Battle of the Gévora

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of the Gévora
View of Badajoz over the river near Guadiana from a foothill of the San Cristóbal height.
View of Badajoz over the river near Guadiana from a foothill of the San Cristóbal height.
date February 19, 1811
place Badajoz , Spain
output French victory
Parties to the conflict

Spain 1785Spain Spain Portugal
Portugal 1707Portugal 

France 1804First empire France

Commander

Spain 1785Spain Gabriel Mendizabal Pedro Caro
Spain 1785Spain

France 1804First empire Nicolas de Dieu Soult Edouard Mortier
France 1804First empire

Troop strength
12,000,
17 guns 		7,000,
12 guns
losses

1,000 dead or wounded,
4,000 prisoners

400

The Battle of Gévora on February 19, 1811 near Badajoz was a minor skirmish between the French and Spanish forces during the Napoleonic Wars on the Iberian Peninsula .

The outnumbered French army determined the course of the battle and almost completely annihilated the Spanish army in Extremadura after Gabriel Mendizabal Wellesley disregarded instructions to entrench himself on the heights of San Cristóbal and failed in an attempt to bring the troops to safety. The ensuing victory over the weakened Spaniards allowed Marshal Soult to focus on his attack on Badajoz, which the French captured on March 11 and held until the following year.

prehistory

Despite the partial success over Marshal Masséna in Portugal at the Battle of Busaco in September 1810, Wellesley, now Viscount Wellington , was forced by Masséna's maneuvers to retreat behind the lines of Torres Vedras, a series of fortresses that defended the Portuguese capital, Lisbon served. Until October 10, 1810, only the British light infantry and some cavalry patrols remained outside the defense lines, while the Portuguese army, led by Massénas , gathered around Sobral to prepare for the attack on the Torres Vedras lines. After an argument with screechers on October 14th, the French dug themselves in instead of launching a large-scale attack. After a month they withdrew between Santarém and Rio Maior .

Napoléon previously dispatched messengers to Marshal Soult, the commander of the Southern Army, urging him to send assistance to Masséna in Portugal. However, the emperor's order that only a small force could provide support was based on outdated information. But the situation had changed considerably when Soult got the news. Now there were 30,000 Allied soldiers from the English and Spanish and six fortresses between the French army and the Portuguese capital, which made an attack on Lisbon practically impossible. Since Soult was forced to act, he assembled an army of 20,000 men, consisting mainly of the V  Corps , and started an expedition to Extremadura with the aim of conquering the Spanish fortress at Badajoz and thereby some of the allies of Masséna and the lines of Torres Vedras to move to the trigger.

Soult divided his army into two contingents and marched towards Extremadura over the two main passes that lead from Andalusia into the Guadiana Valley. His plan was to reunite both contingents at Almendralejo . Meanwhile, a contingent led by General Marie Victor Latour-Maubourg encountered slight resistance. On January 3, 1811, the contingent was confronted with a 2,500-strong Spanish and Portuguese cavalry near Usagre . However, it was only a matter of the rear guard, which was supposed to secure the retreat of a Spanish infantry division commanded by General Mendizabal over the Guadiana. Latour-Maubourg therefore managed to take up position near Almendralejo and wait for the arrival of the second French contingent.

The second contingent, commanded by Jean-de-Dieu Soult and containing General Honoré Gazan's division of the 5th Army Corps , escorted the French siege equipment and therefore had to take a longer, more practicable route to Extremadura. Bad weather and desertion of the Spanish leaders ensured that the artillery was separated from the escorting infantry. This problematic situation was exacerbated when the contingent was threatened by a total of 5,000 Spanish troops under General Francisco Ballesteros . During the confrontation with Marshal Mortier, Ballesteros withdrew without significant losses, but remained a threat to the rear of the French armed forces. Soult sent Gazan's infantry out to intercept the Spanish unit and protect the belated siege train while he himself advanced with his cavalry towards Almendralejo. As a result, Soult met Latour-Maubourg on January 6, albeit with a fraction of his original contingent and without heavy artillery.

The way to battle

Nicolas Jean-de-Dieu Soult

Soult was unable to lay siege to such a powerful fortress as Badajoz with his reduced force, so he changed his plans. He dispatched the light cavalry under Brigadier General André Briche to take the city of Mérida and left four squadrons of dragoons at Albuera to watch the Badajoz garrison. He himself marched on with the remaining part of his armed forces to build a circumvallation around Olivenza . Wellington had previously recommended to the commander of the Spanish Army in Extremadura, General Pedro Caro de La Romana, either to destroy the fortress of Olivenza or to repair and completely occupy its defenses; In return, La Romana instructed Mendizábal to demolish the fortress . But Mendizábal ignored the order and reinforced the garrison with four infantry battalions . Therefore, on January 11, Soult was faced with a strong but defenseless garrison. The French heavy artillery finally arrived on January 19th. On January 22nd, a badly repaired breach in the wall opened again. The Spanish garrison of more than 4,000 soldiers from Extremadura surrendered on January 23.

Soult was in a difficult situation at this point: although he had a 4,000-strong cavalry, he dispatched two battalions to escort the prisoners from Olivenza back to Seville, which was held by the French. As a result, he had only 5,500 infantry available for his campaign. The siege equipment had also arrived. The absence of Gazan's infantry further weakened his position. Still, Soult decided to besiege Badajoz in the hopes that Wellington would send reinforcements to the Spanish fortress, thereby weakening the Allied forces on the Torres Vedras lines. On January 26th, Soult marched to Badajoz. He sent Latour-Maubourg with six cavalry battalions across the Guadiana to block the northern entrances to the fortress. The first siege of Badajoz began on January 27th . Gazan's division returned to Soult's main force on February 3, adding 6,000 men to the occupying force.

Mendizabal had meanwhile withdrawn to the border with Portugal after sending two battalions to reinforce the garrison in Badajoz. Weakened by the defeat in Olivenza and the continued absence of Ballestero's unit, he asked La Romana for reinforcement. This arrived on January 14th in the form of 1,800 men under Carlos de España. In addition, on January 19, approximately 6,000 men were sent from the Torres Vedras lines to Elvas , where they arrived on January 29. When these units joined the remaining 3,000 men from Mendizabal, a Spanish cavalry division and a brigade of the Portuguese cavalry, the Allies had an army of nearly 15,000 under the command of La Romana to keep Soult at bay. However, La Romana died of an aneurysm on January 23 , and the command of the army fell to Mendizabal.

Before his sudden death, La Romana had met with Wellington and agreed on a plan for the battle. The army was to be entrenched on the heights of San Cristóbal, with the right flank protected by the Fort of San Cristóbal, the front by the Gévora and Guadiana rivers , the left flank by the fortress of Campo Maior and the rear by Elvas. Even though he knew the plan, Mendizabal carelessly ignored it when he arrived on the north bank of the Guadiana on February 5th. Instead, he posted most of his infantry in Badajoz, only a small proportion of foot soldiers and his cavalry he left below San Cristóbal. On February 7th, Mendizabal launched a large-scale sortie against the besieging French units: the Portuguese cavalry, supported by a small group of infantry, launched a feint against the French left wing, while a strong force of 5,000 men attacked the right flank. The Spaniards, under the command of de España, broke through the first French parallel to attack one of General Jean-Baptiste Girard's brigades and were only driven back when Mortier sent several battalions in support of Girard. De España withdrew to Badajoz. He himself had lost 650 men against 400 French losses.

On February 9, Mendizabal withdrew most of his men from Badajoz, leaving behind a 7,000-strong garrison. He stationed the 9,000 infantrymen of the field army on the heights of San Cristóbal, while the 3,000-strong cavalry camped behind them on the plains of the Caya. The Spanish commandant once again ignored Wellington's plan to dig himself into the heights; nor did he send any cavalry as a vanguard to protect his front and oversee the French maneuvers. In the days that followed, Soult largely ignored the Spanish army and instead concentrated on building his siege lines and bombarding Badajoz. Heavy rain also caused the Guadiana and Gévora to overflow their banks, making them impassable. This allowed the French to bombard only the southern end of the Spanish line between February 11 and 18, pushing the Spanish further away from Badajoz and the protection of the fortress of San Cristóbal.

Course of the battle

Map of the battle

On the afternoon of February 18, the downpours had subsided and a low water level made the Gévora passable again. In the evening, Soult dispatched nine infantry battalions, three cavalry squadrons and two artillery batteries under the command of Mortiers to the north bank of the Guadiana via a roller ferry . Together with the six cavalry regiments from Latour-Maubourg, the French now had 4,500 infantry, 2,500 cavalry and 12 cannons to attack the Spanish lines at daybreak on February 19th. Due to the heavy fog that morning, Mendizabal had no inkling of the approaching French until his sentry, only a mile and a half from the front, was driven back by Mortier's infantry, who waited through the Gévora. At the same time, the second hussars sent from Latour-Maubourg to attack the left flank of the Spaniards had managed to climb the heights in the north, also undetected, and so attacked one of Carlos de España's unsuspecting regiments.

Mortier demonstrated his tactical superiority in the formation of his small force: he sent all his cavalry north to attack the left flank of the Spaniards; three battalions were sent south between the fort at San Cristóbal and the Spanish right wing; the remaining six infantry battalions attacked the Spanish front. As the fog cleared, the French light cavalry reached the rise and attacked the Spanish left flank. Meanwhile Latour-Maubourg had three dragoon regiments advanced to attack the combined Spanish and Portuguese cavalry on the plain of Caya. Despite the numerical superiority over the French, the Allies ignored all orders and immediately fled to Elvas and Campo Maior. They escaped largely unscathed as Latour-Maubourg ignored them and instead used his cavalry against the lines of the Spanish infantry.

However, the attack on the Spanish right flank was not immediately decisive for the outcome of the battle. Since the fog had lifted, the Spaniards could see the numerical inferiority of the opposing army and formed. The musket duel between the two sides had hardly begun when the French cavalry appeared; the light cavalry approached from the top of the hill, while Latour-Maubourg's dragoons came up from behind. Was formed in response Mendizabal his forces in two huge supported by artillery squares . Although initially able to withstand the French cavalry, they became easy targets for French infantry and artillery. A Spanish infantryman later said: “Your artillery advanced in a most terrible manner. They formed an oval and later an arbitrary line-up so that the cavalry was able to pierce the opposing ranks and take prisoners. ”Consequently, Briche's light cavalry defeated the two Spanish troop concentrations without much difficulty and the battle was practical completed. Some of the Spanish regiments dispersed, many surrendered, and others united to fight their way to Badajoz or the Portuguese border together.

Effects

The battle was a major setback for the Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese alliance. Wellington had previously warned the Spanish generals that the Extremadura army was the last unit their country possessed, and later wrote that "the defeat of Mendizabal is the greatest calamity that could not have been foreseen, but which happened nonetheless." Army was essentially destroyed; although 2,500 infantry escaped to Badajoz and a slightly smaller number to Portugal, 1,000 Spaniards were killed or wounded, 4,000 were captured and 17 cannons were lost. The French had only minor losses to report. Soult initially reported 30 dead and 140 wounded. These figures were eventually corrected to around 400 casualties, mainly cavalry.

Soult could now continue his siege of Badajoz; although the town's garrison was now about 8,000 strong because of the influx of soldiers from Mendizabal's destroyed army, it finally fell to the French on March 11th. Wellington then sent a large Anglo-Portuguese corps under the command of General William Beresford to retake the important fortified city, so that on April 20th the second siege of Badajoz began. This resulted in an attempt by the French to lift this siege on May 16 in the bloody battle of La Albuera . Here Beresford's strong allied corps was able to maintain the siege, but barely managed to hold back an outnumbered French army, again commanded by Soult. However, when the French Army of Portugal, now under the command of Marshal Auguste Marmont , and the Army of the South came together, the combined French forces of more than 60,000 men forced Wellington to break the siege on June 20th and withdraw its 44,000 men to Elvas. Badajoz remained in French hands until the following year, before the Allies recaptured Badajoz after the third siege on April 6, 1812.

The Napoleonic Wars on the Iberian Peninsula were ended on April 17, 1814 by the victory of the Allies.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Jac Weller: Wellington in the Peninsula. 1962, pp. 145-146
  2. ↑ Michael Glover: The Peninsular War 1807-1814: A Concise Military History . Penguin Classic Military History, 1974, p. 142
  3. ^ A b Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV . 1911, p. 32
  4. ↑ Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV . 1911, pp. 36-37
  5. ↑ Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV . 1911, p. 41
  6. ↑ Oman, Sir Charles: A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV , 1911, pp. 44-46. Charles Esdaile: The Peninsular War , Penguin Books, 2002, p. 337 footnote. David Gates: The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War , Pimlico, 1986, p. 248.
  7. ↑ Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV . 1911, p. 48. William Francis Patrick Napier : History of the War in the Peninsula . 1831, p. 96.
  8. ^ William Francis Patrick Napier : History of the War in the Peninsula . 1831, p. 97.Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV . 1911, pp. 50-51
  9. ^ William Francis Patrick Napier : History of the War in the Peninsula . 1831, pp. 97-98. Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV . 1911, pp. 51-52
  10. ↑ Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV . 1911, p. 53
  11. ^ Charles Esdaile: The Peninsular War, Penguin Books . 2002, p. 337
  12. ↑ Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV . 1911, p. 54
  13. ↑ a b David Gates: The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War . Pimlico, 1986, p. 248. Sir Charles Oman (1911, pp. 54-55), A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV
  14. ^ Jac Weller: Wellington in the Peninsula . 1962, pp. 198-205
  15. ↑ Michael Glover: The Peninsular War 1807-1814: A Concise Military History . Penguin Classic Military History, 1974, p. 335

Coordinates: 38 ° 52 '44.4 "  N , 6 ° 58' 1.2"  W.