Federalist Item No. 7
The Federalist article no. 7 is the third of Alexander Hamilton , one of the founding fathers of the United States , written essay in a series of 85 essays 1787-88 in the newspapers "Independent Journal" , "New-York Packet" and " Daily Advertiser ” and published collectively under the name Federalist Papers .
Article No. 7 appeared on November 17, 1787 under the title "Continuation of the topic: About the danger of war between the individual states" ( The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States ) in the Independent Journal under the pseudonym " Publius ".
Historical background
The 1777 adopted Confederation ( Articles of Confederation ) of the United States had proved a few years after its ratification in 1781 as insufficient to ensure an efficient government of the State Union. In 1787 the Philadelphia Convention was convened to revise the articles, but as a result drafted a new constitution . In September 1787 the draft was passed on to constitutional conventions in the individual states for ratification. From September 1787 the opponents of the federation ("anti-federalists") agitated in newspaper articles against the ratification of the draft constitution. On the Republican side, these were countered by the essays by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay .
content
In addition to the incentives that "throughout history have soaked all the nations of this earth in blood", Hamilton describes those that are particularly effective when they are not restricted by a federal constitution.
First and foremost, he cites territorial disputes that could affect the largely unpopulated area of the United States, whose ownership is still unclear. This is particularly true of the former British crown lands in the western territories. The Congress found an amicable solution for this by transferring a large part of the former British crown lands into the common property of the Union. If these areas were to be distributed among the individual states after the fall of the Union, the ensuing territorial disputes would probably not be settled peacefully. As an example, Hamilton cites the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the area of Wyoming, which was decided by the Federal Court according to the provisions of the articles of the Federation. On the question of Vermont's independence, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Maryland opposed the state of New York, whose influence the smaller states wanted to counteract.
Hamilton cites economic competition as a further motive for possible conflicts: Independent individual states would each pursue their own economic policy and try to secure exclusive rights for their citizens. This would lead to differences, preferential and exclusion conditions, which in turn would give rise to dissatisfaction. Justified actions by independent states that pursued their own interests would then be assessed as impairments. The unbridled entrepreneurship prevailing in the states would not accept trade restrictions by means of which individual states wanted to secure exclusive privileges. There would be assaults, reprisals and wars. Individual states would use their economic superiority to make other states dependent on themselves. For example, New York must collect import duties that are payable by the neighboring states of Connecticut and New Jersey, which consume goods from New York. The two neighboring states would not tolerate these oppressive conditions for long. Likewise, the citizens of New York would not be prepared to waive taxes in neighboring states that they would have to pay themselves.
Another source of conflict would be the Union's public debt, borrowing and subsequent repayment. An amicable agreement on burden sharing is hardly possible because there is already disagreement about it. Individual states do not see the need for national creditworthiness and are probably not prepared to pay for it. In other states, where the share of the public in the public debt burden is disproportionately high, the citizens would demand a fairer and more effective clause. Delaying them due to actual differences of opinion and put forward reasons would lead to complaints from the citizens concerned, and foreign powers would press for their legitimate claims to be satisfied. Thus the peace would be threatened by external interference as well as internal disputes.
Even if an amicable settlement were found, it would hit some states harder than others. They would of course look for ways to reduce their burdens. Other states would be against adapting the rules, which would increase their burdens. Their refusal would be a welcome excuse for the complaining States to withhold their contributions, which could lead to fierce discussion and argument. Even if the regulation practically complied with the principle of equality, there would be reasons why individual states could default on their payments: a real lack of means of payment, poor financial management, accidental disorder in the government and a general reluctance of the people to accept money as outdated to spend considered purposes instead of immediate needs. Arrears of any kind would lead to complaints, allegations and arguments. Nothing disturbs the peace of nations more than their obligation to contribute to general goals that do not produce equal and immediate benefits.
Another possible source of hostility is laws that affect private contracts and therefore violate the rights of those states whose citizens are affected. It can be assumed that the legislation of individual states would not be more permissive or equal without additional controls. As an example, Hamilton cites Rhode Island's abuse of trade law, which resulted in retaliation in Connecticut. It is foreseeable that gross violations of moral obligations and social justice could be punished by force of arms.
In earlier articles the possibility of irreconcilable alliances between different states or individual confederations and other foreign powers had already been pointed out. From this it can be concluded that America would be drawn into the labyrinth of European politics and wars if it were not united at all or only in a weak offensive or defensive alliance. Destructive clashes between its parts would make America the prey of the intrigues and machinations of the powers that be, the enemy of all: Divide et impera .
Remarks
- ↑ Rhode Island had passed paper money and debt deferral laws that affected creditors fought against. Connecticut subsequently prohibited the judicial collection of debts from its citizens by Rhode Island creditors. After this measure was unsuccessful, Connecticut sued the Continental Congress in 1787 against this violation of the articles of confederation (after Adams (2004), pp. 37-38).
literature
Angela and Willi Paul Adams: Hamilton / Madison / Jay: The Federalist Articles: Political Theory and Constitutional Commentary by the American Founding Fathers. With the English and German text of the US Constitution . Schöningh, Paderborn 2004, ISBN 978-3-8252-1788-4 , pp. 31-38 .
Web links
Individual evidence
- ↑ Federalist Article No. 7 in the Library of Congress , accessed March 15, 2017