Carl von Clausewitz

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Carl von Clausewitz after a painting by Karl Wilhelm Wach (around 1818)

Carl Philipp Gottlieb Clauswitz , later Clausewitz , from 1827 von Clausewitz (born July 1, 1780 in Burg ; †  November 16, 1831 in Breslau ) was a Prussian major general , army reformer, military scientist and ethicist .

Clausewitz became known for his unfinished main work Vom Kriege , which deals with the theory of war . His theories on strategy , tactics and philosophy had a great influence on the development of warfare in all western countries and are still taught at military academies today. They are also used in the area of corporate management and marketing .



Clausewitz was the son of the tax collector Friedrich Gabriel Clauswitz (1740-1802) and his wife Friederike Dorothea Charlotte, née Schmidt (1746-1811). According to his own statements, his family came from an Upper Silesian noble family. Although the father had been dismissed from the army because of non-aristocratic origins and his request for reinstatement had been rejected by Frederick the Great , both Carl and two of his brothers were accepted into a purely noble regiment of the Prussian army . In the meantime Frederick the Great had died, but doubts remained about Clausewitz's noble descent, which made him very uncomfortable. The title of nobility was officially recognized for him and three of his brothers only in 1827; in the meantime Carl was major general and married to a lady-in-waiting from a count's family.

Carl's older brothers were the Prussian Lieutenant General Friedrich Volmar Karl Heinrich von Clausewitz (1771–1854) and Major General Wilhelm Benedikt von Clausewitz (1773–1849).

Up to the age of 12, Clausewitz received only a very limited education at a local Latin school . Thanks to the good relations of the father, who himself had served as an officer in the Seven Years War , the son was able to join the infantry regiment “Prince Ferdinand” as “von Clausewitz” in the early summer of 1792 , where he became an ensign .

First years of service

Wife Marie von Clausewitz (1779–1836) after a lithograph of the time

In 1793 the regiment entered the First Coalition War , where Clausewitz gained his first war experience at the age of 13 in the trenches during the siege of Mainz . This was followed by the long campaign on the Rhine until the Peace of Basel ended the war for Prussia. The regiment was transferred back to its garrison in Neuruppin . From 1796 to 1801 Clausewitz found time there to devote himself to his studies. He read contemporary literature on the French Revolution , warfare and politics , but also attended lectures on logic and ethics .

Thanks to the best letters of recommendation, in October 1801 he belonged to the first class of the General War School in Berlin newly founded by Gerhard von Scharnhorst . Here he was significantly influenced by the thinking of Scharnhorst, who had already understood the connections between politics and warfare . He also became familiar with the writings of Immanuel Kant at school. As a member of the Military Society , a discussion forum for senior Prussian officers, he came into contact with the most pressing issues of the military at the time, and an unpublished manuscript (now known as the Strategy of 1804 ) attests that he was already working on the constitution of military writings at that time thought. In 1804 Clausewitz graduated best in his class and was then employed as an adjutant to Prince August of Prussia . Thus he had access to the court and to higher society, where he also met his future wife Marie von Brühl . The following year, an anonymous article by him appeared in the magazine Neue Bellona , which was directed against the work of the military writer Dietrich Adam Heinrich von Bülow and is considered the first publication by Clausewitz.

Participation in the Napoleonic Wars

In 1806, Clausewitz went into the Fourth Coalition War as staff captain and adjutant . After the Prussian defeat in the Battle of Jena and Auerstedt on October 14, 1806, he surrendered together with the battalion of the wounded August of Prussia , which covered the retreat, only after further fighting and a chase on October 28, 1806 in the Uckersümpfen Prenzlau of the Beaumont division and thus Marshal Murat . He was brought to Berlin and presented together with Prince August Napoleon I , who resided in the palace. In the short and condescending conversation Napoleon maintained that he had always wanted peace and that he did not understand why Prussia had declared war on him; Clausewitz later translated this assertion into a bon mot particularly valued by Lenin : "The conqueror is always peace-loving, he would very much like to move quietly into our state."

Clausewitz spent a year in French captivity in 1807 , first in Nancy , then in Soissons and Paris . Here he analyzed the defeat of the Prussian army in his historical letters on the great war events in October 1806 . After his return, Scharnhorst brought him to his personal staff in 1809. From then on he worked as one of the most important reformers on the reorganization of the army.

In 1810 he was promoted to major and served as Scharnhorst's office manager as well as a teacher for general staff service and tactics. In addition, as a private tutor, he also taught the Prussian princes (including the crown prince and later German Kaiser Wilhelm I ).

Since it was not morally possible in 1812 Clausewitz to support Napoleon in his war against Russia , he left the army and entered Russian services . He left a patriotic memorandum to his friend August Neidhardt von Gneisenau , which was only discovered in the 1930s and published under the title Confession of 1812 . He took part in all major battles and played an important mediating role in the Tauroggen Convention . The Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III. then refused to take the "deserter" back into Prussian service. Clausewitz participated in the Wars of Liberation as chief of staff of a Russian corps until he was allowed to return to Prussia as a colonel in April 1814 .

In 1815 he took part once again as chief of staff of a Prussian corps in the campaign against Napoleon, which culminated in the battle of Waterloo .

Service during the restoration period

In the following three years Clausewitz served as chief of staff at August Neidhardt von Gneisenau in Koblenz . Since all liberal reformers were undesirable during the Restoration , they were transferred to less influential posts. Clausewitz was appointed director of the General War School in Berlin in 1818, but was not given permission to teach there. In September he was promoted to major general. At 38 he was the youngest general in the Prussian army. This post did not satisfy him, but all requests for transfer were rejected, although from 1821 he was at least admitted to the General Staff.

Around 1823/24 another work was created with News about Prussia in its greatest catastrophe , which again dealt with the events of 1806. In general, the post at the war school gave him plenty of time to do his own work. His main work Vom Krieg was written at that time. In 1827 Clausewitz and his brothers were officially ennobled by the Prussian king. This was nothing more than a confirmation of the family nobility, which the family had not yet been able to clearly prove.

Until 1830 he was transferred first to the 1st Artillery - inspection of Wroclaw . But already in July of that year there was the Polish War of Insurrection , and Clausewitz was appointed Chief of Staff of the Prussian Observation Corps under Gneisenau. The Russian troops brought cholera to Poland, which soon spread across Europe. Gneisenau also died of it, and Clausewitz took over command of the Prussian troops. But he too fell ill with cholera, returned to Breslau in the fall of 1831 and died a few days later on November 16, 1831 at the age of 51. It has not been conclusively clarified whether the cause of death was actually cholera.

First he was buried in Breslau. His remains were reburied together with those of his wife in 1971 in the east cemetery of his native Burg.

Between 1832 and 1837 his widow Marie von Clausewitz published the general's writings at his own expense.

Foundations of Clausewitz's theories

Original edition of the book Vom Kriege from 1832


Clausewitz turned against the system makers . In his view, war theory could not be used as a concrete instruction for generals. Instead, he wanted to show general principles that emerged from the study of history and logical thinking. Even when he dealt with typical things, he constantly pointed out that his principles were related to reality. He said that campaigns could only be planned to a very limited extent, since incalculable influences or events, so-called " frictions ", would render any overly detailed advance planning irrelevant after just a few days. According to Clausewitz, military leaders must be able to make decisions under time pressure with incomplete information, since, in his opinion, “three quarters of those things on which action is built in war ” are concealed or falsified by a “ fog of war ”.

Clausewitz's definition of war

From the confession of 1812 it becomes clear that up to this point in time Clausewitz adhered to a more existential interpretation of war. This means that he saw war as the highest form of self-assertion by a people . This was in every way the spirit of the time when the French Revolution and the conflicts that arose from it had led to the formation of conscription armies and guerrillas . Such armaments of the people and people's wars supported the view that war is an existential struggle.

In the following years, however, Clausewitz severely restricted this view and assumed that war served more as an instrument.

"The war is therefore an act of violence in order to force the opponent to do our will ."

- Clausewitz : Vom Kriege, Book I, Chapter 1, Section 2

One of the most provocative theses of the book Vom Kriege was that a war only begins with the defense of the attacked. Without defense there would be no armed fighting, which Clausewitz considered to be the basis of the concept of war. He recommended deterring a potential enemy by building the largest possible army. The deterrent concept of the defense war formulated here was neither new nor unique, but it became a widely proclaimed basis for the arms race before the First World War and during the Cold War .

The axis of end, goal and means

Clausewitz analyzed the conflicts of his time using an axis of purpose, goal and means. According to Clausewitz, every war is an act of violence with the aim of “forcing the enemy to do our will”. The "purpose" of the war, in other words the will to be fulfilled, is determined by politics . The aim of war is thus to render the enemy defenseless in order to achieve the purpose. This goal is pursued by the strategy and can consist of different approaches, for example by eliminating opposing armed forces (destruction of the army in a battle, withdrawal of the supply base, etc.), but also by non-military measures (e.g. loss of the will to fight in the enemy country, e.g. E.g. through propaganda ; political isolation of the enemy's warmongers through support of the foreign opposition). Everything in which the human mind discovers an aid, i.e. all moral and physical forces of a state, serves as a means to achieve the set goal .

The meaning of Clausewitz's best-known quote arises from this end-goal-center axis:

"The war is a mere continuation of politics by other means."

- Clausewitz : Vom Kriege, Book I, Chapter 1, Section 24

Taken by itself, the sentence formally allows the interpretation that the military will continue / replace politics as soon as the war - politically wanted - has started. In this sense it put z. B. the German General Staff in World War I (see below). The “primacy of politics”, which Clausewitz always postulated, especially during the current war, however, means that war is always subordinate to politics and only a tool of politics, but not replacing them.

"Absolute" and "real" war

Clausewitz's statement that all moral and physical forces of a state could be used as a weapon in war suggested the idea of ​​total warfare. Clausewitz himself described the so-called interactions of the escalation , which would lead to a totalization of the warfare:

  1. Whoever ruthlessly makes use of all means at his disposal must gain a preponderance over his opponent, unless he does the same; thereby both increase to the utmost.
  2. As long as you have not defeated your opponent, you run the risk of being defeated yourself.
  3. Since none of the opponents can accurately assess the determination of his enemy, everyone will try to be as determined as possible.

The result of such a development would be the inclusion of all state resources, which Clausewitz calls "absolute war".

It is a logically thought-through model that cannot even occur in reality because it contains unrealistic assumptions:

  1. The conflict between two parties must be carried out in a completely isolated manner, without interference by third parties - but this does not happen. (See the ceteris paribus clause .)
  2. The conflict should only consist of a single decision, namely whether it will be resolved through war or peace - but it is always a process.
  3. Possible consequences and calculations (e.g. the prospect of peace and a time after the war) should not have any influence on the actions of the parties - in reality they should always be assumed.

So he confronted the concept of “absolute war” (an ideal type ) with an empirical model of “real war” (a normal type ), and this must always remain below the possibilities of an “absolute war”.

In the publications of the modern critics Clausewitz, however, he was repeatedly referred to as a pioneer of total war and the catastrophes of the world wars, without his limitations of the "real war" being taken into account. The term total war has nothing to do with Clausewitz's theory, but goes back to Ludendorff 's book of the same name from 1935, in which the latter explicitly contradicted Clausewitz's theory.

Definition of tactics and strategy

For Clausewitz, the basis of any warfare was the ability of the armed forces to fight. Thus the battle was of central importance and for Clausewitz the tactic was "the lesson of the use of the armed forces in battle". The strategy, on the other hand, "is the doctrine of the use of individual battles for the purpose of war."

The historian Hans Delbrück pointed out that Clausewitz already made a distinction between "prostration strategy" and "fatigue strategy" . Clausewitz was not the one-sided preacher of the battle of annihilation , as critics often portrayed him.

Clausewitz's theory of guerrilla warfare also falls within the framework of tactics . In it he regarded this form of warfare as the most suitable for waging a people's war, which still essentially points to an existential conception of war. He had the example of Spain in mind, which between 1808 and 1814 survived such a war against Napoleon's troops. This form of combat, which Clausewitz called the Little War , was nothing completely new, but Clausewitz has the merit of having developed a closed theory of guerrillas. This was still very important for Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil War .

Attack and defense

Clausewitz considered defense to be the superior form of combat, as it used fewer forces. For him, defense does not mean static waiting for an opponent's blow, but flexible maneuvering. According to Clausewitz's theory, someone who is strategically in defense can still be tactically offensive. An example of such a defensive attack strategy are some of the campaigns of General Robert E. Lee during the American Civil War, 1861-1865.

According to Clausewitz, the defender should remain on the defensive until the attacker's strengths weakened and the defender would have become overweight. At this “ culmination point of victory” the defender can go on the offensive to end the war victoriously. The standard examples of such an approach were Napoleon's Russian campaign in 1812 (which culminated with the capture of Moscow ) and the German Wehrmacht's campaign against the USSR , which culminated in late summer 1942. It is still wrong to assume that the culmination point always corresponds to the greatest gain in terrain. In the case of the war against the Soviet Union in 1941–1945 , some historians see it as being reached after the Smolensk Kessel Battle . The pure gain in terrain was only secondary for Clausewitz.



In the military professional world, Clausewitz's work initially received little attention. It was not until the chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, that the book Vom Kriege gained broad recognition. Moltke reduced Clausewitz's theories to their strategic calculation by saying that politics only determined the beginning of the war. During the war itself, it had to submit to the military. This view became a tradition in the General Staff already after Bismarck's fall in 1890 and then until the First World War , so that politics had little influence in the final phase of the July crisis in 1914 , especially on August 1, 1914 , when the local war escalated into World War I was so crucial. The First World War itself was therefore increasingly determined by military considerations of the General Staff.

In the German Reichswehr , under Chief of Staff Beck , the primacy of politics was remembered , and when Adolf Hitler rose not only to political but also to military head of state in 1934, political goals apparently once again represented the guidelines for military goals. Politics ”here meant Hitler's personal goals, he distanced himself far from their understanding by Clausewitz. Herein, and not in a statesmanlike understanding of politics, lay Hitler's rift with his 1923 fellow putschist Erich Ludendorff , who had stated in 1936, a year before his death: “All of Clausewitz's theories must be thrown overboard. That is why politics has to serve warfare. ”Both points of view corresponded as little as possible to Clausewitz. Perhaps that is why the “real” war was able to approach the “absolute” war as closely as it did in the years from 1939 to 1945.

In Great Britain, the influence of Clausewitz on German strategy was only suspected during the First World War, while a reception in France had already started a few years earlier . In the USA , Clausewitz's effects were only recognized shortly before the Second World War .

Political theory

In the 1850s, after the failed revolution of 1848 , Friedrich Engels occupied himself with Clausewitz's theories in order to enrich the historical-materialist revolutionary approaches with a practical military component. Engels and Marx took over from him, among other things, the views on attack and defense as well as on the partisan war . In their extensive commentaries on the Italian War (1859) and the American Civil War (1861–1865), they demonstrated how closely they were based on the Prussians in matters of political and strategic views. The abundance of Clausewitz quotes that can be found in her letters speaks for a thorough study.

Vladimir Lenin, on the other hand, prepared an excerpt from the work On War during his Swiss exile in order to prepare for the Russian Revolution . The main focus of Lenin's interest was the relationship between war and politics, attack and defense, and morality. As the most important section, he himself described the part in which Clausewitz explicitly referred to the subordination of war to politics. Under the Stalin regime, however, the effect Clausewitz had on the development of Marxism-Leninism was denied.

Political Science and Military History

Due to the unconditional subordination of military operations to political objectives and a preference for rapid maneuver warfare, Clausewitzen's paradigms dominate the school of thought of strategic studies in English-language conflict research (international security) , a branch of international relations . There these are mainly defended and further developed by Colin S. Gray , Beatrice Heuser and Peter Paret , while Michael Howard , John Keegan and Martin van Creveld in particular question their validity in the age of nuclear weapons and increasingly unconventional warfare .

Supporters of Clausewitz usually concede the incompleteness of his theses. This includes Colin S. Gray a lack of appreciation of the effects of political causes and circumstances of war on war planning and the battle, a neglect of ethical considerations in warfare and the untapped potential of these paradigms for naval strategy . The British naval strategist Julian Corbett also found that Clausewitz was "unaware of the full meaning of his brilliant theory [of absolute and real war]". However , Gray rejects Michael Howard's criticism of Clausewitz in his History of Warfare as demonizing.

Despite the controversy, Clausewitz's main work Vom Kriege has become one of the most widely distributed books on earth, the content of which is still taught in many military schools today.

In Germany, the Clausewitz Society endeavors to benefit from Carl von Clausewitz's ideas for the present and to preserve his legacy.

Business and Management

Clausewitz was also dealt with in non-military areas. His theories are also part of the business administration curriculum at Harvard University and various other management schools . The Boston Consulting Group also published a book on this subject.


The Clausewitz memorial in his home town of Burg is dedicated to the memory of Clausewitz . It was set up in the house where he was born at Schulstrasse 12. The building had fallen into ruin before it was restored in 1997. The memorial opened on October 11, 2000. In addition to the museum's memory of Clausewitz, lectures and discussions on historical topics take place here on a regular basis.

The Carl von Clausewitz Circle of Friends in Burg, which was founded in January 2001, three months after the inauguration of the Clausewitz memorial site, plays a key role in maintaining the memorial. There is also a private Clausewitz-Burg research association that has published Burger Clausewitz yearbooks since 2015 (not to be confused with the Clausewitz Society yearbooks that have been published since 2005 ).

Clausewitz grave at the Ostfriedhof Burg

Another place of remembrance is the grave of Carl and Marie von Clausewitz in the Ostfriedhof in Burg. On the occasion of the anniversary of Carl von Clausewitz's death on November 16, 1831, a wreath-laying ceremony takes place here every November. Soldiers from the Burger Clausewitz barracks as well as representatives of the Clausewitz Society, the city of Burg and various associations take part in the ceremony.

The following are named after Clausewitz:

  • the Clausewitz Society as well as the awards "Medal of Honor General von Clausewitz" and "Certificate of Honor General von Clausewitz" awarded by it
  • the International Clausewitz Center (ICZ) at the command academy of the Bundeswehr and the “Clausewitz Talks” organized by the ICZ, a series of around 100 lecture events to date
  • the Clausewitz barracks in Burg
  • the Clausewitz barracks in Hamburg
  • the Clausewitz barracks in Nienburg / Weser
  • the secondary school "Carl von Clausewitz" in Burg
  • the Hotel Carl von Clausewitz in Burg
  • the "Carl von Clausewitz Prize" of the city of Burg - has been awarded annually since 2006 on the anniversary of Clausewitz's death on November 16 to people who have made special contributions to maintaining the Clausewitz tradition

Clausewitz is shown in various portraits and busts . One of the busts stands in the National War College of the US Armed Forces in Washington, another in the command academy of the German Armed Forces in Hamburg, one bust stands as a memorial in the area of ​​the Clausewitz barracks in Burg. In the back yard of the Clausewitz memorial there is another memorial, a memorial stone with a portrait as an embedded bronze relief. Clausewitz fans have the opportunity to purchase Clausewitz souvenirs , from T-shirts to coffee mugs, beer mats and cell phone cases to mousepads with a Clausewitz portrait.


  • Comments on the pure and applied strategy of Herr von Bülow or criticism of the views contained therein. anonymous article in Neue Bellona magazine . 1805.
  • Strategy. 1804-1809. This manuscript was only discovered in the 1930s and was published in: Eberhard Kessel (ed.): Carl von Clausewitz - Strategy from 1804, with additions from 1808 and 1809. Hamburg 1937.
  • Historical letters about the great events of the war in October 1806. 1807/08. reprinted in excerpts in: Gerhard Förster (Ed.): Carl von Clausewitz - Selected military writings. Berlin 1981, pp. 46-75.
  • Confession from 1812. 1812, printed in: Gerhard Förster (ed.): Carl von Clausewitz. Selected military writings. Berlin 1981, pp. 140-215.
  • News about Prussia in its greatest catastrophe. 1823/24. reprinted in excerpts in: Gerhard Förster (Ed.): Carl von Clausewitz. Selected military writings. Berlin 1981, pp. 76-124.
  • From the war. Left work by General Carl von Clausewitz, Vol. 1–3, by Ferdinand Dümmler, Berlin 1832–1834 (edited by Marie von Clausewitz ), here online .
  • The 1796 campaign in Italy. Left work by General Carl von Clausewitz, Vol. 4, by Ferdinand Dümmler, Berlin 1833 (edited by Marie von Clausewitz).
  • The 1799 campaigns in Italy and Switzerland. Left work by General Carl von Clausewitz, Vol. 5–6, by Ferdinand Dümmler, Berlin 1833–1834 (edited by Marie von Clausewitz). Digitized
  • The 1812 campaign in Russia, the 1813 to armistice campaign, and the 1814 campaign in France. Left work by General Carl von Clausewitz, vol. 7, at Ferdinand Dümmler, Berlin 1835 (edited by Marie von Clausewitz). Digitized
  • The campaign from 1813 to the armistice. Digitized
  • The campaign of 1815 in France. Left work by General Carl von Clausewitz, vol. 8, at Ferdinand Dümmler, Berlin 1835 (edited by Marie von Clausewitz). Digitized
  • Strategic lighting of several campaigns by Gustav Adolph , Turenne , Luxemburg and other historical materials on strategy. Left work by General Carl von Clausewitz, Vol. 9, at Ferdinand Dümmler, Berlin 1837 (edited by Marie von Clausewitz). Digitized
  • Strategic lighting of several campaigns by Sobiesky , Münich , Friedrich the Great and Duke Carl Wilhelm Ferdinand of Braunschweig and other historical materials on strategy. Left work by General Carl von Clausewitz, vol. 10, by Ferdinand Dümmler, Berlin 1837 (edited by Marie von Clausewitz). Digitized
  • Strategy from the year 1804, with additions from 1808 and 1809. [Report by the 24-year-old pupil von Scharnhorst], edited by E. Kessel. Hamburg, Hanseatic. Publishing company, 1937.
  • Selected letters. to Marie von Clausewitz and to Gneisenau, Verlag der Nation, Berlin 1953.
  • Werner Hahlweg : writings, essays, studies, letters. Documents from the Clausewitz, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau bequests as well as from public and private collections. (= German historical sources of the 19th and 20th centuries, Volume 45). With a foreword by Karl Dietrich Erdmann and ed. from the Bavarian Academy of Sciences . Volume 1, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1966.
  • Werner Hahlweg (Ed.): About the war. Left work by General Carl von Clausewitz. Complete edition in the original text. 3 parts in one volume. With again expanded historical-critical appreciation of Werner Hahlweg. 19th edition (anniversary edition), Dümmler, Bonn 1991, ISBN 3-427-82019-X .
  • Werner Hahlweg: Scattered little writings. Establishment of the Military History Research Office for the 200th birthday of Major General Carl von Clausewitz. (= Bibliotheca rerum militarium, 45). Compiled, edited and introduced by Werner Hahlweg, Biblio-Verlag, Osnabrück 1979, ISBN 3-7648-1091-2 .



Web links

Commons : Carl von Clausewitz  - Album with pictures, videos and audio files
Wikisource: Carl von Clausewitz  - Sources and full texts

Individual evidence

  1. by royal prussia. Confirmation of nobility on January 30, 1827. Clausewitz himself called himself von Clausewitz earlier and was accepted into the army as such in 1792.
  2. ^ Kurt von Priesdorff: Soldatisches Führertum. Volume 4, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt Hamburg, undated [Hamburg], undated [1937], DNB 367632799 , p. 284, no. 1326.
  3. Birgit Aschmann: Prussia's fame and Germany's honor. Munich 2013, p. 196 f.
  4. ^ Friedrich Doepner: The family of the war philosopher Carl von Clausewitz. In: The Herald. Quarterly magazine for heraldry, genealogy and allied sciences. 12: 54-68 (1987).
  5. ^ W. von Schramm: Clausewitz. Esslingen 1977, pp. 114-120. From exhaustion, about 100 of the 240 remaining men got stuck in the swamps without being able to free themselves.
  6. ↑ About the war. 18th edition, p. 215, quoted from W. von Schramm: Clausewitz. Esslingen 1977, pp. 123-124.
  7. ^ W. von Schramm: Clausewitz. Esslingen 1977, (pp. 35–36) doubts this and assumes heart failure, because death occurred very quickly - within nine hours - and Clausewitz had previously been in quarantine without falling ill. According to a contemporary testimony of doctors, "the rapid extinction" was due to a "state of his nerves shaken by deep soul pain".
  8. Carl von Clausewitz
  9. ^ Carl von Clausewitz: From the war. P. 23.
  10. ^ Carl von Clausewitz: From the war. P. 1.
  11. Clauswitz: Vom Kriege II, 1.
  12. Erich Ludendorff: Der Totale Krieg , 1936, p. 10.
  13. ^ Colin S. Gray : Modern Strategy. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999, p. 100 ff.
  14. ^ Julian S. Corbett: Principles of Maritime Strategy. Dover, Mineola NY, reprint 2004 [1911].
  15. ^ Colin S. Gray: Modern Strategy. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999, p. 111.
  16. ^ The "Burger Clausewitz memorial site"
  17. Carl von Clausewitz Memorial
  18. Carl von Clausewitz friends
  19. Burger Clausewitz yearbooks
  20. Goto gallery See the picture series Grab Burg in the middle of the top row.
  21. Friedhof, text on photography, accessed on September 20, 2019.
  22. ^ The International Clausewitz Center (ICZ) at the Bundeswehr Leadership Academy
  23. ^ Secondary school II "Carl von Clausewitz"
  24. Hotel Carl von Clausewitz
  25. Carl von Clausewitz
  26. Clausewitz Portraits (English)
  27. Sculpture (English)
  28. Goto gallery See the picture series Clausewitz barracks top right.
  29. ^ Photograph of the Clausewitz memorial in the courtyard of the Clausewitz memorial site
  30. The Clausewitz Souvenir Shop
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on December 24, 2006 .