Battle of Venta del Pozo

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Battle of Venta del Pozo
date October 23, 1812
place Villodrigo in Spain
output draw
Parties to the conflict

United Kingdom 1801United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland United Kingdom

France 1804First empire France

Commander

United Kingdom 1801United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Georg von Bock

France 1804First empire Jean B. Curto

Troop strength
Cavalry 1,300, infantry 1,344 and artillery 44 4,511 cavalry
losses

165 dead, wounded and 65 prisoners

200–300 wounded and missing

In the battle of Venta del Pozo (Wirtshaus zum Brunnen) on October 23, 1812, a British-German force under Major-General Eberhardt Georg Otto Bock von Wülfingen fought against French cavalry under Major-Generals Curto and Pierre Boyer with the result of a tactical one Undecided.

The battlefield as it looks today. View of the plain with your back to the village of Villodrigo. Both armies came from northeast to southwest (in the picture from left to right). You can still see the dry stream bed that crossed the valley (today only a narrow ditch). On the right picture the old stone bridge, possibly of Roman origin, over the Arlazón river near Villodrigo, probably similar to the one that spanned the Arroyo del Valle Bach in 1812.
The battle of Villodrigo also called by Venta del Pozo (Edited) .jpg

background

The British-Portuguese army of the Duke of Wellington ended the unsuccessful siege of Burgos on October 21, 1812 and withdrew to the southwest in the direction of Torquemada. Wellington's army of 35,000 men was pursued by the Army of Portugal under Major-General Joseph Souham , which had been reinforced to 53,000 men.

Armies

After the Battle of Salamanca on July 22, 1812 and until December of that year, General Major von Bock temporarily led the entire British cavalry on the peninsula for a second time after General Le Marchand was killed in the battle and his deputy, General Stapleton Cotton, was badly wounded has been. As commander in chief of the cavalry, he led the rearguard during the retreat from Burgos. This consisted u. a. from Colonel Colin Halketts King’s German Legion (KGL) brigade (1st and 2nd light battalion KGL with a total of 1,000 men), Maj-Gen George Anson's light cavalry brigade (11th, 12th and 16th light dragoons with 6 squadrons and 800 Man), Maj-Gen George Bocks heavy cavalry brigade of the King's German Legion with the 1st and 2nd Dragoons regiments and Norman Ramsay's RHA (Royal Horse Artillery) troops (44 men) with five 6-pounder cannons and a 5½ "howitzer. Von Bock's total strength was 2,344 men.

Curto's light cavalry division consisted of the 3rd Hussars, and the 13th (4 squadrons, 686 men) and 14th Chasseurs (3 squadrons with 377 men) Boyer's Dragoons Division was composed of the 6th, 11th, 15th and 25th. Dragoons (a total of 8 squadrons with 1,431 men). The brigade of Colonel Jean-Alexis Betéille consisted of the 1st Lancer Regiment of the Grand Duchy of Berg (2 squadrons with 226 men), the 15th Chasseurs Rgt (3 squadrons with 534 men) and the 1st Imperial Gendarmes of Spain Legion (6 Squadrons with 501 men) The Merlin brigade counted with the 1st Hussar Regiment (3 squadrons with 413 men) and the 31st Chasseurs Regiment (3 squadrons with 343 men) The French counted a total of 4,511 men.

Skirmish

On October 23, von Bock set up his cavalry on a stone bridge on which the main road crossed a deep, dry river bed. He was planning to ambush the French advance guard here. Anson's cavalry would retreat across the bridge, and the French would presumably follow. After some French squadrons crossed the bridge, Ramsay's cannons were supposed to open fire and Bock's dragoons attacked them.

The plan failed when Anson's brigade turned in the wrong direction after leaving the bridge. The light dragoons stopped exactly where they blocked both Ramsay's cannons and Bock's planned attack zone. The French cavalry of the legionnaires of the gendarmes of Spain with the lancers von Berg and those of the Jäger des 15. Chasseurs stormed over the bridge and a static mass of riders quickly developed (1,261 French against 800 Englishmen and 500 Germans), one upon another with sabers hit. Carl von Hodenberg recalled: "... the mission was carried out with so much energy that we were immediately mixed up completely - friend and foe could hardly be distinguished .... the ground was littered with French, and we too had extremely high losses. "

Before von Bock's cavalry had prepared the trap, the French Merlins brigade had been given the task of destroying the Marquinez (also Martinez) guerrillas who had been hanging around the mountains and harassing the French troops over the past few days. Discovered and on the run with the French on their heels, the Spaniards sought the protection of the British column and literally rushed down from the hill at full gallop towards the formation of the 16th Dragoons under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pelly of the brigade Ansons, who suddenly - attacked in his right flank - was surprised by the pursuers of the guerrillas, the Hussars and Chasseurs Merlins (756 men).

In the meantime the brigade of the fruit was already there. Betéille with his 11 squadrons (1,261 men) reached the dry stream bed, had crossed it via a detour and the German-English troops also came to the right flank. The British cavalry retreated in considerable disarray back whereupon Béteille now Halkett two infantry battalions in squares were placed undertook. Betéille, Merlin and Boyér carried on the attack, but the KGL infantry held out, inflicting heavy losses on the French. Meanwhile, the Cavalry Curtos waited on the way in front of the narrow stone bridge, observing the development of the situation and did not feel compelled to bring the cavalry into action.

Both cavalry brigades gathered and formed behind the protective shield of the infantry karees, which withstood a total of three attacks by the French cavalry. When it got dark, the British rearguard managed to leave the battlefield without being followed by the French. Later, after more than two hours of marching, the exhausted troops and horses were given a rest - an opportunity on which Colonel Halkett expressed his gratitude to his German light infantrymen Wellington's gratitude for their bravery and the way in which they had stopped the French cavalry (Wellington, who had been watching the action, sent a double portion of rum in recognition) The march then continued to Torquemada, a place that was reached at 2:00 a.m.

At Venta del Pozo the British-German troops succeeded in stopping the French pursuers for the 10 hours needed by Wellington (a day's advance for the retreating army), with high losses but escaping intact. von Bock distinguished himself in an outstanding way through his "control, judgment and courage".

The Allies counted 165 killed and wounded and 65 prisoners. The French lost between 200 (Smith) and 300 (Glover) men.

comment

Venta del Pozo was the example of a disciplined and properly directed battle by combined troops (infantry, cavalry and artillery), which were thereby able to keep a superior number of cavalry at bay. The two German battalions carried the Venta del Pozo award until 1918 in their subsequent assignments in the Hanoverian and Prussian armies.

gallery

Remarks

  1. Chapell - Chest p. 13
  2. Chapell - Chest p. 13
  3. Beamish p. 111ff
  4. Chapell p. 5

literature

  • Beamish, N. Ludlow, History of the King's German Legion Vol. 2 . 1832-37 (reprint: Naval and Military Press 1997, ISBN 0-9522011-0-0 ).
  • Chapell, Mike, The King's German Legion (2) 1812-1816 Osprey 2000, ISBN 1-85532-997-2 .
  • Chapell, Mike, Die Kavallerie der KGL on the Pyrenees Peninsula (The King's German Legion - German translation Jürgen Brust), ISBN 84-9798-166-9 .
  • Glover, Michael, The Peninsular War 1807-1814. Penguin, 1974.
  • Smith, Digby, The Napoleonic Wars Data Book. Greenhill, 1998.