Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

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Brezhnev and US President Carter signing the SALT II treaty in 1979

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ( SALT ; German talks on the limitation of strategic armaments ) took place from 1969 to 1979 and led to the signing of the SALT contracts ( contracts for the limitation of nuclear arms ). These treaties were signed between the USA and the USSR . The most important result of the negotiations is the ABM contract signed in May 1972 .

SALT I

Negotiations on the SALT I treaties began on November 17, 1969 in Helsinki . The other meetings took place alternately in Vienna and Helsinki. On May 26, 1972 signed US President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow as a result of the negotiations the ABM Treaty and an interim agreement, which essentially consists of a ban on building new land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missile s (SLBM).

The fronts were following initial discussions as hardened after more than 130 meetings succeeded in May 1972, the breakthrough in the negotiations on the limitation of anti-missile defense systems ( anti-ballistic missiles , ABM ). The ABM treaty forms one of the two parts of SALT I. After that, the two states agreed on two ABM bases each with a maximum of 100 anti-missile missiles to protect the capital ( Moscow , Washington ) and one base each for ICBM. In an additional protocol from 1974, only one ABM position was agreed.

The second part of SALT I was a provisional agreement, a five-year interim agreement. Both sides undertook to freeze their strategic offensive radio-controlled weapons, both land-based and sea-based, to the level they had reached in mid-1972. The number of ICBMs was 1,054 for the USA and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had now overtaken the United States in the arms race. To this end, the US has meanwhile equipped its radio- controlled weapons with multiple warheads ( MIRV) , which could be directed at various targets, while the Soviet Union did not yet have this technology. The agreement allowed 1,000 US ICBMs, some with 10 warheads, and 1,408 Soviet ICBMs, some with 3 warheads, to be stationed. So the Soviet Union had to dismantle a greater number of ICBMs than the USA.

Likewise, with the interim agreement, the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) was frozen to 44 US nuclear submarines with a maximum of 710 SLBM and 62 Soviet nuclear submarines with 950 SLBM. In fact, when SALT I was signed, there were 41 US and 656 SLBMs and 25 Soviet nuclear submarines and 740 SLBMs. This meant that new missile submarines were only allowed to be put into service if older ICBMs or SLBMs were decommissioned at the same time. Modernization and replacement of ICBM and SLBM remained permitted.

That fit in with the planning of the American Navy, which from 1978, after the expiry of the interim agreement, wanted to replace its old Poseidon missiles with Trident missiles stationed on new types of submarines .

Both sides reserved freedom of choice in the development of dirigible multiple warheads (MIRV). Strategic bombers were not included in SALT I, nor were their construction restricted. For them, the USA was far superior to the Soviet Union. The aircraft and aircraft carriers stationed in and around Europe and the Pacific were also not counted. Neither did the treaty include France and Britain's nuclear weapons, which had a shorter range. SALT I also did not require the abandonment of a single program for the development of offensive weapons. SALT I meant that the Soviet Union largely gave up its lead in nuclear weapons and the US was given the opportunity to catch up by freezing it for five years.

rating

The arms competition between the USA and the Soviet Union in terms of strategic weapons could only be slowed slightly by SALT I. Because only numerical upper limits were agreed for launchers, but not for warheads, their number quadrupled in the period from 1970 to 1983, both on the American and Soviet sides. Still, it was a political breakthrough in US-Soviet relations.

SALT II

The SALT II agreements were signed in Vienna on June 18, 1979, after negotiations started in Geneva in 1972 . The signatories were Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter . SALT II was a reaction to SALT I, as SALT I only limited long-range missiles and not medium-range missiles. The validity of the contract was initially limited to December 31, 1985. A ratification of the treaty by the US Senate, which was necessary in itself and desired by President Carter , never took place. The negative attitude of the chamber was a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. However, on January 4, 1980, the US government agreed to continue to observe the treaty, in the expectation that the Soviet Union would also comply with the SALT II treaty. On May 31, 1982, US President Ronald Reagan declared the readiness of the USA not to undermine the SALT II regulations as long as the Soviet Union did the same. The treaty was largely adhered to by the Soviet Union.

As of November 28, 1986, the United States no longer adhered to the terms of the treaty. In 1991 START I replaced SALT II.

Content of the contract

The contracting parties committed themselves to mutually equal numerical limits on their strategic nuclear weapons systems. These include the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with ranges of over 5,500 kilometers, the submarine ballistic missiles (SLBM), the heavy bomber aircraft of the B-52 and B-1 type of the USA and Tu-95 and M-4 of the Soviet Union and theirs Successor models , as well as any type of bomber armed with cruise missiles (ALCM, Air-Launched Cruise Missiles) or with ballistic air -to-surface missiles (ASBM, Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles) with a range of more than 600 kilometers, as well as not Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) fitted on cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers.

The agreed limits:

  • 6 months after the start of the contract: a maximum of 2,400 strategic nuclear carrier systems
  • From January 1, 1982: a maximum of 2,250 strategic nuclear carrier systems, of which a maximum of 1,320 carrier systems (ICBM and SLBM) with multiple warheads , and no more than 820 ICBM with multiple warheads (MIRV).

The contracting parties were free to decide on the composition of their deterrent potential within the framework of these limitations.

The treaty also banned the construction of additional ICBM launchers and the conversion of land-based ballistic missiles (not ICBMs) into ICBM launchers.

Warheads of the type W78 as multiple warheads ( MIRV ) Mk12A for an LGM-30G Minuteman III, photo 1985

Furthermore, a limit on the number of warheads was agreed. The number of multiple warheads (MIRV) per missile was frozen so that ICBMs could be equipped with a maximum of 10 warheads each, submarine-based missiles (SLBMs) ​​with a maximum of 14 and ballistic air-to-surface missiles (ASBMs) with a maximum of 10 warheads.

The US B-52 and B-1 bombers were allowed to carry no more than 28 cruise missiles and the Soviet Union's Tu-95 and M-4 no more than 20 cruise missiles.

In addition, the SALT II contract foresaw the development of the following systems:

  • ballistic missiles on ships (excluding submarines) with a range of more than 600 kilometers
  • stationary or mobile launchers for ballistic missiles or cruise missiles on or in the seabed of oceans or inland waters
  • Systems for stationing weapons of mass destruction in orbit, see Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)
  • mobile launchers for heavy ICBMs, e.g. R-36 (SS-9 Scarp) and RS-20 ( SS-18 Satan ) of the Soviet Union and for heavy submarine-based ballistic missiles (SLBM)
  • heavy ballistic air-to-surface missiles
  • airborne cruise missiles with multiple warheads (MIRV) with a range of more than 600 kilometers.

See also

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Henry A. Kissinger: Memoirs 1973-1974 , Volume 2, Munich 1982, ISBN 3-570-00710-3 , pp. 304-312
  2. ↑ Wichard Woyke (Ed.), Handwortbuch Internationale Politik , Bonn 2000, ISBN 3-89331-489-X , p. 349
  3. ↑ See Krüger, Dieter. In the abyss? The Age of Alliances: North Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact 1947 to 1991. Fulda 2013. p. 151.
  4. ↑ US to Break SALT II Limits Friday. In: The Washington Post . November 27, 1986, accessed on June 18, 2019 (Note: date calculated; November 28 was the Friday following publication on November 27, 1986)).
  5. ↑ STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT II). In: Nuclear Threat Initiative . October 26, 2011, accessed June 18, 2019 .
  6. ↑ See Krüger, Dieter. In the abyss? The Age of Alliances: North Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact 1947 to 1991. Fulda 2013. p. 151.