Guadeloupe Conference
The Conference of Guadeloupe was from 4 January to 7 January 1979, at the invitation of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing in Guadeloupe instead. The conference was declared as an informal meeting after the G7 summit in Bonn in 1978 and in preparation for the G7 summit in Tokyo in July 1979 to discuss questions of international security and the security of energy supplies. In addition to the rapid ratification of the SALT II agreement , the sale of British Harrier fighter jets to the People's Republic of China and the deployment of missiles in Europe, there was the “crisis in Iran“One of the most important security policy issues discussed at the conference. A decision should be made as to whether the West would continue to support Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi or whether to seek talks with his political opponent Ayatollah Khomeini . In addition to the host Valéry Giscard d'Estaing from France, President Jimmy Carter from the USA, Prime Minister James Callaghan from Great Britain and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt from Germany took part in the conference. No official decisions were taken at the conference. The French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was instructed to establish contact with Ayatollah Khomeini and to discuss the question of a possible change of government.
The situation in Iran
All through 1978 there had been demonstrations and strikes in Iran. On November 5, 1978, Tehran was on fire. Administrative buildings of foreign companies, cinemas, shops selling alcohol, buses, cars and, above all, banks were attacked by opposition groups. Almost 400 bank branches were set on fire that day. The government of national reconciliation led by Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami , which only began its work on August 27, 1978, had completely failed with its policy of concessions to the opposition. On November 6, 1978 Prime Minister Sharif-Emami resigned and was replaced by a military government led by General Gholam Reza Azhari .
Khomeini in exile in France
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was deported from long-term Iraqi exile on October 6, 1978 to Neauphle-le-Château near Paris, had become the leading figure of the opposition movement . In Paris, Khomeini formed an alliance between sections of the clergy, the left-wing intellectual opposition, and the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist groups whose common goal was the overthrow of the Shah.
French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was convinced that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi received little support from the Iranian people. The French ambassador had sent reports to Paris that the economy, paralyzed by strikes, demonstrations and sometimes violent clashes between the security forces and the opposition, would not recover until the Shah left Iran and Khomeini returned to Iran from his exile in Paris. Until Khomeini's arrival in Paris on October 6, 1978, the French government was not really informed about who Khomeini was, what role he played in the ongoing strikes and demonstrations in Iran, and what his political intentions were. The French President had warned Khomeini on his entry and made it clear that his stay in France was linked to the obligation not to incite acts of violence in Iran. However, Khomeini had disregarded this unequivocal ban from the start: According to information available to the French President, Khomeini had sent tapes to Iran calling for the Shah to be assassinated.
Thereupon Giscard d'Estaing had instructed his interior minister Christian Bonnet to deport Khomeini to Algeria . When asked by the French government, Mohammad Reza Shah said: “The expulsion of Khomeini is a purely French matter; Iran has nothing to do with this decision ”, whereupon Giscard d'Estaing stopped the deportation, because he did not want to bear the political risk associated with it alone. In order to get an exact picture of the situation in Iran, the French President sent the special envoy Michel Poniatowski to Tehran. Poniatowski met Mohammad Reza Shah on December 27, 1978 and later reported in Paris that the monarch was finished, sick, helpless, alone and determined not to allow his army to shoot Iranians under any circumstances.
President Giscard d'Estaing blamed the USA for the tense situation in Iran. The United States had dominated relations between Iran and the Western world in the last few decades and, in the opinion of the French President, had taken on special responsibility for the political stability of Iran. According to the information available to the French President, however, both the American ambassador and almost all other institutions of the American government that were active in Iran seemed to distance themselves from the Shah and to strive for a new "political solution" without having so far would have succeeded in "finding the right man" for it.
In Iraq, Iran's direct neighbor, which is home to a large number of Shiites, there was concern about the political development in the neighboring country. The head of state of Iraq, Saddam Hussein , who was actually known as a political opponent of the Shah, had appealed to the French government that it would be beneficial for his purposes to keep the Shah in Iran.
"Let's think the unthinkable"
In complete contrast to the earlier assessment of the situation in Iran, the US Ambassador to Iran, William H. Sullivan , sent a telegram to Washington on November 9, 1978 entitled Thinking the Unthinkable . In his assessment of the situation, Sullivan started from two groups that would influence the outcome of the revolutionary situation: the clergy and the military. The clergy and the military were both anti-communist. If the military and clergy can be encouraged to work together, Khomeini could return to Iran and play a role similar to Mahatma Gandhi in India. Khomeini would propose a bourgeois opposition politician as prime minister who could also be accepted by the military. Moderate political forces would then organize the election of a constituent assembly and draft a new constitution for Iran that would strengthen the non-communist, non-fundamental Islamist and pro-Western forces. On the basis of these considerations, employees of the US embassy had established contacts with leaders of the opposition, including Ayatollah Mohammad Beheschti , Khomeini's representative in Tehran. The first coordination talks between the American embassy and the opposition on how to proceed had been promising from the point of view of the US Ambassador Sullivan.
The Foreign Office's Iran Task Force was of the opinion that the situation in Iran was still unclear and that there could be riots against foreigners, including against the 13,000 German nationals who are currently in Iran. On December 1, 1978, the task force therefore asked the Luftwaffe to make preparatory considerations as to how the many Germans could be flown out if the situation suddenly deteriorated.
One day before the conference, on January 3, 1979, President Carter convened the National Security Council . All those present believed that the Shah was "irreparably damaged". Before leaving for Guadeloupe, Zbigniew Brzeziński , President Carter's security advisor , stressed in front of the world press that the US would fully support Mohammad Reza Shah. He left open what that would mean in detail. In Guadeloupe, they first wanted to coordinate with France, Great Britain and Germany on how the crisis in Iran could be ended:
“The main danger that the West has to grapple with is the increasing power of“ Islamic fundamentalism ”, from the main opponent of the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini, to the unrest in Turkey and similar currents in the Arabian Peninsula and Pakistan rich. This opponent is unpredictable, has completely different dogmatics than communism and is difficult to grasp because of its fanatical basic component. "
Before the conference began, President Jimmy Carter had sent a telegram to Mohammad Reza Shah that the US would support the Bakhtiar government and that Mohammad Reza Shah would be welcome in the US if he wanted to leave Iran for an indefinite period. The necessary security measures would be provided by the US government. President Jimmy Carter asked the Shah to work to ensure that the Iranian military leaders remain in the country if he leaves the country.
On January 4, 1979, the day the conference participants arrived in Guadeloupe, President Carter dispatched General Robert E. Huyser to Tehran to contact the leading military in the Iranian armed forces. Huyser's main task was twofold:
- The generals of the Iranian armed forces should be prevented from leaving the country if Mohammad Reza Shah went abroad.
- The generals should support the Prime Minister-designate Shapur Bakhtiar to the best of their ability.
On January 4, 1979, the German ambassador to Iran, Gerhard Ritzel , assessed the prospects of the formation of a civilian government under Prime Minister-designate Shapur Bakhtiar as follows:
"There is a chance that the relatively moderate Dr. Bakhtiar, although he has since been disavowed by the radical representatives of the opposition and expelled from the National Front , will succeed in forming a civilian coalition government that would initially be tolerated by the radical opposition. This presupposes that the Shah is ready to make major concessions, including practical abdication [...]. "
The conference
At the official start of the conference, on January 5, 1979, President Carter introduced the world political situation with a general tour d'horizon, in particular about the latest developments in relation to the People's Republic of China. In the afternoon of the same day, the focus of the discussion was on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II and SALT III).
First assessments of the situation in Iran
The following day the discussion about SALT II and SALT III from the previous day was continued. This was followed by the topic of “Iran”, whereby a common assessment of the situation in Iran had to be agreed. Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reported on the engagement of the German economy in Iran. He feared losses from the events in Iran, which the Federal Republic could ultimately cope with. President Carter, who had initially advised the Shah to establish a military government, was of the opinion after the failure of this government led by General Gholam Reza Azhari that the Shah “could not be kept”. President Carter was no longer concerned with how to save the Shah, but rather how things should go on in Iran after the Shah. President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing wrote of the discussion in Guadeloupe in his book Le Pouvoir et La Vie :
“President Jimmy Carter surprisingly told us that the United States had decided to no longer support the Shah's regime. Without the support of the United States, the regime is lost. I still had the report from Michel Poniatowski, who had informed me that the Shah was fully capable of acting, but full of sadness, tired and disaffected. He had assumed that the US would continue to support him. But within a week, the wind had turned. Jimmy Carter explained the further development to us. The military will seize power and restore order in the country. The military leaders are all pro-Western, most of them were trained in the United States. "
With his decision not to support the Shah any further, President Carter had presented the heads of state gathered in Guadeloupe with a fait accompli. President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had come to the conference with a completely different assessment than President Carter:
“The Shah saw the situation quite clearly when he spoke to Poniatowski. He said: 'It is about a powerful religious renewal movement that has emerged as the ultimate battle of strength in the long struggle between the Shiite clergy and the Pahlavi dynasty. That's how things work in Iran. '"
According to this assessment, with the appropriate political support for the Shah, it would have been possible to stabilize the situation in Iran and to carry on with Mohammad Reza Shah's political reform program, the White Revolution . In light of what President Carter said, President Giscard d'Estaing believed that the military and religious leaders were the key forces in Iran and that the two should be brought together.
British Prime Minister Callaghan reported that, according to his information, the Shah would leave Iran in a few days. He assumed that under a new government Iran would take a pro-Arab stance on foreign policy issues. It is therefore necessary to establish more contacts with the Gulf States.
After the heads of state had exchanged views on the situation in Iran, President Carter wanted the following questions clarified:
- Should the US make direct contact with Khomeini?
- Would it be beneficial to support a military coup?
- How long should the US support a transitional government under Prime Minister-designate Shapur Bakhtiar ?
The American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance suggested that a delegation led by former Ambassador Theodor L. Eliot should travel to Paris to negotiate directly with Khomeini. Eliot spoke Persian and was supposed to convince Khomeini in direct conversation that Prime Minister-designate Bakhtiar had to be given more time before Khomeini could return to Iran. Apparently no agreement could be reached among the conference participants. On January 10, 1979, President Carter called President Giscard d'Estaing in Paris asking if France could mediate between the United States and Khomeini. Giscard d'Estaing agreed to establish contact with Khomeini. Ambassador Eliot's mission and thus direct contact between representatives of the US government and Khomeini has been canceled.
The question of the oil supply
On the issue of oil supplies, it was agreed that the events in Iran would lead to an increase in oil prices. They wanted to contact the Saudi leadership on this issue. Israel and South Africa in particular were affected by Iran’s production failures. According to the German Ambassador Ritzel, Iranian oil production had declined from 4.5 million barrels per day to between 200,000 and 250,000. South Africa got 90% of its oil from Iran, with Israel 60% of the imported oil came from Iran. South Africa had stored supplies from which the country could be supplied for two years. Israel was in a less comfortable situation. However, it would be possible to replace the Iranian oil failures with oil from Mexico or Great Britain.
President Carter believed that recent events in Iran had strengthened Egypt's position. There are contacts between Egypt and Saudi Arabia about possible military protection from Egypt in the event of an attack on Saudi Arabia. Carter contradicted a fear of the British Prime Minister Callaghan, who saw a threat to Saudi Arabia from strong Palestinian forces.
As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, the US would be able to fly 100,000 soldiers to Saudi Arabia in a short period of time. For this purpose, rapid reaction troops are provided, consisting of a tank division, a light infantry division and a marine infantry division up to the strength of a corps.
After it became clear that the global oil supply was no longer endangered by the decline in production in Iran, the remaining time of the conference was devoted to the situation in Turkey, Southeast Asia and Africa.
decisions
At the end of the conference it was decided not to take any formal decisions. A press conference called to conclude the talks emphasized the harmony that had prevailed between the statesmen. "It will be some time before the aim, meaning and significance of this meeting become recognizable," wrote Robert Held, who was posted to Guadeloupe, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on January 8, 1979.
After the meeting it was clear to everyone involved in the conference that a political and not a military solution to the crisis in Iran was sought. The only thing that was completely unclear was which solution to strive for. At a meeting with the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal on January 19, 1979, Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was of the opinion:
"The talks in Guadeloupe had shown that none of the participants had a clear concept for Iran."
Mir Ali Asghar Montazam summarizes the results of the conference in his book The Life and the Times of Ayatollah Khomeini as follows:
"The Guadeloupe conference ... was a welcome opportunity for Carter to come to an agreement with the three main European politicians to drop the Shah ... all the allies needed was Iranian oil and stability in the region ..." When General Robert Huyser arrived in Tehran on a special mission without further notice, he represented the entire Western Alliance, not just the United States. The commanders of the Iranian armed forces only agreed to remain in Iran, despite the exile of the Shah, when Huyser showed them the minutes of the Guadeloupe conference. "
The events after the conference
After President Carter's return from Guadeloupe, the German press reported for the first time about an "American change of heart":
“The US policy towards Iran has changed decisively: Washington is now advocating the rapid formation of a civilian government in Tehran and an at least temporary resignation of the Shah. According to the American plan, the Shah should leave his country in order to enable the restoration of regular conditions. ... This ended the months of support for the Shah at any price, which was increasingly difficult to maintain in view of the increasing unrest in Iran. "
Bakhtiar becomes prime minister
Ambassador Sullivan visited Mohammad Reza Shah on January 4, 1979 at the beginning of the Guadeloupe Conference to inform him that the US government was planning to establish direct contact with Khomeini. Mohammad Reza Shah made no objection to Ambassador Sullivan. Sullivan called Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Guadeloupe and told him that the Shah had no objection to direct contact between the US government and Khomeini. President Carter nevertheless preferred to establish contact with Khomeini through the French President, which in turn angered Ambassador Sullivan so that President Carter considered removing Sullivan from Tehran. Ambassador Sullivan had already established his own contacts with the Khomeini representatives in Tehran and wanted to establish contact with Khomeini himself and not through the French government. Sullivan saw himself as the architect of the new relationship between the US and Iran and did not want to leave this merit to French emissaries. It was only through the intervention of Secretary of State Vance that the dispute between Ambassador Sullivan and President Carter was settled. Sullivan stayed in Tehran.
The further course of events now seemed predetermined. Ambassador Sullivan continued to campaign in Washington for direct contact between representatives of the Carter administration and Khomeini, and on January 14, 1979, President Carter instructed Warren Zimmermann, a political advisor to the US Embassy in Paris, to contact Ibrahim Yazdi , an advisor to Khomeini to record. Yazdi explained the content of the conversations in an interview given in 2008:
“My impression was that the US representatives were not really informed about the situation in Iran. In my opinion, you believed that the Shah could stay in power and that any change or reform should be done under his leadership. ... Americans were concerned about the power vacuum that would arise if the Shah left the country, and they wondered who would fill that vacuum. We then agreed that the Shah should leave the country and Shapur Bakhtiar should become Prime Minister. The army would take part in the revolution and find its new role in the course of the revolution. Brzezinski believed that after the Shah's departure the only way to prevent communist forces from coming to power was to get the military and clergy to work together. His thought was that the clergy were anti-communist and that they were also able to mobilize the masses. The army, with its 400,000 men, was also anti-communist and trained to put down insurrections. A coalition of army and clergy could therefore neutralize the danger of a communist seizure of power… The Americans believed that after the victory of the revolution, the army could claim its share of political power if it kept its strength in tact and adhered to the revolution involved."
In Tehran, Mohammad Reza Shah was preparing to leave for the United States. President Carter initially assumed that the Shah would fly directly from Tehran to the USA. General Huyser met daily with the commanders of the Iranian armed forces, who were under the command of General Abbas Gharabaghi , to work out plans for possible military intervention after the Shah's departure, if the situation so required. Otherwise one wanted to support Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar to the best of his ability.
The position of the Soviet Union
On January 11, 1979, the Soviet ambassador to the USA, Anatoly Fjodorowitsch Dobrynin , invited the German ambassador to the USA, Berndt von Staden , to lunch at his residence. Dobrynin asked the German ambassador about the results of the Guadeloupe conference. Von Staden informed him that the Federal Chancellor would support SALT II. As for Iran, Dobrynin reminded the German ambassador of the Soviet-Iranian friendship treaty of 1921 , which gave the Soviet Union the right to armed intervention in the event that third powers intervene. Dobrynin made it clear that Iran is a neighbor of the Soviet Union. For this reason, the Soviet Union has a special interest in developments in Iran. With reference to the Soviet-Iranian friendship treaty, Dobrynin made it clear that military intervention by the West in Iran would have serious consequences, including military intervention by the Soviet Union.
Khomeini returns
Khomeini had declared on January 11, 1979 that Mohammad Reza Shah's stay abroad would not change the situation as long as he did not abdicate as the Shah of Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979. The Shah-appointed Prime Minister Bakhtiar was confirmed in a special session of Parliament and Senate. According to the constitution, Mohammad Reza Shah had set up a Privy Council to represent him during his absence. However, the Shah did not fly to the USA as originally planned, but to Egypt.
On January 19, 1979, Khomeini had called from Paris for a large demonstration in Tehran. The demonstrators demanded that "God, the Koran and Khomeini" should replace the previous state philosophy of "God, King and the Land". The army did not intervene, the demonstrators shouted "The army is our brother" and distributed flowers to the soldiers posted in the streets of Tehran. Everything was still going as discussed in Guadeloupe. Only Khomeini could not be persuaded to give Prime Minister Bakhtiar the time he wanted to restore peace and order in the country and get the economy going again.
On February 1, 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran. Khomeini's representatives had agreed with the military that they would take responsibility for Khomeini's security. The police and the military held back, and Khomeini's triumphant return could proceed without further incident. The American embassy had meanwhile started evacuating over 10,000 American military advisors. Sensitive files and secret weapon systems were brought to the United States. On February 2, 1979, Eric von Marbod, a representative of the US Department of Defense, and representatives of the Iranian Ministry of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding on the "restructuring" and partial termination of further military cooperation. On February 3, 1979, Eric von Marbod and General Huyser left Iran. The Iranian military was now on its own.
Prime Minister Bakhtiar is overthrown
The first deviation from the scenario discussed in Guadeloupe occurred on February 5, 1979, when Khomeini declared the government of Prime Minister Bakhtiar to be illegal and proclaimed Mehdi Bāzargān as prime minister of a transitional government without consulting the military. With this step, Khomeini had taken on the role that Mohammad Reza Shah had previously, namely to propose a suitable person to the parliament for the office of prime minister. Khomeini went one step further than the constitution provided for. He appointed the prime minister directly. Parliament was no longer asked. Since Shapur Bakhtiar did not consider resigning or resigning his office without further ado, Iran had two prime ministers for a short time. On February 9, 1979, further development got completely out of control. Shootings broke out between pro-Khomeini and pro-Shah forces in the barracks of the Imperial Guard. A state of emergency was declared in Tehran on February 10, 1979. Prime Minister Bakhtiar called the commanders in chief of the Iranian army to discuss how to proceed. When the generals saw that Bakhtiar had removed the picture of the Shah from his office and replaced it with a picture of Mossadegh , they considered this to be treason. At that crucial moment, Bakhtiar had lost the generals' support. On February 11, 1979, the military leadership declared their neutrality in the ongoing political conflict and called their soldiers back to the barracks.
With this decision by the Iranian military, the fate of Prime Minister Bakhtiar was sealed. Armed revolutionaries attacked the US consulate in Tabriz . In Tehran, Prime Minister Bakhtiar had to flee his official residence by helicopter and stay in hiding until he was able to secretly leave Iran in March 1979 and seek asylum in France. This resigned the last Prime Minister of Iran proposed by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and confirmed by the Iranian Parliament and Senate. The Guadeloupe scenario of a peaceful transformation of the political system in Iran had outlived itself. The Shah's White Revolution was over. The Khomeini Islamic Revolution had entered a new phase.
literature
In addition to the individual references , the following literature provides further information:
- Robert E. Huyser: Mission to Iran. New York 1986.
- German: Putsch, Herr General! : How Washington wanted to save Iran. Rowohlt, Reinbek near Hamburg 1986, ISBN 3-498-02870-7 .
- William H. Sullivan: Mission to Iran. Norton, New York 1981, ISBN 0-393-01516-5 .
Individual evidence
- ↑ JR: Carter will set out the guidelines for his security policy. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. January 5, 1979, p. 1.
- ↑ Robert Held: The statesmen in the harmony quartet on the lawn. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. January 8, 1979, p. 2.
- ↑ JR: American change of heart: leaving the Shah would be useful. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. January 11, 2009, p. 1.
- ^ The Guadeloupe conference, the collapse of the Shah and Khomeini's seizure of power. June 28, 2008.
- ↑ Abbas Milani: Eminent Persians. Syracuse University Press, 2008, p. 107.
- ( ltS ) Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah . University of California Press, Berkeley / Los Angeles 2009, ISBN 978-0-520-25328-5 . (Preview on google books)
- ( AAP ) Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski (Eds.): Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979 . Volume I: January to June 30, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-59191-0 , (preview on Google books)
- ↑ a b p. 591.
- ↑ p. 224.
- ↑ p. 43.
- ↑ p. 23.
- ↑ p. 12 ff.
- ↑ p. 24.
- ↑ a b p. 23.
- ↑ p. 84.
- ↑ p. 25.
- ↑ p. 25.
- ↑ p. 83.
- ↑ p. 58.
- ( AFD ) Garry Sick: All Fall Down . Random House, New York 1985, ISBN 0-394-54488-9 . (Preview on Google Books)
- ( JC ) Mike Evans: Jimmy Carter. The Liberal Left and World Chaos. A Carter / Obama Plan That Will Not Work . Crossstaff Pub, Phoenix 2009, ISBN 978-0-935199-33-8 .
