Nuclear participation
The nuclear sharing is a concept within the deterrence of NATO , the Member States with no nuclear weapons in the target planning and in the use of arms incorporates by NATO. The transatlantic alliance, which also sees itself as a “nuclear alliance”, has so far designed the concept of nuclear participation to demonstrate that the USA is able and willing to target European NATO member states that are threatened with nuclear weapons with their own and that do not have their own nuclear weapons protect.
Part of nuclear participation is that the states involved consult in relevant bodies and decide that they have the technical prerequisites for the use of nuclear weapons - for example suitable aircraft or missile delivery systems - ready and that US nuclear weapons are stored on their territory. In the event of war, the participating states can use nuclear weapons under US control.
In peacetime and in the event of war, the nuclear weapons stored in the partner states should always remain under US sovereignty until they are fired. Only the US leadership has the necessary codes; they are strictly confidential. However, since the deployment takes place under responsibility and through the weapon systems of the partner state, the partner state ultimately has a de facto veto right .
British and French nuclear weapons were never designed as instruments to protect European NATO partners.
history
The first airborne nuclear weapons were stationed by the USA in the Federal Republic of Germany in March 1955 , shortly thereafter also nuclear warheads for cruise missiles and short-range missiles as well as nuclear artillery projectiles and atomic mines . They were intended for use by US troops in the event of war. It was not until 1957 that the USA informed the German public of the existence of the weapons. A little later, the then Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer ( CDU ), with broad support and against protests, pushed through the nuclear participation of the Federal Republic using the Bundeswehr's weapon systems in the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact . At that time, both alliance camps still considered nuclear weapons to be actually usable weapons in the context of a conventional nuclear war. In 1960, 1,500 American nuclear warheads were stored in the Federal Republic and a further 1,500 in the rest of Western Europe. This strategy was irrelevant already during its implementation, since, in view of the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union , the mutual destruction in case of first use of nuclear weapons was a certainty. In 1967/68 the Flexible Response was adopted as a new NATO strategy, which also provided for a purely conventional exchange of blows as an option.
Strategic planners in both camps assumed that a conventional style war would no longer be possible in which both sides would not stop fighting before their potentials were exhausted and only the loser would ultimately be defenseless (as Carl von Clausewitz explains in his work On War , How Fighters Usually “Win”). According to this logic, the real purpose of nuclear weapons could only be to deter aggressors who are planning a war against a nuclear power from their intention to start a conventional war. To this end, NATO considered nuclear weapons to be indispensable.
In the Warsaw Pact there was a system comparable to nuclear participation. For example, the armed forces of the Soviet Union kept nuclear warheads in the special weapons camps in Himmelpfort and Stolzenhain from 1968 to 1990, which were to be given to the GDR 's National People's Army in the event of war . From June 29, 1991, the area of the former GDR was officially free of nuclear weapons.
In 2007, NATO's “deterrent and defense system” was reviewed. Section 12 of the document states: “Consistent with their commitment to remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist, the Allies agree that the North Atlantic Council will mandate the appropriate committees to develop concepts such as full participation The allies in question can be guaranteed with regard to agreements on nuclear participation, even in the event that NATO decides to reduce its dependence on non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. "
A small question from the left in the German Bundestag about the role of nuclear weapons in the future deterrent and defense system of NATO was not answered on July 25, 2016 with the reason: "The information policy of the German government with regard to the NATO nuclear strategy and its deterrent and For security reasons, defense arrangements are subject to the alliance's mandatory confidentiality rules . "
Organization in the Bundeswehr
The German government always decides on the use of a US nuclear weapon by German weapon systems.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Air Force and the Army were responsible for nuclear participation . In the army, personnel in the pioneer troops were trained in the use of ADM mines as well as for the barrel and rocket artillery as well as parts of the supply troops and repair battalions special weapons for the maintenance, transport and firing of nuclear projectiles and rocket warheads. In the years that followed, the Bundeswehr received missile systems such as Pershing , Honest John and Sergeant as well as the M 110 artillery pieces . Bullets of caliber 155 mm for the M 109 and field howitzer 155 mm were later made available.
The Starfighter should initially be procured entirely without conventional armament. The Luftwaffe also received anti-aircraft missiles that could carry nuclear warheads into hostile streams of bombers.
At the same time, a command and fire control organization was set up that met the strict requirements of the US and NATO. The operational planning for the army lay with the commanding generals of the corps . For advising the commander regarding the management of the entities involved in nuclear operations, to the effects of nuclear weapons and for the external security of special ammunition depot ( Special Ammunition Storage - SAS) the artillery corps commanders (Arkos) and the commanders were in the corps artillery regiments responsible. As specialists for these tasks, they were assigned “impact advisors”.
Because of the US sovereignty over the atomic explosives, guarding, training and exercises are carried out in close cooperation with a US artillery group (corps level) or a US detachment (battalion level). In use, the companies of the supply battalions special weapons, independent supply companies special weapons and their accompanying squadron or the accompanying batteries of the artillery would be responsible for security, transport and storage.
After BRD and US clearance for the respective use, the nuclear explosives must be unlocked with a code shortly before being fired by a US PAL team (Permissive Action Links). The explosive devices must always be accompanied by two US soldiers until they are fired. The units scheduled for a nuclear mission must regularly demonstrate their capabilities in numerous inspections, tests and exercises (ATT, AAT, NSI) in accordance with NATO's test criteria.
NATO double decision and disarmament
After NATO's double decision in the early 1980s once again led to massive nuclear build-up in Europe, the USA withdrew most of its nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War. Up until then, only 208 of the 437 NATO bunkers had been built or commissioned at European air bases. In 1992, around 700 US nuclear warheads were still stored in Europe. Great Britain had disposed of its aerial bombs by the end of 1998 and the last US nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the German air bases in Memmingerberg and Nörvenich as early as 1995 . In 1990 NATO officially declared its nuclear weapons “weapons of last resort” and thus largely turned away from their actual use in its strategy documents.
Currently, of the three nuclear powers of NATO (USA, Great Britain, France), only the United States provides weapons for nuclear participation in Belgium ( peer ), Germany ( Büchel Air Base ), Italy ( Rimini Airport ), the Netherlands ( Uden ) and Turkey ( Incirlik Air Base ). The use of American nuclear weapons by NATO allies was regulated in two- key agreements ( two party key control treaty or two key international arms control treaty ), according to which the command over the nuclear warheads rests with American surveillance teams, while the delivery systems and operating teams to be provided by the allies. This is to prevent an operation against the will of the USA or the stationing countries.
It is assumed that up to 480 US nuclear weapons were stored in Europe in this context in the mid-1990s, of which around 150 were at the US base in Ramstein and at the German Air Force Air Base of JaboG 33 in Büchel . Since January 2007, experts assume that Ramstein was cleared of nuclear weapons. The Air Force only trains in Büchel as part of nuclear participation in the use of nuclear weapons by Tornado- type fighter-bombers .
Major NATO nuclear weapons storage facility in 1995
NATO nuclear weapons type B61-3 / -4, status 2019
| Airport | country | Arms stored | max storable |
|---|---|---|---|
| Büchel Air Base |
 Germany
|
20th | 44 |
| Kleine Brogel military airfield |
 Belgium
|
20th | 44 |
| Volkel military airfield |
 Netherlands
|
20th | 44 |
| Aviano Air Base |
 Italy
|
20th | 72 |
| Ghedi military airfield |
Italy
|
20th | 44 |
| Incirlik Air Base |
 Turkey
|
50 | 100 |
| Total: | 150 | 392 |
Source: Graphic US Nuclear Weapons In Europe 2019 from Briefing HM Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of Amercan Sientists in front of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC on November 1, 2019. Graphic reprinted in the magazine Zu Equal 1/2020, p. 8 in the article by Heinrich Brauss American nuclear weapons in Europe - an important element of the NATO strategy .
criticism
Political Concerns
NATO's concept of nuclear participation is based on the assumption that even states that (are not allowed to) possess their own nuclear weapons should benefit from the “nuclear umbrella” of those NATO states that belong to the nuclear powers. This primarily refers to the US guarantee that it will support allies by threatening to use US nuclear weapons, which are being put under pressure by third countries because they would otherwise be politically blackmailed. In security circles, one speaks of a “cheese dome that the USA had spread over us for over half a century”. This “cheese dome” consists of nuclear-armed US ICBMs, the US bomber fleet with atomic bombs, the nuclear submarine fleet and finally tactical US nuclear weapons (the concept of nuclear participation only applies to the latter).
As early as 1998, the importance of US nuclear weapons for the security of the European part of NATO was called into question: “With the withdrawal of most American nuclear weapons, the extended US nuclear deterrent in Europe has become almost virtual. Today, the British and French arsenals are likely to exceed the number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons that Washington has assigned to NATO for the first time. The American nuclear guarantee is largely limited to the declaratory. "
Some critics claimed that the idea of an "atomic protective shield" was already a mistake. 2010 said z. B. Alliance 90 / The Greens that since the end of the Cold War at the latest, ground-based nuclear weapons in Europe no longer have "the slightest strategic importance".
As early as the peace movement of the 1980s, the suspicion was expressed that the US stationing nuclear weapons in Europe was not about protecting Europe, but about protecting the American continent from attacks with nuclear weapons by ensuring that, despite all pledges of assistance, a " Euroshima ”(a nuclear war restricted to Europe, waged with tactical and eurostrategic nuclear weapons, still“ limited ”, since nuclear war not waged with long-range weapons) is accepted with approval. The talk of a "nuclear protective shield" of the USA is a "fairy tale". “The 'atomic umbrella' is not one. What really hangs over us is a sword of Damocles, and the thread has become thinner again. It would be devastating to repress the fact that peace was already hanging by a wafer-thin thread under the supposed protective umbrella during the Cold War. Europe scraped past the atomic inferno several times just by sheer luck (and once by the prudence of a Russian officer ). "
International law concerns
Despite the aforementioned code and sovereignty regulation, critics of nuclear participation are of the opinion that the transfer and deployment of US nuclear weapons in other NATO countries within the framework of nuclear participation violates the Non-Proliferation Treaty . The planned transfer to the air forces of these states in the event of war would violate Articles I and II of the Treaty, which prohibit the transfer or acceptance of direct or indirect power of disposal. With reference to these articles, the movement of the non-aligned states also calls for an end to nuclear participation. In contrast, an expert report prepared by the Scientific Service of the German Bundestag in 2017 comes to the conclusion that the contract only prohibits sole power of disposal, which does not apply to “nuclear participation”.
Failure to comply with internal standards
According to an internal study commissioned by the American Air Force, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), in 2008 many nuclear weapons depots did not meet the minimum security standards of the American Department of Defense. As a result, the US military plans to distribute nuclear weapons to fewer locations in Europe. The study was commissioned after six nuclear warheads were flown through the United States in August 2007 without the knowledge of the American Air Force. The institute estimates that there will be around 200 to 350 US atomic bombs in Europe in 2008, 10 to 20 of them in Büchel.
New discussion 2020
In 2020, SPD parliamentary group leader Rolf Mützenich spoke out in favor of ending nuclear participation. He then met with criticism in his own party. The chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Norbert Röttgen (CDU), warned against the isolation of Germany, also within Europe, and against the fact that Russia could thus be further encouraged in its armament policy and thus the security situation in Europe, also with regard to the ongoing war in Ukraine , could be further destabilized . The security expert Carlo Masala therefore called demands for unilateral disarmament without compensation a "policy of gamblers". One trigger of this discussion is that Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer wants to replace the outdated Tornado fighter aircraft used for this with new aircraft. In the meantime, for fear of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe, Poland offered to want to station them on their national territory otherwise.
See also
- proliferation
- Nuclear weapons in Germany
- United States Nuclear Forces
- 59th Ordnance Brigade
- Weapon Storage and Security System WS3
literature
- Florian Reichenberger: The »Devil's Spiral« to the Apocalypse - The Bundeswehr leadership under the spell of nuclear war . In: Military History - Journal of Historical Education . No. 4 , 2018, p. 4-9 .
Web links
- Nuclear weapons A – Z: Nuclear participation . 2015
- Hans M. Kristensen: US Nuclear Weapons in Europe . 2005 (PDF file; 4.91 MB)
- Otfried Nassauer: “Just a question of power of disposal? The New NATO Strategy, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Nuclear Participation ” . 2000
- Otfried Nassauer: "Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Treaty and Nuclear Sharing: If Germany finish the nuclear outsourcing?" . 2005
- Otfried Nassauer: “The nuclear NATO. An outline of the problem ” . 2010
- Otfried Nassauer: "NATO and the nuclear" umbrella "- Are there good reasons for nuclear weapons in Germany and Europe?" . 2010
Individual evidence
- ↑ Konstantin von Hammerstein a. a .: The white elephant . In: Der Spiegel , issue 50/2016. December 10, 2016, pp. 54ff.
- ↑ Florian Reichenberger: The »Devil's Spiral« to the Apocalypse - The Bundeswehr leadership under the spell of nuclear war . In: Military History - Journal of Historical Education . No. 4 , 2018, p. 7 .
- ↑ Martin Kaule: Fascination Bunker. Stone evidence of European history . Ch.links, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-86153-761-8 , p. 80 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
- ↑ Sebastian Meinke and Bjorn Lasinski: underground Brandenburg.
- ↑ Permanent Representation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Review of the deterrent and defense system ( memento of November 10, 2016 in the Internet Archive ). 2007, p. 4
- ↑ German Bundestag: The Federal Government's response to the minor question from MPs Dr. Alexander S. Neu, Wolfgang Gehrcke, Christine Buchholz, other MPs and the DIE LINKE parliamentary group. - Printed matter 18/9004 - NATO missile defense shield and NATO nuclear strategy in the vicinity of the Warsaw summit . Printed matter 18/9265. July 25, 2016, p. 2
- ↑ Heinrich Brauss American nuclear weapons in Europe - an important element of the NATO strategy , magazine ZU GLEICH 1/2020, p. 7 ff
- ↑ InstBtl 210, Großengstingen
- ↑ Camp at the location of the rocket artillery battalion or the accompanying battery with the US detachment.
- ↑ The organization for nuclear participation in the army comprised around 8,000 soldiers and was dissolved in 1992.
- ↑ Nuclear weapons from A to Z ( Memento from March 10, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ Otfried Nassauer: US nuclear weapons in Germany and Europe http://www.bits.de/public/stichwort/atomwaffen-d-eu.htm
- ↑ SPIEGEL ONLINE - July 9, 2007 - USA cleared the nuclear arsenal in Ramstein http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/0,1518,493451,00.html
- ↑ Federation of Amercan Sientists
- ↑ Fredy Gsteiger : Europe's defense policy: the nuclear protective shield could fall . SRF . December 30, 2016
- ↑ Burkard Schmitt: European integration and nuclear weapons . International Politics and Society 1/1998
- ↑ Annalena Baerbock / Agnieszka Malczak: Atomic litmus test . August 25, 2010
- ↑ Karl D. Bredthauer: Atomic shield? A sword of Damocles! . Sheets for German and international politics . Edition March 2019.
- ↑ Germany's obligations under international law when dealing with nuclear weapons , Scientific Service of the German Bundestag, May 23, 2017, WD 2 - 3000 - 013/17
- ↑ Tagesschau: Nuclear weapons depot not safe enough? ( Memento from March 25, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) from June 21, 2008
- ↑ tagesschau.de: Report from Berlin. Retrieved May 17, 2020 .
- ↑ FAZ.net / Konrad Schuller May 2, 2020: Two keys to the bomb
- ↑ Peter Carstens, Berlin: According to SPD proposals: Should American nuclear weapons be stored in Poland instead of in Germany? In: FAZ.NET . ISSN 0174-4909 ( faz.net [accessed May 17, 2020]).