Friendship and alliance treaty between Mongolia and Tibet

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The contract text in Tibetan script .

The friendship and alliance treaty between Mongolia and Tibet , also known as the Treaty of Urga , was signed on February 2, 1913 in Urga (now Ulaanbaatar ). However, there are doubts about the competence of the Tibetan signatories to conclude such a contract, and therefore also about whether it is a valid agreement.

Occasionally even the existence of the agreement was questioned, but the text of the agreement in Mongolian was published by the Mongolian Academy of Sciences in 1982, and an original copy in Tibetan language and script emerged from Mongolian archives in 2007.

Signature and validity

After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, both Tibet and Outer Mongolia declared their independence under Lamaist heads of state. The Republic of China did not recognize the secessions . In the agreement, the two Chinese provinces declared their mutual recognition as states and support. On the Mongolian side, the contract was signed by Foreign Minister Da Lama Ravdan and General Manlaibaatar Damdinsüren. The Tibetan signatories were Agvan Dorzhiev, a Buriate , Chijamts and Gendun-Galsan, a Tibetan.

The doubts about the validity of the contract are based, among other things, on the fact that the 13th Dalai Lama denied having authorized Dorzhiev for the relevant negotiations. More seriously, it appears that neither the Buddhist clergy nor the Tibetan government ever ratified the treaty. In addition, the Russian government insisted that the Russian citizen Dorzhiev was in no way able to act as the diplomatic representative of the Dalai Lama.

Most of the other powers avoided recognizing the independence of the two countries in favor of China's sovereignty over the areas concerned. The interests of the western powers (especially Russia and Great Britain ) in the region were guaranteed by agreements with the Qing dynasty, the existence of which the Republic of China had promised. The recognition of the independence of Tibet and Outer Mongolia would have jeopardized the maintenance of these agreements. In addition, Russia and Great Britain feared that their independence could bring new states under the influence of the other power. This prospect was seen as more problematic than nominal control by weak China.

aftermath

The news of the treaty made British Shimla Convention negotiators fearful that Russia might use it to expand its influence in Tibet. In the end, China did not sign the Shimla Convention, but entered into the comparable Kjachta treaty with Russia and Outer Mongolia on May 25, 1915 . This treaty guaranteed the autonomy of Outer Mongolia in internal affairs as well as Russian privileges in Outer Mongolia, albeit still under the formal suzerainty of China.

See also

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  1. Udo B. Barkmann, Geschichte der Mongolei , Bonn 1999, pp. 119–122, 380f
  2. Smith, Warren: Tibetan Nation , p. 186: “ The validity is often questioned, mainly on grounds of the authority of Agvan Dorzhiev to negotiate on behalf of Tibet… the fact that Dorjief was a Russian citizen while ethnically Tibetan somewhat compromises his role ; the treaty had some advantages to Russia in that it could be interpreted as extending Russia's protectorate over Mongolia to encompass Tibet. "
  3. Udo B. Barkmann, Geschichte der Mongolei , Bonn 1999, p. 380f
  4. Phurbu Thinley: Tibet - Mongolia Treaty of 1913, a proof of Tibet's independence: Interview with Prof. Elliot Sperling ( English ) Phayul.com. November 12, 2008. Retrieved November 13, 2008.
  5. a b Bell, Charles: Tibet Past and Present , 1924, pp. 150f, 228f, 304f.
  6. UK Foreign Office Archive: FO 371/1608
  7. The Chinese government initiated the treaty but refused to sign it. For details see Goldstein, Melvyn C .: A History of Modern Tibet , p. 75
  8. ^ Mongolia - Modern Mongolia, 1911-84 , Country Studies US
  9. ^ BL Putnam Weale: The Fight For The Republic In China

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