ABM contract

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The ABM Treaty ( Russian Договор об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны / Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic missile defense systems , ПРО / PRO , English Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ), on 28 May 1972 concluded with unlimited validity, was an arms control treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of missile defense systems ( anti-ballistic missiles , ABM ). It was one of the two parts of the SALT-I agreement. On June 13, 2002 , the USA unilaterally withdrew from the contract after having submitted a declaration of intent 6 months earlier, as contractually stipulated, in which they announced their withdrawal to the contracting party - the legal successor of the Soviet Union, Russia .

Content of the contract

Overview

  • The following are prohibited:
    • the establishment of a nationwide ABM network (Art. 1)
    • the development, testing and installation of further sea, air or space-based and land-based ABM systems (Art. 5.1)
    • the installation of early warning radars (Art. 6, b)
    • the transfer of ABM technology to other countries (Art. 9)
  • Allowed are:
    • initially two ABM positions - later reduced to one - with 100 launchers
    • the associated radar systems
    • the position may either be used to protect an ICBM facility or the capital (within a radius of 150 kilometers) (Art. 3)
    • the modernization and replacement of the systems used (Art. 7)
  • Contract modalities
    • The contract is of unlimited duration, but can be terminated with a six-month notice period if one of the contracting parties sees its interests fundamentally changed (Art. 15.1)
    • The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) is responsible for handling the contract (Art. 13.2)

The limitation to two ABM positions with 100 launchers each, which must also be 1,300 kilometers apart, and further restrictions in the development and installation of ABM radar devices prevented the establishment of a nationwide effective missile defense.

prehistory

Missile defense systems

1950s and early 1960s, the US developed several missile systems, the intention of approaching the end of intercontinental ballistic missiles could shoot. With these technological developments, the US military linked the prognosis that a missile protection shield would soon be able to effectively protect the entire country from the worst consequences of a nuclear war . As part of this defense strategy, the North American Air Defense Command (now known as NORAD ) was established together with Canada .

In the early 1960s, the first breakthrough in weapons technology was achieved with the establishment of the Nike-Zeus system , which was to form the basis for a later ABM system. In addition , a second mainstay was created with the development of the Sprint short-range missile , which was intended to protect the missile defense bases themselves. Both developments should form the basis for the first nationwide ABM project Sentinel .

With Sentinel , missile defense technology was also discussed in broad science and the general public for the first time. On the one hand, the technological obstacles were discussed, which were still enormous despite high investments in research and development, and on the other hand, the security implications of such a system. It was assumed that the Soviet Union could only forestall a functioning ABM system with one attack. From a political perspective, Sentinel was also explosive because the project meant stationing nuclear weapons in close proximity to population centers.

Significance of the ABM contract

The ABM Treaty was the first treaty that did not limit offensive weapons but defensive weapons, thereby increasing the mutual vulnerability of the great powers. The underlying idea was that no country will carry out a nuclear first strike if it can not adequately protect itself against the inevitable counterstrike, the second strike . The fear of their own destruction should rule out a first strike with nuclear missiles. This notion of increasing security through a balance of defensive weapons was expanded into the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the “balance of terror”. The two superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union, established an already existing strategic balance with this treaty.

While these debates were going on, Moscow had not only begun developing missile defense ( A-35 ) for its part, it was also introducing multiple warheads ( MIRV ) technology that made it possible to carry multiple individually steerable warheads on an ICBM. The US already had this technology, the Soviet Union was still testing it. Since a defense missile would be necessary for every warhead, reliable defense against ballistic missiles was not possible for the foreseeable future anyway. But at least an impending ABM arms race was contained for a few years, which it was also assumed that, due to the incomparably more complex technology, would have become much more costly than the previous armament with offensive weapons.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , the USA terminated the ABM Treaty in order to be able to develop new missile defense systems: “Today, our security environment is profoundly different… Russia is not an enemy, but in fact is increasingly allied with us on a growing number of critically important issues ... Today, the United States and Russia face new threats to their security. Principal among these threats are weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means wielded by terrorists and rogue states. ”President Putin responded with a declaration that the security of the Russian Federation was not affected.

See also

Web links

Wikisource: Contract text  - sources and full texts (English)

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Wichard Woyke (ed.): Handwortbuch Internationale Politik . Bonn 2000, ISBN 3-89331-489-X , p. 349
  2. ^ Announcement of Withdrawal from the Abm Treaty . - White House press release, December 13, 2001
  3. ↑ Response to Russian Statement on US ABM Treaty Withdrawal . - U.S. news release, December 13, 2001