally, however, there were fears that NATO territory would become more vulnerable to Soviet pre-emptive strikes.

The negotiations were broken off without result. From November 1983, its failure also weighed on the negotiations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Peace movement

The double resolution and the nuclear upgrade determined the foreign and domestic policy debates from 1979 to 1983. In Western Europe and the USA, a broad peace movement with various topics and many new organizational and ideologically independent citizens' initiatives emerged in a short time . It organized the largest mass demonstrations in its countries to date: including the peace demonstration in Bonn's Hofgarten in 1981 (October 10; 350,000 participants), in Amsterdam (November 21, 1981; 400,000), the peace demonstration in Bonn in 1982 (June 10; 500,000) , the No Nukes Rally in New York City (June 12, 1982; 1 million), the days of action in " Hot Autumn " 1983 (October 22: 1.3 million nationwide; October 29: The Hague 550,000; Lisbon 200,000; Copenhagen 100,000; Vienna 70,000; other cities 100,000). There were also sit-ins at rocket sites, for example in Mutlanger Heide (September 1 to 3, 1983; around 1000 participants, including many celebrities), human chains such as the human chain from Stuttgart to Neu-Ulm , fasting weeks and much more.

The peace movement rejected the double decision altogether because it saw the announced missiles as a qualitatively new upgrade step for an offensive nuclear war strategy and wanted to end the arms race between the two blocs. This threatens to slip away from political control and lead to nuclear war . That is why the Krefeld appeal of November 1980 called for the abandonment of the installation of new nuclear missiles, the abandonment of the military doctrine of equilibrium and a Europe free of nuclear weapons. Minorities called for the exit from NATO, at least the abandonment of the option of a nuclear first strike, or a switch to social defense . Sections of the SPD and the DGB, including IG Metall , sympathized with the peace movement and called for general disarmament and the conversion of German armaments factories to the production of civilian goods .

Protests against the NATO double resolution in The Hague in October 1983

The opponents of the double decision pointed out that the nuclear weapons of both sides were sufficient for the multiple destruction of the world ( overkill ), i.e. any further nuclear armament would be senseless. There was talk of a reverse Cuban Missile Crisis, since the advance warning time for the Soviet Union would have been reduced to a few minutes in the event of a first strike from Europe. This has increased the risk of accidental nuclear war and a nuclear holocaust . One feared a nuclear war limited to Europe and therefore spoke of "Euroshima".

The proponents, however, emphasized: In the event of a Soviet attack with the SS-20 on Western Europe, a NATO counter-attack could only be carried out by US ICBMs, which would escalate the conflict into a nuclear world war. The Pershing II is unsuitable as a first-strike weapon because it can neither reach Soviet missile positions behind the Urals nor threaten the Soviet nuclear submarines.

The peace movement sparked a sharp conflict among Western military experts about NATO's strategy of deterrence: the double resolution made the security-policy conflicting interests between the United States and Western Europe unmistakable and the entire nuclear weapon-based deterrent concept unreliable because the arms race had irrevocably destabilized the strategic balance.

Bundestag decision

The federal government made its approval of the double decision subject to conditions. NATO must decide unanimously and the Federal Republic must not be the only stationing country, the initiative must lie with the USA. You waived the right to participate in decisions on the deployment orders for medium-range weapons.

Both parties of the social-liberal government coalition were internally disagreed on the double decision. After the USA and the Soviet Union rejected the forest walk compromise, more and more members of the SPD and local government associations rejected the deployment of the new NATO missiles. Spokesmen for this internal party opposition were Erhard Eppler and Oskar Lafontaine . More and more FDP members around spokesman William Borm (an informant at the time for the GDR - Ministry for State Security ) rejected the double decision. The FDP chairman Hans-Dietrich Genscher had to ask the vote of confidence in 1981 . When he offered to resign as foreign minister, a majority at the party confirmed his course. As more and more SPD members moved away from the double decision, Genscher agreed a coalition change between the FDP and the CDU / CSU in 1982. So he wanted to keep the FDP on its course and enforce the double resolution.

From June 9th to 11th, 1982 Ronald Reagan visited the Federal Republic and took part in the NATO summit conference in Bonn. The visit was intended to strengthen NATO against the opponents of the double decision, but mobilized enormous protests.

On October 1, 1982, Helmut Kohl replaced Helmut Schmidt in the office of Federal Chancellor with a successful vote of no confidence . In his government statement of October 13, 1982, Kohl emphasized his unreserved adherence to the double resolution: A fluctuating position would be life-threatening for the Federal Republic because it endangered the unity of NATO, which is the core of the German raison d'etre. He will fulfill the negotiation part, if necessary also the retrofitting part. Successful negotiations could only be expected if the Soviet Union knew this.

On January 20, 1983, French President François Mitterrand described the deployment of missiles in a speech in the Bundestag that had been prepared since 1981 as a prerequisite for successful INF negotiations with the Soviet Union. The background was fears that Kohl would not be able to push through the NATO retrofitting against the domestic political protests and would include the French nuclear weapons if the negotiations in Geneva were to be successful.

In the federal election in 1983 , the CDU, CSU and FDP received a clear majority, which Kohl confirmed in office. Economic issues, not the double decision, were decisive for the election. The federal party Die Grünen , founded in 1980, won seats in the Bundestag for the first time and made a major inquiry as to whether nuclear weapons were compatible with international law .

In July 1983, 71.7% of the German citizens questioned, including majorities of CDU and FDP voters, approved a referendum on the deployment of missiles. As a result, leading groups of the peace movement decided to conduct the survey. The Greens introduced a bill on October 24, 1983. All other parliamentary groups rejected this. According to a Europe-wide survey by the Gallup Organization in November 1983, up to 67% of all German citizens eligible to vote, 68% of the Dutch, 58% of the British, 54% of the Italians and 44% of the French were against the missile deployment.

At a special party conference of the SPD on November 18 and 19, 1983, only 14 members of the Bundestag from around 400 delegates from the Seeheimer Kreis voted for the missile deployment. On November 22, 1983, the Bundestag approved the list with 286 votes to 225 with one abstention.

Court judgments

In April 1981 the Greens filed a criminal complaint against the federal government for preparing a war of aggression . The Federal Court of Justice rejected the complaint due to a lack of individual guilt.

On December 16, 1983, the Greens applied for an injunction against the missile deployment and filed a constitutional complaint : The transfer of sovereignty to the US President to use these weapons required federal law, not a mere vote. The Federal Constitutional Court rejected the urgent application and on December 18, 1984 rejected the complaint as unfounded: A consent law was only necessary for international agreements. Since the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955, the US President has had sovereign rights to deploy missiles from German soil. An increase in the risk of war through a Soviet preventive strike cannot currently be proven; the federal government is responsible for this assessment. The limit of obvious arbitrariness is not violated. The court decided not to conduct its own research, as no criterion for a different evaluation could be given. Keeping nuclear missiles ready to deter a suitably armed enemy from using his nuclear weapons is not considered to be contrary to international law in the general legal opinion. Unless the production, storage, deployment and availability for use of these weapons are expressly prohibited by international law, they are permitted. International lawyers largely reject the initial use of nuclear weapons and, in many cases, any use to retaliate against previous nuclear attacks.

In 1984, Sarah Tisdall, an official at the UK Foreign Office, announced to the press the arrival of the first cruise missiles in Britain. She was sentenced to six months in prison for violating government officials' confidentiality obligations.

While large-scale demonstrations ceased after the stationing began in December 1983, sit-in blockades in front of some rocket sites continued until 1987. On January 12, 1987, 19 judges in Mutlangen also took part. Many participants invoked their freedom of conscience or a right of resistance , but were often convicted of coercion . The Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1986 that seat blockades that intentionally hinder traffic were a form of violence, but not reprehensible from the outset, so that prohibitions and arrests must be weighed against the fundamental right of freedom of assembly . In 1995, it repealed the previously expanded definition of violence in sit-ins as unconstitutional. The illegality of seat demonstrations under other regulations remained unaffected by this decision.


Model illustration of a Main Operating Base (MOB) with six vehicles in a Ready Storage Shelter (RSS) in the GLCM Alert and Maintenance Area (GAMA)
The GLCM Alert and Maintenance Area (GAMA) on the Wüschheim Air Station in West Germany with the six Ready Storage Shelters (RSS) for 96 BGM-109G cruise missiles

The medium-range systems of the USA were to be set up within the framework of nuclear participation from 1983 to 1987 in five NATO countries (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands). All 108 Pershing IIs were set up in Baden-Württemberg until 1986 , 36 of them in Lehmgrube (Kettershausen) in the Neu-Ulm area (1st Battalion of the 9th Field Artillery), 36 in Mutlanger Heide (2nd Battalion), 36 in Waldheide in the Heilbronn area (4th Battalion). They were under the command of the 56th Field Artillery Brigade in Schwäbisch Gmünd .

Of the planned 464 cruise missiles, 304 were deployed by the end of 1987. In November 1983 the US Air Force's 501st Tactical Missile Wing unit at RAF Greenham Common received the first six, from December 10, 1983 nine cruise missiles were set up in the Hunsrück , and on August 28, 1984 the first cruise missiles reached Belgium. Overall, they were distributed as follows:

The Netherlands was to receive 48 cruise missiles by the end of 1988. They only approved the double decision in 1979 with the reservation that Parliament would vote on the list in 1981. There was no majority until 1985. The Partij van de Arbeid , which entered the government in 1981 , rejected the list; it was also highly controversial in the CDA . In June 1984, Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers only promised the line-up if the number of SS-20s continued to increase by November 1985. Since this was the case, the conditional establishment decision came into force, but was no longer carried out because of the new INF negotiations that had been going on since May 1985.


On November 23, 1983, one day after the Bundestag decision, the Soviet Union broke off the Geneva INF negotiations. In addition, on December 8, 1983, it postponed the START negotiations that had begun in 1981 and the MBFR negotiations in Vienna on December 15, 1983 for an indefinite period and announced the deployment of operational and tactical nuclear missiles in the GDR and the ČSSR . The MBFR negotiations were resumed on March 16, 1984. From 1984 the Soviet Union increased its short-range nuclear missiles of the type SS-23 and SS-12 in the Eastern Bloc and advanced more of them to the territory of the GDR. This was announced by the Soviet Ministry of Defense on May 15, 1984.

After the re-election of US President Reagan, the US and the Soviet Union agreed on January 7, 1985 to resume talks on nuclear weapons. On May 26, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the new head of state of the Soviet Union, offered to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by a third. In return, he demanded the freezing and modernization of medium-range missiles, a long-term stipulation of the ABM contract and limitation of the SDI program to laboratory tests. The background to this was an enormous budget deficit and the weakness of the Soviet economy to adequately cover the basic needs of the population. Gorbachev wanted to overcome the Cold War through far-reaching disarmament offers in order to free up budget funds for reforming the Soviet economy. In the face of considerable domestic political resistance, he gave up the Brezhnev doctrine and pushed through a partial withdrawal of troops from the Eastern Bloc in order to show the West a serious change of course from the Soviet Union.

The USA initially acted skeptically and waited. Reagan was only ready to negotiate after the Soviet military misinterpreted the NATO maneuver Able Archer 83 as a cover for a real nuclear attack, initiated preventive measures against it and thus almost triggered a nuclear war. After an unsuccessful Geneva summit in 1985, Gorbachev held talks with Reagan directly at the 1986 summit in Reykjavík . He offered to halve the amount of all strategic nuclear weapons and dismantle all medium-range missiles from the two military blocs. He renounced the involvement of the British and French TNF, allowed disarmament controls on Soviet soil and agreed to make human rights a key issue at future summits. He linked this to the demand that the US should limit its SDI program to pure laboratory tests. Reagan refused. Gorbachev then surprisingly proposed the complete abolition of all strategic nuclear weapons in ten years. Reagan outbid him with a proposal to abolish all nuclear weapons within the same period. With regard to SDI, he stuck to his opposition.

December 8, 1987, White House : Mikhail Gorbachev (left) and Ronald Reagan (right) sign the INF treaty

Nevertheless, the wide-ranging offers brought about a breakthrough. The United States agreed not to deploy any antiballistic satellites in space for the next ten years. In February 1987, Gorbachev dropped calls for the United States to renounce the SDI program. In April 1987 he offered the double zero solution, the dismantling of all nuclear missiles with a range of more than 500 km. After initial reservations, Helmut Kohl agreed on August 27, 1987 to include the Pershing IA missiles already stationed on German soil in this contract. On December 8, 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF treaty for the worldwide dismantling of all their nuclear short- and medium-range missiles and the associated launch systems. The contract came into force on June 1, 1988. By May 1991, 2,692 medium-range missiles had been scrapped. The double resolution was thus revised.

Its supporters attributed this disarmament to their consistent approval of the missile deployment, including the minority in the SPD. Helmut Schmidt explained in a letter to the editor in 1986 : He had conceived the double resolution as a means of exerting pressure on mutual negotiations, but doubted that they had been conducted seriously. Had he still been Federal Chancellor at the end of 1982, he would have sparked a considerable conflict with the US government over the rejection of the Forest Walk Compromise at the time. In 1988 he declared that his advocacy of the double decision had cost him his office. Historical research confirms this view. On February 13, 2003, Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) said no to Chancellor Gerhard Schröders to the Iraq war : the implementation of the double resolution had eliminated the nuclear threat posed by Soviet missiles, not the demonstrations against it.

The opponents attributed the breakthrough to the strong civil society's rejection of further arms races in Western Europe. The peace movement had increased trust between the military blocs and made it possible for Gorbachev to give in. Direct contacts between Western disarmament initiatives such as the Doctors Against Nuclear War and the Soviet government would have contributed significantly to their rethinking. Gorbachev himself stated that his contacts with representatives of the peace movement at a congress in Moscow (February 1987) had induced him to separate the problem of medium-range missiles from other disarmament issues. That was made possible by the INF Treaty.

After the NATO states had made an absolute conventional equilibrium a condition, the US withdrew the bilateral agreement of 1986 on the disarmament of all nuclear weapons. Only the USA and the Soviet Union completely dismantled their land-based short and medium-range nuclear weapons. It has not yet been possible to include other nuclear powers multilaterally. NATO has retained the option of first-time use of nuclear weapons to this day. Joschka Fischer (The Greens), who had opposed the double decision in 1983 in the Bundestag, suggested that NATO, as Federal Foreign Minister, waive this option in 1998. The USA, Great Britain and France rejected the advance. The United States rejected any discussion of this in NATO because any questioning of the first deployment option would undermine its deterrent capacity.


  • Jan Hansen: Farewell to the Cold War? The Social Democrats and the rearmament dispute (1977–1987). Oldenbourg, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-11-044684-5 .
  • Jan Hansen: Do missiles create jobs? The dispute over retrofitting and armament conversion in the trade unions (around 1979 to 1983) , in: Arbeit - Bewegungs - Geschichte , Issue II / 2016.
  • Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, Hermann Wentker (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. The NATO double decision from a German-German and international perspective. Oldenbourg, Munich 2011, ISBN 978-3-486-70413-6 .
  • Werner Offenloch: Remembering the Law. The dispute over retrofitting on the streets and in the courts. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2005, ISBN 3-16-148680-3 .
  • Michael Ploetz, Hans-Peter Müller (Ed.): Remote-controlled peace movement? GDR and USSR in the fight against the NATO double decision. LIT, Münster 2004, ISBN 3-8258-7235-1 .
  • Tim Matthias Weber: Between retrofitting and disarmament. The nuclear policy of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany between 1977 and 1989. Nomos, Baden-Baden 1994, ISBN 3-7890-3309-X .
  • Stephan Layritz: The NATO double decision: Western security policy in the field of tension between domestic, alliance and foreign policy. Peter Lang, 1992, ISBN 3-631-45283-7 .
  • Herbert Dittgen: German-American Security Relations in the Helmut Schmidt Era. Prehistory and consequences of the NATO double decision. Fink, Munich 1991, ISBN 3-7705-2676-7 .
  • Anton Notz: The SPD and the NATO double decision: turning away from a security policy based on reason. Baden-Baden 1991, ISBN 3-7890-2010-9 .
  • Thomas Risse-Kappen: Null solution: Decision-making processes for medium-range weapons, 1970–1987. Campus, 1988, ISBN 3-593-33900-5 .
  • Karla Hannemann: The double decision of NATO. Genesis, motives and determinants of a controversial alliance political decision. Munich 1987.
  • Ulf Teichmann: New social movement in the steel mill? Protests for Peace and Work in the Ruhr Area (1981-1984) , in: Work - Movement - History , Issue III / 2018, pp. 91-108.
  • Helga Haftendorn : Security and stability. Foreign relations of the Federal Republic between the oil crisis and NATO double decision. Munich 1986.
  • Ernst-Christoph Meier : German-American security relations and the NATO double decision. The Impact of NATO Internal Divergence of Interest on the Alliance's Nuclear Policy. Schäuble, Rheinfelden 1986, ISBN 3-87718-225-9 .
  • Günther Wagenlehner (ed.): The campaign against the NATO double decision. A balance sheet. Bernard and Graefe, Koblenz 1985, ISBN 3-7637-5343-5 .
  • Gert Bastian (ed.): Generals against retrofitting. Hoffmann and Campe, 1983, ISBN 3-455-08674-8 .
  • Dieter S. Lutz: World War Against Will? The nuclear weapons in and for Europe. A contribution to the discussion about the retrofitting decision. Rowohlt, Reinbek near Hamburg 1981, ISBN 3-499-14934-6 .
  • Alfred Mechtersheimer (Ed.): Retrofitting? Documents and positions on the NATO double decision. Reinbek near Hamburg 1981.
  • Anton-Andreas Guha: Death in the gray area: Can Europe still be defended? (= Fischer-Taschenbuch. 4217). Frankfurt am Main 1980, ISBN 3-596-24217-7 .
  • Eckart Conze: Skepticism of modernity and the utopia of security. NATO rearmament and peace movement in the history of the Federal Republic , in: Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History 7 (2010), pp. 220–239.

Films and images

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Gerhard Spörl (Der Spiegel, March 2, 2009): Series Adenauer's project .
  2. Stephen J. Cimbala: US Military Strategy and the Cold War Endgame. Routledge / Curzon, 1995, ISBN 0-7146-4117-0 , p. 44.
  3. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 310.
  4. Hans-Peter Dürr and others (ed.): Responsibility for peace. Scientists against nuclear armament. Rowohlt, new edition 1987, ISBN 3-499-33045-8 ; Werner Buckel and others (ed.): Thinking instead of upgrading: Scientists for peace. Loeper, 1984, ISBN 3-88652-011-0 , p. 30
  5. ^ Dieter S. Lutz (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1983): Armament and Disarmament - War Danger and War Prevention. Notes on the status of 1983. , p. 551 (PDF); Dieter Senghaas : Again: thinking about retrofitting. In: Leviathan , Volume 12, Issue 1 (March 1984), Nomos, pp. 1–27; Johan Galtung : There are alternatives! Four ways to peace and security. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1984, ISBN 3-531-11679-7 , p. 146
  6. Generals for Peace and Disarmament (Ed.): Sicherheit für Westeuropa. Alternative security and military policy. Rasch & Röhring, Hamburg / Zurich 1985, ISBN 3-89136-014-2
  7. ^ James R. Kurth: The United States and Western Europe in the Reagan Era. In: Morris H. Morley (ed.): Crisis and Confrontation: Ronald Reagan's Foreign Policy. Rowman & Littlefield, 1988, ISBN 0-8476-7432-0 , 1988, p. 53
  8. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 42.
  9. ^ Wichard Woyke (ed.): Handwortbuch Internationale Politik. Bonn 2000, ISBN 3-89331-489-X , p. 359.
  10. ^ Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (ed.): Hamburg Information on Peace Research and Security Policy. Hamburg 1987, p. 7; different Gerhard Hubatschek: Strategy for Peace: Contributions to Security Policy. Busse Seewald, 1986, ISBN 3-512-00760-0 , p. 159.
  11. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 97, fn. 7
  12. Federal Agency for Civic Education: Helmut Schmidt's position when the double decision came about
  13. Thomas Klein: Peace and Justice! Böhlau, Vienna 2007, ISBN 978-3-412-02506-9 , p. 76, fn. 3
  14. ^ Peter Graf Kielmansegg: After the disaster. The Germans and their nation. A history of divided Germany. Berlin 2000, ISBN 3-88680-329-5 , p. 227.
  15. Michael Ploetz, Hans P. Müller: Remote-controlled peace movement? Münster 2004, p. 86.
  16. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 43 ; Der Spiegel, November 14, 1983: Schmidt, the prisoner
  17. ^ Martin A. Smith: NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War. Springer, 2000, ISBN 0-7923-6632-8 , p. 40.
  18. ^ Heinrich Siegler (Ed.): Documentation on Disarmament and Security, Volumes 12-13. Siegler, 1974, pp. 356, 364; Volume 17, Siegler, 1981, p. 35.
  19. Helmut Schmidt: People and Powers. Siedler, 2012, ISBN 978-3-641-08262-8 , pp. 74 and 82
  20. Michael Ploetz, Hans P. Müller: Remote-controlled peace movement? Münster 2004, p. 114 and note 84
  21. Reinhard Bettzuege (Ed.): Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany: Documents from 1949 to 1994. Science and Politics, 1995, ISBN 3-8046-8822-5 , p. 469; Communiqué of the NATO foreign and defense ministers on the conditional resolution on the stationing of medium-range weapons, December 12, 1979 (, PDF p. 4–6; with introduction)
  22. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 371.
  23. ^ Gregor Schöllgen: The foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. From the beginning to the present. Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-51093-0 , p. 155.
  24. Jürgen Bruhn: The Cold War or: The dead armor of the Soviet Union: the US military-industrial complex and its threat from peace. Focus, 1995, ISBN 3-88349-434-8 , p. 172.
  25. ^ Colin S. Gray, Keith Payne (Foreign Affairs, December 1980): Victory is possible (English, PDF)
  26. ^ Francis H. Marlo, Planning Reagan's War: Conservative Strategists and America's Cold War Victory. Free Press, 2012, ISBN 978-1-59797-667-1 , p. 76 and fn. 14
  27. quoted from Till Bastian (ed.): Doctors against nuclear war. We won't be able to help you. Pabel-Moewig, 1987, ISBN 3-8118-3248-4 , p. 9.
  28. Martin Wengeler: The language of armament: on the history of armaments discussions after 1945. Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 1992, ISBN 3-8244-4105-5 , p. 232.
  29. Josef Holik: The arms control: Review of a short era. Duncker & Humblot, 2008, ISBN 978-3-428-12928-7 , pp. 20 and 104
  30. Ulrike Poppe, Rainer Eckert, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk Between Self-Assertion and Adaptation: Forms of Resistance and Opposition in the GDR. Christoph Links, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-86153-097-X , p. 275.
  31. ^ Michael Ploetz, Hans-Peter Müller: Remote-controlled peace movement? Münster 2004, p. 125
  32. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 58.
  33. ^ Franz Josef Meiers: From Relaxation to Confrontation: American Soviet Policy in the Controversy of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1969–1980. Brockmeyer, 1987, ISBN 3-88339-630-3 , p. 313.
  34. Michael Ploetz: How the Soviet Union lost the Cold War: From retrofitting to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Propylaea, 2000, ISBN 3-549-05828-4 , p. 96; Bernd Jakob: Secret intelligence services and globalization: the "intelligence" factor between state-world threat analysis and world-society risk perception. Peter Lang, 1999, ISBN 3-631-33806-6 , p. 96.
  35. Nina Tannenwald: The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945. Cambridge University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-521-52428-5 , pp. 282-285.
  36. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 68 f. and footnote 24
  37. Ludger Volmer: The Greens: From the protest movement to the established party - a balance sheet. C. Bertelsmann, 2009, ISBN 978-3-570-10040-0 , p. 132.
  38. Michael Ploetz, Hans-Peter Müller (Ed.): Remote-controlled peace movement? Münster 2004, p. 119.
  39. ^ Theo Sommer (Die Zeit, June 3, 1983): Compromise during a walk in the woods: The history of the Nitze-Kwitzinskij formula.
  40. Thomas Risse-Kappen: Null solution: Decision-making processes for medium-range weapons, 1970–1987. Campus, 1988, ISBN 3-593-33900-5 , p. 114.
  41. Michael Ploetz, Hans-Peter Müller (Ed.): Remote-controlled peace movement? Münster 2004, p. 126.
  42. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 158.
  43. Federal Ministry of Defense (Ed.): White Book 1983. On the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1983, p. 77 f.
  44. Stephen J. Flanagan, Fen Osler Hampson (ed.): Securing Europe's Future: a Research Volume from the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. Croom Helm, London 1986, ISBN 0-7099-1086-X , p. 15 f.
  45. Wilfried Mausbach: Marching together - striking separately? In: Philipp Gassert and others (ed.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, pp. 291–304.
  46. Detlev Preuße: Upheaval from Below: The Self-Liberation of Central and Eastern Europe and the End of the Soviet Union. Springer VS, 2014, ISBN 978-3-658-04971-3 , p. 220.
  47. Gunilla Budde, Eckart Conze, Cornelia Rauh: The bourgeoisie after the bourgeois age: models and practice since 1945. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2010, ISBN 978-3-525-36850-3 , p. 141.
  48. Michael Ploetz, Hans-Peter Müller (Ed.): Remote-controlled peace movement? Münster 2004, p. 342.
  49. Udo Leuschner: Image selection - The fight against retrofitting ; Documentation of the civil disobedience to disarmament campaign. (Contents)
  50. ^ Network Peace Cooperative , October 22, 2013: 30 years ago: Biggest peace demonstrations in German history
  51. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 180.
  52. ^ Lutz Plümer: Positions of the Peace Movement. Sendler, 1981, ISBN 3-88048-053-2 , p. 133 and more often
  53. See Jan Hansen: Do missiles create jobs? The dispute over retrofitting and armaments conversion in the trade unions (around 1979 to 1983) , in: Arbeit - Bewegungs - Geschichte , Issue II / 2016; as well as Ulf Teichmann: New social movement in the steel mill? Protests for Peace and Work in the Ruhr Area (1981-1984) , in: Work - Movement - History , Issue III / 2018, pp. 91-108.
  54. Michael Salewski: The nuclear century. An interim balance. Franz Steiner, 1998, ISBN 3-515-07321-3 , p. 182.
  55. Susanne Schregel: The nuclear war in front of the apartment door. Frankfurt am Main 2011, p. 64.
  56. Michael Ploetz, Hans-Peter Müller (Ed.): Remote-controlled peace movement? Münster 2004, p. 88; Franz HU Borkenhagen (Hrsg.): Wehrkraftzersetzung: officers comment on the Heilbronn Declaration. Rowohlt, 1984, ISBN 3-499-15435-8 , p. 34 f. Opposition from German military experts in: Papers for German and international politics. Volume 28, Pahl-Rugenstein, Cologne 1983, pp. 1150-1158.
  57. Wilfried von Bredow: Military and Democracy in Germany: An Introduction. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Münster 2007, ISBN 978-3-531-15712-2 , p. 181.
  58. ^ Peter Graf Kielmansegg: After the disaster. Berlin 2000, p. 228.
  59. Jan Hansen: Farewell to the Cold War? The Social Democrats and the Rearmament Dispute (1977–1987) , Berlin 2016; Philipp Gassert and others (ed.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 211.
  60. ^ Hans-Dieter Heumann: Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The biography. Ferdinand Schoeningh, Paderborn 2011, ISBN 978-3-506-77037-0 , pp. 113 and 118-122
  61. Der Spiegel, June 7, 1982: Reagan no longer understands the world
  62. Reinhard Bettzuege, Foreign Office. (Ed.): Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany: Documents from 1949 to 1994. Science and Politics, 1995, ISBN 3-8046-8822-5 , p. 495.
  63. Philipp Gassert and others (eds.): Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 374.
  64. Werner Suss (ed.): The Federal Republic in the eighties: domestic policy, political culture, foreign policy. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1991, ISBN 3-8100-0894-X , p. 273.
  65. Steve Breyman: Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and US Arms Control Policy. State University of New York, 2001, ISBN 0-7914-4656-5 , p. 162.
  66. ^ Ulrich Rommelfanger: The consultative referendum: A constitutional theoretical, legal and comparative investigation. Duncker & Humblot, 1988, ISBN 3-428-06374-0 , p. 156.
  67. Michael Bess: Realism, Utopia, and the Mushroom Cloud: Four Activist Intellectuals and Their Strategies for Peace, 1945-1989. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1993, ISBN 0-226-04420-3 , p. 137.
  68. Minutes of the meeting of the German Bundestag on November 22, 1983 (PDF; 3.5 MB)
  69. Ludger Volmer: The Greens and foreign policy - a difficult relationship. Westphalian steam boat, 1998, ISBN 3-89691-438-3 , p. 81.
  70. Werner Offenloch: Remembrance of the law. Tübingen 2005, p. 105 f.
  71. ^ Rüdiger Wolfrum and others (eds.): Handbuch des Staatsrechts Volume XI: Internationale Bezüge. CFMüller Juristischer Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-8114-4511-6 , p. 574.
  72. BVerfG 13/83 of December 18, 1984, BVerfGE 68.1
  73. Randolph Krüger: The international legal obligation of the USA and Russia to further reduce and completely disarm the nuclear weapons. LIT, Münster 2003, ISBN 3-8258-7081-2 , pp. 167-170.
  74. Trevor Desmoyers-Davis: Citizenship In Modern Britain. Taylor and Francis, 2003, ISBN 1-84314-537-5 , p. 67.
  75. Stefan Harrendorf: Recidivism and criminal careers of violent offenders. Universitätsverlag, Göttingen 1990, p. 12.
  76. DFR - BVerfGE 92, 1 - Sitzblockaden II. Accessed on February 21, 2019 .
  77. ruling d. BVerfG. BVerfGE 92, 1 - Sit-In Blockades II, Rn. 65
  78. ^ Friso Wielenga : The Netherlands. 2008, p. 365.
  79. ^ Heinrich Siegler (German Society for Foreign Policy, ed.): Documentation on Disarmament and Security, Volume 21. Siegler, 1988, p. 260.
  80. Heinrich Siegler (Ed.): Documentation on Disarmament and Security, Volume 22. Siegler, 1984, p. 295.
  81. Randolph Krüger: The international legal obligation of the USA and Russia to further reduce and completely disarm the nuclear weapons. LIT, Münster 2003, ISBN 3-8258-7081-2 , p. 129 f.
  82. Hannes Adomeit, Hans-Hermann Höhmann, Günther Wagenlehner: The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Status, problems and perspectives of Perestroika. Kohlhammer, Munich 1990, ISBN 3-17-010739-9 , p. 149.
  83. Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann, Reinhard Wolf: Rocket armor and international security from 1942 to today. Franz Steiner, 2004, ISBN 3-515-08282-4 , p. 93.
  84. ^ Philipp Gassert and others: Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 82 and fn. 93
  85. ^ Philipp Gassert and others: Second Cold War and Peace Movement. Munich 2011, p. 88.
  86. Josef Holik: The arms control. 2008, pp. 58-60.
  87. WDR, December 8, 2007: 20 years ago: INF treaty is signed in Washington: “A world free of nuclear weapons for our children” ; Gregor Schöllgen: The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany: From the Beginnings to the Present. 3rd edition, Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-51093-0 , p. 169
  88. Correspondence between the supporters of the double decision in the SPD and former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt from December 8, 1987 ( Memento from November 22, 2011 in the Internet Archive )
  89. Helmut Schmidt: Reykjavik went much further than a forest walk. In: Der Spiegel. November 24, 1986.
  90. ^ Helmut Schmidt: Speech to the North Atlantic Assembly on November 18, 1988 in Hamburg. BT-Drs. 11/3799 p. 21 (left column)
  91. Bernd Faulenbach : The social democratic decade. From the reform euphoria to the new confusion. The SPD 1969–1982. Dietz, Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-8012-5035-5 , p. 721; Michael Herkendell: Social democratic foreign and security policy - a historical classification. In: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Ed.): Social - peaceful - global? Foreign and Security Policy Today: Leading Perspectives, Challenges, Solutions. LIT, Münster 2014, ISBN 978-3-643-12436-4 , pp. 31-72.
  92. ^ German Bundestag (plenary minutes 15/25, February 13, 2003): Speech by Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) , PDF p. 1903, top left column
  93. Ulrike Borchardt, Angelika Dörfler-Dierken, Hartwig Spitzer: Peace education: The Hamburg interdisciplinary model. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2014, p. 33.
  94. ^ Arnold Sywottek: The Cold War - Prelude to Peace? LIT, Münster 1994, ISBN 3-89473-602-X , p. 152.
  95. Mikhail Gorbachev: Perestroika. The second Russian revolution. Droemer Knaur, 1989, ISBN 3-426-26375-0 , p. 196; Mikhail Gorbachev: For a world without nuclear weapons, for the survival of humanity: Speech to the participants of the international peace forum in Moscow, February 16, 1987. Dietz, 1987, ISBN 3-320-01013-1 .
  96. Akira Iriye and others: History of the world 1945 to today: The globalized world. Beck, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-406-64116-9 , p. 146.
  97. Federal Government: Annual Disarmament Report 2013, p. 15.
  98. Sibylle Krause-Burger: Joschka Fischer: The way through the illusions. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999, ISBN 3-421-05321-9 , p. 158
  99. Tom Sauer: Nuclear Inertia: Us Weapons Policy After the Cold War. Tauris, 2005, ISBN 1-85043-765-3 , p. 47.
  100. Nuclear weapons: failure for fishermen. In: Der Spiegel. March 20, 2000.