Prussian army reform

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The Prussian army reform describes the reorganization of the Prussian army in the years 1807 to 1814. As in the other areas of the Prussian reforms , parts of the revolutionary and Napoleonic structures of politically and militarily successful France were adopted. In the army reform reformers and conservative forces clashed more directly than in any other reform project.

prehistory

After the defeat by Napoléon Bonaparte in the Fourth Coalition War and the peace of Tilsit in 1807 with its harsh conditions, extensive reforms began in Prussia. Part of them was an army reform.

Even before 1806 there had been criticism of the outdated Prussian military among progressive officers. After the Prussians had failed against Napoleon's troops and the country faced collapse, the suffering was great enough to implement the reforms.

The reform program

Military Reorganization Commission, Königsberg 1807

The installation of Gerhard von Scharnhorst as head of the war department (War Ministry) and the general staff as well as chairman of the military reorganization commission in July 1807 can be seen as the actual beginning of the Prussian army reform .

In this role he tried to reform the Prussian military together with like-minded officers such as August Graf Neidhardt von Gneisenau , Hermann von Boyen and Carl von Clausewitz in order to make it more effective again. In the long run this should make a victory over Napoleon possible. The principle was to combine the successful French “People's War”, led by volunteer and patriotically enthusiastic soldiers, with the military tradition of Prussia, in contrast to the old army of compulsory national children and mercenaries.

Body system

In addition to increasing quality, the reformers tried above all to circumvent the restrictions on army size imposed by the Peace of Tilsit to 42,000 men (previously around 200,000). To do this, Scharnhorst used the body system . This procedure, introduced on July 31, 1807, provided every company with surplus personnel who were trained as reserve troops. During the basic training only some of these soldiers belonged to the regular troops and were counted towards the army size. After a short time, these personnel were replaced by new reservists and released into civilian life. The reservists continued to practice as civilians. These exercises were carried out in public to strengthen cohesion between the population and the military. In addition, the new provisions of the disciplinary law without flogging were applied particularly consistently with the reservists in order to motivate the armed citizens. However, the body system never led to a broad armament of the people and also fell short of the expectations of the reformers. Including the Krümpersoldaten, Prussia had only 65,000 soldiers at the beginning of the Wars of Liberation in 1813 .

Reconstruction of the officer corps

In addition, it was about the processing of the defeat suffered by a self-cleaning of the officer corps . The behavior of all commanders down to the battalion level was examined by the so-called Immediate Investigation Commission . The commission met on December 6, 1807 and worked until 1812. At lower levels, individual officers were judged by regimental tribunals . Numerous dishonorable and honorable dismissals and demotions resulted from the judgments of these authorities . However, as early as 1808, the reinstatement of officers was facilitated by certificates of good conduct from the king. This procedure made it possible for the first time within the officer corps to assess and criticize superiors.

In addition, the reforms changed the training and promotion of officers. First of all, the principle of seniority was abolished in the generals . Promotion was no longer solely dependent on seniority and aristocratic origin, but also on personal performance. An even higher priority was given to personal qualifications in the promotion of staff officers with a decree of November 30, 1808. When ensigns were recruited, professional and character suitability became recruitment criteria on August 6, 1808, which had to be proven in an exam. Excerpt from the regulations of August 6, 1808 (violation of the noble privilege):

"From now on, only knowledge and education are to be granted an entitlement to officer positions in times of peace, and excellent bravery and overview in times of war. All individuals from across the nation who possess this quality can therefore claim the highest positions of honor in the military. All previously held preference of the class ceases completely with the military and everyone has the same duties and rights. "

In principle, the higher officer ranks were also opened to commoners for the first time.

War schools were newly established in 1810 , in which officers of all branches of service were trained together. The election of a part of the officers by the officer corps itself, as proposed by some of the reformers, was never introduced. This promised a greater homogeneity of the officer corps and greater opportunities for talented officer candidates.

Establishment of the War Ministry

The most important structural change was the establishment of the War Ministry , in which, from December 25, 1808, the military administration, which had previously been distributed among various authorities, was brought together. The war minister should be both the military commander directly under the king and the head of the military administration. However, the position was not filled until 1814. In addition to the War Ministry, a modern General Staff was set up on the basis of the Quartermaster General's Staff , which fulfilled several tasks: It was supposed to improve the interaction between the army and serve as a training facility for senior officers in the event of war. The general staff officers should see themselves as military scientists.

Military Justice Reform

An important step on the way to becoming a soldier who fought voluntarily and thus enthusiastically was the revision of the articles of war, that is, of military jurisdiction. From July 19, 1809, military law only applied during service and no longer, for example, for soldiers on leave. The flogging was abolished and replaced by imprisonment. This expressed the new image of a soldier: Only those who had personal honor and freedom could be effectively punished with imprisonment.

Technical innovations

Technical innovations rounded off the reforms. The tirailleur and hunter troops were given greater importance, the army was organized in brigades and the light brigade was introduced as a new formation, the artillery made more mobile, the major maneuver concept geared to real combat conditions, a gendarmerie created, the pioneering forces combined in the engineering corps, the medical services and modernized the conscription system.

Popular armament

With the beginning of the wars of liberation , a four-stage system was intended to mobilize a large part of the population for a “people's war”, initially against Napoleon, but also for later wars. At the beginning of 1813 general conscription was proclaimed and in 1814 it was also enshrined in law, through which all Prussians were to be involved in national defense. Conscription can be described as a central project of the reformers. They had called for it from 1808, but failed when they first tried to introduce it in 1810 because of conservative resistance. In addition, from February 3, 1813, there were voluntary hunter detachments. Citizens could do their military service in these formations if they wished. The citizens fighting in hunter tactics should form the core of a future new army based on enthusiasm, freedom and partnership. This approach was dropped as early as 1814 when the voluntary hunter detachments were incorporated into the line troops. On March 17, 1813, the Landwehr joined them. All of the country's capable of military service were to be incorporated into it. The Landwehr should only receive minimal training that was not very formal and focused on fighting skills . The Landwehr should only be used in the event that an enemy should attack the Prussian state territory directly. During the Wars of Liberation, land defense units were also used for operations outside Prussia. The Landwehr was the most popular of the newly established troops and comprised around 120,000 men. From 1815 onwards, criticism of the Restoration began to be particularly severe, as the civilians with military training were feared of the potential for revolt. The last contingent was the Landsturm on April 21, 1813 . This formation, which consisted almost exclusively of old men unfit for war, was supposed to act as an “institutionalized popular uprising” with partisan tactics against an enemy who might have penetrated the country. The Landsturm was only formally set up and was never used.

The restoration

The army reform, like the other reforms, had from the beginning been subject to sharp criticism from the old, conservative, aristocratic military and political elite, who deeply distrusted the inclusion of the bourgeoisie in leadership positions and the common population on the basis of conscription. Because of this resistance, many elements of the reforms were not implemented. Thus, in fact, commoners could only occupy higher officer posts in the engineering and artillery units, and at least lower ranks in the infantry . Functional posts in the cavalry were completely denied them. The election of officers was never implemented either. In addition, the nobility quickly achieved that the king overturned numerous judgments of the Immediate Investigation Commission by personal decrees.

Army reformer

literature

  • Max Lehmann : Scharnhorst and the Prussian Army Reform (= War History Library, Volume 8). With an introduction by Johannes Ullrich , Junker and Dünnhaupt, Berlin 1935.
  • Karl-Heinz Lutz, Martin Rink , Marcus von Salisch (eds.): Reform, reorganization, transformation. On the change in the German armed forces from the Prussian army reforms to the transformation of the Bundeswehr . Commissioned by the Military History Research Office , Oldenbourg, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-59714-1 .
  • Eckardt Opitz (ed.): Gerhard von Scharnhorst. On the nature and work of the Prussian army reform. A conference volume (= series of publications of the Scientific Forum for International Security eV (WIFIS) . Vol. 12). Ed. Temmen, Bremen 1998, ISBN 3-86108-719-7 .
  • William O. Shanahan : Prussian Military Reforms, 1786-1813 (= Studies in History, Economics and Public Law . 520). Columbia University Press, New York 1945.
  • Heinz Stübig : Army and Nation. The educational-political motives of the Prussian army reform 1807–1814 (= European university publications / 11). Peter Lang Verlag, Frankfurt a. M. 1971.
  • Dierk Walter : Prussian army reforms 1807-1870. Military innovations and the myth of the “Roon Reform” (= War in History, Volume 16). Schöningh Verlag, Paderborn 2003, ISBN 3-506-74484-4 .
  • Arnold Wirtgen : Handguns and Prussian Army Reform 1807 to 1813 (= Defense Technology and Scientific Arms, Volume 3). Herford Verlag, Bonn 1988, ISBN 3-8132-0292-5 .

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